FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
FJE20 v Minister for Home Affairs [2022] FCAFC 45
Appeal from: FJE20 v Minister for Home Affairs [2021] FCCA 1900 File number(s): NSD 1000 of 2021 Judgment of: ALLSOP CJ, MORTIMER AND SC DERRINGTON JJ Date of judgment: 24 March 2022 Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for an extension of time and leave to appeal from a decision of Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCC) – primary judge held the FCC did not have jurisdiction under s 476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – where applicant an unlawful non-citizen brought to Australia for temporary purpose – applicant formerly in immigration detention in Australia but currently holds a bridging visa – applicant seeks declaratory relief concerning former detention in Australia with respect to ss 198AD and 198AH of the Migration Act and brings related claim for common law damages in negligence – whether declaratory relief sought “in relation to” a migration decision: s 476 – declaratory relief is properly characterised as “direct judicial review” of a migration decision – whether declaratory relief hypothetical or inutile and therefore does not give rise to a “matter” under s 75(v) of the Constitution – appeal allowed Legislation: Constitution ss 75(v), 76(ii)
Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) s 131
Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth) (repealed) ss 10, 14, 16, 18
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 37M, 37N
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) ss 39(2), 78B
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5(1), 195A, 198(1), 198(1A), 198AD, 198AH, 198C (repealed), 474(2), 474(3)(e), 474(3)(g), 476, 476A, 486A
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 35.13
Cases cited: Abebe v Commonwealth [1999] HCA 14; 197 CLR 510
Al-Kateb v Godwin [2004] HCA 37; 219 CLR 562
AOU21 v Minister for Home Affairs [2021] FCAFC 60
Apache Northwest Pty Ltd v Newcrest Mining Ltd [2009] FCAFC 39; 182 FCR 124
Bienstein v Bienstein [2003] HCA 7
Bodruddaza v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2007] HCA 14; 228 CLR 651
BQQ15 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 218
Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs [1992] HCA 64; 176 CLR 1
Plaintiff S4/2014 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] HCA 34; 253 CLR 219
Commonwealth of Australia v AJL20 [2021] HCA 21; 391 ALR 562
DBE17 v Commonwealth of Australia [2019] HCA 47; 266 CLR 156
Fernando v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FCA 1203; 165 FCR 471
Hobart International Airport Pty Ltd v Clarence City Council [2022] HCA 5
Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen [1984] FCA 186; 3 FCR 344
In re Judiciary and Navigation Acts [1921] HCA 20; 29 CLR 257
McHugh v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCAFC 223; 283 FCR 602
Mokhlis v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] HCA 30; 382 ALR 1
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- Case
- [2022] FCAFC 45
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the declaratory relief sought was properly characterised as "direct judicial review" of a migration decision and that it did give rise to a "matter" under section 75(v) of the Constitution. The court held that the duty imposed by section 198(6) remained enforceable at all times during the period in which the relevant officers were failing to perform their duty to remove the applicant from Australia and they were amenable to mandamus to require them to perform their duty. The court also held that the applicant could no longer maintain his claim in respect of the claimed illegality of detention said to arise from the migration decisions made under sections 198AD(2) and 198(1), nor could the applicant claim damages for false imprisonment by reason of the Executive's failure to comply with its statutory duties under those provisions because that failure had not rendered the applicant's detention unlawful. However, the court concluded that the FCC had jurisdiction under section 476 to hear and determine the applicant's claims for relief, even if they were wrong in law and bound to fail.
The court granted the application for an extension of time to seek leave to appeal and for leave to appeal. The court set aside the order of the FCC dated 31 August 2021 and stood over the proceedings to a date to be fixed for the making of any necessary further orders. The court also ordered that the FCC be removed as the fourth respondent and that the parties file written submissions as to any necessary further orders, including as to the further conduct of the proceeding, by 31 March 2022. The costs of the hearing on 1 March 2022 were reserved.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The Federal Circuit Court of Australia be removed as the fourth respondent.
2. The application filed on 17 September 2021 for an extension of time to seek leave to appeal be granted.
3. Leave to appeal in terms of the draft notice of appeal at annexure DRT1 to the affidavit of Daniel Robert Taylor affirmed on 17 September 2021 be granted.
4. The appeal be allowed.
5. Order 1 of the Federal Circuit Court dated 31 August 2021 be set aside.
6. The proceedings be stood over to a date to be fixed for the making of any necessary further orders.
7. The parties file written submissions as to any necessary further orders, including as to the further conduct of the proceeding consequent upon these reasons for judgment by 31 March 2022.
8. The costs of the hearing on 1 March 2022 be reserved.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The question of whether the FCC has jurisdiction arises as a consequence of the operation of ss 476 and 476A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) by which the Parliament has bifurcated the judicial review of decisions made under that Act as between the FCC and the Federal Court. The consequence of such bifurcation is apt to lead to complexity and to arguments about the “indivisibility” of proceedings. There is no doubt that the subject matter for decision by a federal court may embrace the whole controversy between the parties, or only part of that controversy according to the terms of conferral by statute: Abebe v Commonwealth [1999] HCA 14; 197 CLR 510 at [49] per Gleeson CJ and McHugh J. In Stack v Coast Securities (No 9) Pty Ltd [1983] HCA 36; 154 CLR 261, Gibbs CJ said, at 281:Under the Constitution, the jurisdiction of a federal court can be defined only by an Act of Parliament, and the jurisdiction so defined can be as wide as, or narrower than, (but not of course wider than) the matters mentioned in ss. 75 and 76. In the context of migration decisions, original jurisdiction has been conferred on the FCC; the Federal Court’s jurisdiction is restricted to circumstances, “if, and only if” they meet one or more of the conditions in sub-paragraphs (a)-(d) of s 476A. In the course of the hearing of the application, it became apparent that the determination of whether the primary judge was correct to find that the FCC had neither “accrued” nor “associated” jurisdiction, in particular the latter under s 18 of the FCC Act, raised potential issues concerning the construction of s 75 of the Constitution and the meaning of “matter” as used both in the Constitution and in ss 14 and 18 of the FCC Act with the consequence that it may be necessary to issue s 78B notices to the Attorneys-General pursuant to the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). For that reason, the Court indicated that it would deal first with the question of whether any of the claims made by the applicant are claims in the nature of direct judicial review. If that were the case, the FCC had jurisdiction, at least to hear such claims on application. The parties were invited to provide additional written submissions on that issue alone and have done so. The resolution of that question is largely determinative of whether the matter could be transferred to the Federal Court and avoids the additional costs associated with dealing with the constitutional issues. As will be discussed below, there is no dispute that the Federal Court has jurisdiction to determine the tortious claim, at least by the terms of s 476 alone. Before turning to consider the requirement for leave to appeal and an extension of time, it is important to note that the FCC was named as the fourth respondent on the applicant’s application to this Court. At the time the application was filed, the FCC had been reconstituted as the FCFC (Div 2). In any event, the FCC is not a proper party to the proceeding in this Court, and therefore an order will be made removing the FCC as the fourth respondent. Any reference to the “respondents” hereafter refers only to the first to third respondents.