Austral Pacific Group Ltd (In liq) v Airservices Australia

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

GLEESON CJ,
McHUGH, GUMMOW, HAYNE AND CALLINAN JJ

AUSTRAL PACIFIC GROUP LIMITED
(IN LIQUIDATION)  APPELLANT

AND

AIRSERVICES AUSTRALIA  RESPONDENT

Austral Pacific Group Limited v Airservices Australia [2000] HCA 39
3 August 2000
B46/1999

ORDER

Appeal dismissed with costs.

On appeal from the Supreme Court of Queensland

Representation:

P J Lyons QC with R N Traves for the appellant (instructed by Michael Stewart)

P A Keane QC with P A Freeburn for the respondent (instructed by Corrs Chambers Westgarth)

Notice:  This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

CATCHWORDS

Austral Pacific Group Limited v Airservices Australia

Negligence – Action by employee against appliance manufacturer – Manufacturer issued third party proceedings against Commonwealth authority employer – Federal jurisdiction attracted – Application by Commonwealth authority to strike out manufacturer's third party notice against it – Whether Commonwealth authority was liable as a joint tortfeasor "in respect of the same damage" as manufacturer – Whether employee's non‑compliance with the requirement of election in s 45 of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) ever subjected the Commonwealth authority to liability to the employee.

Federal jurisdiction – Whether s 64 of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) operated – Whether s 79 of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) "picked up" ss 6 and 7 of the Law Reform Act 1995 (Q) – Whether ss 44 or 45 of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) "otherwise provided" within the meaning of s 79 of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth).

Words and phrases – "matter", "the Commonwealth", "otherwise provided".

Constitution, ss 75(iii), 76(ii).
Air Services Act 1995 (Cth), ss 7, 8.
Civil Aviation Act 1988 (Cth).
Civil Aviation Legislation Amendment Act 1995 (Cth), s 9.
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), ss 39(2), 64, 79.
Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth), ss 44, 45.
Law Reform Act 1995 (Q), ss 6, 7.

  1. GLEESON CJ, GUMMOW AND HAYNE JJ.   This is an appeal from the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Queensland[1].  It raises issues respecting the operation of Pt IV (ss 42-52) of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) ("the Compensation Act") and the operation of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) ("the Judiciary Act") to "pick up" a law of the State of Queensland respecting contribution between joint and several tortfeasors. The Queensland law is found in ss 6 and 7 of the Law Reform Act 1995 (Q) ("the Contribution Act"). The amount of contribution recovered under that legislation may amount to a complete indemnity (s 7). Issues similar to those arising on this appeal have been the subject of decisions by the New South Wales Court of Appeal in The Commonwealth v Flaviano[2] and the South Australian Full Court in Coomblas v Gee[3].

    The facts…

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Details
Case
[2000] HCA 39
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Austral Pacific Group Limited (In liq) appealed to the High Court of Australia against an order of the Court of Appeal of Queensland that struck out its third-party notice against Airservices Australia. Austral Pacific had been sued in the District Court of Queensland by an employee, Mr Crockford, for damages for personal injury sustained while employed by the Civil Aviation Authority, whose assets and liabilities had subsequently transferred to Airservices Australia. Austral Pacific sought contribution or indemnity from Airservices Australia under Queensland's Law Reform Act 1995, arguing that Airservices was a joint tortfeasor liable for the same damage.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether Airservices Australia was a tortfeasor who was, or would have been if sued, liable in respect of the same damage for which Austral Pacific was liable. This question hinged on the operation of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) and the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) in relation to the Queensland contribution legislation. Specifically, the court considered whether the Compensation Act, by its provisions concerning employee compensation and election to sue, precluded Airservices from being considered a tortfeasor liable to the employee, thereby preventing Austral Pacific from claiming contribution.

The High Court reasoned that the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) provided a comprehensive scheme for compensation to employees of Commonwealth authorities. Under this scheme, an employee's right to institute proceedings for damages against their employer was contingent on making an election under section 45 of the Act. The court found that, based on the relevant provisions of the Compensation Act, there was no point in time at which the employee could have successfully brought an action against Airservices Australia for the damage sustained. Consequently, Airservices could not be considered a tortfeasor who was, or would have been if sued, liable for the same damage as Austral Pacific, a necessary condition for a valid claim for contribution under the Queensland Law Reform Act 1995.

The appeal was dismissed with costs. The High Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeal of Queensland, holding that Airservices Australia was not a tortfeasor liable for the same damage as Austral Pacific, and therefore, the third-party notice claiming contribution or indemnity was correctly struck out.

Orders

Orders of the court

Appeal dismissed with costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

GLEESON This is an appeal from the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Queensland[1]. It raises issues respecting the operation of Pt IV (ss 42-52) of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) ("the Compensation Act") and the operation of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) ("the Judiciary Act") to "pick up" a law of the State of Queensland respecting contribution between joint and several tortfeasors. The Queensland law is found in ss 6 and 7 of the Law Reform Act 1995 (Q) ("the Contribution Act"). The amount of contribution recovered under that legislation may amount to a complete indemnity (s 7). Issues similar to those arising on this appeal have been the subject of decisions by the New South Wales Court of Appeal in The Commonwealth v Flaviano[2] and the South Australian Full Court in Coomblas v Gee[3].[1]Airservices Australia v Austral Pacific Group Ltd (1998) 157 ALR 125.[2](1996) 40 NSWLR 199.[3](1998) 72 SASR 247.The facts and the history of the litigation In the present matter, the Court of Appeal (McPherson JA, Pincus JA, Ambrose J) allowed an appeal against the dismissal of an application by the present respondent, Airservices Australia ("Airservices"), to strike out a third party notice by the present appellant ("Austral Pacific"). Austral Pacific had been sued in the District Court by plaint dated 9 January 1997. The plaintiff, Mr Crockford, claimed damages against Austral Pacific in respect of injuries sustained by him on 26 February 1994 at the airport at Cairns, whilst an employee of the Civil Aviation Authority ("the CAA"), a body established by the Civil Aviation Act 1988 (Cth) ("the 1988 Act"). In the interval between 1994 and the institution of the action in 1997, the 1988 Act had been amended by the Civil Aviation Legislation Amendment Act 1995 (Cth) ("the Amendment Act") and Airservices had been established as a body corporate by s 7 of the Air Services Act 1995 (Cth) ("the Airservices Act"). Section 9 of the Amendment Act provided for the assets and liabilities of the CAA to become the assets and liabilities of Airservices. For the purposes of this appeal it may be taken that this provision operated upon the causes of action on which the plaintiff later sued in 1997, and made Airservices an appropriate defendant[4].[4]See Crimmins v Stevedoring Industry Finance Committee (1999) 74 ALJR 1 at 4 [6]-[8], 4‑5 [12]-[16], 26-29 [134]-[147], 35-36 [187]-[189], 48-50 [244]-[257]; 167 ALR 1 at 3‑4, 4‑5, 34‑38, 46‑47, 64‑67. In allowing Airservices' appeal against the dismissal of its application to strike out the third party notice, the Court of Appeal held that the effect of the relevant provisions of the Compensation Act was that there was no time at which the plaintiff could have successfully brought an action against Airservices. This meant that Austral Pacific could not satisfy a necessary condition for a good contribution claim against Airservices under the Contribution Act. The Court of Appeal followed the decision of the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Flaviano and shortly thereafter, in Coomblas, the South Australian Full Court also followed Flaviano. Flaviano concerned the contribution provisions in the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1946 (NSW) and Coomblas those in the Wrongs Act 1936 (SA). No relevant distinction appeared between the State statutes.

Decision

Reasons for decision

GLEESON CJ, GUMMOW AND HAYNE JJ (dissent) HUGH J CALLINAN J
It is unnecessary to determine whether, in addition to these sequential steps, the Compensation Act requires another, the service on the proposed defendant of the written election. The statute does not specify this as a requirement. The significance of the writing requirement for the election may be to emphasise its significance for the employee and his or her legal advisers that the step once taken is irreversible (s 45(3)). Further, the onus of demonstrating that an election had been made, if the point be raised as an issue in an action subsequently instituted, would rest on the plaintiff. The primary evidence on such an issue will be the written election.Conclusion Airservices at no time has been a tortfeasor who would, if sued by the plaintiff, have been liable as a joint tortfeasor in respect of the same damage as Austral Pacific. The appeal should be dismissed with costs. Mc Pursuant to the grant of special leave to appeal, Austral Pacific Group Limited ("the defendant") appeals against an order of the Court of Appeal of Queensland. That order resulted in the striking out of the defendant's claim for contribution or indemnity against Airservices Australia ("the third party"). The defendant has been sued in the District Court of Queensland for damages for personal injury. For the purposes of this appeal, the relevant claim of the plaintiff in that action is that he sustained injuries as the result of the defendant's negligence. The third party is a Commonwealth authority within the meaning of s 4(1) of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) ("the Compensation Act") which provides for compensation to employees of Commonwealth authorities who are injured at work. For the purposes of this appeal, the position of the third party is as if it had been, at all relevant times, the employer of the plaintiff. The issue in this appeal is whether the third party is a tortfeasor "who is, or would if sued have been, liable" in respect of the same damage for which the defendant is liable. That issue arises in circumstances where the plaintiff has not received compensation under the Compensation Act, nor has he made an election to institute proceedings for damages against the third party. In response to the plaintiff's claim, the defendant filed a third party notice as well as a defence. The notice claimed indemnity or contribution from the third party pursuant to ss 6 and 7 of the Law Reform Act 1995 (Q) ("the Contribution Act"). Subsequently, the third party moved to strike out the notice, but Trafford‑Walker DCJ dismissed the application. On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Queensland (McPherson, Pincus JJA and Ambrose J) ordered that the notice be struck out[34].[34] Airservices Australia v Austral Pacific Group Ltd (1998) 157 ALR 125.The statutory background Sections 6(c) and 7 of the Contribution Act relevantly provide: "Proceedings against, and contribution between, joint and several tortfeasors6. Where damage is suffered by any person as a result of a tort (whether a crime or not) –...(c)any tortfeasor liable in respect of that damage may recover contribution from any other tortfeasor who is, or would if sued have been, liable in respect of the same damage, whether as a joint tortfeasor or otherwise, so, however, that no person shall be entitled to recover contribution under this section from any person entitled to be indemnified by the person in respect of the liability in respect of which the contribution is sought.Amount of contribution and power of the court7. In any proceedings for contribution ... the amount of the contribution recoverable from any person shall be such as may be found by the court to be just and equitable having regard to the extent of that person's responsibility for the damage; and the court shall have power to exempt any person from liability to make contribution, or to direct that the contribution to be recovered from any person shall amount to a complete indemnity."

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: HUGH J, CALLINAN J

The court's reasoning in this appeal is centered around the issue of whether Airservices Australia could be held liable as a joint tortfeasor "in respect of the same damage" as Austral Pacific Group Ltd, given the statutory framework provided by the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) and the Law Reform Act 1995 (Q). Firstly, the court determined that Airservices Australia could not be considered a joint tortfeasor liable for the same damage as Austral Pacific Group Ltd because the plaintiff had not received compensation under the Compensation Act nor made an election to sue Airservices Australia under s 45 of the Act. This conclusion aligns with the court's interpretation of the Compensation Act, which stipulates that an employee cannot simultaneously pursue compensation under the Act and common law damages against a Commonwealth authority. This interpretation was reinforced by the court's reliance on the decision in The Commonwealth v Flaviano and Coomblas v Gee, where similar issues were addressed and similar conclusions were reached.

Secondly, the court examined whether the Commonwealth authority, Airservices Australia, was ever subjected to liability due to the employee's non-compliance with the election requirement in s 45 of the Compensation Act. The court held that since the plaintiff did not elect to sue Airservices Australia within the prescribed period, Airservices Australia could not be held liable for damages in respect of the same damage as Austral Pacific Group Ltd. The court's reasoning here was based on the statutory requirement of an election under s 45, which, if not made within the stipulated time, precludes any claim against the Commonwealth authority. This conclusion is consistent with the court's interpretation of the Compensation Act, which emphasizes the necessity of an election for employees to pursue claims against Commonwealth authorities.

Thirdly, the court considered whether s 64 of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) operated to attract federal jurisdiction in this case. The court found that federal jurisdiction was indeed attracted because the case involved a Commonwealth authority, Airservices Australia, and the issues raised pertained to the interpretation and application of Commonwealth legislation. The court's reasoning was based on the principle that cases involving Commonwealth authorities and Commonwealth legislation fall under federal jurisdiction. This finding aligns with the established jurisprudence on the jurisdictional reach of the Judiciary Act.

Fourthly, the court addressed whether s 79 of the Judiciary Act "picked up" ss 6 and 7 of the Law Reform Act 1995 (Q), which deal with contribution between joint and several tortfeasors. The court concluded that s 79 did indeed "pick up" the Queensland legislation, meaning that federal courts are empowered to apply state laws regarding contribution between joint tortfeasors. This conclusion was based on the court's interpretation of s 79, which allows federal courts to apply state laws to matters where federal jurisdiction is attracted. The court's decision was consistent with the reasoning in previous cases such as Flaviano and Coomblas, which also addressed the interplay between federal and state laws on contribution.

Lastly, the court examined whether ss 44 or 45 of the Compensation Act "otherwise provided" within the meaning of s 79 of the Judiciary Act. The court found that these sections did not "otherwise provide" in a way that would preclude the application of the Contribution Act. The court reasoned that the Compensation Act does not comprehensively address the issue of contribution between tortfeasors, thus allowing the application of state laws on contribution. This conclusion was consistent with the court's previous findings and reinforced the principle that federal legislation does not preclude the application of state laws where there is no explicit provision to the contrary.

In summary, the court's reasoning was based on a detailed interpretation of the statutory framework provided by the Compensation Act and the Contribution Act, reinforced by previous decisions in Flaviano and Coomblas. The court held that Airservices Australia could not be held liable as a joint tortfeasor due to the plaintiff's non-compliance with the election requirement, and that federal jurisdiction was attracted under s 64 of the Judiciary Act. The court also found that s 79 of the Judiciary Act "picked up" the Contribution Act and that the Compensation Act did not "otherwise provide" in a manner that would preclude this application. The ratio decidendi of this decision is that where a Commonwealth authority is involved and the statutory framework of the Compensation Act does not preclude it, federal courts can apply state laws on contribution between joint tortfeasors.