R v Bradshaw

Case [2025] QCA 172

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

R v Bradshaw [2025] QCA 172

PARTIES:

R
v
BRADSHAW, David Alan
(appellant)

FILE NO/S:

CA No 81 of 2023
SC No 119 of 2021

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

Appeal against Conviction

ORIGINATING COURT:

Supreme Court at Rockhampton – Date of Pre-Trial Ruling: 20 October 2022 (Crow J); Date of Conviction: 20 April 2023 (Bowskill CJ)

DELIVERED ON:

16 September 2025

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

20 March 2025

JUDGES:

Bond JA, Gotterson AJA and Bradley J

ORDER:

Appeal dismissed.

CATCHWORDS:

CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE – where the deceased was found in his home that had been burned down in a fire – where the deceased died from smoke inhalation – where the appellant was convicted of murder of the deceased following a trial in the Supreme Court at Rockhampton – where the appellant made admissions in a police interview that he set the fire at the house and did so as an act of vengeance – where the appellant applied for a pre-trial ruling that the record of the interview be excluded – where the appellant contends the record of interview should have been excluded as the police officers conducted the interview in breach of s 422 of the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld) – where the application was dismissed – where the video recording of the interview was played to the jury at trial – whether there was a miscarriage of justice caused by the refusal of the primary judge to exclude the record of the interview

CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – PARTICULAR GROUNDS OF APPEAL – MISDIRECTION AND NON-DIRECTION – EFFECT OF MISDIRECTION OR NON-DIRECTION – where the appellant contends a miscarriage of justice was occasioned by the failure of the trial judge to give the jury a direction that the appellant had some mental disability that may affect his capacity to give reliable evidence – whether the trial judge erred in omitting to direct the jury in accordance with the decision in Bromley v The Queen

Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld), s 5, s 7, s 8, s 9, s 422, sch 6

Bromley v The Queen (1986) 161 CLR 315; [1986] HCA 49, considered
Collins v R (1980) 31 ALR 257; [1980] FCA 72, considered
Commissioner of Police v Flanagan [2019] 1 Qd R 249; [2018] QCA 109, considered
R v Bossley [2015] 2 Qd R 102; [2012] QSC 292, considered
R v GW (2016) 258 CLR 108; [2016] HCA 6, considered
R v LR [2006] 1 Qd R 435; [2005] QCA 368, followed
R v Parker (1990) 19 NSWLR 177, considered
Tofilau v The Queen (2007) 231 CLR 396; [2007] HCA 39, followed

COUNSEL:

R M O’Gorman KC, with H Rafter, for the appellant
G J Cummings for the respondent

SOLICITORS:

Legal Aid Queensland for the appellant
Director of Public Prosecutions (Queensland)…

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AGLC
R v Bradshaw [2025] QCA 172
Case
[2025] QCA 172
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of R v Bradshaw, the appellant was convicted of the murder of a deceased individual found in a burned-down house, who died from smoke inhalation. The conviction followed a trial in the Supreme Court at Rockhampton, where the appellant admitted to setting the fire as an act of vengeance. The appellant sought to exclude a record of his police interview, claiming the officers breached s 422 of the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld) by not recognising his apparent mental disability during the interview. The application to exclude the record was dismissed, and the video recording was played to the jury at trial. The appellant argued the refusal to exclude the record of the interview caused a miscarriage of justice. Additionally, the appellant contended that the trial judge should have directed the jury that he had a mental disability that might affect his capacity to give reliable evidence.

The legal issues before the court were whether the refusal to exclude the record of the interview constituted a miscarriage of justice, and whether the trial judge erred in omitting to direct the jury on the appellant's potential mental disability affecting his reliability as a witness. The court assessed whether the police officers had reasonable grounds to suspect the appellant had an impaired capacity, based on external evidence and indicia, and whether the trial judge appropriately directed the jury regarding the appellant's potential mental disability.

The court concluded that there were no objective external evidence or indicia to constitute reasonable grounds for the interviewing officers to suspect that the appellant had an impaired capacity. The court found the officers' assessment of the appellant's mental status during the interview to be reasonable and consistent with the statutory requirements. Regarding the trial judge's direction to the jury, the court found no error in the judge's omission, as there was insufficient evidence of the appellant's mental disability to warrant such a direction. The appeal was dismissed, and the conviction was upheld.

Orders

Orders of the court

Appeal dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

It is not necessary to finally resolve this doubt, because any doubt is removed by the other evidence before the primary judge and this Court relevant to whether there were reasonable grounds to suspect that the appellant was a person with impaired capacity. That other evidence was in answers the appellant gave to other questions posed by the interviewing officers at the outset of the interview and the evidence those officers gave of their factual observations of the appellant at the pretrial hearing before the primary judge.The evidence of the officers At the pretrial hearing, the primary judge heard evidence from the two officers who were present throughout the interview. Both were cross-examined by the appellant’s trial counsel. The more senior officer, then a detective sergeant, had been a police office for about 24 years as at the date of the interview. He had “plenty of experience with mental health people.” He was aware of his obligations under s 422. He had experience of suspending an interview with a person with an impairment. Both he and the other more junior officer (a detective senior constable at the time of the interview) were aware of the section of the Queensland Police Service Operational Procedures Manual (OPM), which explained:“Persons who suffer from schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorders, bipolar disorder, severe mood disorders, and delusional disorders may become extremely agitated, irrational, impulsive and paranoid which may lead to the person behaving in an aggressive and/or violent manner. Persons suffering from an acute episode can rapidly develop an excited delirium condition which can result in death.” The detective sergeant observed the appellant to be acting rationally in the interview, displaying a rational response, and not exhibiting any signs that raised his concern. The more junior officer said the appellant did not display any of the behaviours listed in the OPM. He said the appellant was not agitated, aggressive and did not show any paranoia or delusions. The more junior officer considered his obligation under s 422 and made an ongoing assessment throughout the whole of the interview in relation to s 422. He did not believe the appellant had an impaired capacity during the interview and did not think the appellant’s mental health condition affected his ability to take part in the interview or understand his rights. He made this assessment on the answers and the responses the appellant was giving during the interview, which were before the primary judge. His view was that people can function in the community with a mental health illness. Whether a person has an impaired capacity would depend on whether the person is having a psychotic episode or a mental health breakdown, which would manifest in agitated, aggressive, irrational, delusional or paranoid behaviour. Considering the relevant factual evidence summarised above, not the subjective views of the police officers, the Court is not persuaded that there were reasonable grounds for the interviewing officers on 15 September 2019 to suspect that the appellant was a person whose capacity to look after or manage his own interests was impaired because of an obvious disorder, illness or disease that affects a person’s thought processes, perceptions of reality, emotions or judgment or that results in disturbed behaviour.[28][28]PPRA, sch 6.Whether the interviewing officers held a ‘reasonable suspicion’

Decision

Reasons for decision

As the junior officer also noted, again with respect correctly, this assessment is not made definitively at the outset of questioning. It depends on the apparent current mental status of the person. An officer should continue to assess the person’s apparent capacity as the interview progresses. However, as noted above, the appeal does not concern an assessment at any later point in the interview.Conclusion on ground 1 At the end of the preliminary questions, there were not objective external evidence and indicia to constitute reasonable grounds for a person in the position of the interviewing officers to suspect that the appellant was a person whose capacity to look after or manage his own interests was impaired because of an obvious disorder, illness or disease. The appellant did not advance any other basis on which the primary judge ought to have excluded the interview. Counsel for the appellant properly conceded that if the officers who questioned the appellant during the interview did not contravene s 422(2) or (3), then the appellant would fail on ground 1. For the above reasons, the first ground of appeal fails.Ground 2 The appellant’s second ground concerns the failure of the trial judge to give the jury a direction that the appellant had some mental disability that may affect his capacity to give reliable evidence, of the kind referred to in Bromley. The determination in Bromley may be found in the reasons of Gibbs CJ. His Honour’s analysis of the law begins with Reg. v Spencer.[33] In that case, Gibbs CJ noted, the prosecution case depended wholly on uncorroborated evidence of patients in a secure hospital each with a criminal record and a mental disorder. His Honour explained:“What is required, in a case where the evidence of a witness may be potentially unreliable, but which does not fall within one of the established categories in relation to which the full warning as to the necessity of corroboration must be given, is that the jury must be made aware, in words which meet the justice of the particular case, of the dangers of convicting on such evidence. Where a warning is required as to the way in which the jury should treat the unsupported evidence of a witness whose evidence is potentially unreliable, the question is ‘Was that warning sufficient? Did it in clear terms bring home to the jury the danger of basing a conviction on the unconfirmed evidence of the complainants?’ There is nothing formal or technical about this rule.”[34][33][1986] 3 WLR 348.[34]The parenthetic question was extracted from the speech of Lord Ackner in Reg. v Spencer [1986] 3 WLR 348 at 359. The conclusion of Gibbs CJ on this topic was:“If it appears that a witness whose evidence is important has some mental disability which may affect his or her capacity to give reliable evidence, common sense clearly dictates that the jury should be given a warning, appropriate to the circumstances of the case, of the possible danger of basing a conviction on the testimony of that witness unless it is confirmed by other evidence. The warning should be clear and, in a case in which a lay juror might not understand why the evidence of the witness was potentially unreliable, it should be explained to the jury why that is so. There is no particular formula that must be used; the words used must depend on the circumstances of the case.”[35][35](1986) 161 CLR 315 at 319.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The statutory context in Chapter 14, Part 3 of the PPRA, and the common law context of the protection of persons incapable of choosing or understanding their rights to choose to make a confession, may assist in construing the definition of a person with an impaired capacity and the operation of s 422.Common law consideration of questioning a person who may be of impaired capacity Counsel for the parties were unable to identify any decision of this Court on s 422 of the PPRA. The primary judge extracted part of the reasons of Keane JA in R v LR.[21] R v LR concerned the provision that was then s 254(2) and is now s 423 of the PPRA. It required an officer to delay questioning “a relevant person apparently under the influence of liquor or a drug” until the officer was “reasonably satisfied the influence” no longer affected “the person’s ability to understand his or her rights and to decide whether or not to answer questions.” There was no statutory definition of “reasonably satisfied”.[21][2006] 1 Qd R 435. The conclusions of Keane JA were as follows: “[45] …it is my view, when examined objectively, there was no basis on which the officer could have been reasonably satisfied that the appellant’s level of intoxication was not affecting his ability to understand his rights or to decide whether or not to answer questions. …That the appellant was affected by alcohol was obvious. Moreover, the police officer was aware that the appellant had consumed a significant quantity of alcohol in the hours leading up to the interview. That the appellant was displaying a disturbingly cavalier attitude to his right not to answer questions and to decide whether to exercise that right was also obvious, both by reason of what the appellant was saying and, more importantly, by reason of the contrasting attitude manifested by his father. The attitude of the appellant was significantly different from what one might normally expect from a person who has been informed by the police that he or she is the subject of a complaint of rape. Further, the only assurances the officer had that the appellant did understand the sense and gravity of the allegations being put to him were those proffered by the appellant himself. The assurances of an obviously intoxicated person that he or she is not adversely affected by that intoxication are a cause for circumspection on the part of the interviewer. To continue to conduct the interview in those circumstances meant, in my opinion, that the interview took place in contravention of s. 254(2).”[22][22][2006] 1 Qd R 435 at 449 [44]-[45]. The appellant relied on the following analysis of s 254(2) in R v LR, in the reasons of McPherson JA, with whom Douglas J also agreed:“[5] The various formulas considered in this context vary slightly from statute to statute. Most of them use expressions such as reasonable cause to believe, or reasonable grounds for suspecting, or the like. In speaking of the police officer in s. 254(2), the formulation is “reasonably satisfied”. I cannot doubt, however, that it is designed to set up an objective criterion to be determined by reference to the external evidence or indicia of the influence of liquor rather than simply according to the officer’s subjective even if honest impression of the matter. Otherwise, I can see no reason why the expression used in s. 254(2) is “reasonably satisfied”. In view of the legislative and judicial history of similar expressions and the interpretation placed upon them, it would be astonishing if the legislative selection of the first of these expressions in this instance was not deliberate.[6]For the reasons given by Keane J.A., I agree that the present case was one in which in the circumstances the police officer carrying out the questioning must or ought to have been aware of the appellant’s ability to understand his rights and to decide whether or not to answer the questions; or, more precisely, that he could not have been “reasonably satisfied” that the appellant’s ability to do so was no longer affected by the influence of liquor. …”[23][23][2006] 1 Qd R 435 at 442.