NEW SOUTH WALES COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL
CITATION:
DJS v R [2010] NSWCCA 200
This decision has been amended. Please see the end of the judgment for a list of the amendments.
FILE NUMBER(S):
2008/0657
HEARING DATE(S):
14 July 2010
JUDGMENT DATE:
8 September 2010
PARTIES:
DJS (appellant)
The Crown
JUDGMENT OF:
Hodgson JA Kirby J Whealy J
LOWER COURT JURISDICTION:
District Court
LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S):
DC 2008/657
LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER:
Blackmore DCJ
LOWER COURT DATE OF DECISION:
3 October 2008
COUNSEL:
S BUCHEN (appellant)
S DOWLING/ B KAPLAN (Crown)
SOLICITORS:
Legal Aid Commission of NSW (appellant)
Director of Public Prosecutions (Crown)
CATCHWORDS:
CRIMINAL LAW – Appeal against conviction – Sexual assaults – Tendency evidence – Trial judge does not direct jury that uncharged incidents suggesting sexual interest in the complainant must be proved beyond reasonable doubt – Whether a miscarriage of justice – Whether the proviso to s 6 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1912 should be applied.
LEGISLATION CITED:
Criminal Appeal Act 1912 s 6
Criminal Procedure Act 1986 s 294B
Evidence Act 1995 s 97
CATEGORY:
Principal judgment
CASES CITED:
R v ATM [2000] NSWCCA 475
DJV v R [2008] NSWCCA 272
Gipp v The Queen [1998] HCA 21; 194 CLR 106
R v Haggerty [2004] NSWCCA 89; (2004) 145 A Crim R 138
HML v The Queen [2008] HCA 16; 235 CLR 334
JDK v R [2009] NSWCCA 76; (2009) 194 A Crim R 333
Rees v R [2010] NSWCCA 66
RWB v R [2010] NSWCCA 147
R v TAB [2002] NSWCCA 274
R v Toki (No. 3) [2000] NSWSC 999; (2000) 116 A Crim R 536
Weiss v The Queen [2005] HCA 81; (2005) 224 CLR 300
TEXTS CITED:
DECISION:
Appeal dismissed.
JUDGMENT:
- 26 -
IN THE COURT OF
CRIMINAL APPEAL
2008/0657
HODGSON JA
KIRBY J
WHEALY J8 SEPTEMBER 2010
DJS v R
Judgment
HODGSON JA: On 11 August 2008, the appellant was arraigned before Blackmore DCJ on seven counts, charging him with various sex offences involving the complainant, his stepdaughter.
There were three counts alleging sexual intercourse with the complainant without her consent, knowing she was not consenting, when the complainant was under the age of 16 (counts 1, 4 and 6). There were alternative counts to each of these, alleging sexual intercourse with the complainant, a child above the age of 10 years and under the age of 14 years (in the case of count 2) or above the age of 14 years and under the age of 16 years (in the case of counts 5 and 7). There was one count of indecent assault on the complainant, a child under the age of 16 years (count 3).
Counts 1 and 2 were alleged to have occurred between 22 and 24 September 2005 at Thurgoona NSW. Count 3 was alleged to have occurred between 1 and 30 April 2007 at Albury NSW. Counts 4 – 7 were alleged to have occurred between…
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- AGLC
- DJS v R [2010] NSWCCA 200
- Case
- [2010] NSWCCA 200
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issue that the court was required to decide was whether the trial judge’s failure to direct the jury that uncharged incidents suggesting sexual interest in the complainant must be proved beyond reasonable doubt amounted to a miscarriage of justice. The appellant argued that the trial judge should have directed the jury that the uncharged incidents had to be proved beyond reasonable doubt, and that this failure deprived him of a fair trial. The appellant submitted that the proviso to s 6 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW) should be applied, which provides that an appeal against conviction shall not be allowed unless the court is of the opinion that a miscarriage of justice has actually occurred or that the appellant was deprived of a fair trial. The Crown submitted that the trial judge’s failure to give a direction on the uncharged incidents did not amount to a miscarriage of justice, and that the appellant was not deprived of a fair trial.
The court held that the trial judge’s failure to direct the jury that the uncharged incidents had to be proved beyond reasonable doubt was an error, but it did not amount to a miscarriage of justice. The court held that the error did not deprive the appellant of a fair trial, as the jury would have been aware that the uncharged incidents had to be proved beyond reasonable doubt, and the appellant did not submit that any prejudice arose from the trial judge’s failure to give the direction. The court held that the evidence of the complainant was clear, cogent and compelling, and that the jury had been properly directed on the principles of corroboration and on the need to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the appellant’s guilt. The court held that the error was not so fundamental as to deprive the appellant of a trial according to law.
The court dismissed the appeal.
Orders
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