SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
Commissioner of Police v Flanagan [2018] QCA 109
PARTIES:
COMMISSIONER OF POLICE
(applicant)
v
FLANAGAN, Stephen Patrick
(respondent)FILE NO/S:
CA No 156 of 2017
DC No 139 of 2017DIVISION:
Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING:
Application for Leave s 118 DCA (Criminal)
ORIGINATING COURT:
District Court at Brisbane – Date of Conviction: 21 June 2017 (Ryrie DCJ)
DELIVERED ON:
5 June 2018
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
19 February 2018
JUDGES:
Philippides and McMurdo JJA and Boddice J
ORDERS:
1. Grant leave to appeal.
2. Allow the appeal.
3. Set aside the orders of the District Court allowing the appeal and instead order that the appeal to the District Court be dismissed.
CATCHWORDS:
CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL – MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE – where the respondent was convicted by a Magistrate of the offences of common assault pursuant to s 335 of the Criminal Code (Qld) and deprivation of liberty pursuant to s 355 of the Criminal Code (Qld) – where the offences arose as a result of the respondent’s conduct while he was on duty as a police officer – where the respondent sought to be excused from criminal responsibility by relying on the defence pursuant to s 24 of the Criminal Code that he had an honest and reasonable but mistaken belief – where the Magistrate found the prosecution disproved the respondent acted on an honest and reasonable but mistaken belief – where the respondent appealed against his convictions to the District Court – where the District Court judge overturned the convictions on the basis the trial had miscarried because the magistrate failed to determine whether the respondent was lawfully exercising a power under the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld) – where the applicant seeks leave from the Court of Appeal to appeal against the District Court judge’s decision – whether the District Court judge erred by concluding it was necessary for the prosecution to prove the force used in assaulting and detaining the complainant was more than reasonably necessary to deal with the offence – whether the District Court judge erred in acting contrary to s 223(1) of the Justices Act 1866 (Qld) by not conducting the appeal as a rehearing
Criminal Code (Qld), s 24, s 335, s 355
District Court Act of Queensland Act 1967 (Qld), s 119(2)(b)
Justices Act 1886 (Qld), s 223
Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld), s 5, s 29, s 30, s 31, s 52, s 60, s 615George v Rockett (1990) 170 CLR 104; [1990] HCA 26, cited
Johnson v Police [2017] SASC 87, cited
McDonald v Queensland Police Service[2017] QCA 255, considered
Pickering v McArthur[2005] QCA 294, cited
R v Mrzljak [2005] 1 Qd R 308; [2004] QCA 420, cited
Whitelaw v O’Sullivan[2010] QCA 366, consideredCOUNSEL:
G P Cash QC for the applicant
J Hunter QC for the respondentSOLICITORS:
Director of Public Prosecutions…
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- Case
- [2018] QCA 109
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issues revolved around whether the District Court judge correctly assessed the need for the prosecution to prove that the force used was more than reasonably necessary and whether the judge adhered to the statutory requirements by not conducting the appeal as a rehearing. The primary concern was whether the respondent's mistaken but reasonable suspicion could affect the assessment of criminal liability under the circumstances, as distinct from an honest and reasonable belief.
The Court of Appeal found that the District Court judge erred by concluding it was necessary for the prosecution to prove the force used was more than reasonably necessary to deal with the offence. The Court held that a reasonable suspicion, even if mistaken, was insufficient to affect the assessment of criminal liability; only an honest and reasonable belief could alter this assessment. Furthermore, the Court determined that the primary judge’s approach was inconsistent with uncontested findings made by the Magistrate. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal, allowed the appeal, and set aside the orders of the District Court, dismissing the appeal to the District Court instead.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Grant leave to appeal.
2. Allow the appeal.
3. Set aside the orders of the District Court allowing the appeal and instead order that the appeal to the District Court be dismissed.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Ground 1 raises an important question of law concerning the construction of s 615 of the PPRA and its interaction with s 24 of the Code warranting the granting of leave. Further, for the reasons set out below, ground 2 also warrants the granting of leave, in that the primary judge concluded the matter should be remitted on the basis that there was evidence available to support a finding that the respondent held a relevant reasonable suspicion and that the use of force was reasonably necessary. However, in so concluding, the primary judge preceded on an approach that was inconsistent with or contrary to uncontested findings made by the magistrate.Ground 1: Error by the primary judge as to the operation of s 615 of the PPRAThe applicant’s submissions Ground 1 raised the argument that “the primary judge erred in law in concluding that the prosecution was required to prove, beyond reasonable doubt, that the force used in assaulting and detaining Mr Povey was “more than was reasonably necessary to deal with the offence or offences the respondent reasonably suspected had been or would be committed”. The applicant’s contention was that the only matter in issue before the magistrate concerned whether the prosecution had proved beyond reasonable doubt that, at the time of the commission of the offence, the respondent did not honestly and reasonably believe in the existence of a state of things that justified the force he used. The primary judge thus erred in considering that the issue which ought to have been determined was whether the respondent reasonably suspected a state of things that justified his use of force pursuant to the PPRA. The applicant submitted that the primary judge’s error was revealed by her Honour’s finding, that the magistrate failed to consider whether:[45] “… not only had the Crown proved, beyond reasonable doubt, that section 24 didn’t apply, but also whether the Crown proved, beyond reasonable doubt, that the force that was, in fact, used by the appellant was not objectively reasonably necessary force under section 615 of the Act in respect of dealing with an offence, or an offence being committed, of which he was exercising his powers, which he reasonably suspected was occurring at the relevant time.”[45]AB at 187.45-188.04. On that question, the respondent referred to the magistrate’s finding that the respondent pointed a gun at and handcuffed Mr Povey in circumstances where he did not honestly, nor reasonably, believe Mr Povey had been driving a stolen car and may have had a firearm in the vehicle. As such, it was submitted, the magistrate had concluded that the force used by the respondent was more than was reasonably necessary and was unlawful. The applicant challenged the reasoning of the primary judge, as erroneous, essentially on the basis that a reasonable suspicion, where it was mistaken, as to the existence of a state of things was insufficient to affect the assessment of criminal liability. That was because it was only an honest and reasonable belief pursuant to s 24 of the Code that could alter the assessment of criminal liability.