Ascic v Australian Federal Police

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Ascic v Australian Federal Police [2025] FCA 124

File number: WAD 266 of 2023
Judgment of: FEUTRILL J
Date of judgment: 26 February 2025
Catchwords:

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for summary dismissal and strike out – consideration of principles applicable to s 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) and r 16.21 and r 26.01 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) – jurisdiction of the Federal Court of Australia – cause of action for damages for personal injury and tort – limitation periods under s 38(1)(c)(vi) of the Limitation Act 1935 (WA) and s 13 and s 14 of the Limitation Act 2005 (WA) – extension of limitation periods while insane or of unsound mind under s 40 of the Limitation Act 1935 – whether cause of action clearly statute barred

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – informal application for recusal – consideration of principles concerning apprehended and actual bias  

Legislation:

Constitution ss 51(xxxi), 75(iii)

Compensation (Commonwealth Employees) Act 1971 (Cth) ss 27, 97, 99; Pt IV

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 20A, 31A, 31A(2), 31A(3), 37M

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) ss 39B(1A)(c), 56, 64. 79, 80

Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) ss 4, 10, 24, 25, 27, 44, 44(1), 45, 47, 52, 123A, 124, 127(2), 174; Ptt IV, X

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 16.21, 16.21(1), 26.01, 26.01(1), 26.01(1)(c), 26.01(2), 26.21, 26.21(1); Divs 4.2. 9.6

Limitation Act 1935 (WA) ss 38, 38(1)(c)(vi), 38(3), 38A, 39, 40, 42

Limitation Act 2005 (WA) ss 2, 3, 4(1), 6, 6(1), 13, 13(1), 14, 14(1), 55, 55(1), 91, 92

Cases cited:

Agar v Hyde [2000] HCA 41; 201 CLR 552

Ascic and Comcare (Compensation) [2017] AATA 1436

Ascic and Comcare (Compensation) [2019] AATA 2476

Ascic v Comcare [2019] FCA 819

Ascic v Comcare [2020] FCAFC 105

Ascic v Comcare [2021] FCA 1498

Ascic v Comcare [2022] FCA 1245

Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd v Dzienciol [2001] WASC 305

Batistatos v Roads & Traffic Authority of New South Wales [2006] HCA 27; 226 CLR 256

Blunden v Commonwealth [2003] HCA 73; 218 CLR 330

Charisteas v Charisteas [2021] HCA 29; 273 CLR 289

Commonwealth v Mewett [1997] HCA 29; 191 CLR 471

Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63; 205 CLR 337

Fewin Pty Ltd v Prentice [2018] FCA 852

Georgiadis v Australian & Overseas Telecommunications Corporation [1994] HCA 6; 179 CLR 297

Hawkins v Clayton [1988] HCA 15; 164 CLR 539

Laws v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal [1990] HCA 31; 170 CLR 70

Letang v Cooper [1965] 1 QB 232

Metwally v University of Wollongong [1985] HCA 28; 60 ALR 68

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng [2001] HCA 17; 205 CLR 507

Morgan v Banning (1999) 20 WAR 474

Mullaley v State of Western Australia [2020] FCA 13

Polar Aviation Pty Ltd v Civil Aviation Safety Authority (No 4) [2011] FCA 1126

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Details
Case
[2025] FCA 124
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The matter of Ascic v Australian Federal Police involves a claim by the applicant, a former employee of the Australian Federal Police, seeking damages for personal injury and tort. The case was brought before the Federal Court of Australia, where the primary issue was whether the applicant's cause of action was barred by the limitation periods under the Limitation Act 2005 (WA) and the Limitation Act 1935 (WA). The court also had to consider the principles governing summary dismissal and strike-out applications under the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) and the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth).

The legal issues before the court included determining whether the applicant's cause of action was clearly statute-barred, and whether the court had the jurisdiction to hear the case. Additionally, the court examined whether there were grounds for an informal application for recusal due to apprehended bias. The applicant argued that his cause of action was not barred by the limitation periods and that the court had jurisdiction over the matter. The Commonwealth, represented by the Australian Federal Police, contended that the applicant's claim was statute-barred and that the court lacked jurisdiction.

The court found that the applicant's cause of action was not clearly statute-barred, as there were provisions under the Limitation Acts that could potentially extend the limitation periods. The court held that it had jurisdiction over the matter as the claim for damages arose under common law and was supported by the provisions of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth). Furthermore, the court dismissed the application for recusal, finding no evidence of apprehended bias.

The court concluded that the applicant's claim was not so weak that it warranted summary dismissal or strike-out. The case involved substantial issues of law and fact, and the court was not satisfied that the applicant had no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding. Consequently, the court dismissed the respondent's interlocutory application with no order as to costs.

The final orders included amending the respondent's name to 'The Commonwealth (Australian Federal Police)' and dismissing the respondent’s interlocutory application filed on 22 April 2024, with no order as to costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The respondent’s name be amended to ‘The Commonwealth (Australian Federal Police)’.

2. The respondent’s interlocutory application filed 22 April 2024 be dismissed with no order as to costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The principal issue on the application is whether it is sufficiently clear that the applicant’s cause of action for tortious damages is barred by operation of the provisions of the Limitation Act 2005 (WA) and (or) the Limitation Act 1935 (WA) to satisfy the Court that the applicant has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding. For the reasons that follow, I am not so satisfied and the proceeding should not be dismissed with costs.Background The applicant commenced employment with the Commonwealth Police, later and now known as the Australian Federal Police, on 25 December 1973. On 11 December 1987 the applicant went on medical leave and did not return to work. On 1 September 1988 the applicant ceased employment with the AFP. During the period he was on medical leave the applicant made a claim for compensation under Pt IV of the Compensation (Commonwealth Employees) Act 1971 (Cth). From 1 September 1988 the applicant received a pension under the 1971 Compensation Act. With effect from 1 December 1988 the 1971 Compensation Act was repealed and replaced by the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth). The SRC Act contains transitional provisions by which, in effect, the SRC Act applies to injury, loss or damage suffered by an employee whether it is suffered before or after the commencement day of that Act. A person is entitled to compensation under the SRC Act in respect of an injury, loss or damage suffered before 1 December 1988 if compensation was or would have been payable to the person under the 1971 Compensation Act: s 124 SRC Act. Comcare has made various determinations of the applicant’s average weekly earnings and normal weekly earnings under the relevant provisions of the 1971 Compensation Act and SRC Act. The applicant requested Comcare conduct independent reviews of all determinations concerning his entitlement to compensation. The applicant unsuccessfully sought review of the determinations in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal: Ascic and Comcare (Compensation) [2017] AATA 1436. A challenge of the AAT’s decision in this Court was unsuccessful: Ascic v Comcare [2019] FCA 819; Ascic v Comcare [2020] FCAFC 105. The applicant made a claim for a lump sum compensation payment for a ‘permanent impairment’ for the accepted condition of ‘depression and acute paranoid reaction to perceived stress in employment’ under s 124 of the SRC Act. On 2 February 2017 Comcare declined the applicant’s claim on the ground that the applicant’s condition had become permanent before 1 December 1988 and, because the 1971 Compensation Act made no provision for a lump sum payment of compensation for psychological conditions, the applicant was not entitled to such a payment under s 174 of the SRC Act. On 16 March 2017 a delegate of Comcare affirmed that decision on a review. On 18 May 2017 the applicant lodged an application for review of the delegate’s decision in the AAT. On 9 August 2019 the AAT affirmed the delegate’s decision: Ascic and Comcare (Compensation) [2019] AATA 2476. An appeal from the AAT’s decision to this Court was unsuccessful: Ascic v Comcare [2021] FCA 1498. An appeal from that decision was dismissed: Ascic v Comcare [2022] FCA 1245.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Section 31A of the Federal Court Act provides, relevantly:31A Summary judgment …(2)The Court may give judgment for one party against another in relation to the whole or any part of a proceeding if:(a)the first party is defending the proceeding or that part of the proceeding; and (b)the Court is satisfied that the other party has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding or that part of the proceeding. (3)For the purposes of this section, a defence or a proceeding or part of a proceeding need not be:(a)hopeless; or (b)bound to fail;for it to have no reasonable prospect of success. … Rule 26.01(1) provides, relevantly, that a party may apply to the Court for an order that judgment be given against another party because: (a) the applicant has no reasonable prospect of prosecuting the proceeding; or (c) no reasonable cause of action is disclosed. The application must be accompanied by an affidavit stating the grounds of the application and the facts and circumstances relied on to support those grounds: r 26.01(2). Here, the Commonwealth filed, read and relied on the affidavit of Georgina Ellis affirmed 22 April 2024. Rule 16.21(1) provides, relevantly, that a party may apply for an order that all or part of a pleading be struck out on the ground that the pleading contains frivolous or vexatious material, is evasive or ambiguous, is likely to cause prejudice embarrassment or delay in the proceeding, or fails to disclose a reasonable cause of action. The principles applicable to an application for summary dismissal under s 31A of the Federal Court Act or under r 26.01(1) of the Rules, alternatively to strike-out a statement of claim under r 16.21 of the Rules without leave to amend or re-plead were set out by Kenny J in Polar Aviation Pty Ltd v Civil Aviation Safety Authority (No 4) [2011] FCA 1126; 203 FCR 293 at [7]-[18]. The correctness of her Honour’s explanation of these principles was confirmed on appeal: Polar Aviation Pty Ltd v Civil Aviation Safety Authority [2012] FCAFC 97; 203 FCR 325 at [40]-[51], [93] (Perram, Dodds-Streeton and Griffiths JJ). These principles may be summarised as follows.(1)Rule 16.21 generally relates to the sufficiency of pleadings. The pleadings must disclose a reasonable cause of action against the party against whom the cause of action is brought and must state all the material facts necessary to establish that cause of action and the relief sought. A reasonable cause of action for this purpose means one which has some chance of success if regard is had only to the allegations and the pleadings upon which the applicant relies. The question on a strike-out application is not whether the facts pleaded are in themselves sufficient to give rise to a cause of action; rather, the question is whether it would be open to the applicant upon the pleadings to prove the facts at trial which would constitute a cause of action.(2)There may be circumstances in which the failure of a pleading to disclose a reasonable cause of action may warrant striking out the action. However, the mere fact that the case appears weak is not of itself sufficient to justify striking out the action. Normally, the power to strike out an action should only be exercised in plain and obvious cases, where no reasonable amendment could cure the defect. If a substantial case is involved in the claim, the power to strike out the action should not be exercised. But, the power to strike out an action must be exercised with caution and should not be exercised unless it is obvious that there is no real question to be tried. Notwithstanding the need for caution, where in a strike-out application a point of law arises, which can be appropriately decided summarily, the judge is entitled to determine the point, thereby avoiding the need for a lengthy trial.(3)Under s 31A of the Federal Court Act and r 26.01 of the Rules, the Court may give judgment for a respondent against an applicant in relation to the whole or any part of a proceeding if the Court is satisfied that the applicant has no reasonable prospects of successfully prosecuting the proceeding or that part of the proceeding. To have no reasonable prospects the proceeding need not be ‘hopeless’ or ‘bound to fail’. In effect, no hard or fast rule can be laid down as to when summary judgment is available. The critical question is that set by s 31A; namely, whether the moving party has persuaded the Court that the opposing party has no reasonable prospect of success.(4)The High Court considered s 31A in Spencer v Commonwealth [2010] HCA 28; 241 CLR 118. In that case, French CJ and Gummow J said:25Section 31A(2) requires a practical judgment by the Federal Court as to whether the applicant has more than a “fanciful” prospect of success. That may be a judgment of law or of fact, or of mixed law and fact. Where there are factual issues capable of being disputed and in dispute, summary dismissal should not be awarded to the respondent simply because the Court has formed the view that the applicant is unlikely to succeed on the factual issue. Where the success of a proceeding depends upon propositions of law apparently precluded by existing authority, that may not always be the end of the matter. Existing authority may be overruled, qualified or further explained. Summary processes must not be used to stultify the development of the law. But where the success of proceedings is critically dependent upon a proposition of law which would contradict a binding decision of this Court, the court hearing the application under s 31A could justifiably conclude that the proceedings had no reasonable prospect of success.26Where an application under s 31A requires consideration of apparently complex questions of fact, then the caution uttered by Lord Hope is relevant. The importance of those considerations is amplified if the case involves resolution of issues of law and fact, or mixed law and fact. (5)Justices Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell although agreeing on the outcome explained their reasoning in slightly different terms as follows:60… The Federal Court may exercise power under s 31A if, and only if, satisfied that there is “no reasonable prospect” of success. Of course, it may readily be accepted that the power to dismiss an action summarily is not to be exercised lightly. But the elucidation of what amounts to “no reasonable prospect” can best proceed in the same way as content has been given, through a succession of the decided cases, to other generally expressed statutory phrases, such as the phrase “just and equitable” when it is used to identify a ground for winding up a company. At this point in the development of the understanding of the expression and its application, it is sufficient, but important, to emphasise that the evident legislative purpose revealed by the text of the provision will be defeated if its application is read as confined to cases of a kind which fell within earlier, different, procedural regimes. (6)While there is a relationship between the operation of s 31A and r 26.01, on the one hand, and r 16.21 and other provisions of the Rules dealing with strike-outs, on the other, summary dismissal and strike-out are distinct. Evidence may disclose that an applicant has or may have a reasonable cause of action or reasonable prospects of success and, yet, the statement of claim or originating process may not disclose those matters. In such a case, the pleading may be struck-out but there would be no power to order summary judgment. However, the Court may infer from a failure to plead a reasonable cause of action after ample opportunity that none exists and, therefore, the applicant has no reasonable prospects of success.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

If s 13 or s 14 of the Limitation Act 2005 applies to the cause of action, there are other potentially relevant provisions of the Limitation Act 2005 that affect the limitation period under that Act. The Court may extend the time in which an action can be commenced if satisfied that the failure to commence the action was attributable to fraudulent or other improper conduct of the respondent: s 38 of the Limitation Act 2005. The Court may also extend the time in which an action for damages for personal injury can be commenced if satisfied that a person to whom the cause of action accrues was not aware of the physical cause of the injury, or not aware that it was attributable to the conduct of a person, or had been unable to establish that person’s identity: s 39 of the Limitation Act 2005. The Court may extend the time in which an action is to be commenced up to 12 years from when the cause of action accrues for an applicant who suffers a mental disability at any time after a cause of action accrues to that person if satisfied that in the circumstances it was unreasonable for a guardian of the applicant not to commence the action within the limitation period: s 42 of the Limitation Act 2005. If s 38(1)(c)(vi) of the Limitation Act 1935 applies to the cause of action, there are no provisions that permit the Court to extend the period of time within which an action, suit or other proceedings were to have been commenced. However, the limitation period is extended in certain circumstances of latent injury and disability: s 38A, s 40 of the Limitation Act 1935. ConsiderationDoes the Federal Court have jurisdiction? The first paragraph of the originating application asserts:This is my continuing action, since about 1992; to recover common law damages, or compensation for non economic loss; following my serious mental injury on 11/12/1987 and invalidity retirement on 01/09/1988. This is an entitlement that arises under common law, as confirmed by the provisions. of Part IV of SRC 1988 Act, for personal injuries. The applicant’s statement of claim asserts:1.This document accompanies an originating application, seeking relief that includes a claim for recovery of damages, aggravated damages and malfeasance, in the sum of $10,000,000, for damages deliberately and systematically inflicted upon me, by my employer, from 25/12/1973 to 11/12/1987, resulting in my total mental disintegration. This damage was continued util the present and I seek an additional compensation of $10,000,000 for perpetuated deliberate and aggravated damages, implemented and prosecuted from 11/12/1987 until the present. The details of these damages are identified and explained in the attached originating application.2.My right to recover damages for non economic loss from AFP was denied by AFP/Comcare, by concealing that this action lies against AFP, my employer and not Comcare; with a false claim that this right was removed in the SRC 1988 Act, as a means of reducing the ballooning compensation costs. Comcare is not my employer and therefore this action for damages does not lie with Comcare. 3.Comcare falsely claims that this right was replaced by the right to claim permanent impairment compensation under sections 24 and 27 instead. 4.The Comcare denial of my claim is based on a fabricated determination at T17 and a fabricated reviewable decision at T22, which can not be actioned under SRC 1988 or the AAT Act, as neither is produced under the authority of a Comcare Delegate. Similarly, these can not be actioned by any Court either. The primary decision maker must be a sworn Comcare Delegate and a sworn public servant, for such a decision to be actionable under those provisions. 5.The, decision of Justice Jackson, at paragraph 50 of Ascic v Comcare [2022] FCA 1245 confirms that the right to damages does exist and that the provisions for review of Comcare determinations is not the correct forum for pursuing the right to recover damages. 6.The right to recover damages is enshrined in Part IV of SRC 1988 Act, including section 4 definitions of: action for non economic loss, damages, sections 10 (recovery of damages) for non economic loss, sections 47(1) (a) and (b), 52, 123A, 124, 127(2) and 128. 7.I have been compelled to litigate this case through an irrelevant forum, as a means of AFP/Comcare concealing and disregarding all of the above provisions; through a fabricated primary decision, (Determination) to enable an unsupported case on permanent impairment compensation to replace the right to recover damages. A genuine Delegate would not ever have produced such a fabrication or initiated such a process.