Mullaley v State of Western Australia

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Mullaley v State of Western Australia [2020] FCA 13

File number: WAD 149 of 2019
Judge: COLVIN J
Date of judgment: 13 January 2020
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - application for extension of time to commence a claim for personal injury suffered by alleged negligence of certain police officers - where personal injury alleged was a mental health injury - consideration of s 39 of the Limitation Act 2005 (WA) - consideration of s 55 of the Limitation Act - consideration of the meaning of awareness - finding that time accrued from diagnosis of the applicants' mental health conditions - whether there was a discretion to extend time - whether the applicants attributed their mental health injuries to the actions of the police officers prior to the expiry of the limitation period - finding that there was no discretion to extend time - application dismissed
Legislation: Limitation Act 2005 (WA) ss 14, 35, 39, 41, 55, 79
Cases cited:

AME Hospitals Pty Ltd v Dixon [2015] WASCA 63; (2015) 48 WAR 139

Baker-Morrison v New South Wales [2009] NSWCA 35; (2009) 74 NSWLR 454

Belgravia Nominees Pty Ltd v Lowe Pty Ltd [2017] WASCA 127; (2017) 51 WAR 341

BHP Iron Ore Pty Ltd v Westraint Resources Pty Ltd [2002] WASCA 18

Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor [1996] HCA 25; (1996) 186 CLR 541

Dedousis v Water Board [1994] HCA 57; (1994) 181 CLR 171

Gill v Commonwealth of Australia [1999] ACTSC 64

Gill v Ethicon Sàrl (No 5) [2019] FCA 1905

Harrex v Hall-King [2012] TASSC 45

Howley v Principal Healthcare Finance Pty Ltd [2014] NSWCA 447

Queensland North Australia Pty Ltd v Takeovers Panel [2015] FCAFC 68; (2015) 230 FCR 150

Roncevich v Repatriation Commission [2005] HCA 40; (2005) 222 CLR 115

Shire of Toodyay v Merrick [2016] WASC 29

Thomas Peacock & Sons Pty Ltd v Abreu [2013] WASCA 19

Trafalgar West Investments Pty Ltd as Trustee for the Trafalgar West Investments Trust v Superior Lawns Australia Pty Ltd [No 7] [2015] WASC 280

Waldron v Joondalup Hospital Pty Ltd [2018] NSWCA 182; (2018) 98 NSWLR 552

Wardley Australia Ltd v State of Western Australia [1992] HCA 55; (1992) 175 CLR 514

Wells v Commonwealth [2014] NSWSC 148

Date of hearing: 31 October 2019
Date of last submissions: 5 December 2019
Registry: Western Australia
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 119
Counsel for the Applicants: Mr TH Offer with Ms D Tang
Solicitor for the Applicants: The National Justice Project Ltd
Counsel for the Respondents: Mr AJ Sefton
Solicitor for the Respondents: State Solicitor's Office

ORDERS

WAD 149 of 2019
BETWEEN:

EDWARD MULLALEY

First Applicant

TAMICA MULLALEY

Second Applicant

AND:

STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

First Respondent

SENIOR CONSTABLE PAUL MOORE

Second Respondent

CONSTABLE JULIA HUXLEY

Third Respondent

SERGEANT DARREN CONNOR

Fourth Respondent

JUDGE:

COLVIN J

DATE OF ORDER:

13 JANUARY…

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Details
Case
[2020] FCA 13
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Mullaley v State of Western Australia involved the applicants, Mr Mullaley and Ms Mullaley, seeking an extension of time to commence a claim for personal injury against the State of Western Australia, which they alleged was caused by the negligence of certain police officers. The applicants argued that their injuries, which were mental health related, were not attributable to the police officers until after the limitation period had expired. The matter was before the court on an application under section 39 of the Limitation Act 2005 (WA) for an extension of time to bring the claim.

The legal issues before the court were whether there was a discretion to extend the time to bring the negligence claims and whether the applicants had attributed their mental health injuries to the actions of the police officers prior to the expiry of the limitation period. The court found that the time for bringing the claims accrued from the date of diagnosis of the applicants' mental health conditions, and that there was no discretion to extend time in this case. The court held that there was no evidence that the applicants had attributed their mental health injuries to the actions of the police officers prior to the expiry of the limitation period.

The court's reasoning was based on the evidence presented, which showed that the applicants were aware or ought reasonably to have become aware that their injuries were attributable to the members of the police force at various times prior to the expiry of the limitation period. The court found that the applicants had not demonstrated any special circumstances that would warrant an extension of time. The court also considered the meaning of "awareness" under section 55 of the Limitation Act, and held that the applicants' lack of knowledge of the cause of their injuries did not prevent the limitation period from commencing to run.

The court dismissed the application for an extension of time, and ordered that the parties file and serve a joint minute of proposed orders as to costs or separate outlines of submissions as to the costs orders that should be made. The court held that the question of costs should be determined on the papers, unless otherwise ordered. The applicants' claim for damages relating to personal injury was therefore statute-barred, and the application was dismissed in its entirety.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application pursuant to s 39 of the Limitation Act 2005 (WA) for leave to commence an action against the first respondent for damages relating to personal injury as set out in the statement of claim filed 18 March 2019 be dismissed.

2. On or before 7 February 2020, the parties do file and serve a joint minute of proposed orders as to costs or separate outlines of submissions as to the costs orders that should be made consequent upon order 1.

3. Unless otherwise ordered, the question of costs be determined on the papers.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Alternatively, it was submitted for the State that the applicants were aware or ought reasonably to have become aware that their injuries were attributable to the members of the police force (and therefore the State) at the time of the events in March 2013, alternatively by 4 May 2013 (when the Aboriginal Legal Service made a complaint to the Corruption and Crime Commission on behalf of the applicants), alternatively in early October 2014 (when the applicants were interviewed for the purposes of an internal investigation by the police force), alternatively by 23 April 2015 at the latest (being the date when a meeting was held with Mr Mullaley and Ms Mullaley and members of their family to discuss the findings and outcome of an internal investigation conducted by the police force).Evidence of Professor Newman The applicants relied upon a report prepared by Professor Louise Newman. The report was based upon medical records and the affidavit evidence of Mr Mullaley and Ms Mullaley and brief telephone interviews with them. It asked for an opinion as to the likely date that each of Mr Mullaley and Ms Mullaley developed the first symptom, clinical sign or other manifestation of personal injury consistent with having sustained a not insignificant personal injury. The report expressed the view that there was no clear documentation of preceding psychiatric diagnosis for Mr Mullaley or Ms Mullaley. Professor Newman was unable on the basis of the material to provide a definitive account of any preceding psychiatric disturbances. She expressed concern about the appropriateness of seeking a definitive answer to the question about the timing of psychiatric disability with respect to the traumatic event of the death of Ms Mullaley's child. In that regard, Prof Newman stated:I do consider that the ongoing nature of these symptoms and the distress that these parties are obviously experiencing constitutes some form of lack of resolution of trauma and ongoing mental dysregulation.However, in the context of a lack of a more definitive record of the historical nature of their initial state after the event it is not possible to definitively say at what point in time they developed ongoing symptoms of an unresolved nature as opposed to experiencing the immediate and normative grief and stress reaction.It would commonly be held that a traumatic loss increases the overall risk of unresolved and ongoing complex trauma responses. In a less traumatic situation a normative grief and loss response would normally resolve in a 12 month period.I conclude that clearly these symptoms are ongoing and causing significant suffering to both parties. Therefore, in the expert opinion of Prof Newman, the available medical records do not enable a conclusion to be reached as to when the first manifestation of an unresolved and ongoing trauma response occurred. Necessarily implicit in that opinion is the view that there will be a normative grief and stress reaction but there may be a point where that reaction is not resolved. In the opinion of Prof Newman, this is what has occurred for Mr Mullaley and Ms Mullaley.

Decision

Reasons for decision

It is common ground that the negligence claims that form part of the Claim are brought out of time. The issues that arise on the present application concern the extent of the Court's discretion to extend time. The State says that there is no discretion to extend the time for commencement of the negligence claims that form part of the Claim. Therefore, it submits, the application should be refused and the claim is statute barred. Otherwise, the State advances no submission against the exercise of the discretion to extend time if the Court (a) finds there is a discretion; and (b) is otherwise satisfied on the material that there is a proper basis for the discretion to be exercised in all the circumstances.Summary of decision For the following reasons, there is no discretion to extend the time to bring the negligence claims set out in the Claim and the application for an extension of time must be refused.Proper approach to limitation questions It is well established that it is undesirable for limitation questions that depend upon contested factual issues to be decided in interlocutory proceedings in advance of the hearing of the action, except in the clearest of cases: Wardley Australia Ltd v State of Western Australia [1992] HCA 55; (1992) 175 CLR 514 at 533. In Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor [1996] HCA 25; (1996) 186 CLR 541, the High Court considered a case in which an application for an extension of time in which to bring an action for alleged medical negligence had been refused. The application had been supported by affidavit evidence and there was no cross‑examination. An appeal was upheld. In the High Court it was found that there had been error by the appellate court as to the nature of the discretion and the original decision was reinstated. The case focussed upon whether there would be prejudice because the relevant medical practitioner was unlikely to have a recollection of events due to the passage of time. There was no suggestion that the approach in Wardley should have been adopted. That may have been because there was no factual contest as to matters bearing on the application. In Shire of Toodyay v Merrick [2016] WASC 29 an application to extend time was sought on the basis of alleged fraud. Gething AM observed that the conduct relied upon was the same as the conduct alleged to form the basis for the substantive causes of action: at [104]. His Honour observed that it may be appropriate in such cases for the Court to order the determination of the application at the same time as the substantive action, citing Trafalgar West Investments Pty Ltd as Trustee for the Trafalgar West Investments Trust v Superior Lawns Australia Pty Ltd [No 7] [2015] WASC 280 at [108] (Kenneth Martin J). However, that course was not followed because there were no affidavits filed in opposition and there was 'no significant factual conflict in the affidavit evidence' on the application. Trafalgar West Investments was a case concerned with an application for leave to amend. It was not an application for an extension of time in which to bring an action. The course followed was to grant conditional leave reserving the right to raise limitation defences on the basis that the amendments raised a new claim that was out of time. A similar course was followed in Belgravia Nominees Pty Ltd v Lowe Pty Ltd [2017] WASCA 127; (2017) 51 WAR 341. Nevertheless, where there is a clear case that a claim is out of time, leave should not be given to plead the time-barred claim: BHP Iron Ore Pty Ltd v Westraint Resources Pty Ltd [2002] WASCA 18.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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