FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BNL20 v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCA 1180
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- Case
- [2020] FCA 1180
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the Commonwealth had a duty to exercise reasonable care in all the circumstances in relation to the health and safety of persons in immigration detention. The risk of the applicant suffering serious ill health or death due to contracting COVID-19 while detained in the Melbourne Immigration Transit Accommodation (MITA) was significant, and the respondents did not articulate the nature of any risk that they assert the applicant’s presence in the community or in some alternative place of detention would pose. The court gave greater weight to the risk of the applicant suffering serious ill health or death than to the existence of the adverse security assessment. The court granted the injunction requiring that BNL20 no longer be detained at the detention centre and ordered the respondents to inform BNL20’s legal representatives of the steps proposed to be taken at least 24 hours prior to taking any steps to comply with the injunction. The court reserved costs and gave liberty to apply.
The orders made by the court required the respondents, as soon as reasonably practicable but in any event by no later than 1.00 pm on 13 August 2020, to cease to detain the applicant at MITA until further order. The respondents must also inform the applicant’s legal representatives of the steps proposed to be taken at least 24 hours prior to taking any steps to comply with the injunction. The court reserved costs and gave liberty to apply.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Until further order, as soon as reasonably practicable but in any event by no later than 1.00 pm on 13 August 2020, the respondents cease to detain the applicant at the Melbourne Immigration Transit Accommodation centre.
2. At least 24 hours prior to taking any step to comply with Order 1 the respondents inform the applicant’s legal representatives of the step or steps proposed to be taken.
3. Liberty to apply.
4. Costs reserved.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Finally, the respondents contend that a further difficulty with the applicant’s assertion of a prima facie case of negligence is that the applicant has suffered no damage and at most, he apprehends a fear of harm if he were to contract COVID-19. They contend that damage is the gist of a cause of action in negligence and it can never be enough to show that the defendant has been negligent in the absence of actionable damage, citing Tabet v Gett [2010] HCA 12; (2010) 240 CLR 537; Gregg v Scott [2005] 2 AC 176 at 231-232. They argue that the absence of any actionable damage means that this is not a case of a continuing tort and distinguishes this case from cases involving interlocutory relief in the context of a continuing tort: eg Mastipour and MZYYR, as cited above. They contend that in the absence of damage the Court would only grant interlocutory relief in circumstances that were exceptional and where the apprehended harm was imminent: Plaintiff S99 at [472] and [490].Consideration regarding prima facie case The respondents accept that the Commonwealth has a duty to exercise such care for the applicant’s health and safety as is reasonable in all the circumstances. That duty is well established. By reference to the salient features identified by Allsop P (as his Honour then was) in Caltex Refineries (Qld) Pty Ltd v Stavar [2009] NSWCA 258; (2009) 75 NSWLR 649; at [102]-[103], the foreseeability of harm in the present case, the nature of the harm alleged, the degree and nature of control able to be exercised by the respondents to avoid harm, the degree of vulnerability of the applicant to harm resulting from the respondent’s conduct, the incapacity of the applicant to take steps to protect himself from the harm, the degree of the applicant’s reliance upon the respondents, and the respondents’ assumption of responsibility in relation to the risks to detainees posed by SARS-CoV-2, all support the existence of such a duty. The question as to whether the Commonwealth has a duty to exercise reasonable care to avoid persons in immigration detention suffering foreseeable harm to their health or safety, and the scope of any such duty, has been considered by the Court on numerous occasions:(a)in Mastipour the Full Court was satisfied that, having regard to the detainee’s mental health problems, there was a serious question to be tried as to whether the form of immigration detention provided to the detainee involved a breach of the duty to take reasonable care of his safety. Their Honours found that injunctive relief was appropriate (at [127]-[128], [132]-[136] and [138]-[143]);(b)in S v Secretary Finn J was satisfied that the Commonwealth owed a duty of care to persons in immigration detention to avoid a likelihood of harm to those who are known to suffer from mental illness. His Honour said (at [209]) that the relationship between the Commonwealth and such persons was closely analogous to two classes of relationship which attract a non-delegable duty of care: those of hospital and patient and gaoler and prisoner. His Honour was prepared to grant injunctive relief against the Commonwealth to prevent the applicants being exposed to the likelihood of harm to their mental health, but as the applicants had already been transferred to a mental health facility an injunction was unnecessary (at [263]);(c)in MZYYR Gordon J was satisfied (at [39]) that a prima facie case existed that the applicant was subject to a continuing tort in that the Commonwealth detained him in immigration detention at a place or in a way which did not provide medical care reasonably designed to meet or alleviate his mental health care needs, which was causing him injury. Her Honour (at [55]) was not persuaded that the Court lacked power to restrain a continuing tort of that nature;(d)in Plaintiff S99 the applicant had been raped while held in immigration detention on Nauru, and had fallen pregnant as a result. She wished to undergo an abortion but abortions were illegal in Nauru. She requested the Minister to bring her to Australia for an abortion but he refused to do so, and instead moved the applicant to Papua New Guinea (PNG) where the Minister was prepared to assist her to receive an abortion. The applicant refused to undergo an abortion in PNG on grounds including that, having regard to a particular medical condition from which she suffered, PNG lacked appropriate medical resources. She also contended that abortion was illegal in PNG and she would be exposed to criminal penalty. Bromberg J concluded (at [243]) that the Minister owed a duty of care to the applicant to exercise reasonable care in the discharge of the responsibility that he assumed to procure her a safe and lawful abortion, and made final orders to restrain the Minister from failing to discharge his duty of care in that regard: [528]; and(e)in a raft of decisions by single judges of the Court interlocutory injunctions have been granted for the transfer to Australia for medical treatment of persons detained in immigration detention on Nauru or Papua New Guinea. In each case the Court held that there was a serious question to be tried that the Commonwealth owed the detainee a duty of care to provide him or her with the level of medical care reasonably designed to meet his or her health care needs, albeit expressed in slightly different ways: see, for example, FRX17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 63; (2018) 262 FCR 1 (Murphy J), AYX18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2018] FCA 283 (Perram J); DCQ18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2018] FCA 918 (Robertson J); BAF18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2018] FCA 1060; (2018) 162 ALD 115 (Bromberg J); and DJA18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2018] FCA 1050 (Murphy J).