MOK v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW)

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

FRENCH CJ,
KIEFEL, BELL, KEANE AND GORDON JJ

YAU MING MATTHEW MOK  APPELLANT

AND

DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS (NSW)                  RESPONDENT

Mok v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW)

[2016] HCA 13

6 April 2016

S246/2015

ORDER

Appeal dismissed with costs.

On appeal from the Supreme Court of New South Wales

Representation

G R James QC with P D Lange for the appellant (instructed by Murphy's Lawyers)

N J Adams SC with B K Baker for the respondent (instructed by Solicitor for Public Prosections (NSW))

Notice:  This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

Federal jurisdiction – Application of State laws – Service and Execution of Process Act 1992 (Cth) ("SEPA"), s 89(4) – Where appellant arrested in Victoria pursuant to warrant issued in New South Wales – Where order made under s 83(8)(b) of SEPA to return appellant in custody to New South Wales – Where appellant charged with attempting to escape lawful custody under s 310D of Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) ("Crimes Act") – Whether s 89(4) of SEPA applied s 310D of Crimes Act as surrogate federal law – Whether content of applied State law altered – Whether prosecution required to prove all elements of offence under State law.

Words and phrases – "competent authority", "correctional centre", "court", "escape lawful custody", "inmate", "law of a State", "surrogate federal law". 

Constitution, ss 51(xxiv), 52(i).
Commonwealth Places (Application of Laws) Act 1970 (Cth), s 4.
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), ss 68, 79.
Service and Execution of Process Act 1992 (Cth), ss 8(4), 81A, 82, 83, 89.
Children (Detention Centres) Act 1987 (NSW), s 33(1).
Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), Pt 1A, ss 310A, 310D.
Crimes (Administration of Sentences) Act 1999 (NSW), ss 3(1), 4.
Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW), ss 5, 12.

FRENCH CJ AND BELL J.

Introduction

  1. The Service and Execution of Process Act 1992 (Cth) ("SEPA 1992") provides for the execution throughout Australia of warrants authorising the apprehension of persons under State laws[1].  Under SEPA 1992 a person named in a warrant issued in one State may be apprehended in another State[2] and taken before a magistrate in that State.  Upon production of the warrant or a copy of it[3] the magistrate must make one of two orders under s 83(8) of the Act. The person must be remanded on bail to appear in the issuing State at a specified place and time[4] or, as in the present case, an order made under s 83(8)(b):

    "that the person be taken, in such custody or otherwise as the magistrate specifies, to a specified place in the place of issue of the warrant."

    In the latter event, the person must be returned in custody to the State in which the warrant was issued.

    [1]SEPA 1992, s 3(1), definition of "warrant".  Section 5(1) regards each Territory (except external Territories that are taken to be part of a State or another Territory…

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Details
Case
[2016] HCA 13
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered an appeal by an appellant who had been arrested in Victoria pursuant to a New South Wales bench warrant and subsequently ordered to be returned to New South Wales. The appellant was charged in New South Wales with attempting to escape lawful custody under section 310D of the *Crimes Act 1900* (NSW), with the prosecution contending that this State law applied to the appellant by virtue of section 89(4) of the *Service and Execution of Process Act 1992* (Cth) ("SEPA"). The central dispute concerned whether section 89(4) of SEPA operated to create a federal offence based on the New South Wales law, and if so, whether the prosecution was required to prove all the elements of the State offence as it would ordinarily apply.

The legal issues before the High Court were whether section 89(4) of SEPA applied section 310D of the *Crimes Act* as a "surrogate federal law", whether the content of the applied State law was altered by this operation, and consequently, whether the prosecution was required to prove all the elements of the offence under the State law. The Court was required to interpret the scope and effect of section 89(4) of SEPA in relation to State laws concerning escape from lawful custody when a person is being returned to a State under an order made pursuant to SEPA.

The High Court held that section 89(4) of SEPA applied section 310D of the *Crimes Act* as a surrogate federal law to the appellant. The Court reasoned that section 89(4) operates in a focused manner, applying a limited class of State laws to a person being taken to the place of issue of a warrant in compliance with an order made under SEPA. Unlike other Commonwealth provisions that might pick up State laws unaltered, section 89(4) was characterised as containing an express provision enabling the alteration of the language of a State statute and its application in that altered form. Therefore, the requirement that the person be an "inmate" for the purposes of section 310D was not a necessary condition for the application of the offence as a federal law under section 89(4). The appeal was dismissed with costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

Appeal dismissed with costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

By reason of s 89(4) of the SEP Act, could the appellant be guilty of an offence contrary to s 310D of the Crimes Act? The answer is yes. Facts On 11 March 2004, the appellant pleaded guilty to a number of fraud offences contrary to New South Wales law before a magistrate at the Local Court of New South Wales. He was consequently committed to the District Court of New South Wales for sentence. 13 April 2006 was fixed for the purpose of sentencing the appellant. However, on that day, the appellant failed to appear. Freeman DCJ then issued a bench warrant for the apprehension of the appellant ("the NSW Bench Warrant"). The NSW Bench Warrant was directed to "the Commissioner of Police for the State of New South Wales, and to all Police Officers in the said State". The NSW Bench Warrant stated, in part: "AND WHEREAS the said Offender has not appeared at the said District Court on 13/04/2006[.] These are therefore to command you in Her Majesty's name forthwith to apprehend the said Offender and to bring him before me or some other Judge of the said Court or some Justice or Justices of the Peace, in and for the said State to be dealt with according to law." Many years later, on 14 December 2011, the appellant was arrested and charged in Victoria with two unrelated offences. On 26 February 2013, the appellant was sentenced to a term of imprisonment at the Magistrates' Court of Victoria for those offences. On that day, a Victorian police officer executed the NSW Bench Warrant and arrested the appellant pursuant to s 82(1) and (3)(a) of the SEP Act. Those provisions relevantly provide that the person "named in a warrant issued in a State may be apprehended in another State … [by] an officer of the police force of the State in which the person is found". The next day, 27 February 2013, the appellant was brought before a Victorian magistrate pursuant to s 83(1) of the SEP Act. The magistrate ordered that the appellant be delivered into the custody of a New South Wales police officer for the purpose of taking him to New South Wales, in accordance with s 83(8)(b) of the SEP Act ("the SEPA Orders"). The SEPA Orders directed the return of the appellant to New South Wales. Section 83(8)(b) of the SEP Act authorised the magistrate to order "that the person be taken, in such custody or otherwise as the magistrate specifies, to a specified place in the place of issue of the warrant". The SEPA Orders were contained in a document headed "Service and Execution of Process Act 1992 Warrant to remand a person to another State". After setting out details of the NSW Bench Warrant, that document relevantly stated:"I order that the defendant be returned to SYDNEY POLICE CENTRE in the State of NSW in which the warrant was issued, and for that purpose to be delivered into the custody of DET SGT ROBERT MCLENNAN the person bringing the said warrant, or of the Members of the Police Force or persons to whom the warrant was originally directed, or any of them. These are therefore to command you DET SGT ROBERT MCLENNAN the person bringing the said warrant, and all members of the Police Force and persons to whom the warrant was originally directed, or any of you, to forthwith take the defendant and safely convey him to SYDNEY POLICE CENTRE in the State of NSW and take him before a Magistrate for the said State to answer the said charge and to be further dealt with according to law."

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

FRENCH CJ KIEFEL AND KEANE JJ GORDON J
Rothman J held that both pars (d) and (e) of the definition of "inmate" in the Crimes (Administration of Sentences) Act were applicable because the term "court" used in that definition extended to the Melbourne Magistrates' Court[58]. He rejected a submission by the appellant that neither par (d) nor par (e) applied because the appellant had not been "committed" to a correctional centre[59]. His Honour set aside the order of the magistrate dismissing the proceedings and remitted the hearing of the charge to the Local Court to determine any issues associated with irregularity or necessity to amend the charge.[58](2014) 296 FLR 1 at 14 [62]–[63].[59](2014) 296 FLR 1 at 14–15 [64]–[68].The decision of the Court of Appeal The Court of Appeal held that Rothman J was correct to conclude that the appellant must be taken to have been charged with a federal offence, namely a contravention of s 310D of the Crimes Act as made applicable by operation of s 89(4) of SEPA 1992[60]. The Court held that the CPAL Act was inapplicable to the case because of s 8(4) of SEPA 1992, read with s 4(2)(a) of the CPAL Act[61]. Their Honours observed that it was "common ground that s 89(4) applied when [the appellant] was at Tullamarine Airport on 28 February 2013" and that "[t]he parties were correct to proceed on that basis"[62].[60](2015) 320 ALR 584 at 585 [2].[61](2015) 320 ALR 584 at 591–592 [32]–[36].[62](2015) 320 ALR 584 at 591 [28]. The Court of Appeal identified as a common premise in the submissions made to their Honours that it was a necessary condition of the application of s 310D to the appellant by operation of s 89(4) that the appellant was an "inmate" for the purpose of s 310D at the time of his attempted escape at Tullamarine Airport. That premise was rejected[63]. The operation of s 89(4) was distinguished from that of ss 68 and 79 of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). Section 89(4) was characterised as taking a limited class of State laws, namely laws of the place of issue of a warrant of apprehension relating to the liability of a person who escapes or attempts to escape from lawful custody. It did not purport to apply that class of laws generally or "according to their tenor" or "in all cases to which they are applicable". Their Honours said[64]:"Subsection 89(4) does something far more focused. Its premise is that there is a person being taken to the place of issue in compliance with an order made under [SEPA 1992]. That order will at least ordinarily name the person. Subsection 89(4) applies that limited class of laws to that person — the person named in the order."[63](2015) 320 ALR 584 at 589 [20].[64](2015) 320 ALR 584 at 594 [47]. The Court of Appeal approached the construction of s 310D as applied by s 89(4) on a different basis from that adopted by the magistrate and by Rothman J. Their Honours said[65]:"the effect of s 89(4) applying s 310D to persons being returned to New South Wales was not merely confined to those persons who were being returned in accordance with [SEPA 1992] and who sought to escape who happened to be 'inmates'. Unlike s 79 [of the Judiciary Act], s 89(4) does contain an 'express provision which would enable [the court] to alter the language of a State statute and apply it in that altered form', to paraphrase what Mason J said in John Robertson & Co."Section 89(4) was treated as applying State law relating to the liability of a person escaping or attempting to escape from lawful custody as surrogate federal law "upon the assumption that escape from lawful custody imposed by an order made by a magistrate in another state is not outside their field."[66] The provision left no room for debate about whether or not the appellant was a person who "as an 'inmate'" was within the scope of s 310D in its ordinary operation as an offence under State law. The new federal offence created by s 89(4), acting upon s 310D, applied to all persons being taken to New South Wales in compliance with an order under SEPA 1992 mentioned in s 89(1) and the appellant was such a person[67]. The conclusion of the Court of Appeal was correct although it need not be supported by the proposition that s 89(4) "alters" the laws which it applies.[65](2015) 320 ALR 584 at 595 [49] (emphasis in original).[66](2015) 320 ALR 584 at 595 [50] (emphasis in original).[67](2015) 320 ALR 584 at 595 [51].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: FRENCH CJ, KIEFEL AND KEANE JJ, GORDON J

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal with costs. This left in place the remitter order made by Rothman J, there being unresolved issues about whether the Court Attendance Notice could be amended to define the offence charged by reference to s 89(4) of SEPA 1992.The operation of s 89(4) on State laws There is a variety of verbal formulae by which Commonwealth laws give effect to State laws as laws of the Commonwealth. Section 68(1) of the Judiciary Act provides that relevant State laws shall "apply and be applied so far as they are applicable". Section 79(1) of that Act provides that the relevant State laws shall "be binding on all Courts exercising federal jurisdiction in that State ... in all cases to which they are applicable." The CPAL Act provides that the laws of a State may "apply, or shall be deemed to have applied, in accordance with their tenor"[68].[68]CPAL Act, s 4(1). See also Commonwealth Places (Mirror Taxes) Act 1998 (Cth), s 6. As this Court observed in Western Australia v The Commonwealth (Native Title Act Case)[69], there can be no objection to the Commonwealth Parliament adopting as a law of the Commonwealth a text emanating from a source other than the Parliament:"In such a case the text becomes, by adoption, a law of the Commonwealth and operates as such."It follows that there is no reason in principle which prevents the Commonwealth from adopting the text of a State law and applying it analogically or modifying it, for example by the addition or removal of conditions attaching to duties, liabilities or powers created by that law[70]. Whether the State law as picked up is applied analogically or modified depends upon the construction of the relevant Commonwealth law. In the case of s 79 of the Judiciary Act, the State laws which it makes "binding" on courts exercising federal jurisdiction are picked up with their meaning unchanged. They are binding only in cases "to which they are applicable"[71].[69](1995) 183 CLR 373 at 484–485 per Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ.[70]For example, s 4(6) of the CPAL Act authorises regulations providing that a State law applied by s 4 "shall be deemed to have so applied, with such modifications as are specified in the regulations."[71]John Robertson & Co Ltd v Ferguson Transformers Pty Ltd (1973) 129 CLR 65 at 94–95 per Mason J; [1973] HCA 21; Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Edensor Nominees Pty Ltd (2001) 204 CLR 559 at 593–594 [72]–[74] per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron and Gummow JJ, 609–610 [129]–[130] per McHugh J; [2001] HCA 1; Solomons v District Court (NSW) (2002) 211 CLR 119 at 134 [22] per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ; [2002] HCA 47; British American Tobacco Australia Ltd v Western Australia (2003) 217 CLR 30 at 60 [67] per McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ; [2003] HCA 47. The construction of s 89(4) does not require a binary choice between picking up s 310D unaltered and picking it up altered so as to eliminate the requirement that the person attempting to escape be an "inmate". Analogical application does not strictly involve alteration. It is simply a way of describing how s 89(4) uses the text of the relevant State law. The first constructional question is — what is the content of the class of laws able to be applied by s 89(4) and defined by the term "law in force in the place of issue of a warrant"? The second constructional question is — what does it mean to "apply" a law in that class? Those questions are to be answered by reference to the text, context and purpose of s 89(4).