FJE20 v Minister for Home Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

FJE20 v Minister for Home Affairs [2022] FCAFC 45

Appeal from: FJE20 v Minister for Home Affairs [2021] FCCA 1900
File number(s): NSD 1000 of 2021
Judgment of: ALLSOP CJ, MORTIMER AND SC DERRINGTON JJ
Date of judgment: 24 March 2022
Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for an extension of time and leave to appeal from a decision of Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCC) – primary judge held the FCC did not have jurisdiction under s 476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – where applicant an unlawful non-citizen brought to Australia for temporary purpose – applicant formerly in immigration detention in Australia but currently holds a bridging visa – applicant seeks declaratory relief concerning former detention in Australia with respect to ss 198AD and 198AH of the Migration Act and brings related claim for common law damages in negligence – whether declaratory relief sought “in relation to” a migration decision: s 476 – declaratory relief is properly characterised as “direct judicial review” of a migration decision – whether declaratory relief hypothetical or inutile and therefore does not give rise to a “matter” under s 75(v) of the Constitution – appeal allowed
Legislation:

Constitution ss 75(v), 76(ii)

Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) s 131

Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth) (repealed) ss 10, 14, 16, 18

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 37M, 37N

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) ss 39(2), 78B

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5(1), 195A, 198(1), 198(1A), 198AD, 198AH, 198C (repealed), 474(2), 474(3)(e), 474(3)(g), 476, 476A, 486A

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 35.13

Cases cited:

Abebe v Commonwealth [1999] HCA 14; 197 CLR 510

Al-Kateb v Godwin [2004] HCA 37;  219 CLR 562

AOU21 v Minister for Home Affairs [2021] FCAFC 60

Apache Northwest Pty Ltd v Newcrest Mining Ltd [2009] FCAFC 39; 182 FCR 124

Bienstein v Bienstein [2003] HCA 7

Bodruddaza v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2007] HCA 14; 228 CLR 651

BQQ15 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 218

Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs [1992] HCA 64; 176 CLR 1

Plaintiff S4/2014 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] HCA 34; 253 CLR 219

Commonwealth of Australia v AJL20 [2021] HCA 21; 391 ALR 562

DBE17 v Commonwealth of Australia [2019] HCA 47; 266 CLR 156

Fernando v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FCA 1203; 165 FCR 471

Hobart International Airport Pty Ltd v Clarence City Council [2022] HCA 5

Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen [1984] FCA 186; 3 FCR 344

In re Judiciary and Navigation Acts [1921] HCA 20; 29 CLR 257

McHugh v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCAFC 223; 283 FCR 602

Mokhlis v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] HCA 30; 382 ALR 1

Moorgate Tobacco Co Ltd v Philip Morris Ltd [1980]…

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Details
Case
[2022] FCAFC 45
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of FJE20 v Minister for Home Affairs, the applicant, an unlawful non-citizen who was brought to Australia for a temporary purpose and had been in immigration detention, sought an extension of time and leave to appeal against a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCC). The primary judge had held that the FCC did not have jurisdiction under section 476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) to hear the applicant's claims for declaratory relief concerning his former detention in Australia and a claim for common law damages in negligence. The applicant argued that the declaratory relief sought was "in relation to" a migration decision and therefore the FCC had jurisdiction, and that the relief was not hypothetical or inutile. The court was required to decide whether the declaratory relief sought was properly characterised as "direct judicial review" of a migration decision and whether it gave rise to a "matter" under section 75(v) of the Constitution.

The court found that the declaratory relief sought was properly characterised as "direct judicial review" of a migration decision and that it did give rise to a "matter" under section 75(v) of the Constitution. The court held that the duty imposed by section 198(6) remained enforceable at all times during the period in which the relevant officers were failing to perform their duty to remove the applicant from Australia and they were amenable to mandamus to require them to perform their duty. The court also held that the applicant could no longer maintain his claim in respect of the claimed illegality of detention said to arise from the migration decisions made under sections 198AD(2) and 198(1), nor could the applicant claim damages for false imprisonment by reason of the Executive's failure to comply with its statutory duties under those provisions because that failure had not rendered the applicant's detention unlawful. However, the court concluded that the FCC had jurisdiction under section 476 to hear and determine the applicant's claims for relief, even if they were wrong in law and bound to fail.

The court granted the application for an extension of time to seek leave to appeal and for leave to appeal. The court set aside the order of the FCC dated 31 August 2021 and stood over the proceedings to a date to be fixed for the making of any necessary further orders. The court also ordered that the FCC be removed as the fourth respondent and that the parties file written submissions as to any necessary further orders, including as to the further conduct of the proceeding, by 31 March 2022. The costs of the hearing on 1 March 2022 were reserved.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The Federal Circuit Court of Australia be removed as the fourth respondent.

2. The application filed on 17 September 2021 for an extension of time to seek leave to appeal be granted.

3. Leave to appeal in terms of the draft notice of appeal at annexure DRT1 to the affidavit of Daniel Robert Taylor affirmed on 17 September 2021 be granted.

4. The appeal be allowed.

5. Order 1 of the Federal Circuit Court dated 31 August 2021 be set aside.

6. The proceedings be stood over to a date to be fixed for the making of any necessary further orders.

7. The parties file written submissions as to any necessary further orders, including as to the further conduct of the proceeding consequent upon these reasons for judgment by 31 March 2022.

8. The costs of the hearing on 1 March 2022 be reserved.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Nevertheless, as observed by the majority at [53], the duty imposed by s 198(6) remained enforceable at all times during the period in which the relevant officers were failing to perform their duty to remove the applicant from Australia and they were amenable to mandamus to require them to perform their duty. The majority concluded, at [72]-[73]: 72It is enough for the duty to detain imposed by s 189(1) to be sustained in accordance with s 196(1)(a) until completion of the performance of the duty to remove imposed by s 198 that the officer keeping or causing the person to be kept in immigration detention knows or reasonably suspects that the person is an unlawful non-citizen. Provided the requisite knowledge or suspicion continues to exist throughout the period of detention, an unauthorised or prohibited purpose on the part of the officer in prolonging the period of detention can affect neither the duty to detain nor the duty to remove nor the appropriate remedy for non- performance of the duty to remove. Conclusion73The conclusion that officers of the Executive have not discharged their statutory duty to remove the respondent from Australia as soon as reasonably practicable affords a basis for orders requiring that they do their duty… The applicant could therefore no longer maintain his claim in respect of the claimed illegality of detention said to arise from the migration decisions made under s 198AD(2) and 198(1), nor could the applicant claim damages for false imprisonment by reason of the Executive’s failure to comply with its statutory duties under those provisions because that failure had not rendered the applicant’s detention unlawful. The claimed public law relief of prohibition to prevent his further detention was, in any event, contrary to those authorities endorsing the validity of the Executive’s authority and duty to detain an unlawful non-citizen pursuant to s 189(1): Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs [1992] HCA 64; 176 CLR 1; Al-Kateb v Godwin [2004] HCA 37; 219 CLR 562; Plaintiff S4/2014 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] HCA 34; 253 CLR 219. Nevertheless, and at the date of the amended application, that application was framed as one for direct judicial review of the “migration decisions” identified in prayers 2 and 3 such that the FCC had jurisdiction under s 476 to hear and determine those claims for relief, even if they were wrong in law and bound to fail. The various iterations of the relief sought, as would be expected, reflect the applicant’s changing circumstances. The first application sought a declaration that the applicant’s detention was unlawful and an order in the nature of habeas corpus. The second sought, inter alia, declarations that the applicant no longer needed to be in Australia from 23 October 2019 and that he had been illegally detained in the past, both underpinning a claim that he should be removed back to PNG, and a claim for damages for false imprisonment.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The question of whether the FCC has jurisdiction arises as a consequence of the operation of ss 476 and 476A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) by which the Parliament has bifurcated the judicial review of decisions made under that Act as between the FCC and the Federal Court. The consequence of such bifurcation is apt to lead to complexity and to arguments about the “indivisibility” of proceedings. There is no doubt that the subject matter for decision by a federal court may embrace the whole controversy between the parties, or only part of that controversy according to the terms of conferral by statute: Abebe v Commonwealth [1999] HCA 14; 197 CLR 510 at [49] per Gleeson CJ and McHugh J. In Stack v Coast Securities (No 9) Pty Ltd [1983] HCA 36; 154 CLR 261, Gibbs CJ said, at 281:Under the Constitution, the jurisdiction of a federal court can be defined only by an Act of Parliament, and the jurisdiction so defined can be as wide as, or narrower than, (but not of course wider than) the matters mentioned in ss. 75 and 76. In the context of migration decisions, original jurisdiction has been conferred on the FCC; the Federal Court’s jurisdiction is restricted to circumstances, “if, and only if” they meet one or more of the conditions in sub-paragraphs (a)-(d) of s 476A. In the course of the hearing of the application, it became apparent that the determination of whether the primary judge was correct to find that the FCC had neither “accrued” nor “associated” jurisdiction, in particular the latter under s 18 of the FCC Act, raised potential issues concerning the construction of s 75 of the Constitution and the meaning of “matter” as used both in the Constitution and in ss 14 and 18 of the FCC Act with the consequence that it may be necessary to issue s 78B notices to the Attorneys-General pursuant to the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). For that reason, the Court indicated that it would deal first with the question of whether any of the claims made by the applicant are claims in the nature of direct judicial review. If that were the case, the FCC had jurisdiction, at least to hear such claims on application. The parties were invited to provide additional written submissions on that issue alone and have done so. The resolution of that question is largely determinative of whether the matter could be transferred to the Federal Court and avoids the additional costs associated with dealing with the constitutional issues. As will be discussed below, there is no dispute that the Federal Court has jurisdiction to determine the tortious claim, at least by the terms of s 476 alone. Before turning to consider the requirement for leave to appeal and an extension of time, it is important to note that the FCC was named as the fourth respondent on the applicant’s application to this Court. At the time the application was filed, the FCC had been reconstituted as the FCFC (Div 2). In any event, the FCC is not a proper party to the proceeding in this Court, and therefore an order will be made removing the FCC as the fourth respondent. Any reference to the “respondents” hereafter refers only to the first to third respondents.