Commonwealth v Westwood

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Commonwealth of Australia v Westwood [2007] FCA 1282

JURISDICTION – whether the Court has jurisdiction to entertain an application for purely declaratory relief in relation to an evidentiary ruling of a court martial – whether the Director of Military Prosecutions is the Commonwealth for the purposes of s 39B(1A)(a) of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth).

JUDICIAL REVIEW – discretion – application for declaratory relief in relation to pending court martial – whether circumstances of the case are ‘most exceptional’ – prejudice to accused – likelihood of alternative remedies.

WORDS AND PHRASES – ‘the Commonwealth’, ‘most exceptional’.

Constitution ss 51(vi), 75, 76, 77(i), 77(iii)

Defence Act 1903 (Cth), s 9A
Defence Force Discipline Act 1982 (Cth) ss 3(1), 10, 40(1), 44(1), 29(1), 101, 101ZB, 101ZC, 114, 115(1), 119(1), 133, 134, 140(1), 141, 146, 188F, 188FA, 188G, 188GA, 188GF, 188GH, 188GN, 190(1)
Defence Force Discipline Appeals Act 1955 (Cth)
Defence Legislation Amendment Act 2006 (Cth)
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), s 8(1)
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), s 39B(1A)(a)

Defence Instruction (General) ADMIN 45-2
Defence Instruction (General) ADMIN 20-29
Defence Security Manual (‘SECMAN 4’)

Defence Legislation Amendment Bill 2007 (Cth), cl 19A
Explanatory Memorandum, Defence Legislation Amendment Bill 2007 (Cth)

Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW) s 5F

ACS v Anderson [1975] 1 NSWLR 212 cited
Austral Pacific Group Ltd (in liq) v Airservices Australia (2000) 203 CLR 136 cited
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Edensor Nominees Pty Ltd (2001) 204 CLR 559 applied
Bacon v Rose [1972] 2 NSWLR 793 distinguished
Commonwealth v Lyon (2003) 133 FCR 265 cited
Mellifont v. Attorney-General (Qld) (1991) 173 CLR 289 cited
Re Tracey; Ex parte Ryan (1989) 166 CLR 578 cited

Sankey v Whitlam (1978) 142 CLR 1 followed
White v Director of Military Prosecutions [2007] HCA 29 cited

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA v BRIG IAN WESTWOOD & ANOR

NSD1253 OF 2007

SACKVILLE J
21 AUGUST 2007
SYDNEY

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD1253 OF 2007

BETWEEN:

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
First Applicant

DIRECTOR OF MILITARY PROSECUTIONS
Second Applicant

AND:

BRIG IAN WESTWOOD
CHIEF JUDGE ADVOCATE
First Respondent

LT COL ROGER STEPHEN GIBSON
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

SACKVILLE J

DATE OF ORDER:

21 AUGUST 2007

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application be dismissed.

2.There be no order as to costs.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

 NSD1253 OF 2007

BETWEEN:

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
First Respondent

DIRECTOR OF MILITARY PROSECUTIONS
Second Applicant 

AND:

BRIG IAN WESTWOOD
CHIEF JUDGE ADVOCATE
First Respondent

LT COL ROGER STEPHEN GIBSON
Second Respondent 

JUDGE:

SACKVILLE J 

DATE:

21 AUGUST 2007

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THE PROCEEDINGS

  1. These proceedings arise out of an evidentiary ruling made by the first respondent (‘Judge Advocate’) on 11 April 2007, in the course of a restricted court martial.  The court martial was convened by…

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Details
Case
[2007] FCA 1282
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Commonwealth v Westwood involved a legal dispute concerning an evidentiary ruling made in a court martial. The applicants sought a declaration from the court that the ruling was flawed and should be reconsidered. The legal issues before the court were whether the circumstances of the case were exceptional enough to warrant the grant of declaratory relief, and if so, whether the court should exercise its discretion to grant the relief. The court found that the applicants had not established that the circumstances were exceptional, and that there was an alternative procedure available that protected the interests of the accused and was sanctioned by Parliament. The court declined to grant the declaration and dismissed the application. There was no order as to costs.

The court considered the question of whether the circumstances of the case were exceptional enough to warrant the grant of declaratory relief. The applicants argued that the issue of law they wished to ventilate was important, but the court found that there was an alternative procedure available that provided a means of testing the correctness of the Judge Advocate's reasoning. The court also noted that the intervention of the court would cause significant delay and fragmentation of the court martial process. The court found that the applicants had not established that the circumstances were exceptional enough to warrant the grant of declaratory relief.

The court further considered whether it should exercise its discretion to grant the relief, even if the applicants made out their contentions on the question of law. The court found that declaratory relief would involve the potential for significant prejudice to the accused, who would be the only member of the Armed Forces charged with an offence before a court martial ever to be denied the benefit of a favourable evidentiary ruling made by the court martial. The court also noted that if the amending legislation was passed, the accused would presumably be the last such person. The court found that it would not be appropriate to exercise its discretion in favour of granting the declaration sought by the applicants.

The court dismissed the application and made no order as to costs. The court found that the circumstances of the case were not exceptional enough to warrant the grant of declaratory relief, and that there was an alternative procedure available that protected the interests of the accused and was sanctioned by Parliament. The court also found that declaratory relief would involve the potential for significant prejudice to the accused, and that it would not be appropriate to exercise its discretion in favour of granting the declaration sought by the applicants.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed.

2. There be no order as to costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

SACKVILLE J
Having reached the conclusion that the circumstances of the present case are not exceptional, it is perhaps not necessary to consider the exercise of discretion as a separate matter. If, however, there is a residual discretion to grant the declaration relief sought by the applicants notwithstanding the conclusion I have reached, I would not exercise it in favour of the applicants. In addition to the matters to which I have referred, declaratory relief would involve the potential for significant prejudice to the Accused. On the information I have been given, if the present application were to succeed the Accused would be the only member of the Armed Forces charged with an offence before a court martial ever to be denied the benefit of a favourable evidentiary ruling made by the court martial. And if the amending legislation is passed, he would presumably be the last such person.CONCLUSION For the reasons I have given, I do not think that it would be appropriate for the Court to grant the applicants the declaration they seek. Even if they establish that the reasoning of the Judge Advocate in support of his evidentiary ruling was flawed, this is not one of the most exceptional cases that would justify the grant of declaratory relief. In any event, I would not be prepared to exercise any discretion available to me in favour of granting the declaration sought by the applicants. The application will be dismissed. Since the Accused does not seek a costs order if he is successful in the proceedings, there will be no order as to costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: SACKVILLE J

The issue the applicants wish to ventilate involves a question of law. In order to resolve it, there would be no occasion to make findings of fact.A Case For a Declaration? In determining whether I should entertain the application for declaratory relief in respect of an evidentiary ruling made in the course of an incomplete court martial, there are two closely related questions. The first is whether the present application involves ‘most exceptional’ circumstances, as Sankey v Whitlam suggests and the applicants accept is necessary for the grant of declaratory relief. The second is whether the Court should exercise its discretion in favour of granting the declaration sought by the applicants (assuming they make out their contentions on the question of law). In my view, the applicants have not established that the circumstances of this case are most exceptional. I am prepared to accept that the issue of law that the applicants wish to ventilate is of some importance in relation to the organisational arrangements within the ADO and the Department of Defence for the investigation of alleged security breaches by defence personnel. However, the legislation before Parliament proposing to amend the DFDA Act, if passed (as seems likely), will provide a mechanism for testing the correctness of the Judge Advocate’s reasoning in the present case (should that reasoning be followed by a subsequent court martial or by the Australian Military Court, once it is established). The new statutory procedure, unlike the procedure invoked by the applicants in the present case, will not deny the accused person the benefit of a favourable evidentiary ruling by reason of the presiding officer erring in law. Nor will it involve delay and fragmentation of the court martial or military court process, as do the current proceedings. The circumstances of this case are not quite the same as ACS v Anderson [1975] 1 NSWLR 212, to which I was referred in argument. There it was held that the entitlement of both the Crown and the accused to appeal against an evidentiary ruling, thereby providing a means of determining the question raised by an application for declaratory relief, was a ‘cogent reason for the jurisdiction being declined’: at 217, per Hutley JA. In the present case, the prosecution does not yet have a means of challenging the Judge Advocate’s ruling. But the likelihood is that it will soon have a means of challenging any similar ruling in this Court. The evidence does not establish that there are any pending courts martial that will necessarily give rise to the same legal issue as that presented by the Judge Advocate’s ruling in the present case. Even if the same issue does arise, the applicants do not suggest that a later court martial will be bound to follow the Judge Advocate’s ruling. If that ruling is as flawed as the applicants suggest, they will be able to challenge it before the court martial when it convenes. Furthermore, the intervention of this Court would sanction significant delay by the applicants, for which no adequate explanation has been given. The court martial process has been fragmented to the detriment of the Accused. Indeed, the making of a declaration will effectively require the court martial to reconsider the admissibility of the Record of Interview in the light of other arguments advanced by the Accused. An alternative procedure, which is sanctioned by Parliament and protects the interests of accused persons, is likely to be available shortly. This procedure will allow any ruling to the same effect as that made by the Judge Advocate, insofar as it has value as a precedent, to be challenged in this Court.