SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
R v HDA [2025] QCA 166
PARTIES:
R
v
HDA
(appellant)FILE NO/S:
CA No 53 of 2023
DC No 96 of 2021DIVISION:
Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING:
Appeal against Conviction
ORIGINATING COURT:
District Court of Queensland at Gladstone – Date of Conviction: 3 March 2023 (Chowdhury DCJ)
DELIVERED ON:
9 September 2025
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
21 March 2025
JUDGES:
Mullins P, Bond and Brown JJA
ORDER:
The appeal is dismissed.
CATCHWORDS:
CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – VERDICT UNREASONABLE OR INSUPPORTABLE HAVING REGARD TO EVIDENCE – APPEAL DISMISSED – where the appellant was convicted of 13 counts of indecent treatment of a child under 16 under 12 years lineal descendant; one count of attempted indecent treatment of a child under 16 under 12 years lineal descendant; and two counts of rape – where the complainant was the appellant’s granddaughter – where the appellant appealed his convictions on the ground that all verdicts were unreasonable and cannot be supported having regard to the evidence – where the appellant argued that proper consideration was not given by the jury to inconsistencies and discrepancies in the evidence of the complainant and as between the complainant and her mother which should have caused the jury to have reasonable doubt – whether the jury was entitled to conclude that guilt on all counts had been proved beyond reasonable doubt
CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE – PARTICULAR CIRCUMSTANCES NOT AMOUNTING TO MISCARRIAGE – OTHER IRREGULARITIES – where the appellant was convicted of 13 counts of indecent treatment of a child under 16 under 12 years lineal descendant; one count of attempted indecent treatment of a child under 16 under 12 years lineal descendant; and two counts of rape – where the complainant was the appellant’s granddaughter – where the appellant appealed his convictions on the ground that the learned trial judge erred in failing to grant the application for a mistrial – where the complainant’s mother gave evidence in chief referring to police attending the family home with a warrant – where the trial judge, with whom defence counsel agreed, refused to order a mistrial and did not provide a direction relating to the evidence – where the jury subsequently asked a question and the trial judge directed the jury that they were to concentrate on the evidence and not to speculate – whether the failure to discharge the jury risked a miscarriage of justice
R v Allen (a pseudonym)[2020] QCA 233, cited
R v Miller (2021) 8 QR 221; [2021] QCA 126, cited
R v WCH [2025] QCA 124, citedCOUNSEL:
D V Nguyen with R M Hew for the appellant (pro bono)
S L Dennis for the respondentSOLICITORS:
Craven Lawyers for the appellant (pro bono)
Director of Public Prosecutions (Queensland) for the respondent
MULLINS P: I agree with Brown JA.
BOND JA: I agree with the reasons for judgment of Brown JA…
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- AGLC
- R v Hda [2025] QCA 166
- Case
- [2025] QCA 166
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the nature of the discrepancies and inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence, including changes in the details of the incidents reported in different interviews and the lack of initial complaint to police. The court also considered the trial judge's decision not to discharge the jury due to an irregularity in the evidence. The court found that the jury was entitled to conclude that guilt had been proved beyond reasonable doubt, given the probative value of the complainant's evidence. The court noted that the criminal standard of proof applies equally to child and adult witnesses but that the reliability of a child's evidence is assessed differently. The court concluded that the trial judge's decision not to discharge the jury did not risk a miscarriage of justice.
The appeal was dismissed, and the convictions were upheld. The court determined that the jury was properly entitled to find the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt, considering the evidence as a whole and the principles of assessing a child's evidence. The court rejected the arguments that the inconsistencies and irregularities in the evidence were so significant as to undermine the reliability of the complainant's testimony or to warrant a mistrial. The trial judge's decision not to discharge the jury was also found to be correct, and there was no miscarriage of justice.
Orders
Orders of the court
The appeal is dismissed.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Also relevant to the present case, given the complainant’s age at the time of giving evidence, are the observations of Sofronoff P in R v Allen (a pseudonym)[42] recently endorsed by Bond JA in R v WCH[43] that:“While the criminal standard of proof applies just as much to the evidence given by a child as it does to the evidence given by an adult, it is well understood and accepted that the factors taken into account to assess the reliability of the evidence of young children are not the same as those affecting the reliability of the evidence of adults. A child may not view events with the understanding of an adult, may be unable to recall important details that would be prominent in an adult’s recollection and may lack the linguistic ability to recount events or to explain them. Immaturity may lead a child into avoidance techniques when being questioned. Most importantly, as everyone who has any experience of young children knows, although in common with adults, the recollection of a child will be more accurate close in time to the relevant events, a very young child’s memory of events tends to fade very quickly.Section 93A of the Evidence Act is founded upon the sound assumption that the earliest account given by a young child is likely to be the most accurate account. It is this assumption which justifies a prosecutor asking a child, who is giving evidence pursuant to s 21AK at a later trial, whether the account tendered under s 93A is true and it is the assumption which can justify a jury’s acceptance of an affirmative answer. It is why s 2lAA states, as has already been pointed out, that one of the objects of Division 4A of Part 2 of the Act is to preserve, to the extent practicable, the integrity of the evidence of an affected child. The result of the practice that has developed around the use of the provision is that the jury has, potentially, an accurate account of events because it incorporates the contemporaneous choice of language, knowledge, experience, gestures and demeanour of a child witness rather than the account given by a child appearing as a witness, a long time later in the difficult sitting of a criminal trial, when the account may suffer not only from failures of recollection, the stressors inherent in a formal trial, but also from the effects of gained knowledge, experience and maturity.”Consideration[42][2020] QCA 233 at [21] and [22].[43][2025] QCA 124 at [10] with whom Flanagan JA and I agreed.Ground One The appellant contends that the Court in undertaking its own assessment of the evidence as a whole should conclude that the jury acting rationally should have entertained a reasonable doubt as to the appellant’s guilt. The appellant contends that the probative value of the complainant’s evidence was diminished or undermined by:(a)the complainant’s answers to the police in the first s 93A interview that there were no other incidents and that the appellant had not touched her vagina in any other way than she had described in the first interview, but then described both penile and digital penetration in the second interview. That included saying that additional sexual offending had occurred while staying at the hotel when they visited Aussie World and Australia Zoo;(b)the complainant had said in the first interview that the appellant had not tried to get her to touch him, but then in the second interview said that he had attempted to get her to touch his penis;(c)her evidence that a significant amount of the offending happened while she was asleep;(d)the complainant’s lack of recall as to what she had told police in the s 93A interviews when cross-examined which have been referred above;(e)the delay in making the complaint including the lack of complaint by the complainant in the interview with police on 25 February 2021 about the appellant offending against her raised doubt as the veracity of the complaints made by her; and(f)inconsistencies between the medical evidence and the allegations of sexual offending raised by the complainant.