FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
FJE20 v Minister for Home Affairs [2021] FCCA 1900
ORDERS
SYG 2994 of 2020 BETWEEN: FJE20
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS
First Respondent
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, MIGRANT SERVICES AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
Second Respondent
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA (and another named in the Schedule)
Third Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE DRIVER
DATE OF ORDER:
31 AUGUST 2021
INTERLOCUTORY ORDERS:
1.Pursuant to rule 13.10(a) of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth), the amended application filed on 30 April 2021, as proposed to be further amended by the third further amended application lodged on 2 August 2021, is dismissed on the basis that the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear and determine the application.
2.Each of the applications listed in the annexure to this judgment are also dismissed.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JUDGE DRIVER:
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
By an Application in…
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- Case
- [2021] FCCA 1900
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the Court was whether it possessed the necessary statutory jurisdiction to entertain the applicant's claims. Specifically, the Court was required to determine if any provision of a statute or legislative instrument conferred jurisdiction on the Federal Circuit Court to hear the type of claims the applicant sought to bring, particularly in light of the limitations on its jurisdiction as established by legislation.
Driver J reasoned that the Federal Circuit Court's original jurisdiction is strictly confined to that conferred by statute. The Court's jurisdiction in migration matters is primarily governed by section 476(1) of the *Migration Act*, which grants it the same original jurisdiction as the High Court has under paragraph 75(v) of the Constitution in relation to migration decisions. Drawing on High Court authority, particularly in construing section 476A of the *Migration Act*, the Court held that the phrase "in relation to a migration decision" is confined to public law remedies in the nature of judicial review. This interpretation means the jurisdiction does not extend to collateral attacks on migration decisions, such as claims for damages for false imprisonment. Section 14 of the *Federal Circuit Court Act*, which aims to avoid multiplicity of proceedings, was found not to confer jurisdiction itself but rather to operate where jurisdiction already exists.
Consequently, the respondents successfully established that the Court lacked jurisdiction to deal with the application. Driver J ordered that the applicant's amended application, and 56 other matters listed for mention with this case, be dismissed. The Court also indicated it would hear the parties on the issue of costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Federal Circuit Court has only such original jurisdiction as is conferred upon it by legislation.[5] Accordingly, in order to establish that this Court has jurisdiction to hear his application, the applicant must identify a provision of a statute or legislative instrument by which jurisdiction is conferred on the Court to hear claims of the kind the applicant seeks to bring. For the reasons below, there is said to be no such provision. It follows in the respondents’ submission that the applicant has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding, and his amended application should be summarily dismissed under rule 13.10(a) of the Federal Circuit Court Rules. [5] Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth) (Federal Circuit Court Act), ss 10(1), (1A)Migration Act The Federal Circuit Court’s jurisdiction with respect to migration decisions is conferred by s 476(1) of the Migration Act (and subject to the qualifications in s 476(2)). Section 476(1) provides: Subject to this section, the Federal Circuit Court has the same original jurisdiction in relation to migration decisions as the High Court has under paragraph 75(v) of the Constitution. The jurisdiction of this Court is conferred “in relation to migration decisions”. A cognate of that phrase appears in s 476A, which follows immediately after s 476 in the Migration Act. Section 476A(1) concerns the jurisdiction of the Federal Court. It provides that the Federal Court has original jurisdiction “in relation to a migration decision” only if one or more of the conditions in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) are met. The High Court has held, in construing the meaning of the phrase “in relation to a migration decision” as it appears in s 476A, that the phrase is confined to “public law remedies in the nature of judicial review of migration decisions”.[6] In DBE17, Nettle J (sitting as a single judge) affirmed the position at [14] that had, in his Honour’s words, “consistently been taken in the Federal Court”, namely, that s 476A does not deny the Federal Court jurisdiction to determine a claim for damages for false imprisonment comprised of allegedly unlawful detention under the Migration Act. The proper construction of the phrase was explained in the following terms by Siopis J in Fernando v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship[7] at [22] that the phrase “in relation to migration decisions” in the context of s 476A: is to be read as if the words “an application for judicial review of”, were inserted between the words “in relation to” and “a migration decision”.[6] DBE17 (by his litigation guardian Arthur) v Commonwealth (2019) 266 CLR 156 at [15] (Nettle J)[7] (2007) 165 FCR 471 The reasoning for that construction of the phrase “in relation to a migration decision” has been explained in numerous decisions of the Federal Court, a number of which were cited with approval by Nettle J in DBE17 at [14]. It was explained most recently by the Full Federal Court in McHugh v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs.[8] Allsop CJ, after referring to Nettle J’s reasons in DBE17, explained the position to be as follows at [15]: the phrase “jurisdiction in relation to a migration decision” can be taken to be no wider than jurisdiction in public law remedies of direct judicial review of a migration decision. The phrase “in relation to” has no width or flexibility in this context beyond that. It does not include what might be called collateral attack upon a migration decision: Bodruddaza at [22], such as a claim for false imprisonment available within jurisdiction under ss 39B(1A)(c) and 75(iii) of the Constitution by s 32(1) of the Federal Court Act 1976 (Cth): PCS Operations Pty Ltd v Maritime Union of Australia (1998) 153 ALR 520; [1998] HCA 29 at [6]–[13]. See also Commonwealth v Okwume (2018) 263 FCR 604; 356 ALR 290; 160 ALD 515; [2018] FCAFC 69; and DBE17.(emphasis in original)[8] [2020] FCAFC 223