FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Hobson v Commonwealth of Australia [2022] FCA 418
File number(s): VID 120 of 2022 Judgment of: SC DERRINGTON J Date of judgment: 14 April 2022 Date of publication of reasons: 21 April 2022 Catchwords: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – Constitution s 51(xix) – content of the tripartite test in Mabo v Queensland (No 2) [1992] HCA 23; 175 CLR 1 – whether ratio in Love v Commonwealth of Australia [2020] HCA 3; 270 CLR 152
‘controlled’ by judgment of Nettle J in relation to the third limb – where applicant is biologically descendent from an Aboriginal woman, self-identifies, and is accepted by Dharug Elders – where Minister contends no evidence that Dharug community has remained continuously united in and by its customs and laws deriving from before the Crown’s acquisition of sovereignty
MIGRATION – where applicant is a New Zealand citizen –– where visa cancelled under s 501(3) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – where applicant is biologically descendent from an Aboriginal woman, self-identifies, and is accepted by Dharug Elders – whether applicant lawfully detained under s 189 of Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – construction of s 189 – whether Minister satisfied onus of proof that detention lawful – whether detaining officer’s suspicion of non-Aboriginality reasonable –whether applicant entitled to writ of habeas corpus
EVIDENCE – constitutional facts – onus of proof – whether rules of evidence displaced
EVIDENCE – opinion evidence – evidence of traditional laws and customs – exception under s 78A of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth)
Legislation: Constitution s 51(xix)
Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s15A
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 78A
Evidence Amendment Act 2008 (Cth) sch 1 s 36
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B(1A)(b) and (c), 78B
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5, 13, 14, 29, 45, 189(1), 196(4), 501(2), 501(3), 501(6)(b)
Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) ss 223(1)(b), 225
Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) s 8
Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) s 21(7)
Cases cited: Breen v Sneddon [1961] HCA 67; 106 CLR 406
Burgess v Commonwealth of Australia [2020] FCA 670; 276 FCR 548
Clubb v Edwards [2019] HCA 11; 267 CLR 171
Dillon v The Queen [1982] AC 484
Fernando v Commonwealth of Australia [2012] FCAFC 18; 200 FCR 1
Gale v Minister for Land & Water Conservation for New South Wales [2004] FCA 374
Goldie v Commonwealth of Australia [2002] FCAFC 100
Guo v Commonwealth [2017] FCA 1355
Jerrard (Deceased), Re Estate [2018] NSWSC 781; 97 NSWLR 1106
Jones v Dunkel [1959] HCA 8; 101 CLR 298
Lacey (a pseudonym) v Attorney General for New South Wales [2021] NSWCA 27; 104 NSWLR 333
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- Case
- [2022] FCA 418
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court held that the burden of proof lies with the Minister to establish the lawfulness of Mr Hobson's detention under section 189 of the Migration Act. The court found that the Minister must demonstrate that a relevant officer knows or reasonably suspects that Mr Hobson is a non-citizen and not an Aboriginal Australian. The court accepted that Mr Hobson satisfies the tripartite test for Aboriginality, as he is biologically descended from an Aboriginal woman, self-identifies as such, and is accepted by Dharug Elders. The court ruled that the Minister's contention that there is no evidence of the Dharug community remaining continuously united in and by its customs and laws from before the Crown's acquisition of sovereignty was not substantiated. Consequently, the court concluded that the Minister did not meet the onus of proof required to justify Mr Hobson's detention, and granted the writ of habeas corpus. The court also ordered that the respondents pay the applicant's costs, to be assessed if not agreed.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. A writ of habeas corpus issue.
2. The respondents pay the applicant’s costs to be assessed if not agreed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
It is sufficient for the purposes of resolution of Mr Hobson’s application to this Court for an order in the nature of habeas corpus that I accept the Minister’s preferred construction, being that the only relevant basis for release under s 196(4) is whether Mr Hobson’s detention pursuant to s 189(1) is unlawful because it exceeds the legislative power of the Parliament. This in turn depends solely on the question of whether a relevant officer ‘knows or reasonably suspects’ that Mr Hobson ‘is a non-citizen and a non-Aboriginal Australian’. If so, Mr Hobson must be detained: Migration Act s 189(1). The ratio of Love and the approach of Nettle J As I have already said, there is no dispute that Mr Hobson is not a citizen. Nor does he hold a visa because of the operation of s 501(3). Mr Hobson contended that an officer, acting under s 189(1), cannot reasonably suspect him to be an alien because he is an Aboriginal Australian. This follows from the decision in Love, in which a majority of the High Court decided that an Aboriginal Australian is not an ‘alien’ within the meaning of s 51(xix) and so is not within the reach of the aliens power. Until the High Court determines otherwise, I reiterate the view I expressed in Montgomery (at [48]) and, respectfully, with that expressed by Mortimer J in Helmbright at [108], that the ratio decidendi of Love is the proposition that ‘Aboriginal Australians (understood according to the tripartite test in Mabo (No 2)) are not within the reach of the “aliens” power conferred by s 51(xix) of the Constitution’: Love at [81] per Bell J. That tripartite test for Aboriginality was set out by Brennan J in Mabo v Queensland (No 2)[1992] HCA 23; 175 CLR 1 at 70, where his Honour said:[m]embership of the indigenous people depends on biological descent from the indigenous people and on mutual recognition of a particular person’s membership by that person and by the elders or other persons enjoying traditional authority among those people. I respectfully agree with and adopt Mortimer J’s analysis of the four majority judgments in Love and concur with her Honour’s conclusion that there is no modification of the Mabo (No 2) test by any of the majority justices (Helmbright at [211]). In her Honour’s view, the correct understanding of the test as explained by Brennan J is that there must be (Helmbright at [148]):a.biological descent from the “indigenous people”, which is a reference to an identifiable group, clan or community; andb.mutual recognition of a person’s membership of that same group, clan or community by the person concerned and by elders or others enjoying traditional authority within that group, clan or community. In this context, what is required is authority to permit or preclude membership that has its source in the norms handed down from generation to generation, since prior to European settlement. Her Honour reasoned, at [141]:Therefore, when Brennan J describes mutual recognition by those with “traditional authority”, and “by elders”, his Honour is describing those people who are seen, by their own community, as having authority under the laws and customs of that community as passed down through the generations, to make decisions for and about the community (including membership of the group or clan itself). As his Honour recognised, there may have been some adaptation and change to the content of law and custom because of the impact of European settlement.