FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Plaintiff S99/2016 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 483
SUMMARY
In accordance with the practice of the Federal Court in cases of public interest, importance or complexity, the following summary has been prepared to accompany the orders made today. This summary is intended to assist in understanding the outcome of this proceeding and is not a complete statement of the conclusions reached by the Court. The only authoritative statement of the Court’s reasons is that contained in the published reasons for judgment which will be available on the internet at the Court’s website. This summary is also available there.
This proceeding commenced in the High Court and was referred for hearing and determination by this Court. As will be apparent, it required an urgent hearing and an urgent determination. By reason of the exemplary efforts of the parties, their legal advisors and the staff of the Court, for which I am grateful, that has been achieved.
The applicant is a young African woman. The respondents are the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and the Commonwealth of Australia (collectively, the Minister).
The applicant arrived in Australia on 17 October 2013 having travelled by boat from Indonesia to Christmas Island. On arrival and by virtue of s 14 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act), the applicant was designated an “unlawful non‑citizen” and therefore an “unauthorised maritime arrival” within the meaning of s 5AA of the Act. On arrival, the applicant was detained by the Minister under s 189 of the Act. In the exercise of the power conferred by s 198AD of the Act, on 19 October 2013, the applicant was taken from Australia by an officer of the Minister and placed in the Republic of Nauru, a country designated to be a “regional processing country” under s 198AB(1) of the Act. Upon her removal from Australia, the applicant became a “transitory person” within the meaning of s 5 of the Act. She was detained in a detention centre in Nauru until November 2014. On being recognised as a refugee she was released from detention and is awaiting resettlement. She has no independent means. She has been and remains dependant on the Minister for food, shelter, security and healthcare.
Despite the nomenclature used by the Act to describe her, the applicant remains entitled to the protection of Australian law. Principally, that is because the Minister is bound by the law and, as my reasons explain, the Minister and the applicant are parties to a relationship recognised and enforced by the law out of which legal rights and obligations flow.
The applicant claims that by reason of a legal relationship recognised by the common law, the Minister must take reasonable care of her. She claims to be a vulnerable woman in desperate circumstances. It is undeniable that she needs care. On 31 January 2016, she was raped whilst unconscious and suffering a seizure likely to have been caused by epilepsy.…
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- Case
- [2016] FCA 483
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues the court was required to decide included whether the respondents owed a duty of care to the Plaintiff, whether there was an apprehended breach of that duty, and what the applicable law was in relation to the tort of negligence. The court was also required to consider whether there was a breach of a fiduciary duty and whether section 474 of the Migration Act precluded the issue of injunctive relief in proceedings other than judicial review proceedings.
The court found that the respondents owed a duty of care to the Plaintiff to exercise reasonable care in procuring for her a safe and lawful abortion. The court rejected the argument that the standard of care should be determined by reference to the medical services available in Papua New Guinea, and found that the magnitude of both the legal and medical risks of the abortion were high to extreme, and the probability of materialisation of the risk material, and neither trivial nor insignificant. The court found that the respondents had not discharged their duty of care by procuring the abortion in Papua New Guinea. The court also found that the applicable law in relation to the tort of negligence was Australian law.
The court made orders for the respondents to cease to fail to discharge their responsibility to procure for the Plaintiff a safe and lawful abortion, and to take steps to ensure that the abortion was procured in accordance with the court’s directions. The court also made orders for the publication of certain information to be prohibited and for the respondents to take no step to remove the Plaintiff from Papua New Guinea.
This case highlights the importance of considering the legal and medical risks of forced removal and medical procedures for refugees and the duty of care owed to them by the relevant authorities.
Orders
Orders of the court
2. On or before 15 May 2016, the Respondents cease to fail to discharge the responsibility that they assumed to procure for the Applicant a safe and lawful abortion.
3. Unless otherwise agreed in writing between the legal representative of the Applicant and the Respondents, upon the Respondents discharging their duty of care to exercise reasonable care to procure for the Applicant a safe and lawful abortion:
(a) the abortion not be procured so that it takes place in Papua New Guinea; and
(b) the abortion not be procured so that it takes place in any location where a person who participates in an abortion is exposed to criminal liability; and
(c) the abortion not be procured so that it takes place in a hospital or other medical facility that does not have, or that cannot make available to the treating doctor or doctors who perform the abortion:
(i) the neurological expertise and neurological facilities referred to in the expert medical report of Associate Professor Ernest Somerville dated 19 April 2016, together with his expert medical report dated 27 April 2016; and
(ii) the psychiatric expertise, and other resources including cross-cultural expertise, referred to in the expert medical report of Professor Louise Newman dated 18 April 2016, together with her email dated 27 April 2016; and
(iii) the anaesthetic expertise and anaesthetic facilities referred to in the expert medical report of Dr Gregory Purcell dated 20 April 2016; and
(iv) the gynaecological expertise and experience, and the gynaecological facilities, referred to in the expert medical report of Professor Caroline de Costa dated 19 April 2016, together with her expert medical report dated 27 April 2016, and the expertise, experience and facilities referred to in the expert medical report of Dr Miriam O’Connor dated 20 April 2016, together with her expert medical report dated 27 April 2016.
4. On or before 13 May 2016, the Respondents file and serve any submission in relation to the costs of the application.
5. If the Respondents file and serve any submission in relation to costs pursuant to Order 4, then on or before 20 May 2016 the Applicant file and serve any submission in reply.
6. Should no submission as to costs be made pursuant to Order 4, the Respondents pay the Applicant’s costs of and incidental to the application.
7. On the grounds set out at s 37AG(1)(a) and (c) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), publication of the following information be prohibited under s 37AF of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), until further order or six months from today, whichever first occurs:
(a) the name of the Applicant.
(b) the age of the Applicant.
(c) the applicant’s country of origin, and the country in which she lived before she came to Australia.
(d) the identification number of the boat on which the Applicant first arrived in Australia.
(e) the procedure that the Applicant had when she was seven years old.
8. There be liberty to apply to extend or vary Order 7.
9. Unless otherwise agreed in writing between the legal representatives of the Applicant and the Respondents, the Respondents, whether by their officers, servants, agents, contractors or otherwise, take no step, on or before 5:00 pm on 15 May 2016, to remove the Applicant from Papua New Guinea.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: BROMBERG J