HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
FRENCH CJ,
KIEFEL, BELL, KEANE AND GORDON JJYAU MING MATTHEW MOK APPELLANT
AND
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS (NSW) RESPONDENT
Mok v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW)
[2016] HCA 13
6 April 2016
S246/2015
ORDER
Appeal dismissed with costs.
On appeal from the Supreme Court of New South Wales
Representation
G R James QC with P D Lange for the appellant (instructed by Murphy's Lawyers)
N J Adams SC with B K Baker for the respondent (instructed by Solicitor for Public Prosections (NSW))
Notice: This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.
Federal jurisdiction – Application of State laws – Service and Execution of Process Act 1992 (Cth) ("SEPA"), s 89(4) – Where appellant arrested in Victoria pursuant to warrant issued in New South Wales – Where order made under s 83(8)(b) of SEPA to return appellant in custody to New South Wales – Where appellant charged with attempting to escape lawful custody under s 310D of Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) ("Crimes Act") – Whether s 89(4) of SEPA applied s 310D of Crimes Act as surrogate federal law – Whether content of applied State law altered – Whether prosecution required to prove all elements of offence under State law.
Words and phrases – "competent authority", "correctional centre", "court", "escape lawful custody", "inmate", "law of a State", "surrogate federal law".
Constitution, ss 51(xxiv), 52(i).
Commonwealth Places (Application of Laws) Act 1970 (Cth), s 4.
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), ss 68, 79.
Service and Execution of Process Act 1992 (Cth), ss 8(4), 81A, 82, 83, 89.
Children (Detention Centres) Act 1987 (NSW), s 33(1).
Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), Pt 1A, ss 310A, 310D.
Crimes (Administration of Sentences) Act 1999 (NSW), ss 3(1), 4.
Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW), ss 5, 12.
FRENCH CJ AND BELL J.
Introduction
The Service and Execution of Process Act 1992 (Cth) ("SEPA 1992") provides for the execution throughout Australia of warrants authorising the apprehension of persons under State laws[1]. Under SEPA 1992 a person named in a warrant issued in one State may be apprehended in another State[2] and taken before a magistrate in that State. Upon production of the warrant or a copy of it[3] the magistrate must make one of two orders under s 83(8) of the Act. The person must be remanded on bail to appear in the issuing State at a specified place and time[4] or, as in the present case, an order made under s 83(8)(b):
"that the person be taken, in such custody or otherwise as the magistrate specifies, to a specified place in the place of issue of the warrant."
In the latter event, the person must be returned in custody to the State in which the warrant was issued.
[1]SEPA 1992, s 3(1), definition of "warrant". Section 5(1) regards each Territory (except external Territories that are taken to be part of a State or another Territory…
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- Case
- [2016] HCA 13
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the High Court were whether section 89(4) of SEPA applied section 310D of the *Crimes Act* as a "surrogate federal law", whether the content of the applied State law was altered by this operation, and consequently, whether the prosecution was required to prove all the elements of the offence under the State law. The Court was required to interpret the scope and effect of section 89(4) of SEPA in relation to State laws concerning escape from lawful custody when a person is being returned to a State under an order made pursuant to SEPA.
The High Court held that section 89(4) of SEPA applied section 310D of the *Crimes Act* as a surrogate federal law to the appellant. The Court reasoned that section 89(4) operates in a focused manner, applying a limited class of State laws to a person being taken to the place of issue of a warrant in compliance with an order made under SEPA. Unlike other Commonwealth provisions that might pick up State laws unaltered, section 89(4) was characterised as containing an express provision enabling the alteration of the language of a State statute and its application in that altered form. Therefore, the requirement that the person be an "inmate" for the purposes of section 310D was not a necessary condition for the application of the offence as a federal law under section 89(4). The appeal was dismissed with costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
Appeal dismissed with costs.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: FRENCH CJ, KIEFEL AND KEANE JJ, GORDON J
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal with costs. This left in place the remitter order made by Rothman J, there being unresolved issues about whether the Court Attendance Notice could be amended to define the offence charged by reference to s 89(4) of SEPA 1992.The operation of s 89(4) on State laws There is a variety of verbal formulae by which Commonwealth laws give effect to State laws as laws of the Commonwealth. Section 68(1) of the Judiciary Act provides that relevant State laws shall "apply and be applied so far as they are applicable". Section 79(1) of that Act provides that the relevant State laws shall "be binding on all Courts exercising federal jurisdiction in that State ... in all cases to which they are applicable." The CPAL Act provides that the laws of a State may "apply, or shall be deemed to have applied, in accordance with their tenor"[68].[68]CPAL Act, s 4(1). See also Commonwealth Places (Mirror Taxes) Act 1998 (Cth), s 6. As this Court observed in Western Australia v The Commonwealth (Native Title Act Case)[69], there can be no objection to the Commonwealth Parliament adopting as a law of the Commonwealth a text emanating from a source other than the Parliament:"In such a case the text becomes, by adoption, a law of the Commonwealth and operates as such."It follows that there is no reason in principle which prevents the Commonwealth from adopting the text of a State law and applying it analogically or modifying it, for example by the addition or removal of conditions attaching to duties, liabilities or powers created by that law[70]. Whether the State law as picked up is applied analogically or modified depends upon the construction of the relevant Commonwealth law. In the case of s 79 of the Judiciary Act, the State laws which it makes "binding" on courts exercising federal jurisdiction are picked up with their meaning unchanged. They are binding only in cases "to which they are applicable"[71].[69](1995) 183 CLR 373 at 484–485 per Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ.[70]For example, s 4(6) of the CPAL Act authorises regulations providing that a State law applied by s 4 "shall be deemed to have so applied, with such modifications as are specified in the regulations."[71]John Robertson & Co Ltd v Ferguson Transformers Pty Ltd (1973) 129 CLR 65 at 94–95 per Mason J; [1973] HCA 21; Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Edensor Nominees Pty Ltd (2001) 204 CLR 559 at 593–594 [72]–[74] per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron and Gummow JJ, 609–610 [129]–[130] per McHugh J; [2001] HCA 1; Solomons v District Court (NSW) (2002) 211 CLR 119 at 134 [22] per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ; [2002] HCA 47; British American Tobacco Australia Ltd v Western Australia (2003) 217 CLR 30 at 60 [67] per McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ; [2003] HCA 47. The construction of s 89(4) does not require a binary choice between picking up s 310D unaltered and picking it up altered so as to eliminate the requirement that the person attempting to escape be an "inmate". Analogical application does not strictly involve alteration. It is simply a way of describing how s 89(4) uses the text of the relevant State law. The first constructional question is — what is the content of the class of laws able to be applied by s 89(4) and defined by the term "law in force in the place of issue of a warrant"? The second constructional question is — what does it mean to "apply" a law in that class? Those questions are to be answered by reference to the text, context and purpose of s 89(4).