Brookfield Multiplex Ltd v Owners Corporation Strata Plan 61288

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

FRENCH CJ,
HAYNE, CRENNAN, KIEFEL, BELL, GAGELER AND KEANE JJ

BROOKFIELD MULTIPLEX LTD  APPELLANT

AND

OWNERS CORPORATION STRATA PLAN 61288
& ANOR  RESPONDENTS

Brookfield Multiplex Ltd v Owners Corporation Strata Plan 61288

[2014] HCA 36

8 October 2014

S66/2014

ORDER

1.Appeal allowed.

2.Set aside the order of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales made on 25 September 2013 and, in its place, order that the appeal to that Court be dismissed with costs.

3.Special leave to cross-appeal granted.

4.Cross-appeal treated as instituted and heard instanter and dismissed with costs.

5.First respondent to pay the appellant's costs of the appeal.

On appeal from the Supreme Court of New South Wales

Representation

D F Jackson QC with T J Breakspear for the appellant (instructed by Gilbert + Tobin Lawyers)

F Corsaro SC with P J Bambagiotti for the first respondent (instructed by Grace Lawyers Pty Ltd)

Submitting appearance for the second respondent

Notice:  This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

Negligence – Duty of care – Pure economic loss – Strata-titled apartment complex constructed pursuant to contract between builder and developer – Apartments sold pursuant to standard form contract of sale – Contracts conferred rights to have defects remedied – Latent defects in common property – Owners corporation for strata scheme claimed damages from builder for pure economic loss – Whether builder owed owners corporation a duty of care – Relevance of inquiry into whether builder owed anterior duty of care to developer.

Words and phrases – "assumption of responsibility", "common property", "disconformity of obligations", "proximity", "pure economic loss", "reliance", "vulnerability".

FRENCH CJ.

Introduction

  1. The Court of Appeal of New South Wales held that the builder of strata-titled serviced apartments on land at Chatswood owed a duty of care to the owners corporation to avoid causing it to suffer loss resulting from latent defects in the common property which were structural or constituted a danger to persons or property in the vicinity or made the apartments uninhabitable[1].  An owners corporation is created by statute whenever a strata plan is registered.  The common property is vested in it as manager of the strata scheme and as "agent" for the owners of the apartments.  In this case, the owners corporation ("the Corporation") is the first respondent.  The serviced apartments were incorporated in levels one to nine of a 22 storey development[2].  The apartments had been built under a design and construct contract made in November 1997 between the appellant, Brookfield Multiplex Ltd ("Brookfield"), and the registered proprietor of the land and property developer, Chelsea Apartments Pty Ltd ("Chelsea").  All of the apartments were subject to leases given by Chelsea to Park Hotel Management Pty Ltd ("Park Hotel"), a subsidiary of the Stockland Trust Group ("Stockland"), which was to operate them collectively as a serviced apartment hotel under the "Holiday Inn" brand. 

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Details
Case
[2014] HCA 36
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered an appeal by Brookfield Multiplex Ltd (the builder) against the Owners Corporation of Strata Plan 61288. The dispute concerned whether the builder owed a duty of care to the Owners Corporation for pure economic loss arising from latent defects in the common property of a strata-titled apartment complex. The Owners Corporation, which had no direct contractual relationship with the builder, claimed damages for these defects.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the builder owed a duty of care to the Owners Corporation in circumstances where the building was constructed under a design and construct contract with a developer, and the apartments were subsequently sold to individual proprietors, leading to the creation of the Owners Corporation. The Court was required to determine if the builder's contractual obligations to the developer extended to a concurrent duty of care to the Owners Corporation for pure economic loss, considering the principles of proximity, reliance, and vulnerability in the context of latent defects in common property.

The High Court reasoned that the builder's responsibility to the developer was exhaustively defined by the design and construct contract. The Court found that the builder assumed no responsibility for pure economic loss beyond the contractual limits, and the developer did not rely on any such extended responsibility. The statutory relationship between the Owners Corporation and the developer, as the initial owner of the lots, did not create an anterior duty of care owed by the builder to the Owners Corporation as a proxy for the developer. The Court concluded that the builder did not owe a duty of care to the Owners Corporation in this scenario.

Consequently, the High Court allowed the builder's appeal, setting aside the orders of the Court of Appeal and dismissing the appeal to that Court with costs. The Owners Corporation's cross-appeal was also dismissed with costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Appeal allowed.

2. Set aside the order of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales made on 25 September 2013 and, in its place, order that the appeal to that Court be dismissed with costs.

3. Special leave to cross-appeal granted.

4. Cross-appeal treated as instituted and heard instanter and dismissed with costs.

5. First respondent to pay the appellant's costs of the appeal.

Background

Background to the litigation

By special leave the builder appeals to this Court. The Owners Corporation applies for special leave to cross‑appeal seeking orders providing for a larger duty of care than that found by the Court of Appeal. The builder's appeal should be allowed with costs. The orders of the Court of Appeal should be set aside and the appeal to that Court dismissed with costs. The Owners Corporation should have special leave to cross‑appeal but the cross‑appeal should be dismissed with costs.The essential facts The building works were to construct "a mixed use retail, restaurant, residential and serviced apartments building" on the land. The builder undertook these works under a "design and construct" contract it made with a developer: Chelsea Apartments Pty Ltd ("the developer"). The contract obliged the builder to construct the building in general accordance with detailed plans and specifications for a contract price of more than $57 million. The contract incorporated detailed provisions regulating the performance and superintendence of the work. The contract provided for certain warranties by the builder about the work and for the builder to remedy defects or omissions in the work. It provided that the issue of a "final certificate" under the contract was evidence, subject to specified exceptions, that the works had been completed in accordance with the contract. Before a final occupation certificate was granted by the relevant municipal council, a strata plan was registered in relation to that part of the building which was to be used for serviced apartments. Initially, the developer owned the lots in the strata scheme. The lots were later sold by the developer to different proprietors under standard sale contracts, the form of which was fixed by agreement between the developer and the builder. Those contracts obliged the developer, as vendor, to "cause the Building to be constructed in a proper and workmanlike manner" and made detailed provision about the repair of defects or faults (including defects or faults in the common property). Upon registration of the strata plan, the Owners Corporation was created by operation of law[73]. The owners of the lots from time to time in the strata scheme constitute[74] a body corporate under the name of the Owners Corporation. The estate or interest of that body corporate in the common property is held[75] by the Owners Corporation as agent for the owner or owners of the lots the subject of the strata scheme. Initially, the Owners Corporation held the common property as agent for the developer as the owner of all of the lots. Now that the lots are owned by different proprietors, the Owners Corporation holds the common property as agent for those proprietors as tenants in common in shares proportional to their unit entitlements[76]. The Owners Corporation is bound[77] to properly maintain and keep in a state of good and serviceable repair the common property and any personal property vested in the Owners Corporation and to renew or replace any fixtures or fittings comprised in the common property and any personal property vested in the Owners Corporation. [73]Strata Schemes Management Act 1996 (NSW), s 8(1).[74]Strata Schemes Management Act 1996 (NSW), s 11(1).[75]Strata Schemes (Freehold Development) Act 1973 (NSW), s 20.[76]Strata Schemes (Freehold Development) Act 1973 (NSW), s 20(b).[77]Strata Schemes Management Act 1996 (NSW), s 62.The damage

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

FRENCH CJ HAYNE AND KIEFEL JJ CRENNAN, BELL AND KEANE JJ GAGELER J
Did the builder owe the Owners Corporation the alleged duty of care?The decisions below and the appeal to this Court In the Supreme Court of New South Wales, McDougall J held[71] that the builder did not owe the alleged duty and entered judgment for the builder. On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales held[72] that the builder owed the Owners Corporation "a duty to exercise reasonable care in the construction of the building to avoid causing [the Owners Corporation] to suffer loss resulting from latent defects in the common property vested in [the Owners Corporation], which defects (a) were structural, or (b) constituted a danger to persons or property in, or in the vicinity of, the serviced apartments, or (c) made those apartments uninhabitable".[71]Owners Corporation Strata Plan 61288 v Brookfield Multiplex [2012] NSWSC 1219.[72]The Owners – Strata Plan No 61288 v Brookfield Australia Investments Ltd (2013) 85 NSWLR 479 at 510 [132]. By special leave the builder appeals to this Court. The Owners Corporation applies for special leave to cross‑appeal seeking orders providing for a larger duty of care than that found by the Court of Appeal. The builder's appeal should be allowed with costs. The orders of the Court of Appeal should be set aside and the appeal to that Court dismissed with costs. The Owners Corporation should have special leave to cross‑appeal but the cross‑appeal should be dismissed with costs.The essential facts The building works were to construct "a mixed use retail, restaurant, residential and serviced apartments building" on the land. The builder undertook these works under a "design and construct" contract it made with a developer: Chelsea Apartments Pty Ltd ("the developer"). The contract obliged the builder to construct the building in general accordance with detailed plans and specifications for a contract price of more than $57 million. The contract incorporated detailed provisions regulating the performance and superintendence of the work. The contract provided for certain warranties by the builder about the work and for the builder to remedy defects or omissions in the work. It provided that the issue of a "final certificate" under the contract was evidence, subject to specified exceptions, that the works had been completed in accordance with the contract. Before a final occupation certificate was granted by the relevant municipal council, a strata plan was registered in relation to that part of the building which was to be used for serviced apartments. Initially, the developer owned the lots in the strata scheme. The lots were later sold by the developer to different proprietors under standard sale contracts, the form of which was fixed by agreement between the developer and the builder. Those contracts obliged the developer, as vendor, to "cause the Building to be constructed in a proper and workmanlike manner" and made detailed provision about the repair of defects or faults (including defects or faults in the common property).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: FRENCH CJ, HAYNE AND KIEFEL JJ, CRENNAN, BELL AND KEANE JJ, GAGELER J

The present appeal falls for decision against a background of prior decisions about classes of case in which a person performing a contract may have a concurrent duty of care to another contracting party, classes of case in which a party to a contract may owe a duty of care to a person who is not a party to the contract, classes of case involving pure economic loss, and classes of case in which the careless performance of a building contract has left latent defects in the building and thereby caused economic loss to a subsequent purchaser. Those decisions interact with each other but none is precisely applicable in this case. Consistently with the approach taken in Woolcock and, before that, in Bryan v Maloney, the determination of this appeal requires consideration of the salient features of the relationship between the Corporation and Brookfield, including whether Brookfield owed Chelsea a relevant duty of care and whether the Corporation was vulnerable in the sense discussed above.Whether Brookfield owed a duty of care to the Corporation When Brookfield entered into the design and construct contract with Chelsea, Chelsea was the owner of the parcel of land upon which the apartment block was to be constructed. It remained the registered proprietor of that parcel until it was subdivided into lots and common property when the strata plan was registered by Brookfield in November 1999. Upon that registration, the Corporation came into existence and became the legal owner of the common property. It had no contractual relationship with Brookfield or with Chelsea. Nevertheless, it held the common property as agent for Chelsea within the meaning of the Strata Freehold Act. It was effectively subject to Chelsea's control, albeit Chelsea's controlling rights and those of its successors in title to the strata lots were ceded to Park Hotel under the prior leasing arrangements. The Corporation had a function under the standard form contract of sale whereby it could, within seven months of registration of the strata plan, serve written notice of defects or faults in the common property on Chelsea which would enliven Chelsea's contractual obligation to the lot owners to repair such defects and faults. No doubt control of the Corporation, which was effectively conferred on Park Hotel by the leases from the lot owners, enabled Park Hotel to require the Corporation to issue such notices. Chelsea, as initial owner of all of the lots, was at the outset the directing mind of the Corporation, albeit it had delegated its powers of direction to Park Hotel. The Corporation was controlled by Chelsea and Park Hotel, who were party to and therefore can be taken to have been fully apprised of the contractual arrangements and in particular the extent and limits of Brookfield's obligations and liabilities in relation to defects in the common property. The responsibility assumed by Brookfield with respect to Chelsea, as initial owner of the lots, was defined in detail by the design and construct contract. Chelsea cannot be taken to have relied upon any responsibility on the part of Brookfield, and Brookfield assumed none, in relation to pure economic loss flowing from latent defects extending beyond the limits of the responsibility imposed on it by the contract. The statutory relationship between the Corporation and Chelsea as first owner meant that there was no duty of care owed to the Corporation as a proxy for Chelsea. The question that follows is whether there was a duty of care owed to the Corporation by virtue of its relationship to subsequent purchasers from Chelsea.