Johnson v Village Bakery Balgowlah Heights Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

(DIVISION 2)

Johnson v Village Bakery Balgowlah Heights Pty Ltd [2025] FedCFamC2G 892

File number(s): SYG 2517 of 2024
Judgment of: JUDGE PAPADOPOULOS
Date of judgment: 11 June 2025
Catchwords:

INDUSTRIAL LAW – FAIR WORK – application for default judgment – where respondents have not filed any response material or otherwise participated in proceedings – consideration of rr 13.04 and 13.05 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) – alleged contraventions of ss 45, 323(1) and 325 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) – contraventions found – application granted.

Whether Court had jurisdiction to hear associated matter – whether tort of detinue or conversion – whether second respondent refused demand to return applicant’s belongings – relief granted.

Legislation:

Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ss 45, 323(1), 325(1), 545(1) and 550

Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) s 134

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 32

Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) rr 11.10, 13.04 and 13.05

Cases cited:

CHEP Australia Ltd v Bunnings Group Ltd [2010] NSWSC 301

Fair Work Ombudsman v Klinsic Construction Pty Limited [2022] FedCFamC2G 622

Hoser v Eleftheriou [2025] FedCFamC2G 392

Philip Morris Inc v Adam P Brown Male Fashions Proprietary Limited (1981) 148 CLR 457

Productivity Partners Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2024) 419 ALR 30; [2024] HCA 27

Rana v Google Inc (2017) 254 FCR 1; [2017] FCAFC 156

Division: Division 2 General Federal Law
Number of paragraphs: 70
Date of hearing: 11 March 2025
Place: Sydney
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr Guy
Solicitor for the Applicant: Hall and Wilcox
Respondents No appearance by or on behalf of the Respondents

ORDERS

SYG 2517 of 2024

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)

BETWEEN:

TAYLA MADDISON JOHNSON

Applicant

AND:

VILLAGE BAKERY BALGOWLAH HEIGHTS PTY LTD (ACN 643 812 202)

First Respondent

NHU ANH VU

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

JUDGE PAPADOPOULOS

DATE OF ORDER:

11 JUNE 2025

THE COURT DECLARES THAT:

1.The first respondent contravened sections 45 and 323(1) of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (FW Act) by failing to pay the applicant in accordance with the General Retail Industry Award 2020.

2.The first respondent contravened section 325(1) of the FW Act by unreasonably requiring the applicant to spend or pay money directly for the benefit of the first respondent.

3.Pursuant to section 550 of the FW Act, the second respondent was involved in the contraventions by the first respondent of sections 45, 323(1) and 325(1) of the FW Act.

4.Pursuant to section 545(1) of the FW Act, the second respondent is jointly and severally liable to pay the applicant the amounts of compensation ordered under order 5 of these orders.

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

5.Pursuant to section 545(1) of the FW Act, the respondents pay as compensation to the applicant, on…

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Details
Case
[2025] FedCFamC2G 892
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Fair Work Division of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia, the applicant, Ms Tayla Maddison Johnson, filed an application seeking a default judgment against Village Bakery Balgowlah Heights Pty Ltd (first respondent) and Ms Nhu Anh Vu (second respondent). The claim involves alleged underpayment of wages, non-payment of superannuation, and other contraventions of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) as well as a claim under common law for the alleged unlawful conversion or detention of the applicant's personal property by the second respondent. The respondents have not filed any response material or participated in the proceedings. The legal issues before the Court were whether it had jurisdiction to hear the matter, whether the tort of detinue or conversion was applicable, and if the second respondent had refused to return the applicant's belongings.

The Court found that it had jurisdiction to hear the matter based on the provisions of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth). The Court considered that the second respondent's refusal to return the applicant's belongings, which included items of sentimental value, amounted to the tort of detinue or conversion. The applicant's demands for the return of these items had been ignored, and the Court accepted the applicant's evidence in this regard. Given the lack of knowledge regarding the condition and location of the applicant's belongings, the Court determined that awarding damages was the appropriate remedy. The Court noted that in an undefended default judgment application, it need only be satisfied that there was a sufficient basis for the relief sought and that detailed proof of the value of each item was not required.

The Court granted the application for default judgment and ordered the respondents to pay the applicant compensation for the underpayment of wages, superannuation, and other contraventions of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth). Additionally, the Court awarded the applicant damages for the alleged unlawful conversion or detention of her personal property.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

In relation to the employment claims, the applicant alleges that the second respondent is liable as an accessory under s 550(1) of the FW Act, with the result that she is personally liable for the contraventions engaged in by the first respondent comprising the employment claims, and for orders relating to compensation, interest or pecuniary penalties. FACTUAL BACKGROUND In or about June 2021, the applicant, then 16 years of age, accepted an offer of employment as a casual retail assistant for the first respondent.[1] [1] Statement of Claim filed 9 October 2024 at [3]. The applicant’s employment was governed by an agreement that was partly verbal and partly in writing.[2][2] Statement of Claim filed 9 October 2024 at [4]. Between June 2021 and 22 August 2021, the applicant and second respondent developed a personal relationship, during which time the second respondent invited the applicant to live at her residence above the business premises. The applicant subsequently lived with the second respondent intermittently as follows:[3](a)between 23 August 2021 and 1 October 2021;(b)between about 8 April 2022 and 4 June 2022; and (c)between 30 October 2022 and 24 April 2023. [3] Third McNally Affidavit 4 to 6 at [12] to [16].PROCEDURAL HISTORY On 9 October 2024, the applicant filed an application in the Fair Work Division of this Court, and by 29 January 2025, the application was served on the first respondent.[4][4] Order 4 of orders made on 11 February 2025.Litigation guardian order On 3 December 2024, at the first court date, the applicant sought, amongst others, orders for the appointment of Ms Amanda McNally as litigation guardian for the applicant. In support of this order, the applicant relied on an affidavit of Ms McNally, sworn on 15 October 2024 (first McNally Affidavit). By the first McNally Affidavit, Ms McNally provided detail in relation to the applicant’s intellectual disability, and further medical diagnoses.[5] Accordingly, the applicant requires assistance to undertake her daily activities as well as to manage her personal and financial affairs. Annexed to this affidavit are orders made by the Guardianship Division of the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal dated 7 June 2023 (guardianship orders), by which Ms McNally was appointed the legal guardian of the applicant and the financial manager of her estate for a period of two years commencing on 7 June 2023.[6] On 9 June 2023, the NSW Trustee and Guardian provided Ms McNally a ‘Directions and Authorities’ document which specified that Ms McNally was required to seek approval from the NSW Trustee and Guardian in relation to commencing, or continuing, legal proceedings on behalf of the applicant.[5] First McNally Affidavit, exhibit AM-1 at 45 to 82.[6] First McNally Affidavit, exhibit AM-1 at 6 to 8. At the first court date on 3 December 2024, having not been satisfied that Ms McNally had received the requisite approval from the NSW Trustee and Guardian, I made the following order:1.The Applicant is to file and serve, on or before 15 January 2025, an Affidavit which evidences that Ms McNally is the manager of the affairs of the Applicant for the purposes of rule 11.11 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Rules).

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Before the Court is an application in a proceeding filed on 6 February 2025 (default judgment application), by which the applicant seeks orders for default judgment against both respondents pursuant to subrules 13.04(2)(b) and 13.05(2)(c) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) (Rules). The respondents have not filed any material responding to the applicant’s claims, nor did the respondents attend the hearing of the default judgment application on 11 March 2025. The claims made by Ms Tayla Maddison Johnson (applicant) in this proceeding arise in the context of her prior employment with Village Bakery Balgowlah Heights Pty Ltd (first respondent), which is, or was, a bakery business in Balgowlah Heights, Sydney. Ms Nhu Anh Vu (second respondent) was, at all material times, the sole director and shareholder of the first respondent. The applicant’s claims can be separated in two separate categories:(a)the employment claims made under the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (FW Act), which comprise claims relating to:(i)the underpayment of wages, with respect to her minimum entitlements under the relevant modern award;(ii)the non-payment of superannuation, due to the fact the first respondent failed to pay any superannuation at all in respect of the work performed by the applicant;(iii)compensation for the excessive amount of the applicant’s personal money the applicant was required to pay for the direct benefit of the first respondent’s bakery business, in contravention of the prohibition on unreasonably requiring an employee to spend or pay money;(iv)the contravention of other civil remedy provisions, such as the requirement to keep employment records and to provide payslips, in respect of which the applicant seeks orders for the imposition of pecuniary penalties; and(b)the claim arising at common law, which is made against the second respondent only, and which, insofar as the default judgment application is concerned, relates to the applicant’s personal property that has been unlawfully converted or detained by the second respondent. The second respondent was, and remains, the sole director and shareholder of the first respondent. She was the relevant actor who performed the relevant acts giving rise to the employment claims brought against the first respondent. In relation to the employment claims, the applicant alleges that the second respondent is liable as an accessory under s 550(1) of the FW Act, with the result that she is personally liable for the contraventions engaged in by the first respondent comprising the employment claims, and for orders relating to compensation, interest or pecuniary penalties. FACTUAL BACKGROUND In or about June 2021, the applicant, then 16 years of age, accepted an offer of employment as a casual retail assistant for the first respondent.[1] [1] Statement of Claim filed 9 October 2024 at [3]. The applicant’s employment was governed by an agreement that was partly verbal and partly in writing.[2][2] Statement of Claim filed 9 October 2024 at [4].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

A claim of this sort was discussed by the Supreme Court of New South Wales in CHEP Australia Ltd v Bunnings Group Ltd [2010] NSWSC 301 at [182]-[184] per McDougall J:182. In short, conversion is the intentional performance of an act of dominion inconsistent with the rights of “the true owner” (to use the convenient phrase of Dixon J; I shall no longer distinguish it by quotation marks), even if the intention is merely to exercise dominion and not to deprive the true owner of dominion or property.183. By contrast, the essence of detinue lies in a refusal to deliver up goods to a person having the immediate right to the possession of those goods. It must be shown that the detention of the goods is wrongful. That is normally shown by request or demand for their return, and a refusal to comply. See John F Goulding Pty Limited v The Victorian Railways Commissioners (1932) 48 CLR 157 at 167. But it is not necessary that there should be demand and refusal: it will be sufficient, for example, if a bailee of goods has, without permission and in default or breach of duty, parted with possession of the bailed goods so as to incapacitate itself from returning them in accordance with the terms of the bailment: Goulding at 167 again, and at 169. 184. In some circumstances, even though the bailee remains in possession of the goods, it may not be necessary to show demand before detinue can be established. In Baud Corp, NV v Brook (1973) 40 DLR (3d) 418, the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of Alberta held that where, in an action of detinue, the defence shows clearly that the defendant would have refused to comply with a demand by the plaintiff for possession of the property, the formal making of such a demand is not a necessary part of the plaintiff’s cause of action. See McDermid JA at 422-423. His Lordship concluded by expressing his opinion thus:I am of the opinion where the defence of a defendant shows clearly that if a demand has been made on him for possession of the property, he would have refused delivery, then it should no longer be a defence to an action in detinue that no such demand was made. To require such a formality in circumstances that show it would have been futile is empty of any merit, and is reminiscent of the discarded formalities of the past century.Consideration The applicant’s unchallenged evidence, which I accept, is that the second respondent has ignored the applicant’s demands that these belongings be returned. The Court acknowledges that a number of the items listed in Schedule 4 to the Statement of Claim are belongings which are of sentimental value to the applicant. The applicant submits, and I agree, that given the lack of knowledge in relation to the condition and location of the applicant’s belongings, the appropriate order is for the Court to award the applicant an order for damages rather than an order for the belongings to be returned. In the context of this undefended default judgment application, to make such an order, the Court need only be satisfied there is a sufficient basis for the relief sought and proof by way of evidence of the value of each item or belonging is not required: see Fair Work Ombudsman v Klinsic Construction Pty Limited [2022] FedCFamC2G 622 at [10] per Judge Given.