HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
GLEESON CJ,
GUMMOW, KIRBY, HAYNE, CALLINAN, HEYDON AND CRENNAN JJANNE MARGARET WHITE PLAINTIFF
AND
DIRECTOR OF MILITARY PROSECUTIONS & ANOR DEFENDANTS
White v Director of Military Prosecutions [2007] HCA 29
19 June 2007
S312/2006ORDER
Application dismissed with costs.
Representation
A W Street SC with D A McLure and J A Hogan-Doran for the plaintiff (instructed by North & Badgery)
D M J Bennett QC, Solicitor-General of the Commonwealth with T F J Berkley and S B Lloyd for the defendants (instructed by Australian Government Solicitor)
Notice: This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.
GLEESON CJ. The plaintiff, a Chief Petty Officer in the Royal Australian Navy, has been charged with seven offences under the Defence Force Discipline Act 1982 (Cth) ("the Act"). The alleged offences are said to have occurred in Victoria. They involve complaints of acts of indecency, or assault, upon five other female members of the Australian Defence Force, all of lower rank. The trial of the charges has not yet occurred, but it will be either by court martial or a Defence Force magistrate. The plaintiff challenges the validity of the provisions of the Act creating the offences with which she has been charged and providing for trial and punishment of such offences. In order to sustain that challenge, the plaintiff invites the Court to overrule its previous decisions in Re Tracey; Ex parte Ryan[1], Re Nolan; Ex parte Young[2], and Re Tyler; Ex parte Foley[3]. For the reasons that follow, the invitation should be declined.
Two arguments are advanced on behalf of the plaintiff. The first, which conflicts with the reasoning of all the Justices who participated in the trilogy of cases just mentioned, is that it is contrary to the Constitution, and beyond the power of the Parliament, to establish a system of military justice involving trial and punishment of service offences, being a form of Commonwealth-made criminal law, by tribunals operating outside Ch III of the Constitution. Under pressure of argument, senior counsel for the plaintiff developed a narrower submission, which was said to be supported by some of the dissenting reasoning in those cases. The alternative submission is that no such system of military justice can operate validly in the case of service offences constituted by conduct that would also be an offence against the civil law; that the Act purports to apply to such conduct; that it is impossible by any process of severance to confine its operation to exclusively disciplinary offences; and that the Act is therefore invalid. By an exclusively disciplinary offence, counsel said he meant an offence that has three characteristics: first, it is one for which there is no civilian equivalent; secondly, it pertains to service discipline; and thirdly, it involves no exposure to imprisonment.
It is necessary…
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- Case
- [2007] HCA 29
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the trial of service offences, particularly those based on civilian criminal law such as the alleged indecency and assault, by Defence Force magistrates or courts martial constituted an exercise of the judicial power of the Commonwealth, thereby requiring adherence to Chapter III of the Constitution. The Court had to consider whether the *Defence Force Discipline Act 1982* (Cth) validly conferred jurisdiction over such matters to service tribunals, or if these offences should instead be tried by the independent courts established under Chapter III. This involved an examination of the nature of "service offences" and the extent to which they could be distinguished from ordinary criminal offences triable by the civil judicature.
A majority of the High Court, in joint reasons from Gummow, Hayne, and Crennan JJ, with separate concurring judgments from Gleeson CJ, Callinan, and Heydon JJ, found that the challenge to the constitutional validity of the provisions in question succeeded on the second argument advanced by the plaintiff. The Court reasoned that defence personnel, as citizens, are entitled to have disputed charges of serious criminal conduct resolved before independent courts operating within the Judicature and outside the Executive. The majority concluded that the Act should be restructured to confine the exercise of "military justice" outside the civil courts to properly defined disciplinary offences, while remitting all other contested offences to the independent courts established under Chapter III of the Constitution. The application was dismissed with costs, but this outcome was accompanied by the significant finding that the provisions allowing for the trial of these types of offences by service tribunals were constitutionally invalid. Kirby J dissented.
Orders
Orders of the court
Application dismissed with costs. [Gummow, Hayne, Crennan JJ in a joint judgment, with individual judgments and reasons from Gleeson CJ, Callinan and Heydon JJ, Kirby J dissenting.]
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: GUMMOW, HAYNE AND CRENNAN JJ, KIRBY J, CALLINAN J,