FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Ascic v Australian Federal Police [2025] FCA 124
File number: WAD 266 of 2023 Judgment of: FEUTRILL J Date of judgment: 26 February 2025 Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for summary dismissal and strike out – consideration of principles applicable to s 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) and r 16.21 and r 26.01 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) – jurisdiction of the Federal Court of Australia – cause of action for damages for personal injury and tort – limitation periods under s 38(1)(c)(vi) of the Limitation Act 1935 (WA) and s 13 and s 14 of the Limitation Act 2005 (WA) – extension of limitation periods while insane or of unsound mind under s 40 of the Limitation Act 1935 – whether cause of action clearly statute barred
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – informal application for recusal – consideration of principles concerning apprehended and actual bias
Legislation: Constitution ss 51(xxxi), 75(iii)
Compensation (Commonwealth Employees) Act 1971 (Cth) ss 27, 97, 99; Pt IV
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 20A, 31A, 31A(2), 31A(3), 37M
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) ss 39B(1A)(c), 56, 64. 79, 80
Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) ss 4, 10, 24, 25, 27, 44, 44(1), 45, 47, 52, 123A, 124, 127(2), 174; Ptt IV, X
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 16.21, 16.21(1), 26.01, 26.01(1), 26.01(1)(c), 26.01(2), 26.21, 26.21(1); Divs 4.2. 9.6
Limitation Act 1935 (WA) ss 38, 38(1)(c)(vi), 38(3), 38A, 39, 40, 42
Limitation Act 2005 (WA) ss 2, 3, 4(1), 6, 6(1), 13, 13(1), 14, 14(1), 55, 55(1), 91, 92
Cases cited: Agar v Hyde [2000] HCA 41; 201 CLR 552
Ascic and Comcare (Compensation) [2017] AATA 1436
Ascic and Comcare (Compensation) [2019] AATA 2476
Ascic v Comcare [2019] FCA 819
Ascic v Comcare [2020] FCAFC 105
Ascic v Comcare [2021] FCA 1498
Ascic v Comcare [2022] FCA 1245
Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd v Dzienciol [2001] WASC 305
Batistatos v Roads & Traffic Authority of New South Wales [2006] HCA 27; 226 CLR 256
Blunden v Commonwealth [2003] HCA 73; 218 CLR 330
Charisteas v Charisteas [2021] HCA 29; 273 CLR 289
Commonwealth v Mewett [1997] HCA 29; 191 CLR 471
Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63; 205 CLR 337
Fewin Pty Ltd v Prentice [2018] FCA 852
Georgiadis v Australian & Overseas Telecommunications Corporation [1994] HCA 6; 179 CLR 297
Hawkins v Clayton [1988] HCA 15; 164 CLR 539
Laws v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal [1990] HCA 31; 170 CLR 70
Letang v Cooper [1965] 1 QB 232
Metwally v University of Wollongong [1985] HCA 28; 60 ALR 68
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng [2001] HCA 17; 205 CLR 507
Morgan v Banning (1999) 20 WAR 474
Mullaley v State of Western Australia [2020] FCA 13
Polar Aviation Pty Ltd v Civil Aviation Safety Authority (No 4) [2011] FCA 1126
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- Case
- [2025] FCA 124
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court included determining whether the applicant's cause of action was clearly statute-barred, and whether the court had the jurisdiction to hear the case. Additionally, the court examined whether there were grounds for an informal application for recusal due to apprehended bias. The applicant argued that his cause of action was not barred by the limitation periods and that the court had jurisdiction over the matter. The Commonwealth, represented by the Australian Federal Police, contended that the applicant's claim was statute-barred and that the court lacked jurisdiction.
The court found that the applicant's cause of action was not clearly statute-barred, as there were provisions under the Limitation Acts that could potentially extend the limitation periods. The court held that it had jurisdiction over the matter as the claim for damages arose under common law and was supported by the provisions of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth). Furthermore, the court dismissed the application for recusal, finding no evidence of apprehended bias.
The court concluded that the applicant's claim was not so weak that it warranted summary dismissal or strike-out. The case involved substantial issues of law and fact, and the court was not satisfied that the applicant had no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding. Consequently, the court dismissed the respondent's interlocutory application with no order as to costs.
The final orders included amending the respondent's name to 'The Commonwealth (Australian Federal Police)' and dismissing the respondent’s interlocutory application filed on 22 April 2024, with no order as to costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The respondent’s name be amended to ‘The Commonwealth (Australian Federal Police)’.
2. The respondent’s interlocutory application filed 22 April 2024 be dismissed with no order as to costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
If s 13 or s 14 of the Limitation Act 2005 applies to the cause of action, there are other potentially relevant provisions of the Limitation Act 2005 that affect the limitation period under that Act. The Court may extend the time in which an action can be commenced if satisfied that the failure to commence the action was attributable to fraudulent or other improper conduct of the respondent: s 38 of the Limitation Act 2005. The Court may also extend the time in which an action for damages for personal injury can be commenced if satisfied that a person to whom the cause of action accrues was not aware of the physical cause of the injury, or not aware that it was attributable to the conduct of a person, or had been unable to establish that person’s identity: s 39 of the Limitation Act 2005. The Court may extend the time in which an action is to be commenced up to 12 years from when the cause of action accrues for an applicant who suffers a mental disability at any time after a cause of action accrues to that person if satisfied that in the circumstances it was unreasonable for a guardian of the applicant not to commence the action within the limitation period: s 42 of the Limitation Act 2005. If s 38(1)(c)(vi) of the Limitation Act 1935 applies to the cause of action, there are no provisions that permit the Court to extend the period of time within which an action, suit or other proceedings were to have been commenced. However, the limitation period is extended in certain circumstances of latent injury and disability: s 38A, s 40 of the Limitation Act 1935. ConsiderationDoes the Federal Court have jurisdiction? The first paragraph of the originating application asserts:This is my continuing action, since about 1992; to recover common law damages, or compensation for non economic loss; following my serious mental injury on 11/12/1987 and invalidity retirement on 01/09/1988. This is an entitlement that arises under common law, as confirmed by the provisions. of Part IV of SRC 1988 Act, for personal injuries. The applicant’s statement of claim asserts:1.This document accompanies an originating application, seeking relief that includes a claim for recovery of damages, aggravated damages and malfeasance, in the sum of $10,000,000, for damages deliberately and systematically inflicted upon me, by my employer, from 25/12/1973 to 11/12/1987, resulting in my total mental disintegration. This damage was continued util the present and I seek an additional compensation of $10,000,000 for perpetuated deliberate and aggravated damages, implemented and prosecuted from 11/12/1987 until the present. The details of these damages are identified and explained in the attached originating application.2.My right to recover damages for non economic loss from AFP was denied by AFP/Comcare, by concealing that this action lies against AFP, my employer and not Comcare; with a false claim that this right was removed in the SRC 1988 Act, as a means of reducing the ballooning compensation costs. Comcare is not my employer and therefore this action for damages does not lie with Comcare. 3.Comcare falsely claims that this right was replaced by the right to claim permanent impairment compensation under sections 24 and 27 instead. 4.The Comcare denial of my claim is based on a fabricated determination at T17 and a fabricated reviewable decision at T22, which can not be actioned under SRC 1988 or the AAT Act, as neither is produced under the authority of a Comcare Delegate. Similarly, these can not be actioned by any Court either. The primary decision maker must be a sworn Comcare Delegate and a sworn public servant, for such a decision to be actionable under those provisions. 5.The, decision of Justice Jackson, at paragraph 50 of Ascic v Comcare [2022] FCA 1245 confirms that the right to damages does exist and that the provisions for review of Comcare determinations is not the correct forum for pursuing the right to recover damages. 6.The right to recover damages is enshrined in Part IV of SRC 1988 Act, including section 4 definitions of: action for non economic loss, damages, sections 10 (recovery of damages) for non economic loss, sections 47(1) (a) and (b), 52, 123A, 124, 127(2) and 128. 7.I have been compelled to litigate this case through an irrelevant forum, as a means of AFP/Comcare concealing and disregarding all of the above provisions; through a fabricated primary decision, (Determination) to enable an unsupported case on permanent impairment compensation to replace the right to recover damages. A genuine Delegate would not ever have produced such a fabrication or initiated such a process.