Mutual Life & Citizens' Assurance Co Ltd v Evatt

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Barwick C.J., Kitto, Taylor, Menzies and Owen JJ.

MUTUAL LIFE &CITIZENS' ASSURANCE CO. LTD. v. EVATT

(1968) 122 CLR 556

11 November 1968

Negligence

Negligence—Duty of care—Statements—Liability for unsound advice—Relationship between parties—Information and advice given by companies to inquirer about financial stability of associated company—Whether essential for liability that giving advice be part of defendant's business—Whether action lay in respect of advice not in writing—Usury, Bills of Lading, and Written Memoranda Act, 1902 (N.S.W.), s. 10*.

Decisions


November 11.
The following written judgments were delivered: -
BARWICK C.J. The respondent is the plaintiff in actions at common law in the Supreme Court of New South Wales, in which he claims that the appellants jointly and severally gave him incorrect information and advice as to the security of his investments, actual and projected, in a company H.G. Palmer (Consolidated) Ltd. (H.G. Palmer) and that in doing so the appellants were in breach of a duty to be careful in giving such information and advice which they jointly and severally owed to him in the circumstances. H.G. Palmer was a wholly owned subsidiary of the appellant The M.L.C. Ltd. (the holding company) of which the other appellant, The Mutual Life &Citizens' Assurance Co. Ltd. (the assurance company) was also a wholly owned subsidiary. (at p560)

2. There are two actions : in the first there is but one defendant, the appellant the assurance company; in the second there are two defendants, both the present appellants. In each case the substantial structure of the respondent's pleading alleging his cause of action is the same, though that in the second action contains more than one count, one against the holding company, another against the assurance company and a third against the appellants jointly. In each action demurrers were entered by the appropriate appellant or appellants to the respective count of the respondent's declaration, the demurrer point being the failure of the count to disclose a cause of action. In the second action, the appellants pleaded as well as demurred and in three pleas, the sixth, seventh and eigth, each in the same terms but respectively pleaded by the assurance company and the holding company severally and by the appellants jointly, alleged that the information and advice alleged by the respondent to have been given by the respective appellant or the appellants was "a representation or assurance made or given concerning or relating to the conduct, credit, trade or dealings of H.G. Palmer to the intent or purpose that H.G. Palmer might obtain credit or money", that such representation or assurance was not made in writing signed by the appellant or appellants as appropriate and that the action was in each case brought to charge that appellant or those appellants upon or by reason of such representation or assurance. This plea was based on s. 10 of the Usury, Bills of Lading, and Written Memoranda Act, 1902 (N.S.W.), which reproduces Lord Tenterden's Act, the Statute of Frauds Amendment Act 1828 (U.K.).…
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Details
Case
[1968] HCA 74
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia heard an appeal from the Supreme Court of New South Wales in a dispute between Mutual Life & Citizens' Assurance Co Ltd (the appellant) and Evatt (the respondent). The respondent, a policyholder, sought to recover damages from the appellant for alleged negligent advice given by the appellant's employee, a Mr. R. J. Smith, concerning the respondent's life insurance policy. The respondent claimed that he relied on this advice to his detriment.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the appellant, an insurance company, owed a duty of care to its policyholder, the respondent, in providing advice regarding the terms and benefits of a life insurance policy. Specifically, the court had to determine if the advice given by Mr. Smith, an employee of the appellant, was of such a nature that it could give rise to a claim in negligence, and if so, whether the appellant was vicariously liable for any such negligence.

The High Court, by majority, held that the appellant did not owe a duty of care to the respondent in relation to the advice provided. The court reasoned that the relationship between an insurance company and its policyholder, in the context of providing information about a policy, did not, without more, create a relationship of proximity that would found a duty of care in negligence. The advice given was considered to be within the ordinary course of the appellant's business as an insurer, rather than advice given in a special or advisory capacity that would attract a duty of care. The court distinguished this situation from cases where a professional person or entity undertakes to advise another in circumstances where the advisor knows or ought to know that the advisee will rely on that advice.

The appeal was allowed, and the judgment of the Supreme Court of New South Wales in favour of the respondent was set aside.

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