White v Director of Military Prosecutions

Link copied
Case Copied 74 min read

HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

GLEESON CJ,
GUMMOW, KIRBY, HAYNE, CALLINAN, HEYDON AND CRENNAN JJ

ANNE MARGARET WHITE  PLAINTIFF

AND

DIRECTOR OF MILITARY PROSECUTIONS & ANOR                   DEFENDANTS

White v Director of Military Prosecutions [2007] HCA 29
19 June 2007
S312/2006

ORDER

Application dismissed with costs.

Representation

A W Street SC with D A McLure and J A Hogan-Doran for the plaintiff (instructed by North & Badgery)

D M J Bennett QC, Solicitor-General of the Commonwealth with T F J Berkley and S B Lloyd for the defendants (instructed by Australian Government Solicitor)

Notice:  This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

  1. GLEESON CJ.   The plaintiff, a Chief Petty Officer in the Royal Australian Navy, has been charged with seven offences under the Defence Force Discipline Act 1982 (Cth) ("the Act"). The alleged offences are said to have occurred in Victoria. They involve complaints of acts of indecency, or assault, upon five other female members of the Australian Defence Force, all of lower rank. The trial of the charges has not yet occurred, but it will be either by court martial or a Defence Force magistrate. The plaintiff challenges the validity of the provisions of the Act creating the offences with which she has been charged and providing for trial and punishment of such offences. In order to sustain that challenge, the plaintiff invites the Court to overrule its previous decisions in Re Tracey; Ex parte Ryan[1], Re Nolan; Ex parte Young[2], and Re Tyler; Ex parte Foley[3].  For the reasons that follow, the invitation should be declined.

  2. Two arguments are advanced on behalf of the plaintiff. The first, which conflicts with the reasoning of all the Justices who participated in the trilogy of cases just mentioned, is that it is contrary to the Constitution, and beyond the power of the Parliament, to establish a system of military justice involving trial and punishment of service offences, being a form of Commonwealth-made criminal law, by tribunals operating outside Ch III of the Constitution. Under pressure of argument, senior counsel for the plaintiff developed a narrower submission, which was said to be supported by some of the dissenting reasoning in those cases. The alternative submission is that no such system of military justice can operate validly in the case of service offences constituted by conduct that would also be an offence against the civil law; that the Act purports to apply to such conduct; that it is impossible by any process of severance to confine its operation to exclusively disciplinary offences; and that the Act is therefore invalid. By an exclusively disciplinary offence, counsel said he meant an offence that has three characteristics: first, it is one for which there is no civilian equivalent; secondly, it pertains to service discipline; and thirdly, it involves no exposure to imprisonment.

  3. It is necessary…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read White v Director of Military Prosecutions and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2007] HCA 29
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This case concerned a constitutional challenge brought by Ms Anne White, a member of the Royal Australian Navy, against the Director of Military Prosecutions. Ms White had been charged with seven "service offences" under the *Defence Force Discipline Act 1982* (Cth). Six of these charges alleged conduct outside the Jervis Bay Territory that constituted a "Territory offence" under the *Crimes Act 1900* (ACT), while the seventh alleged assault. Ms White denied these charges, and the dispute centred on whether the Director could constitutionally prosecute these offences before a service tribunal, or whether such trials required the exercise of the judicial power of the Commonwealth under Chapter III of the Constitution. The High Court of Australia was required to determine the constitutional validity of the provisions of the Act that allowed for the trial of these service offences by military tribunals.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the trial of service offences, particularly those based on civilian criminal law such as the alleged indecency and assault, by Defence Force magistrates or courts martial constituted an exercise of the judicial power of the Commonwealth, thereby requiring adherence to Chapter III of the Constitution. The Court had to consider whether the *Defence Force Discipline Act 1982* (Cth) validly conferred jurisdiction over such matters to service tribunals, or if these offences should instead be tried by the independent courts established under Chapter III. This involved an examination of the nature of "service offences" and the extent to which they could be distinguished from ordinary criminal offences triable by the civil judicature.

A majority of the High Court, in joint reasons from Gummow, Hayne, and Crennan JJ, with separate concurring judgments from Gleeson CJ, Callinan, and Heydon JJ, found that the challenge to the constitutional validity of the provisions in question succeeded on the second argument advanced by the plaintiff. The Court reasoned that defence personnel, as citizens, are entitled to have disputed charges of serious criminal conduct resolved before independent courts operating within the Judicature and outside the Executive. The majority concluded that the Act should be restructured to confine the exercise of "military justice" outside the civil courts to properly defined disciplinary offences, while remitting all other contested offences to the independent courts established under Chapter III of the Constitution. The application was dismissed with costs, but this outcome was accompanied by the significant finding that the provisions allowing for the trial of these types of offences by service tribunals were constitutionally invalid. Kirby J dissented.

Orders

Orders of the court

Application dismissed with costs. [Gummow, Hayne, Crennan JJ in a joint judgment, with individual judgments and reasons from Gleeson CJ, Callinan and Heydon JJ, Kirby J dissenting.]

Background

Background to the litigation

The challenge to the constitutional validity of the provisions in question succeeds on the second argument advanced in the proceedings[91]. Appropriate relief should issue. This would have the beneficial consequence of requiring a restructuring of the Act to confine the exercise of "military justice", outside the courts, to disciplinary offences properly defined, remitting all other contested offences to the independent courts of the Judicature, established in accordance with Ch III of the Constitution. Defence personnel are citizens. They are entitled, as much as any others, to one of the most precious guarantees that the Constitution offers – the resolution of disputed charges of serious criminal conduct before independent courts operating wholly within the Judicature and outside the Executive.[91]Reasons of Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ ("joint reasons") at [60].The facts The alleged offences: Ms Anne White ("the plaintiff") is a defence member[92], being a member of the Permanent Navy of the Commonwealth ("the Royal Australian Navy"). The expression "defence member" includes, in certain circumstances, members of the Reserves[93]. The plaintiff has been charged with seven "service offences"[94]. [92]As defined in the Act, s 3(1).[93]The Act, s 3(1). See also s 3(4).[94]As defined in the Act, s 3(1). Six of the alleged offences charge that the plaintiff engaged "in conduct outside the Jervis Bay Territory" which is a "Territory offence"[95], being an offence of an act of indecency without consent. The remaining charge, alleged in the alternative to such an offence, asserts that the plaintiff assaulted a named person in a public place. The indecency offences are based on the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT), s 60 as applied to a defence member by s 61(3) of the Act. That section extends defined Territory offences to "a defence member or a defence civilian"[96]. [95]As defined in the Act, s 3(1).[96]As defined in the Act, s 3(1). The plaintiff denies all of the offences. A contest between the first defendant, the Director of Military Prosecutions ("the Director"), and the plaintiff is thus presented as to whether the Director can prove the charges against the plaintiff according to law in a constitutionally valid court or tribunal. Unless restrained by this Court, the Director intends to request the Registrar of Military Justice to refer the charges for trial before a Defence Force magistrate or to convene a court martial for such trial[97]. The determination of the charges at trial has been interrupted by these proceedings.[97]Under s 103(1)(c) and (d). The jurisdiction of the Defence Force magistrate is provided by the Act, s 129. See also s 135. Trial by courts martial is provided for by the Act, s 132. The surrounding circumstances: Although this Court has not been asked to determine any contested facts, the record contains an affidavit of the plaintiff, included without stated objection by the Director or the Commonwealth (the latter added as second defendant). The affidavit contains unchallenged assertions which, although not determinative of any constitutional question, illustrate the kind of circumstance to which the language of the Act lends itself to application, if the Act is valid.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

GLEESON CJ (dissent) GUMMOW, HAYNE AND CRENNAN JJ KIRBY J CALLINAN J HEYDON J (dissent)
Undoubtedly difficult questions may arise in considering the significance for a particular case of that overlap. However, these questions need not be pursued in this case. The plaintiff's second submission is cast in a form which denies an occasion here for consideration of the overlap.Conclusion The application should be dismissed with costs. These proceedings involve a challenge to the constitutional validity of the trial of charges brought under the Defence Force Discipline Act 1982 (Cth) ("the Act"). The case obliges this Court to return to first principles. In the past, there have been holdings, assumptions and dicta concerning the validity of the applicable provisions of the Act and its predecessors. However, the point now presented has not hitherto been decided. In a number of recent cases, it was reserved[87]. Where a challenge of such a kind is presented by a party with the requisite standing, this Court is engaged in the most important function for which it is established by the Constitution[88]. A laissez faire attitude to challenged federal legislation is not one that this Court has historically adopted[89]. It is not one that I would adopt now[90].[87]Hembury v Chief of the General Staff (1998) 193 CLR 641 at 657 [44]-[45], and see also at 669-670 [72]; Re Aird; Ex parte Alpert (2004) 220 CLR 308 at 326 [57].[88]Constitution, s 71.[89]cf Bank of NSW v The Commonwealth (1948) 76 CLR 1, affirmed (1949) 79 CLR 497; [1950] AC 235; Australian Communist Party v The Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1 at 193.[90]cf New South Wales v Commonwealth (2006) 81 ALJR 34 at 168 [615]; 231 ALR 1 at 165; Forge v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2006) 80 ALJR 1606 at 1658 [218]; 229 ALR 223 at 286; Attorney-General (Vic) v Andrews (2007) 81 ALJR 729 at 758 [164]; 233 ALR 389 at 427. The challenge to the constitutional validity of the provisions in question succeeds on the second argument advanced in the proceedings[91]. Appropriate relief should issue. This would have the beneficial consequence of requiring a restructuring of the Act to confine the exercise of "military justice", outside the courts, to disciplinary offences properly defined, remitting all other contested offences to the independent courts of the Judicature, established in accordance with Ch III of the Constitution. Defence personnel are citizens. They are entitled, as much as any others, to one of the most precious guarantees that the Constitution offers – the resolution of disputed charges of serious criminal conduct before independent courts operating wholly within the Judicature and outside the Executive.[91]Reasons of Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ ("joint reasons") at [60].The facts The alleged offences: Ms Anne White ("the plaintiff") is a defence member[92], being a member of the Permanent Navy of the Commonwealth ("the Royal Australian Navy"). The expression "defence member" includes, in certain circumstances, members of the Reserves[93]. The plaintiff has been charged with seven "service offences"[94]. [92]As defined in the Act, s 3(1).[93]The Act, s 3(1). See also s 3(4).[94]As defined in the Act, s 3(1).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: GUMMOW, HAYNE AND CRENNAN JJ, KIRBY J, CALLINAN J,