Baker v Department of Natural Resources & Mines

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QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND
ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL


CITATION:

Baker v Department of Natural Resources & Mines [2018] QCAT 375

PARTIES:

MICHAEL VINCENT BAKER
(applicant)

v

DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES & MINES

(respondent)

APPLICATION NO/S:

GAR155-17

MATTER TYPE:

General administrative review matters

DELIVERED ON:

23 November 2018

HEARING DATE:

25 January 2018

HEARD AT:

Brisbane

DECISION OF:

Justice Daubney, President

ORDERS:

1.   The name of the respondent is amended to “Chief Executive, Department of Natural Resources and Mines”.

2.   The application for miscellaneous matters filed 12 October 2017 is otherwise dismissed.

CATCHWORDS:

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS – QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL – where applicant had been convicted of a vegetation clearing offence – where the applicant was consequently issued with a restoration notice and new Property Map of Assessable Vegetation (PMAV) by an authorised delegate of the Chief Executive of the Department of Natural Resources and Mines pursuant to the Vegetation Management Act (VMA) – where applicant applied for internal review of that decision and was unsuccessful – where applicant applied to the Tribunal for external review of that decision – where interim application filed to address jurisdictional matters – where the applicant contends the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction on the basis that s 54B of the VMA required the Respondent to ‘reasonably believe’ a person has committed a vegetation clearing offence which does not extend to actual knowledge of a criminal conviction – where the applicant contends the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction on the basis that the Respondent’s decision to issue a new PMAV was defective as it should have been made under only one subsection of s 20B of the VMA

Vegetation Management Act 1999 (Qld), s 20B, 20D, s 54B, s 60, s 63A, s 63B

Commissioner of Police v Flanagan [2018] QCA 109
Electricity Trust of South Australia v Krone (Australia) (1994) 51 FCR 520 at 547; 123 ALR 202
Technique Pty Ltd & Ors (1994) 123 ALR 202
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Industrial Equity Ltd & Anor (2000) 171 ALR 1
George v Rockett [1990] 170 CLR 104
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Baker (1997) 153 ALR 463
Prior v Mole (2017) 91 ALJR 441

APPEARANCES & REPRESENTATION:

Applicant:

G R Allan, instructed by Marland Law

Respondent:

P A Hastie QC, with G B Dann, instructed by Department of Natural Resources & Mines

REASONS FOR DECISION

  1. The principal proceeding before the Tribunal is an application by the applicant for external review, under s 63B of the Vegetation Management Act 1999 (Qld) (“VMA”), of certain decisions made by delegates of the Chief Executive (“the Chief Executive”) of the Department of Natural Resources & Mines (“the Department”).

  2. By the present application, the applicant seeks to have several jurisdictional questions determined as preliminary issues.  As will appear, determination of these issues involves statutory interpretation and no relevant factual dispute.  There was no objection to these questions being determined in this way for the purpose of clarifying the application and the…

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Details
Case
[2018] QCAT 375
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Baker v Department of Natural Resources & Mines, the applicant, who had been convicted of a vegetation clearing offence, was issued with a restoration notice and a new Property Map of Assessable Vegetation (PMAV) by an authorised delegate of the Chief Executive of the Department of Natural Resources and Mines pursuant to the Vegetation Management Act (VMA). The applicant sought internal review of these decisions and, when unsuccessful, applied to the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal (QCAT) for external review of that decision. The applicant filed an interim application to address jurisdictional matters, arguing that the Tribunal did not have jurisdiction because s 54B of the VMA required the respondent to reasonably believe that the applicant had committed a vegetation clearing offence, which did not extend to actual knowledge of a criminal conviction. The applicant also argued that the decision to issue a new PMAV was defective, as it should have been made under only one subsection of s 20B of the VMA.

The court was required to decide on the jurisdictional matters raised by the applicant. Specifically, the court had to determine whether the restoration notice issued under s 54B of the VMA was beyond power and invalid due to the delegate's actual knowledge of the applicant's criminal conviction for a vegetation clearing offence. Additionally, the court had to decide whether the issuance of the new PMAV under s 20B of the VMA was defective, as it was made under multiple subsections of the Act. The court also needed to determine if the Tribunal had the jurisdiction to review the decisions in question.

The court rejected the applicant's arguments on both jurisdictional matters. Firstly, the court held that the requirement for the delegate to reasonably believe that the applicant had committed a vegetation clearing offence did not exclude actual knowledge of a criminal conviction. Therefore, the issuance of the restoration notice was not beyond power and invalid. Secondly, the court held that the issuance of the new PMAV under multiple subsections of s 20B of the VMA was not defective. The court concluded that the Tribunal had jurisdiction to review the decisions in question.

In conclusion, the court dismissed the jurisdictional arguments raised by the applicant and confirmed that the Tribunal had jurisdiction to review the decisions made by the Department of Natural Resources and Mines. The court ordered the name of the respondent to be amended to "Chief Executive, Department of Natural Resources and Mines" and dismissed the application for miscellaneous matters filed on 12 October 2017.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The name of the respondent is amended to “Chief Executive, Department of Natural Resources and Mines”.

2. The application for miscellaneous matters filed 12 October 2017 is otherwise dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

By the present application, the applicant seeks to have several jurisdictional questions determined as preliminary issues. As will appear, determination of these issues involves statutory interpretation and no relevant factual dispute. There was no objection to these questions being determined in this way for the purpose of clarifying the application and the availability of relief in the principal proceeding.Background In August 2010, a Property Map of Assessable Vegetation (“PMAV”)[1] was made by the Department in respect of a property at Eidsvold, described as Lot 5 on Plan WK207, known as “Chess Park” (“the Property”). [1]As defined in s 20AK of the VMA. In March 2011, the lease of the Property was transferred to the applicant. The Property was then converted to freehold tenure, and on 15 July 2011 the applicant became the registered proprietor of the estate in fee simple of the Property. In November 2016, following prosecution for contravention of certain provisions of the Sustainable Planning Act 2009 (Qld), the applicant was convicted of numerous offences. Specifically, he was convicted of having carried out assessable development, namely the clearing of 332.7 hectares of remnant vegetation on the Property, without having an effective development permit for that development. It was not in issue that the applicant was thereby convicted of a “vegetation clearing offence”, as that term is defined in the Schedule to the VMA. Following that conviction, on 23 February 2017, Mr Stumer, an authorised delegate of the Chief Executive:(a)issued the applicant with a Restoration Notice pursuant to s 54B of the VMA, and(b)issued, under s 20B of the VMA, a new PMAV in respect of the Property, to replace the PMAV which had been issued in August 2010. The applicant sought internal review of each of those decisions, pursuant to Part IV Division 1 of the VMA. That internal review was conducted by Mr Horrocks, as delegate of the Chief Executive. In May 2017, Mr Horrocks issued his review decisions, by which he:(a)confirmed the decision made under s 20B to make the replacement PMAV in respect of the Property, and(b)amended Mr Stumer’s decision to issue a Restoration Notice by amending the requirements of the Restoration Notice and issuing an amended Restoration Notice. The applicant then applied to this Tribunal for review of Mr Horrocks’ review decisions and that is the principal proceeding before the Tribunal. The applicant also applied for a stay of both review decisions. In the course of filing written submissions in respect of the stay application, however, the applicant identified what he described as jurisdictional matters which needed to be decided as preliminary issues because they are “preliminary questions of law that affect or may affect the future exercise of the Tribunal’s review jurisdiction”.[2] Those questions were articulated in the applicant’s solicitor’s supporting affidavit as follows:[2]Affidavit of T H Allan filed 12 October 2017.(a) Whether the original decision purportedly made by Mr Paul Stumer on 23 February 2017 to issue Restoration Notice 2017/000798 under s 54B(1) of the Vegetation Management Act 1999 (VMA) was beyond power and is unlawful and invalid as section 54B(1) of the Vegetation Management Act 1999 does not apply in circumstances where, based on the fact that are not in dispute, the areas identified in the Restoration Notice:-(i)have been unlawfully cleared (as that expression is defined in the Schedule to the VMA); or(ii)have been cleared of native vegetation and, in relation to the clearing, a person has been found guilty by a Court.(b) Whether the Review decision that was purportedly made on 16 May 2017 by Mr Paul Horrocks under section 63A(1)(b)(ii) and section 54B(1) of the VMA to issue Amended Restoration Notice 2017/001535 was beyond power and is unlawful and invalid because section 54B(1) of the VMA does not apply in circumstances where, based on the facts that are not in dispute, the areas identified in the Amended Restoration Notice:(i)have been unlawfully cleared (as that expression is defined in the Schedule to the VMA); or(ii)have been cleared of native vegetation and, in relation to the clearing, a person has been found guilty by a Court.(c) If the answer to question ‘(2)(b)’ above is ‘Yes,’ whether in the exercise of its review jurisdiction under sections 19 and 20 of the QCAT Act, the Tribunal:-(i)does not have power under section 20(2) of the QCAT Act to hear and review the reviewable decision to issue the Amended Restoration Notice 2017/001535 by way of a fresh hearing on the merits (‘merits review’); and(ii)if the Tribunal decides that it does not have power to undertake a merits review, whether it does have power to set aside the review decision and substitute its own decision under s 24(1)(b) of the QCAT Act.(d) Whether, in respect of the Internal Review Decision purportedly made on 16 May 2017 by Mr Horrocks to confirm the original decision to issue the new PMAV 2017/000796 (made on 23 February 2017) relying on s 20B(1)(d) and s 20B(1)(e)(i) and s 20B(1)(g) of the VMA (Internal Review PMAV Decision) was unlawful but not invalid in circumstances where, on the facts not in dispute, the areas in the new PMAV had been ‘unlawfully cleared’ (as that expression is defined in the Schedule to the VMA).(e) In the alternative, whether the internal Review PMAV Decision was unlawful and invalid, to the extent that Mr Horrocks purported to rely on s 20B(1)(e) and s 20B(1)(g) in addition to s 20B(1)(d) in circumstances where, on the facts not in dispute, the areas in the new PMAV had been ‘unlawfully cleared’ (as that expression is defined in the Schedule to the VMA).(f) any further questions that potentially affect the exercise of the Tribunal’s review jurisdiction by reason of ‘(a) – (e)’ above that the Tribunal decides should also be determined.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

On that interpretation of s 20B, and having rejected above the applicant’s arguments about the Chief Executive (or his delegates) not having a reasonable belief that the applicant had committed a vegetation clearing offence, I reject the applicant’s ultimate argument that “the exercise of the Tribunal’s review jurisdiction is limited to deciding whether the internal review decision to issue the PMAV was lawful because the areas had been unlawfully cleared”.Conclusion For these reasons, I would answer the preliminary questions identified at paragraph [9] above as follows:(a)No.(b)No.(c)Not necessary to answer.(d)No.(e)No.(f)Not necessary to answer. The parties were agreed that the name of the respondent needed to be corrected. Accordingly, the Tribunal’s decisions are as follows:1. The name of the respondent is amended to “Chief Executive, Department of Natural Resources and Mines”;2. The application for miscellaneous matters filed 12 October 2017 is otherwise dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Section 54B of the VMA provides:54B Restoration notice(1) This section applies if an official reasonably believes – (a)a person has committed a vegetation clearing offence, whether before or after the commencement of this section; and(b)the matter is capable of being rectified.(2) The official may give the person a notice (a restoration notice) requiring the person to rectify the matter.(3) The restoration notice must state – (a)that the official believes the person has committed a vegetation clearing offence; and(b)the vegetation clearing offence the official believes has been committed; and(c)briefly, how it is believed the offence has been committed; and(d)the matter the official believes is reasonably capable of being rectified; and(e)the reasonable steps the person must take to rectify the matter; and(f)the stated reasonable period in which the person must take the steps.(4) The restoration notice must be accompanied by or include an information notice about the decision to give the notice.(5) The person must comply with the restoration notice unless the person has a reasonable excuse.Maximum penalty – 1665 penalty units.(6) In this section – step includes any action or other measure the official believes is necessary to rectify the matter.Examples – · giving a proposed restoration plan under section 55AB(1) or making a request under section 55AB(3)· setting objectives and timeframes for restoring the vegetation· giving the chief executive a progress report about whether the steps taken within a particular period to rectify the matter have satisfied a stated objective As noted above, it was not in issue that the applicant had committed a “vegetation clearing offence”. Nor was it in issue that both Mr Stumer and Mr Horrocks knew that the applicant had been convicted of having committed a vegetation clearing offence at the time they made their respective decisions. The applicant, however, pointed to the introductory words of s 54B(1) which, relevantly, call for the person making the decision to reasonably believe that the applicant had committed a vegetation clearing offence, and argued that the requirement to hold a reasonable belief in the offence having been committed did not extend to include actual knowledge of a criminal conviction for having committed the offence.[3] [3]Applicant’s consolidated outline of submissions, para 37. The phrase “reasonably believes” is defined in the Schedule to the VMA to mean “believes on grounds that are reasonable in the circumstances”. The applicant’s argument was, in effect, that “reasonable belief” was a jurisdictional fact which founded the power to make a decision under s 54B, that in the absence of that necessary “reasonable belief” there was no decision which could have been the subject of internal review, and that consequently there is no decision which can be the subject of external review by this Tribunal. These arguments cannot be accepted for several reasons.