FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Rana v Google Inc [2017] FCAFC 156
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Details
- AGLC
- Rana v Google Inc [2017] FCAFC 156
- Case
- [2017] FCAFC 156
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
In the Federal Court of Australia, Rana sought to bring claims for defamation, contravention of the Australian Consumer Law, and negligence against Google Inc. The primary judge dismissed the proceeding for lack of jurisdiction, having struck out the Australian Consumer Law claims and concluding that the Federal Court lacked jurisdiction to hear and determine the defamation claims. Rana appealed, arguing that the defamation and negligence claims formed part of the same justiciable controversy as the Australian Consumer Law claims, and thus the Federal Court had jurisdiction over all claims.
The court considered the nature of federal jurisdiction and whether the defamation and negligence claims were part of the same justiciable controversy as the Australian Consumer Law claims. The court found that the primary judge’s reasoning and conclusions as to jurisdiction were incorrect. The court held that the Federal Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine the defamation claim, and indeed the negligence claim, as these aspects are part of a single matter within the jurisdiction of the Court that has, and has had since it was commenced, its substratum of facts in the asserted defamation, the conduct of Google in dealing with the publications and, arguably, in how the Commonwealth dealt with the matter.
Accordingly, the appeal was allowed. The orders of the primary judge were set aside, and the interlocutory applications were dismissed. The matter was remitted to the primary judge for case management and for its further conduct otherwise. The costs of the application for leave to appeal and the appeal were to be hereafter within the discretion of the primary judge.
The court considered the nature of federal jurisdiction and whether the defamation and negligence claims were part of the same justiciable controversy as the Australian Consumer Law claims. The court found that the primary judge’s reasoning and conclusions as to jurisdiction were incorrect. The court held that the Federal Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine the defamation claim, and indeed the negligence claim, as these aspects are part of a single matter within the jurisdiction of the Court that has, and has had since it was commenced, its substratum of facts in the asserted defamation, the conduct of Google in dealing with the publications and, arguably, in how the Commonwealth dealt with the matter.
Accordingly, the appeal was allowed. The orders of the primary judge were set aside, and the interlocutory applications were dismissed. The matter was remitted to the primary judge for case management and for its further conduct otherwise. The costs of the application for leave to appeal and the appeal were to be hereafter within the discretion of the primary judge.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be allowed.
2. The orders of the primary judge made on 25 January 2017 be set aside.
3. The interlocutory applications dated 31 July 2017 and 2 August 2017 be dismissed.
4. The matter be remitted to the primary judge for case management and for its further conduct otherwise.
5. The costs of the application for leave to appeal and the appeal be hereafter within the discretion of the primary judge.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
The primary judge did not address the negligence claim against Google. It is possible this was because the primary application before her Honour was focused on leave to commence the defamation proceedings. The negligence claim, in summary, alleges that Google Inc was negligent in failing to remove the alleged defamatory material.The conclusions of the primary judge on jurisdiction Having struck out the ACL claims without granting leave to re-plead, her Honour concluded at [55] that this Court lacked jurisdiction to hear and determine the defamation claims as there was no core federal matter pleaded. The negligence claim was not adverted to, but it appears the same conclusion would have been reached. Her Honour thus dismissed the balance of the proceeding for want of jurisdiction. The primary judge had determined at [45] that the Court’s jurisdiction to hear and determine the claims in defamation had to be pursuant to its jurisdiction in “associated” matters under s 32 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth). Given the defects in the ACL claims, the primary judge said that it was “difficult, if not impossible” to determine whether these claims were within the scope of a single justiciable controversy that encompassed the defamation claims or whether the federal claim made under the ACL was “colourable”: [2017] FCA 17 at [52]-[54]. For the reasons that follow, the primary judge’s reasoning and conclusions as to jurisdiction were, with respect, wrong. The striking out of the ACL claims did not mean this Court somehow lost jurisdiction. This Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine the defamation claim (and, indeed, the negligence claim). These aspects are part of a single matter within the jurisdiction of this Court that has, and has had since it was commenced, its substratum of facts in the asserted defamation, the conduct of Google in dealing with the publications and, arguably, in how the Commonwealth dealt with the matter.Principles of federal jurisdiction and the jurisdiction of this Court The jurisdiction exercised by the Federal Court is always federal jurisdiction: Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally [1999] HCA 27; 198 CLR 511. The content of that jurisdiction exercised by this Court is derived from ss 75 and 76 of the Constitution, and that jurisdiction is defined by laws that are authorised by s 77(i) of the Constitution. Section 19 of the Federal Court of Australia Act provides that the Federal Court “has such original jurisdiction as is vested in it by laws made by the Parliament”. Leaving to one side specific conferrals of jurisdiction on the Court by individual Acts of the Commonwealth Parliament, by s 39B(1A)(c) of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), Parliament has conferred upon the Court a general federal civil jurisdiction, being “jurisdiction in any matter … arising under any laws made by the Parliament …”. Crucial to the scope and operation of federal jurisdiction, to the question whether a proceeding is within federal jurisdiction and to the question whether a proceeding is within the jurisdiction of this Court, is the concept of a “matter”. In Re Wakim, Gummow and Hayne JJ at 198 CLR 585-586 [139]-[140] described a “matter”, and the process of its identification, as follows:[139] The central task is to identify the justiciable controversy. In civil proceedings that will ordinarily require close attention to the pleadings (if any) and to the factual basis of each claim. [140] In Fencott it was said that: “in the end, it is a matter of impression and of practical judgment whether a non-federal claim and a federal claim joined in a proceeding are within the scope of one controversy and thus within the ambit of a matter.” The references to “impression” and “practical judgment” cannot be understood, however, as stating a test that is to be applied. Considerations of impression and practical judgment are relevant because the question of jurisdiction usually arises before evidence is adduced and often before the pleadings are complete. Necessarily, then, the question will have to be decided on limited information. But the question is not at large. What is a single controversy “depends on what the parties have done, the relationships between or among them and the laws which attach rights or liabilities to their conduct and relationships”. There is but a single matter if different claims arise out of “common transactions and facts” or “a common substratum of facts”, notwithstanding that the facts upon which the claims depend "do not wholly coincide”. So, too, there is but one matter where different claims are so related that the determination of one is essential to the determination of the other, as, for example, in the case of third party proceedings or where there are alternative claims for the same damage and the determination of one will either render the other otiose or necessitate its determination. Conversely, claims which are “completely disparate”, “completely separate and distinct” or “distinct and unrelated” are not part of the same matter. (citations omitted and emphasis added)
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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