Fernando v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Fernando v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 975

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – non-compliance with rules – whether letter from applicant invoked Court’s jurisdiction – power exercised to waive non-compliance with rules.
MIGRATION – cancellation of visa – failure to pass character test – whether respondent’s decision to cancel visa a decision made under the Migration Act – procedural fairness – whether partial mis-description of offences and failure to grant interview to applicant led to jurisdictional error – certain adverse information in documents (“the Documents”) placed before respondent at time decision made to cancel visa – at trial of application respondent claimed privilege (public interest immunity) in respect of the Documents – asserted that existence of that privilege self-evident on the face of the Documents – unrepresented applicant called for production to him of the Documents – respondent consented to Court examining the Documents – balancing of the relevant public interests – claim for privilege rejected and no direction made under s 130(1) of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) – the Documents admitted into evidence – order made restricting access to the Documents to Judges of the Court – whether respondent denied procedural fairness to the applicant by not disclosing the substance of the Documents to the applicant regardless of whether they contained “non-disclosable information”.

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 5, 474, 501, 501G(1)(e)
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), s 130
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 50

Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550 at 629 applied
Yong v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (1997) 75 FCR 155 referred to
Sharif v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 278 referred to
Rishmawi v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 611 referred to
D v National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children [1978] AC 171 referred to
Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia [2003] HCA 2 followed

Attorney-General for New South Wales v Smith (1996) 86 A Crim R 308 at 311-312 referred to

Long v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 218 followed
Javillonar v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2001) FCR 311 followed
WAFG v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 93 distinguished

Applicant VEAL of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 437 followed
Ball v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 699 followed

Gilson v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, 21 July 1997 BC9703148 referred to
Chu v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1997) 78 FCR 314 referred to
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Miah (2001) 206 CLR 57 referred to
Muin v Refugee Review Tribunal [2002] HCA 30 referred to
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Lam [2003] HCA 6 referred to

WANNAKUWATTEMITIWADUGE LLOYD NIRMALEEN FERNANDO v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
W306 of 2002

CARR J
16…

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Details
Case
[2003] FCA 975
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Fernando v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs involves the applicant, a citizen of Sri Lanka who has been residing in Australia since 1989, seeking judicial review of a decision by the respondent to cancel his visa. The central issues before the court were whether the applicant's application for judicial review was valid and timely, whether the respondent's decision was made under the Migration Act 1958, and if so, whether there were grounds for reviewing that decision.

The court first examined the validity of the applicant's application for judicial review. It concluded that the handwritten letter dated 4 January 2002, lodged with the Court on 10 January 2002, constituted a valid application for judicial review. The court found that the subsequent document filed by the applicant on 31 October 2002, titled "Application for Extension of Time to File and Serve Notice of Appeal", was an incompetent application for review but waived compliance with the relevant Federal Court Rules for the purpose of reviewing the respondent's decision.

Turning to the jurisdictional aspect, the court considered whether the respondent's decision to cancel the applicant's visa was made under the Act. It determined that the decision was indeed made under the Act, and subsequently assessed whether the decision was reviewable. The court found that the respondent's decision was flawed due to jurisdictional errors and quashed the decision. It also dismissed the respondent's objection to the competency of the application for judicial review.

The court concluded that the respondent's decision to cancel the applicant's visa was quashed, and ordered the respondent to pay the applicant's costs limited to reasonable disbursements related to the preparation, filing, and service of the application, affidavits, and submissions. Additionally, the court admitted a specific document into evidence but ordered it to remain sealed pending further order from the Court.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The letter dated 4 January 2002 (and its enclosures) from the applicant to the Court lodged with the Court on 10 January 2002, stand as the application in this matter.

2. In relation to the form of that application, compliance with so much of the Federal Court Rules as might otherwise prevent the Court from reviewing the respondent’s decision, made on 29 November 2001, to cancel the applicant’s BT Transitional (permanent) visa (“the respondent’s decision”), for the purpose of ascertaining whether it was a decision made under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and, if so, whether it is reviewable under that Act, be waived.

3. The respondent’s objection (by notice filed on 20 November 2002) to the competency of the application filed on 31 October 2002 be dismissed with no order as to costs.

4. The document referred to in these reasons as “Annexure L”, which was the subject of an order made on 15 August 2003, is admitted into evidence as Exhibit “A4” but shall remain in a sealed envelope marked “Annexure L” which is not to be unsealed other than by a Judge of this Court or until further order.

5. The respondent’s decision is quashed.

6. The respondent pay the applicant’s costs limited to such disbursements as the District Registrar consider reasonable in relation to the preparation, filing and service of the application, affidavits and submissions.

Background

Background to the litigation

In this matter the Court has to decide the following questions. First, whether a handwritten letter dated 4 January 2002 lodged with the Court on 10 January 2002 is, or should be treated as, a valid application for judicial review of the respondent’s decision, made on 29 November 2001 (notice of which was not given to the applicant until 14 December 2001), to cancel the applicant’s visa. If not, what is the status, if any, of a document subsequently filed by the applicant (on 31 October 2002) headed “Application for Extension of Time to File and Serve Notice of Appeal”, which the respondent says is an incompetent application for an order of review? The respondent has filed a Notice of Objection to Competency challenging the Court’s jurisdiction to hear that application as being out of time, and asserting that the Court has no power to extend the relevant time – see s 477(1) and (2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”). Another question is whether the respondent’s decision was, as a matter of law, a decision “made under” the Act for the purposes of Part 8? That question involves consideration of a claim for privilege or public interest immunity in respect of some information which was not made available to the applicant. If the respondent’s decision was made under the Act, the final question is whether any grounds for review have been made out, notwithstanding the provisions of ss 474 and 476 of the Act? FACTUAL BACKGROUND The applicant was born in Sri Lanka on 12 April 1961 and is a citizen of that country. He first arrived in Australia on 2 February 1989, entering on a student visa. The applicant has remained in Australia since that date. Since 21 February 1995 he has remained under a BF Transitional (permanent) visa for an indefinite stay period. He studied, but did not complete, various courses at various institutions until imprisoned for the criminal offences to which I now refer. On 31 July 1998 the applicant was found guilty (having pleaded not guilty) of three counts of sexual penetration without consent. On 25 September 1998 he was sentenced by the District Court of Western Australia for those three offences to three terms of imprisonment, being four years on one count and two years cumulatively on each of the other two counts, i.e. a sentence of eight years, with a direction of eligibility for parole. The appellant appealed against the convictions to the Court of Criminal Appeal. On 11 October 2000 those appeals were dismissed. On 18 September 2000 an officer of the respondent’s Department gave written notice to the applicant that consideration was being given to cancellation of his visa pursuant to s 501 of the Act. The cancellation grounds were set out in that notice (by reference to various provisions of s 501, a copy of which was enclosed with the notice) and the applicant was invited to submit any comment which he believed relevant to the consideration of the issue of visa cancellation. The applicant responded to that invitation by letter dated 11 October 2000.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

CARR J
In those circumstances the application is within time. The respondent, not being aware of the applicant’s first approach to the Court, filed the Notice of Objection to Competency referred to above. I think that the appropriate order in relation to that objection to competency is (as the respondent submitted, should I form the view referred to in paragraph [13] above) to dismiss it with no order as to costs. I will do so. I now turn to the challenges which were raised by the applicant in relation to the respondent’s decision. WAS THE RESPONDENT’S DECISION MADE WITHIN JURISDICTION? The applicant was not represented. He lodged over 750 pages of submissions, which he updated at various stages. As a result of that process of updating, I reviewed a total of well over 1000 pages of his submissions. Nearly all of them were irrelevant to the matters which I have to decide. The submissions included other documents such as transcripts of evidence in the criminal proceedings and correspondence. The applicant also tendered two affidavits. Much of the documentation submitted by the applicant was repetitive. Nearly all of it went to the alleged injustice of his three convictions in the District Court of Western Australia on 27 July 1998. The submissions included allegations of misconduct on the part of the police, the prosecution, the trial judge, the various counsel who appeared for the applicant, and the malfunction of the judicial system generally. There were also numerous submissions challenging factual matters set out or referred to in the briefing minute. I have examined the documentation with a view to isolating any possible indications of jurisdictional error or other legal error which might have the result that the respondent’s decision was not made under the Act. I was also assisted at trial in that process, most fairly, by counsel for the respondent, Ms L B Price. I should add, as a matter of fairness to Ms Price, that she made it quite clear that she did not see it as part of her role as counsel for respondent to make a case for the applicant. In my view, the only matters raised either by the applicant or by counsel for the respondent were as follows. First, the description of the three convictions in the briefing paper submitted to the respondent. Secondly, the applicant’s complaint that he should have been granted an interview by the respondent or his Department before the visa was cancelled, and thirdly whether there had been a denial of natural justice in relation to what was said to be some “non-disclosable information” which was placed before the respondent with the briefing minute in respect of which the respondent claimed privilege or public interest immunity. I shall deal with those matters in that order. The first mention of the applicant’s convictions in the briefing minute was in the following terms: ‘CONSIDERATION OF VISA CANCELLATIONGrounds[2] Section 501(2) of the Migration Act 1958 provides that the Minister may cancel a visa granted to a person if the Minister reasonably suspects that the person does not pass the character test (s 501(2)(a)), and the person does not satisfy the Minister that he or she in fact passes the character test (s 501(2)(b)). Under Section 501(6)(a), a person does not pass the character test if he or she has a substantial criminal record within the meaning of s 501(7). [3] Under s 501(7)(c), a person is deemed to have a substantial criminal record if he or she has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 12 months or more. [4] On 27 July 1998, Mr FERNANDO was sentenced by the District Court of WA for the following s 501(7)(c) applicable offences: 3 charges of SEXUAL PENETRATION WITHOUT imprisonment for 8 years CONSENT AGGRAVATED. [5] Mr FERNANDO Appealed each conviction to the Court of Criminal Appeal. Each application was dismissed on 11 October 2000.It is open for you to find on the above facts that there is a reasonable suspicion that Mr FERNANDO does not pass the character test due to the fact that he has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 12 months of more.’

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: CARR J

The first mention of the applicant’s convictions in the briefing minute was in the following terms: ‘CONSIDERATION OF VISA CANCELLATIONGrounds[2] Section 501(2) of the Migration Act 1958 provides that the Minister may cancel a visa granted to a person if the Minister reasonably suspects that the person does not pass the character test (s 501(2)(a)), and the person does not satisfy the Minister that he or she in fact passes the character test (s 501(2)(b)). Under Section 501(6)(a), a person does not pass the character test if he or she has a substantial criminal record within the meaning of s 501(7). [3] Under s 501(7)(c), a person is deemed to have a substantial criminal record if he or she has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 12 months or more. [4] On 27 July 1998, Mr FERNANDO was sentenced by the District Court of WA for the following s 501(7)(c) applicable offences: 3 charges of SEXUAL PENETRATION WITHOUT imprisonment for 8 years CONSENT AGGRAVATED. [5] Mr FERNANDO Appealed each conviction to the Court of Criminal Appeal. Each application was dismissed on 11 October 2000.It is open for you to find on the above facts that there is a reasonable suspicion that Mr FERNANDO does not pass the character test due to the fact that he has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 12 months of more.’ Later in the briefing minute, there was the following further reference to the convictions. ‘[11] Mr FERNANDO has convictions for the following offences: 27 July 1998 SEXUAL PENETRATION WITHOUT X3 8 yrs imp. CONSENT AGGRAVATED,[12] Mr FERNANDO appealed to the Court of Criminal appeals (sic); his claims were dismissed on 11 October 2000.A copy of Mr FERNANDO’s criminal history is at Annex B. [13] The sentencing remarks of DCJ Williams indicate the seriousness with which the court viewed the offences:In my view there are a number of aggravating features in relation to this matter. The first is the particular vulnerability of the complainant due to her below average intelligence and severe deficit in the area of social and communication skills…In my view, the offender’s attitude was predatory … he must have known at the time that she was intellectually disadvantaged. The variety of penetration, one act of vaginal intercourse and one act of anal intercourse, each in my view was a distinct act which would no doubt cause an accumulated trauma to the complainant…In my view, these offences are serious and I have come to the conclusion that the head sentence in relation to these offences should be a term of imprisonment of 8 years.’ The essence of the applicant’s complaint is as follows. He says, quite rightly, that he was originally charged with eight counts of aggravated sexual penetration contrary to s 326 of the Criminal Code (WA) and one count of indecent assault contrary to s 324 of that Code. After the committal proceedings those charges were withdrawn and replaced with an indictment containing six counts. He was acquitted on three of those counts by the same jury which convicted him on the other three counts.