Okwume v Commonwealth of Australia

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Okwume v Commonwealth of Australia [2016] FCA 1252

File number: SAD 112 of 2015
Judge: CHARLESWORTH J
Date of judgment: 24 October 2016
Catchwords:

HIGH COURT AND FEDERAL COURT — federal jurisdiction – collateral challenge to a migration decision on a false imprisonment claim – migration decision not previously set aside by a court of competent jurisdiction – matters arising under a law of the Parliament – jurisdiction under s 476A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) not invoked

TORT – false imprisonment – detention under s 189 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) by three detaining officers – matters of fact and law known or reasonably capable of being known by detaining officers – respondent’s onus of proof – false imprisonment established in relation to two detaining officers

TORT – misfeasance in public office – alleged duty to facilitate freedom – alleged duty not established – breach of duty not established – requisite state of mind not established – individual public officer not joined as respondent — whether Crown in right of the Commonwealth may be vicariously liable for the tort of misfeasance in public office – vicarious liability not established on facts

TORT – negligence – duty of care owed to persons held in immigration detention – fires razing accommodation buildings at an immigration detention centre — no breach established – application of Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA) — causation not established

MIGRATION – detention – interrelation between s 189 and s 196 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth)

MIGRATION – cancellation of visa under s 116(1)(d) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – applicable rules of procedural fairness – requisite particulars of information not provided to visa holder – where Minister’s delegate impermissibly acted under the perceived need to carry out instructions of a supervisor

MIGRATION – alleged presentation of a document reasonably suspected to be counterfeit in contravention of s 103 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – where Minister’s delegate relied upon expert opinion of a document examiner – visa holder wrongly deprived of opportunity to dissuade delegate from acting on the expert’s opinion

Legislation:

Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), s 2C

Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), ss 34, 35

Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 5D

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), ss 69, 76, 79, 97

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), ss 19, 32, 51A

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), r 23.12

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), ss 39B(1A), 56, 79, 80

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 5, 13, 14, 15, 97, 97A, 103, 107, 108, 109, 116, 118A, 119, 120, 166, 172, 189, 192, 195A, 196, 198, 199, 200, 273(1), 476A, 484, 486A, 496, 501, Pt 2

Migration Litigation Reform Act 2005 (Cth), cl. 41

Public Service Act 1999 (Cth)

Cases cited:

Adeels Palace Pty Ltd v Moubarak (2009) 239 CLR 420

Agtrack (NT) Pty Ltd v Hatfield (2005) 223 CLR 251

Al-Kateb v Godwin (2004) 219 CLR 562

Applicant NAHF of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural…

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Details
Case
[2016] FCA 1252
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Okwume v Commonwealth of Australia, the plaintiff, Mr Okwume, pursued multiple claims against the Commonwealth of Australia, including false imprisonment, misfeasance in public office, and negligence. The Federal Court of Australia was tasked with determining the validity of these claims, considering the jurisdictional constraints under the Migration Act 1958 and the associated legislation. The court had to assess whether the Commonwealth was vicariously liable for the actions of its officers and whether the statutory provisions and procedural fairness had been appropriately applied.

The court examined the legal issues surrounding the jurisdictional limits of the Federal Court in reviewing migration decisions, the elements required to establish false imprisonment and misfeasance in public office, and the criteria for proving negligence in the context of immigration detention. It also assessed whether the procedural fairness requirements were met in the visa cancellation process and if there was a breach of duty of care regarding the safety of detainees during a fire at the detention centre.

The court found that Mr Okwume's claim of false imprisonment was partially valid, awarding him $2,000.00 for the period of unlawful detention. However, the claims of misfeasance in public office and negligence were dismissed due to insufficient evidence to prove the necessary elements of those torts. The court held that the Commonwealth was not vicariously liable for the actions of its officers, and the procedural fairness requirements were not breached. Additionally, the court concluded that the Commonwealth did not owe a duty of care that would result in liability for the harm suffered by Mr Okwume during the fire.

The court ordered that the respondent pay Mr Okwume $2,000.00 as compensation for the period of false imprisonment. The claims for misfeasance in public office and negligence were dismissed, and no further compensation was awarded. The procedural history and jurisdictional constraints were carefully considered, reflecting the complexity and specificity of migration law and its intersection with tort law.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application is allowed in part.

2. The respondent is to pay the applicant $2,000.00 comprising $1,600.00 awarded as general damages and a sum of $400.00 in lieu of pre-judgment interest.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Mr Okwume’s claim founded in misfeasance in public office is properly to be regarded as falling within the jurisdiction conferred by s 39B(1A)(c) of the Judiciary Act. That aspect of the matter also arises under a law of the Parliament. The claim would, in any event, fall within the Court’s associated or accrued jurisdiction, as does the claim founded in negligence: see s 19 and s 32 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (FC Act). The jurisdiction of the Court having been properly invoked, the whole of the matter falls to be determined in the exercise of federal jurisdiction. The applicable law is that identified by the application of s 79 and s 80 of the Judiciary Act.THE PROVEN FACTS In the narrative that follows I refer at times to persons who I describe as officers of the Department. Those references should be understood to mean persons who satisfy the broad definition of “officer” in s 5(1) of the Act. Officers who worked in the Department at the relevant time were employed under the Public Service Act 1999 (Cth). They were subject to the direction of the Secretary of the Department who, in turn, advised the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (Minister) in relation to the administration of the Department and the Act. With the exception of the claim founded in the tort of misfeasance in public office, the respondent acknowledges that, as a general proposition, it is vicariously liable for torts committed by officers of the Department. The respondent bore the onus of establishing that Mr Okwume’s detention was lawfully justified. The primary contention of the respondent is that Mr Okwume’s detention was at all times lawfully justified under s 189 of the Act irrespective of the validity of the decision to cancel his visa on 21 July 2005. Notwithstanding that, it is necessary to consider the whole of the factual circumstances surrounding the cancellation of Mr Okwume’s visa and all of the circumstances surrounding his subsequent detention and continued detention. That is because the relevant power to detain Mr Okwume could only be exercised by an officer who reasonably suspected that Mr Okwume was an unlawful non-citizen, as that phrase is defined in the Act. I elaborate on the applicable principles below. Given the passage of time between Mr Okwume’s detention and the trial of this action, it is not surprising that witnesses called by the respondent professed to have little or no independent recollection of the critical events. For the most part, the respondent’s witnesses could add little to the events as may be evidenced by Departmental records. The witnesses were, again for the most part, in no position to give evidence from their own independent recollection capable of rebutting any negative inferences that might arise from those written materials. Mr Okwume’s evidence was also characterised in part by an inability to independently and reliably recall past events at the time of trial, particularly in relation to his subjective experience of the fires at Baxter. In the result, however, very little turns on factual questions affected by Mr Okwume’s reliability or credibility as a witness at trial.The events of 21 and 22 July 2005

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The Howse report does not state the materials from which the insulated sandwich panel was constructed. Although it might be permissible to reason backward from the report to conclude that the compound was constructed in the manner pleaded by Mr Okwume (namely, from metal sheeting and polystyrene foam), that method of construction is inconsistent with the assumptions upon which Mr Potts formed his expert opinion and with the architectural diagrams in evidence. Even taking into account the Howse report, I find it more probable than not that the dwellings in the White One Compound were constructed of insulated sandwich panel comprised of VillaBoard, Fyrchek and fibreglass in the manner I have described above. The warnings and recommendations given in the Howse report do not assist Mr Okwume’s case because they are largely disconnected from the evidentiary basis upon which his case proceeded at trial.Other evidence Following the Baxter fires in November 2005, a series of reports and statements were produced by or on behalf of GSL. Those reports give a detailed account of the events that had occurred and the efforts that had been made by GSL personnel to quell the disturbance, evacuate the detainees and extinguish the fires. It is not necessary to give a detailed account of those efforts because Mr Okwume did not establish, whether by evidence or by way of submissions, that the strategies employed by GSL personnel were in any way inadequate in the circumstances. Mr Okwume’s primary case at trial was that the White One Compound ought to have been constructed so as to retard or prevent the progression of the fires, enabling more time for detainees to be evacuated before suffering harm. It is in that respect that the aspects of the respondent’s breach were, to some extent, interrelated and co-dependent. Even if conceived of as an independent breach, I am not satisfied that the respondent breached its non-delegable duties in any of the other ways pleaded by Mr Okwume. On the basis of reports produced shortly after the fire, I am satisfied that the efforts by GSL personnel at Baxter to extinguish the fires and to evacuate the detainees were frustrated by the actions of those detainees who were promoting unrest there. There is otherwise insufficient evidence to prove on the balance of probabilities how quickly the fires at Baxter spread and how close they were in relation to Mr Okwume’s room. I am, in all of the circumstances, not satisfied that the respondent breached its duty to exercise reasonable care for the safety of Mr Okwume in relation to the fires that occurred at Baxter on 12 November 2005.Causation If I am wrong in my conclusion that the respondent did not breach the applicable duty of care by the mode of construction of White One Compound or by the other alleged omissions, I would find in any event that Mr Okwume has not established to the requisite standard that any such breach caused the loss he claims in these proceedings. The claim for damages includes components of non-economic loss occasioned by the aggravation of a pre-existing post-traumatic stress disorder, as well as a component for the loss of personal property in the fires. In relation to the psychiatric injury, whilst the pleaded case alleged that the fires had aggravated his pre-existing post-traumatic stress disorder, Mr Okwume adduced expert opinion evidence at trial to the effect that the fires were the precipitating traumatic event that had caused him to suffer that condition. Either way, the claim is dependent upon proof of Mr Okwume’s subjective experience of the fires.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The claim founded in negligence is brought independently of the claims founded in false imprisonment and misfeasance in public office. Mr Okwume does not make a discrete claim to have suffered psychiatric injury or property loss by virtue of his detention per se.SUMMARY OF JUDGMENT I give separate consideration to each of the three causes of action in [103] – [203], [204] – [231] and [238] – [278] respectively. I have determined that Mr Okwume’s claim founded in false imprisonment should be allowed in part, by reason of him having been detained without lawful justification for a period between 2:55pm on 21 July 2005 and about 8:15am on 22 July 2005. I have assessed general damages in the amount of $2,000.00 inclusive of a sum in lieu of pre-judgment interest. I reject Mr Okwume’s plea that an award of exemplary damages is justified in all of the circumstances. Mr Okwume’s claim to have been falsely imprisoned in any subsequent period is not established. I have rejected Mr Okwume’s claim founded in the tort of misfeasance in public office for two reasons. First, the elements of the tort are not made out in connection with the acts and omissions of Ms Grau. Second, Mr Okwume has failed to establish the factual foundation necessary to establish vicarious liability on the part of the Crown in right of the Commonwealth in relation to the tort alleged against Ms Grau in any event. Mr Okwume’s claim founded in negligence in respect of the fires at Baxter must also fail on several bases. Mr Okwume did not establish at trial that the respondent owed a duty to “ensure” his personal safety and that of his possessions. Even on the alternate basis that the respondent owed a duty to exercise reasonable care, Mr Okwume has not proven to the requisite standard that the respondent breached that duty, nor has he established to the requisite standard that any such breach caused him to suffer the pleaded harm.JURISDICTION Before proceeding further, I make the following observations about this Court’s jurisdiction to determine Mr Okwume’s claims. The action has a laborious procedural history, the trial having commenced nearly 11 years after the events in issue and nearly seven years after the proceedings were first instituted. The action was first commenced by summons in the District Court of South Australia on 18 July 2008. From there, it was removed to the Supreme Court of South Australia and then transferred, by consent, to this Court on 10 March 2015. It appears that the matter was transferred after the respondent contended that s 484 of the Act excluded the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction “in relation to a migration decision”. The original jurisdiction of this Court “in relation to a migration decision” is limited by s 476A of the Act. It relevantly provides:476A Limited jurisdiction of the Federal Court(1)Despite any other law, including section 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 and section 8 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977, the Federal Court has original jurisdiction in relation to a migration decision if, and only if:(a)the Federal Circuit Court transfers a proceeding pending in that court in relation to the decision to the Federal Court under section 39 of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999; or(b)the decision is a privative clause decision, or a purported privative clause decision, of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal on review under section 500; or(c)the decision is a privative clause decision, or purported privative clause decision, made personally by the Minister under section 501, 501A, 501B or 501C; or(d)the Federal Court has jurisdiction in relation to the decision under subsection 44(3) or 45(2) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975.…(2)Where the Federal Court has jurisdiction in relation to a migration decision under paragraph (1)(a), (b) or (c), that jurisdiction is the same as the jurisdiction of the High Court under paragraph 75(v) of the Constitution.…

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.