Hobson v Commonwealth of Australia

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Hobson v Commonwealth of Australia [2022] FCA 418  

File number(s): VID 120 of 2022
Judgment of: SC DERRINGTON J
Date of judgment: 14 April 2022
Date of publication of reasons: 21 April 2022
Catchwords:

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – Constitution s 51(xix) – content of the tripartite test in Mabo v Queensland (No 2) [1992] HCA 23; 175 CLR 1 – whether ratio in Love v Commonwealth of Australia [2020] HCA 3; 270 CLR 152

‘controlled’ by judgment of Nettle J in relation to the third limb – where applicant is biologically descendent from an Aboriginal woman, self-identifies, and is accepted by Dharug Elders – where Minister contends no evidence that Dharug community has remained continuously united in and by its customs and laws deriving from before the Crown’s acquisition of sovereignty

MIGRATION – where applicant is a New Zealand citizen –– where visa cancelled under s 501(3) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – where applicant is biologically descendent from an Aboriginal woman, self-identifies, and is accepted by Dharug Elders – whether applicant lawfully detained under s 189 of Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – construction of s 189 – whether Minister satisfied onus of proof that detention lawful – whether detaining officer’s suspicion of non-Aboriginality reasonable –whether applicant entitled to writ of habeas corpus

EVIDENCE – constitutional facts – onus of proof – whether rules of evidence displaced

EVIDENCE – opinion evidence – evidence of traditional laws and customs – exception under s 78A of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth)

Legislation:

Constitution s 51(xix)

Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s15A

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 78A

Evidence Amendment Act 2008 (Cth) sch 1 s 36

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B(1A)(b) and (c), 78B

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5, 13, 14, 29, 45, 189(1), 196(4), 501(2), 501(3), 501(6)(b)

Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) ss 223(1)(b), 225

Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) s 8

Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) s 21(7)

Cases cited:

Breen v Sneddon [1961] HCA 67; 106 CLR 406

Burgess v Commonwealth of Australia [2020] FCA 670; 276 FCR 548

Clubb v Edwards [2019] HCA 11; 267 CLR 171

Dillon v The Queen [1982] AC 484

Fernando v Commonwealth of Australia [2012] FCAFC 18; 200 FCR 1

Gale v Minister for Land & Water Conservation for New South Wales [2004] FCA 374

Gale on behalf of the Darug Tribal Aboriginal Corporation v New South Wales Minister for Land and Water Conservation [2011] FCA 77

Goldie v Commonwealth of Australia [2002] FCAFC 100

Guo v Commonwealth [2017] FCA 1355

Helmbright v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (No 2) [2021] FCA 647

Jerrard (Deceased), Re Estate [2018] NSWSC 781; 97 NSWLR 1106

Jones v Dunkel [1959] HCA 8; 101 CLR 298

Lacey (a pseudonym) v Attorney General for New South Wales [2021] NSWCA 27; 104 NSWLR 333

Love v Commonwealth of Australia [2020] HCA 3; 270 CLR 152

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Details
Case
[2022] FCA 418
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Hobson v Commonwealth of Australia is a case before the Federal Court of Australia where the applicant, Mr Hobson, is seeking a writ of habeas corpus. Mr Hobson, a New Zealand citizen, contends that his detention under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) is unlawful. He argues that he is an Aboriginal Australian, and therefore not subject to the provisions of the Migration Act that permit the detention of non-citizens. The central legal issues in the case involve the interpretation of constitutional provisions, specifically section 51(xix) of the Australian Constitution, which pertains to the Commonwealth's power to make laws with respect to aliens. The case also examines the application of the tripartite test for Aboriginality as established in Mabo v Queensland (No 2) [1992] HCA 23; 175 CLR 1 and the High Court's decision in Love v Commonwealth of Australia [2020] HCA 3; 270 CLR 152. Furthermore, the case addresses the construction of section 189 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), the burden of proof concerning the lawfulness of detention, and the admissibility of evidence regarding traditional laws and customs.

The court held that the burden of proof lies with the Minister to establish the lawfulness of Mr Hobson's detention under section 189 of the Migration Act. The court found that the Minister must demonstrate that a relevant officer knows or reasonably suspects that Mr Hobson is a non-citizen and not an Aboriginal Australian. The court accepted that Mr Hobson satisfies the tripartite test for Aboriginality, as he is biologically descended from an Aboriginal woman, self-identifies as such, and is accepted by Dharug Elders. The court ruled that the Minister's contention that there is no evidence of the Dharug community remaining continuously united in and by its customs and laws from before the Crown's acquisition of sovereignty was not substantiated. Consequently, the court concluded that the Minister did not meet the onus of proof required to justify Mr Hobson's detention, and granted the writ of habeas corpus. The court also ordered that the respondents pay the applicant's costs, to be assessed if not agreed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. A writ of habeas corpus issue.

2. The respondents pay the applicant’s costs to be assessed if not agreed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The Minister objected to two paragraphs of Mr Hobson’s affidavit on the basis that they contained bare statements of opinion – [7] and [9]. Paragraphs [7] and [9] stated that certain named Elders ‘had traditional authority’. Mr Hobson submitted that this was the very type of evidence to which s 78A of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) is directed. The objection is dealt with below in the context of my consideration of the evidence that was sought to be adduced. The Minister read and relied on the affidavit of Mrs Kui Kathleen Grindlay, the detaining officer, dated 31 March 2022 (Aff-KKG) and which annexed a letter of advice from the Australian Government Solicitor dated 29 March 2022 (AGS Advice), privilege over which was waived by the Minister. The Minister invited me to draw a Jones v Dunkel [1959] HCA 8; 101 CLR 298 inference from the circumstance that Mr Hobson was not being called to give evidence in chief. Mr Hobson was present in Court at the hearing. Mr Hobson’s affidavit expressly offered to provide further information (Aff-JDH at [24]). The Minister expressly declined to cross-examine Mr Hobson on the basis that unanticipated evidence about the content of traditional laws and customs could be prejudicial to the Minister’s position. That was an unattractive submission, to say the least, in circumstances where a person’s liberty is at stake and where the Minister bears the onus of justifying the continuing detention of the person. As has already been observed above, Mr Hobson has been in immigration detention, with the exception of one month, since February 2020. In Mashood v Commonwealth [2003] FCA 1147; 133 FCR 50 at [21], Goldberg J said:Loss or deprivation of liberty, even for a short time, is a matter of irreparable harm. The right to enjoy personal liberty is “the most elementary and important of all common law rights”: Trobridge v Hardy (1995) 94 CLR 147 at 152 per Fullagar J. In Re Bolton; Ex parte Beane (1987) 162 CLR 514 Brennan J said at 523: “The law of this country is very jealous of any infringement of personal liberty …” Liberty is a precious and valued right. Much blood has been shed in defence of liberty. In Preston v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 420, French J said at [27]:Liberty lost is never recoverable even if partially compensable by damages.I adopt with respect with his Honour’s observation, although I am inclined to doubt the proposition that liberty lost can be compensated, even partially, by the award of a monetary sum. As I said in Montgomery v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCA 1423 at [46]:1.The approach and principles relevant to an application for an order in the nature of habeas corpus in the context of immigration detention of an Aboriginal Australian under the Migration Act have been explained by the Full Court in McHugh v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCAFC 223; 358 ALR 405. They may be summarised as follows:2.The writ of habeas corpus is a writ of right, although not of course: McHugh at [58] per Allsop CJ; at [77] per Besanko J.3.An application for an order in the nature of habeas corpus can be entertained in this Court as a remedy within, or as an incident of, the matters that include the judicial review of the decision under s 501CA and the claim under s 39B of the Judiciary Act that s 189 of the Migration Act does not apply to an Aboriginal Australian: McHugh at [23] per Allsop CJ; at [75] per Besanko J; at [235]-[236], [248] per Mortimer J.4.The question for consideration in the application is whether the detention is and was at all times justified by s 189(1) of the Migration Act being:If an officer knows or reasonably suspects that a person in the migration zone (other than an excised offshore place) is an unlawful non-citizen, the officer must detain the person.McHugh at [24]-[25] per Allsop CJ.5.Sections 13 and 14 of the Migration Act must be read down and construed so as not to exceed legislative power: s 15A of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth); Love at [285] per Nettle J; at [390] per Gordon J; at [398] per Edelman J: McHugh at [28] per Allsop CJ.6.Sections 13(1) and 14(1) must be taken to be construed as directed only to non-citizens who are not Aboriginal Australians: McHugh at [29] per Allsop CJ.7.In order to continue to detain a person, an officer must continue to have a reasonable suspicion that the person is an unlawful non-citizen and is not an Aboriginal Australian: McHugh at [76] per Besanko; at [332] per Mortimer J; Allsop CJ leaving open whether the fact of a person not being an Aboriginal Australian was a fact to be proved by the detainer seeking to rely on s 189 before any question of relevant suspicion arose at [51]-[52]; Besanko J agreeing at [83].8.The applicant for the writ carries ‘at least an evidential burden of establishing that there is a reason to suppose that his detention has ceased to be lawful’: Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs v Al Masri [2003] FCAFC 70; 126 FCR 54 at [176]; Plaintiff M47/2018 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] HCA 17; 256 CLR 285 at [39]: McHugh at [60] per Allsop CJ; at [92] per Besanko J; at [267]-[273] per Mortimer J.9.The burden then shifts to the respondent to show, at the time of trial, that the detention is lawful. Proof of the existence of a reasonable suspicion must be clear and cogent and may be discharged on the balance of probabilities: McHugh at [57], [60] per Allsop CJ; at [90] per Besanko J; at [281], [294], [340] per Mortimer J.Construction of s 189

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

It is sufficient for the purposes of resolution of Mr Hobson’s application to this Court for an order in the nature of habeas corpus that I accept the Minister’s preferred construction, being that the only relevant basis for release under s 196(4) is whether Mr Hobson’s detention pursuant to s 189(1) is unlawful because it exceeds the legislative power of the Parliament. This in turn depends solely on the question of whether a relevant officer ‘knows or reasonably suspects’ that Mr Hobson ‘is a non-citizen and a non-Aboriginal Australian’. If so, Mr Hobson must be detained: Migration Act s 189(1). The ratio of Love and the approach of Nettle J As I have already said, there is no dispute that Mr Hobson is not a citizen. Nor does he hold a visa because of the operation of s 501(3). Mr Hobson contended that an officer, acting under s 189(1), cannot reasonably suspect him to be an alien because he is an Aboriginal Australian. This follows from the decision in Love, in which a majority of the High Court decided that an Aboriginal Australian is not an ‘alien’ within the meaning of s 51(xix) and so is not within the reach of the aliens power. Until the High Court determines otherwise, I reiterate the view I expressed in Montgomery (at [48]) and, respectfully, with that expressed by Mortimer J in Helmbright at [108], that the ratio decidendi of Love is the proposition that ‘Aboriginal Australians (understood according to the tripartite test in Mabo (No 2)) are not within the reach of the “aliens” power conferred by s 51(xix) of the Constitution’: Love at [81] per Bell J. That tripartite test for Aboriginality was set out by Brennan J in Mabo v Queensland (No 2)[1992] HCA 23; 175 CLR 1 at 70, where his Honour said:[m]embership of the indigenous people depends on biological descent from the indigenous people and on mutual recognition of a particular person’s membership by that person and by the elders or other persons enjoying traditional authority among those people. I respectfully agree with and adopt Mortimer J’s analysis of the four majority judgments in Love and concur with her Honour’s conclusion that there is no modification of the Mabo (No 2) test by any of the majority justices (Helmbright at [211]). In her Honour’s view, the correct understanding of the test as explained by Brennan J is that there must be (Helmbright at [148]):a.biological descent from the “indigenous people”, which is a reference to an identifiable group, clan or community; andb.mutual recognition of a person’s membership of that same group, clan or community by the person concerned and by elders or others enjoying traditional authority within that group, clan or community. In this context, what is required is authority to permit or preclude membership that has its source in the norms handed down from generation to generation, since prior to European settlement. Her Honour reasoned, at [141]:Therefore, when Brennan J describes mutual recognition by those with “traditional authority”, and “by elders”, his Honour is describing those people who are seen, by their own community, as having authority under the laws and customs of that community as passed down through the generations, to make decisions for and about the community (including membership of the group or clan itself). As his Honour recognised, there may have been some adaptation and change to the content of law and custom because of the impact of European settlement.