Commissioner of Police v Flanagan

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Commissioner of Police v Flanagan [2018] QCA 109

PARTIES:

COMMISSIONER OF POLICE
(applicant)
v
FLANAGAN, Stephen Patrick
(respondent)

FILE NO/S:

CA No 156 of 2017
DC No 139 of 2017

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

Application for Leave s 118 DCA (Criminal)

ORIGINATING COURT:

District Court at Brisbane – Date of Conviction: 21 June 2017 (Ryrie DCJ)

DELIVERED ON:

5 June 2018

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

19 February 2018

JUDGES:

Philippides and McMurdo JJA and Boddice J

ORDERS:

1.   Grant leave to appeal.

2.   Allow the appeal.

3.   Set aside the orders of the District Court allowing the appeal and instead order that the appeal to the District Court be dismissed.

CATCHWORDS:

CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL – MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE – where the respondent was convicted by a Magistrate of the offences of common assault pursuant to s 335 of the Criminal Code (Qld) and deprivation of liberty pursuant to s 355 of the Criminal Code (Qld) – where the offences arose as a result of the respondent’s conduct while he was on duty as a police officer – where the respondent sought to be excused from criminal responsibility by relying on the defence pursuant to s 24 of the Criminal Code that he had an honest and reasonable but mistaken belief – where the Magistrate found the prosecution disproved the respondent acted on an honest and reasonable but mistaken belief – where the respondent appealed against his convictions to the District Court – where the District Court judge overturned the convictions on the basis the trial had miscarried because the magistrate failed to determine whether the respondent was lawfully exercising a power under the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld) – where the applicant seeks leave from the Court of Appeal to appeal against the District Court judge’s decision – whether the District Court judge erred by concluding it was necessary for the prosecution to prove the force used in assaulting and detaining the complainant was more than reasonably necessary to deal with the offence – whether the District Court judge erred in acting contrary to s 223(1) of the Justices Act 1866 (Qld) by not conducting the appeal as a rehearing

Criminal Code (Qld), s 24, s 335, s 355
District Court Act of Queensland Act 1967 (Qld), s 119(2)(b)
Justices Act 1886 (Qld), s 223
Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld), s 5, s 29, s 30, s 31, s 52, s 60, s 615

George v Rockett (1990) 170 CLR 104; [1990] HCA 26, cited
Johnson v Police [2017] SASC 87, cited
McDonald v Queensland Police Service[2017] QCA 255, considered
Pickering v McArthur[2005] QCA 294, cited
R v Mrzljak [2005] 1 Qd R 308; [2004] QCA 420, cited
Whitelaw v O’Sullivan[2010] QCA 366, considered

COUNSEL:

G P Cash QC for the applicant
J Hunter QC for the respondent

SOLICITORS:

Director of Public Prosecutions…

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Details
Case
[2018] QCA 109
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Commissioner of Police v Flanagan, the respondent was convicted by a Magistrate of common assault and deprivation of liberty, stemming from his actions while on duty as a police officer. The respondent argued he had an honest and reasonable but mistaken belief that justified his actions. The Magistrate rejected this defence, but the District Court later overturned the convictions, finding a miscarriage of justice due to the Magistrate’s failure to determine if the respondent was lawfully exercising a power under the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld). The Commissioner of Police sought leave to appeal this decision to the Court of Appeal.

The central legal issues revolved around whether the District Court judge correctly assessed the need for the prosecution to prove that the force used was more than reasonably necessary and whether the judge adhered to the statutory requirements by not conducting the appeal as a rehearing. The primary concern was whether the respondent's mistaken but reasonable suspicion could affect the assessment of criminal liability under the circumstances, as distinct from an honest and reasonable belief.

The Court of Appeal found that the District Court judge erred by concluding it was necessary for the prosecution to prove the force used was more than reasonably necessary to deal with the offence. The Court held that a reasonable suspicion, even if mistaken, was insufficient to affect the assessment of criminal liability; only an honest and reasonable belief could alter this assessment. Furthermore, the Court determined that the primary judge’s approach was inconsistent with uncontested findings made by the Magistrate. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal, allowed the appeal, and set aside the orders of the District Court, dismissing the appeal to the District Court instead.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Grant leave to appeal.

2. Allow the appeal.

3. Set aside the orders of the District Court allowing the appeal and instead order that the appeal to the District Court be dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The magistrate found that the respondent’s lack of credibility in respect of his evidence concerning what he said when pointing a pistol at Mr Povey, his use of the horn, his knowledge that the lights and sirens were not working and his being angry with Mr Povey “damaged his credibility irreparably” with respect to his evidence as to what was “submitted to be honest beliefs”. In that regard, the magistrate stated:[35]“I find his evidence implausible and I don’t accept his evidence as being credible in the circumstances that he thought Povey’s vehicle was stolen simply because it didn’t stop as quickly as he thought it could, and which, on the evidence, was not a significant time. In … the activity log, although he mentions a possible evade, he doesn’t make any mention of his thinking that Povey’s vehicle was stolen or possibly stolen. And also on the issue on whether Povey was going for a gun by his making what, on the evidence, was an unremarkable movement, I don’t find his evidence to be credible. And that this, in combination - that is, what he thought was stolen and that he was going for a gun – meant that he had to point his pistol and handcuff Povey.” (emphasis added)[35]AB at 142.12-142.30.The primary judge’s decision As mentioned, there was no challenge, on the appeal to the District Court, as to any of the factual findings of the magistrate. Nor was it disputed that the actions of the respondent prima facie constituted the offences of assault and deprivation of liberty. The respondent’s complaint on the appeal was that the magistrate erred in failing to consider whether the prosecution proved the respondent’s actions were unlawful under the PPRA, which was said to amount to jurisdictional error so that the decision was a nullity.[36] It was uncontested that the magistrate appeared to have proceeded on the basis that the respondent’s actions were only made lawful under the PPRA if Mr Povey’s car was in fact stolen or Mr Povey in fact had a weapon and that, given the defence concession, the only basis for acquittal was s 24 of the Code. It was argued, however, that the magistrate should have only convicted the respondent if he was satisfied that the respondent did not reasonably suspect the car was stolen and there was a weapon or if satisfied that the force used was not reasonably necessary for the exercise of the power under the PPRA. The primary judge accepted the respondent’s submission that the magistrate erred in commencing from the proposition that the respondent acted unlawfully when he assaulted and detained Mr Povey, rather than determining that issue.[37] Her Honour found that the magistrate should have but failed to consider:[38]“… the critical issue [being] whether the police officer had, in fact, formed a reasonable suspicion regarding whether the vehicle itself was a stolen one, and subsequently, upon interception of it, whether the complainant, when reaching down, appeared to be doing so for a weapon. And … in those circumstances, whether or not the force that he then used was objectively reasonably necessary force, under [s 615 of the PPRA].”[36]AB at 207 [9].[37]AB at 184.15-184.22.[38]AB at 182.47-183.5.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Ground 1 raises an important question of law concerning the construction of s 615 of the PPRA and its interaction with s 24 of the Code warranting the granting of leave. Further, for the reasons set out below, ground 2 also warrants the granting of leave, in that the primary judge concluded the matter should be remitted on the basis that there was evidence available to support a finding that the respondent held a relevant reasonable suspicion and that the use of force was reasonably necessary. However, in so concluding, the primary judge preceded on an approach that was inconsistent with or contrary to uncontested findings made by the magistrate.Ground 1: Error by the primary judge as to the operation of s 615 of the PPRAThe applicant’s submissions Ground 1 raised the argument that “the primary judge erred in law in concluding that the prosecution was required to prove, beyond reasonable doubt, that the force used in assaulting and detaining Mr Povey was “more than was reasonably necessary to deal with the offence or offences the respondent reasonably suspected had been or would be committed”. The applicant’s contention was that the only matter in issue before the magistrate concerned whether the prosecution had proved beyond reasonable doubt that, at the time of the commission of the offence, the respondent did not honestly and reasonably believe in the existence of a state of things that justified the force he used. The primary judge thus erred in considering that the issue which ought to have been determined was whether the respondent reasonably suspected a state of things that justified his use of force pursuant to the PPRA. The applicant submitted that the primary judge’s error was revealed by her Honour’s finding, that the magistrate failed to consider whether:[45] “… not only had the Crown proved, beyond reasonable doubt, that section 24 didn’t apply, but also whether the Crown proved, beyond reasonable doubt, that the force that was, in fact, used by the appellant was not objectively reasonably necessary force under section 615 of the Act in respect of dealing with an offence, or an offence being committed, of which he was exercising his powers, which he reasonably suspected was occurring at the relevant time.”[45]AB at 187.45-188.04. On that question, the respondent referred to the magistrate’s finding that the respondent pointed a gun at and handcuffed Mr Povey in circumstances where he did not honestly, nor reasonably, believe Mr Povey had been driving a stolen car and may have had a firearm in the vehicle. As such, it was submitted, the magistrate had concluded that the force used by the respondent was more than was reasonably necessary and was unlawful. The applicant challenged the reasoning of the primary judge, as erroneous, essentially on the basis that a reasonable suspicion, where it was mistaken, as to the existence of a state of things was insufficient to affect the assessment of criminal liability. That was because it was only an honest and reasonable belief pursuant to s 24 of the Code that could alter the assessment of criminal liability.