Fernando v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship

Link copied
Case Copied 12 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Fernando v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FCA 1203

MIGRATION – false imprisonment – detention under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – objection to competency – whether Federal Court has original jurisdiction to hear and determine a claim for damages for false imprisonment in respect of a detention under s 189 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth)

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B(1A)(c)
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5, 189, 198, 474, 474(3)(g), 476A, 486A, 501(2)
Migration Litigation Reform Act 2005 (Cth)

Explanatory Memorandum, Migration Litigation Reform Bill 2005 (Cth)

Fernando v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 975
Sales v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2006] FCA 1807
Beyazkilinc v Manager, Baxter Immigration Reception and Processing Centre (2006) 155 FCR 465
Alsalih v Manager, Baxter Immigration Detention Facility (2004) 136 FCR 291
Secretary, Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Mastipour (2004) 207 ALR 83
Goldiev Commonwealth of Australia (No 2) [2004] FCA 156
Bodruddaza v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2007) 234 ALR 114

WANNAKUWATTEMITIWADUGE LLOYD NIRMALEEN FERNANDO v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
WAD 111 OF 2007

SIOPIS J
10 AUGUST 2007
PERTH


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

WAD 111 OF 2007

BETWEEN:

WANNAKUWATTEMITIWADUGE LLOYD NIRMALEEN FERNANDO
Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
Respondent

JUDGE:

SIOPIS J

DATE OF ORDER:

10 AUGUST 2007

WHERE MADE:

PERTH

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The respondent’s notice of objection to competency filed 20 June 2007 is dismissed.

2.The respondent is to pay the applicant’s costs.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

WAD 111 OF 2007

BETWEEN:

WANNAKUWATTEMITIWADUGE LLOYD NIRMALEEN FERNANDO
Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
Respondent

JUDGE:

SIOPIS J

DATE:

10 AUGUST 2007

PLACE:

PERTH

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. The applicant is a citizen of Sri Lanka.  He came to Australia in 1989 on a student visa.  He has been in Australia since then.  In 1995, the applicant was granted a permanent residency visa.

  2. In 1998, the applicant was convicted after a trial in the District Court of Western Australia of three charges of sexual penetration without consent, committed in 1996.  He was sentenced to eight years imprisonment with eligibility for parole.

  3. On 29 November 2001, the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs cancelled the applicant’s visa under s 501(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act). In September 2003, the Federal Court set aside the Minister’s decision to cancel the applicant’s visa on the grounds that the applicant had not been afforded procedural fairness (Fernando v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 975).

  4. On 3 October 2003, the Acting Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs exercised the power to cancel the applicant’s permanent residency visa for a second time.  At that time the applicant was…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Fernando v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2007] FCA 1203
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Fernando v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship involved the applicant, Fernando, seeking damages for false imprisonment against the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship. The central issue before the court was whether the Federal Court had original jurisdiction to hear and determine a claim for damages for false imprisonment arising from a detention effected by a person acting under the authority of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The respondent argued that the detention of the applicant was a privative clause decision under s 474(3)(g) of the Act and that s 476A of the Act restricted the original jurisdiction of the Federal Court to hear and determine claims in relation to migration decisions. The court had to decide whether the Federal Court could entertain a claim for damages for false imprisonment under these circumstances.

The court examined the legislative intent behind the 2005 amendments to the Act, particularly in light of the High Court's observations in Bodruddaza v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs. The court noted that the High Court had emphasised that the phrase "a remedy...in relation to a migration decision" in s 486A of the Act was not intended to encompass claims for damages for false imprisonment. The court concluded that the legislative intent was to impose uniform time limits for applications for judicial review of migration decisions, and not to preclude claims for common law damages for false imprisonment. Therefore, the court held that s 476A(1) of the Act should be read as if the words "an application for judicial review of" were inserted between "in relation to" and "a migration decision," thereby preserving the original jurisdiction of the Federal Court under s 39B(1A)(c) of the Judiciary Act.

Consequently, the court dismissed the respondent’s objection to competency and ordered that the respondent pay the applicant’s costs. This decision underscores the continued availability of the Federal Court's original jurisdiction to hear claims for damages for false imprisonment arising from detention under the Act, despite the restrictions imposed by s 476A on the court’s jurisdiction to hear and determine claims for judicial review of migration decisions.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The respondent’s notice of objection to competency filed 20 June 2007 is dismissed.

2. The respondent is to pay the applicant’s costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case of Fernando v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship revolves around the applicant, Fernando, who was detained under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). Fernando brought a claim for damages for false imprisonment, arguing that his detention was unlawful. The respondent, the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, contended that the detention was a privative clause decision and, therefore, not subject to judicial review or other forms of legal challenge. The respondent relied on the case of Beyazkilinc v Manager, Baxter Immigration Reception and Processing Centre to argue that the detention was a "doing of an act" under the Act, making it a privative clause decision. The central issue was whether the Federal Court had original jurisdiction to hear and determine Fernando's claim for damages for false imprisonment despite the privative clause.

The case came before the Federal Court as an application to determine the court's jurisdiction to hear a claim for damages for false imprisonment. The respondent filed a notice of objection to competency on 20 June 2007, challenging the court's ability to hear the matter. The court needed to decide if the claim for damages was a collateral attack on a migration decision and, therefore, outside the court's original jurisdiction under s 476A of the Act. The court's determination involved interpreting the scope of s 476A and its impact on the original jurisdiction of the Federal Court under s 39B(1A)(c) of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth).

Decision

Reasons for decision

SIOPIS J
Section 474 of the Act states:(1)A privative clause decision:(a)is final and conclusive; and(b)must not be challenged, appealed against, reviewed, quashed or called in question in any court; and(c)is not subject to prohibition, mandamus, injunction, declaration or certiorari in any court on any account.(2)In this section:privative clause decision means a decision of an administrative character made, proposed to be made, or required to be made, as the case may be, under this Act or under a regulation or other instrument made under this Act (whether in the exercise of a discretion or not), other than a decision referred to in subsection (4) or (5).(3)A reference in this section to a decision includes a reference to the following:…(g)doing or refusing to do any other act or thing; The respondent contended that the detention of the applicant was a privative clause decision because his detention comprised the “doing of an act” under the Act, and so was within the ambit of s 474(3)(g) of the Act. The respondent relied upon the case of Beyazkilinc v Manager, Baxter Immigration Reception and Processing Centre (2006) 155 FCR 465. In that case, Besanko J held that removal of the applicant pursuant to s 198 of the Act was the “doing of an act” and so fell within the ambit of s 474(3)(g), with the consequence that it was to be characterised as a “privative clause decision”. The respondent submitted that by parity of reasoning the detention of the applicant under s 189 of the Act was also the “doing of an act” under the Act and, therefore, a privative clause decision and a “migration decision”. The respondent went on to submit, in oral submissions, that the claim for damages for false imprisonment amounted to a collateral attack on a migration decision and, therefore, the Federal Court has no original jurisdiction to hear and determine the applicant’s claim. In light of my finding below, it is unnecessary to determine whether the detention of a person under s 189 of the Act is a privative clause decision. However, I will assume that to be the case. The first question is whether, in the absence of the restriction sought to be imposed on the original jurisdiction of the Court by s 476A, this Court would have original jurisdiction to hear and determine a claim for damages for false imprisonment arising from a detention effected by a person acting, or purporting to act, under the Act. In my view, whether a person is entitled to damages in respect of his or her imprisonment by a person acting or purporting to act, under the authority of the Act, is a matter arising under a Commonwealth statute, and any claim for damages brought by that person for false imprisonment would fall within the original jurisdiction of the Federal Court under s 39B(1A)(c) of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) (Alsalih v Manager, Baxter Immigration Detention Facility (2004) 136 FCR 291 at 304, at [41]; Secretary, Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Mastipour (2004) 207 ALR 83 and see also Goldiev Commonwealth of Australia (No 2) [2004] FCA 156).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: SIOPIS J

In Bodruddaza v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2007) 234 ALR 114, the respondent advanced a similar argument to that advanced in this Court, as to the ambit of the words “a remedy…in relation to a migration decision” in s 486A of the Act. In the course of considering that argument, the High Court considered the legislative intent of Parliament in enacting the 2005 Act, and observed at 118‑119, at [21]‑[25]:The Solicitor‑General of the Commonwealth submitted that the phrase in s 486A(1) “a remedy…in relation to a migration decision” was sufficiently broad to encompass more than applications for judicial review. He submitted that, for example, unless the plaintiff complied with s 486A, an action in tort would not lie in the original jurisdiction of this court against the Commonwealth for false imprisonment where an officer had detained the plaintiff as an unlawful non‑citizen without the knowledge or reasonable suspicion stipulated by s 189 of the Act.Counsel for the plaintiff advanced cogent reasons why the phrase “a remedy…in relation to a migration decision” should not be given a reading which would take s 486A beyond public law remedies and into the area of what might be called collateral attack upon migration decisions.First, the plaintiff emphasised the extensive scope of the definition of “migration decision” in s 5(1), and in particular the inclusion of proposed decisions in the definition of “purported privative clause decision” found in s 5E. The tortious conduct completing a cause of action might well take place after the end of the 84‑day period stipulated in s 486A by reference to actual notification of a migration decision. Such a draconian, if not irrational, legislative scheme should not be attributed to the parliament in the absence of clear words.Secondly, the perceived mischief to which the 2005 Act was directed concerned the challenge by judicial review processes to migration decisions. The application to this court identified in s 486A(1) is “for a remedy” by way of judicial review, specifically in a s 75(v) matter. The explanatory memorandum on the Bill for the 2005 Act circulated by the authority of the Attorney‑General to the House of Representatives is instructive in this respect. Section 486A was one of several provisions included in the 2005 Act amendments with the avowed objective “to impose uniform time limits for applications for judicial review of migration decisions in the [Federal Magistrates Court], the Federal Court (in the limited circumstances that migration cases will be commenced in that court) and the High Court”.Accordingly, the submission now made by the Solicitor‑General which would give broader reach to s 486A should not be accepted. (Footnotes omitted and emphasis added.) In my view, the observations of the High Court in relation to the legislative intention of the 2005 Act apply mutatis mutandis to the amendments made to the Act by the insertion of s 476A. Accordingly, the limitations imposed by that section on the original jurisdiction of the Federal Court were intended to apply only to the “challenge by the judicial review processes to migration decisions”. It follows that the original jurisdiction of the Federal Court under s 39B(1A)(c) of the Judiciary Act, to hear and determine a claim for common law damages for false imprisonment arising from detention under the Act, is not affected by s 476A. In other words, s 476A(1) of the Act is to be read as if the words “an application for judicial review of”, were inserted between the words “in relation to” and “a migration decision”.