Long v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Long v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs
[2003] FCAFC 218

MIGRATION – cancellation of visa under s 501 of Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether signed Departmental Briefing Paper was a written notice setting out the reasons for the decision made – Briefing Paper indicated that cancellation of appellant’s visa and removal of him from Australia would not have a detrimental effect on his children – no consideration of what were the best interests of those children – no notice given to appellant of any intention to take that course – jurisdictional error established.

MIGRATION – constitutional law – British subject resident in Australia since 1981 – whether respondent had the constitutional power to cancel his visa – whether appellant an “alien” – appellant sought declaration of right – appeal on this point further reserved until delivery of judgment by High Court of Australia in Shaw v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs.  

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 501

NAAV v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCAFC 228 referred to
Re Patterson; Ex parte Taylor [2001] HCA 51 referred to
Nolan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1988) 165 CLR 178 referred to
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273 referred to

Wan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 107 FCR 133 referred to
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v W157/00A [2000] FCAFC 281 referred to
Ayan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 7
Re Ruddock, Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Truong, 22 March 2001, unreported (HC) referred to
Adams v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 552 referred to
Ruhl v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 648 referred to
Javillonar v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 854 referred to
Diep v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1130 referred to
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v VFAD of 2002 [2002] FCAFC 390 followed
NAMU of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCAFC 401 distinguished

LONG v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND
INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
W338 OF 2002

CARR, MERKEL & HELY JJ
8 SEPTEMBER 2003
PERTH


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

W 338 OF 2002

BETWEEN:

BRIAN LONG
Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
Respondent

JUDGES:

CARR, MERKEL & HELY JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

8 SEPTEMBER 2003

WHERE MADE:

PERTH

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.        The appeal be allowed.

2.        The orders made on 19 November 2002 be set aside.

3.A writ of certiorari be issued to quash the decision of the respondent, made on 24 January 2002, to cancel the appellant’s visa.

4.A writ of prohibition issue prohibiting the respondent from further proceeding to act on the decision made by him on 24 January 2002 to cancel the appellant’s visa. 

5.The respondent…

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Details
Case
[2003] FCAFC 218
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Long v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, the appellant, a British subject born in the United Kingdom, challenged the decision of the Minister for Immigration to cancel his visa under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The appellant argued that the Minister had erred in exercising his discretion under section 501(2) of the Act by not considering the best interests of his children as a relevant factor. He also contended that the Minister failed to afford him natural justice by not notifying him that the best interests of his children would not be taken into account. The case was brought to the court on appeal after the primary judge dismissed the appellant’s application for review.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the Minister’s decision to cancel the appellant’s visa was legally sound, particularly in light of the appellant’s argument that the Minister failed to consider relevant factors and did not provide natural justice. The court had to determine if the Minister's decision to cancel the appellant's visa was lawful and if it complied with the statutory and constitutional requirements.

The court found that the Minister's decision to cancel the visa was flawed because it did not consider the best interests of the appellant’s children, which is a relevant factor under the Migration Act. The court held that this constituted a failure to take into account a relevant consideration, which is a ground for judicial review. Additionally, the court held that the Minister did not accord the appellant natural justice by not notifying him that the best interests of his children would not be taken into account. The court concluded that the Minister’s failure to consider these factors amounted to a jurisdictional error. Therefore, the court allowed the appeal, quashed the Minister's decision to cancel the visa, and prohibited the Minister from enforcing that decision. The court also restrained the Minister from detaining or removing the appellant based on that decision. The matters of declaratory relief and costs were reserved for further consideration.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed.

2. The orders made on 19 November 2002 be set aside.

3. A writ of certiorari be issued to quash the decision of the respondent, made on 24 January 2002, to cancel the appellant’s visa.

4. A writ of prohibition issue prohibiting the respondent from further proceeding to act on the decision made by him on 24 January 2002 to cancel the appellant’s visa.

5. The respondent be restrained from relying upon that decision to detain the appellant for the purpose of removing him from Australia and to remove him from Australia.

6. The matters of the appellant’s claim for declaratory relief, and costs, both at first instance and on appeal be reserved.

Background

Background to the litigation

In the alternative, the appellant contends, first, that the respondent, in exercising his discretion under s 501(2) did not take into account the best interests of his children, being a failure to take into account a relevant consideration, which constituted jurisdictional error. Secondly, he contends that the respondent failed to accord him natural justice by not taking into account the best interests of his children as a primary consideration without giving him notice of his intention not to do so. FACTUAL BACKGROUND The appellant is a British subject who was born in the United Kingdom on 11 October 1963. On 24 March 1975 he came to Australia with his parents and three sisters and was granted the visa referred to above. In December 1975, when the appellant was aged twelve, his family returned to the United Kingdom and remained there until 21 March 1977 when they all travelled back to Australia. The family again returned to England in June 1979, save for one of the appellant’s sisters who had married and remained in Western Australia. After completing school in England, the appellant, who wanted to return to Australia, persuaded his parents to let him come back and live with his sister. He arrived back in Australia on 24 March 1981 (at the age of 17) and has resided in this country ever since. Six months later, his parents again decided to live in Australia and returned here with his two remaining sisters. The family, and the appellant’s wife, whom he married in Australia on 1 May 1983, and four children (now aged between 3 and 20), all live in Australia. The appellant and his wife visited the United Kingdom on a holiday for about two months between 9 December 1986 and 10 February 1987. He has not left Australia since then. The appellant has been enrolled on both State and Federal electoral rolls since he turned eighteen and has voted in Federal and State elections, save for the times that he has served in prison. The appellant’s long record for crimes committed in Australia between 18 October 1977 and 7 July 2000 is set out in the reasons of the learned primary judge. The record culminated in five convictions for stealing on the latter date which resulted in the appellant being sentenced to five years imprisonment, of which two years were to be served concurrently. The appellant had previously been sentenced to various terms of imprisonment (seven of which exceeded twelve months), including a term of two years in November 1987 for possessing heroin with intent to supply. Section 501(2) of the Act provides that: “The Minister may cancel a visa that has been granted to a person if: (a)the Minister reasonably suspects that the person does not pass the character test; and (b)the person does not satisfy the Minister that the person passes the character test.” The character test is defined in s 501(6) of the Act which relevantly provides that a person does not pass the character test if the person has a substantial criminal record as defined by s 501(7).

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 22 February 2002 the applicant filed an application for an order of review of the respondent’s decision. By an amended application, the appellant sought relief pursuant to s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) on both the constitutional ground and the traditional judicial review grounds referred to above. The Attorney-General for the Commonwealth (represented by the Solicitor-General) intervened at first instance and the Solicitor-General appeared as senior counsel for the respondent on the appeal, to contend that s 501 of the Act validly applied to the appellant because (in summary) he was not living in Australia in 1973 upon the enactment of the Royal Style and Titles Act 1973 (Cth), had never owed allegiance, in the relevant sense, to the Queen of Australia and was therefore an alien. THE DECISION AT FIRST INSTANCE The learned primary judge noted that none of the traditional judicial review grounds relied upon by the appellant fell within any of the exceptions to the application of s 474 of the Act. The appellant, who was represented by counsel, accepted that, having regard to the decision of a Full Court of this Court in NAAV v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCAFC 228, the Court could not determine those grounds in the appellant’s favour. His Honour then proceeded to consider the appellant’s constitutional argument. After reviewing the constitutional and statutory context, his Honour turned to the authorities and in particular the High Court’s decision in Re Patterson; Ex parte Taylor [2001] HCA 51. The circumstances of the prosecutor in that case were relevantly very similar to those of the appellant in this matter, save that Mr Taylor arrived in Australia in 1966 i.e. before the passing of the Royal Style and Titles Act. In Re Patterson, the High Court, by a majority of four justices comprising McHugh, Gaudron, Kirby and Callinan JJ upheld Mr Taylor’s contention that he was not an alien. In doing so, the majority overruled Nolan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1988) 165 CLR 178. The primary judge noted that within the majority judgments in Re Patterson there were at least two views supporting the conclusion that Mr Taylor was not an alien when his visa was cancelled. His Honour then said this:“The first view, associated with the judgments of Gaudron, Kirby and Callinan JJ, is that British subjects who were absorbed into the Australian community prior to May 1987 could not be treated as aliens for the purposes of s 51(xix). The second view expressed by McHugh J was that until the commencement of the Royal Style and Titles Act 1973 “and maybe later” British subjects owed their allegiance to the Queen of the United Kingdom. Those British subjects born in the United Kingdom who were living in Australia at the commencement of the Royal Style and Titles Act 1973 became subjects of the Queen of Australia as well as subjects of the Queen of the United Kingdom. Accordingly, they were not and did not subsequently become aliens within the meaning of s 51(xix) of the Constitution. The latter reasoning does not expressly address the position of a British subject who arrived in Australia after the commencement of the Royal Style and Titles Act. Indeed, in par [121] his Honour stated that a British subject living in Australia was not an alien within the meaning of the Constitution “at least until the passing of the Royal Style and Titles Act 1973 (Cth)”. This and the “maybe later” reference appears to leave open the question whether a British subject who came to Australia after 1973, as did Long in this case, and subsequently became absorbed into the community, is to be treated as an alien. It suggests however at least a provisional view that 1973 represented a cut off point. Absent a clear common ratio on the part of the majority in Re Patterson on the question of the aliens power, the extent to which, and the principles for which, it can be regarded as binding authority is debatable.”

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

On 22 January 2002, an officer of the respondent’s department prepared a minute entitled “CONSIDERATION OF LIABILITY FOR CANCELLATION of Brian Edward Long’s VISA UNDER s 501(2) OF THE MIGRATION ACT 1958”. The record of the respondent’s decision appears on p 16 of the minute. On that page the respondent was offered a number of alternative decisions. The record of the decision made, disregarding deleted options, read as follows: “PART E: DECISION [59] I have considered all relevant matters including (1) an assessment of the Character Test as defined by s501(6) of the Migration Act 1958, (2) my Direction under s499 of that Act and Mr Brian Edward LONG’s comments, and have decided that: . . .(d)I reasonably suspect that Mr Brian Edward LONG does not pass the character test and Mr Brian Edward LONG has not satisfied me that he passes the character test AND I have decided TO EXERCISE MY DISCRETION UNDER SUBSECTION 501(2) OF THE ACT TO CANCEL THE VISA, so I hereby cancel the visa. Phillip RuddockMinister for Immigration, Multicultural and Indigenous AffairsDate: 24.1.02” On 22 February 2002 the applicant filed an application for an order of review of the respondent’s decision. By an amended application, the appellant sought relief pursuant to s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) on both the constitutional ground and the traditional judicial review grounds referred to above. The Attorney-General for the Commonwealth (represented by the Solicitor-General) intervened at first instance and the Solicitor-General appeared as senior counsel for the respondent on the appeal, to contend that s 501 of the Act validly applied to the appellant because (in summary) he was not living in Australia in 1973 upon the enactment of the Royal Style and Titles Act 1973 (Cth), had never owed allegiance, in the relevant sense, to the Queen of Australia and was therefore an alien. THE DECISION AT FIRST INSTANCE The learned primary judge noted that none of the traditional judicial review grounds relied upon by the appellant fell within any of the exceptions to the application of s 474 of the Act. The appellant, who was represented by counsel, accepted that, having regard to the decision of a Full Court of this Court in NAAV v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCAFC 228, the Court could not determine those grounds in the appellant’s favour. His Honour then proceeded to consider the appellant’s constitutional argument. After reviewing the constitutional and statutory context, his Honour turned to the authorities and in particular the High Court’s decision in Re Patterson; Ex parte Taylor [2001] HCA 51. The circumstances of the prosecutor in that case were relevantly very similar to those of the appellant in this matter, save that Mr Taylor arrived in Australia in 1966 i.e. before the passing of the Royal Style and Titles Act. In Re Patterson, the High Court, by a majority of four justices comprising McHugh, Gaudron, Kirby and Callinan JJ upheld Mr Taylor’s contention that he was not an alien. In doing so, the majority overruled Nolan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1988) 165 CLR 178.