Central Highlands Regional Council v Geju Pty Ltd

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Central Highlands Regional Council v Geju Pty Ltd [2018] QCA 38

PARTIES:

CENTRAL HIGHLANDS REGIONAL COUNCIL
(appellant)
v
GEJU PTY LTD
ACN 010 714 799
(respondent)

FILE NO/S:

Appeal No of 13451 of 2016
SC No 4 of 2014

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

General Civil Appeal

ORIGINATING COURT:


Supreme Court at Mackay – [2016] QSC 279

DELIVERED ON:

16 March 2018

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

24 May 2017

JUDGES:

Fraser and McMurdo JJA and Brown J

ORDER:

1.   Allow the appeal.

2.   Set aside the orders made in the Queensland Supreme Court on 13 December 2016.

3.   The parties may make submissions about the costs of the proceedings in the trial division and on appeal in accordance with the Practice Direction.

CATCHWORDS:

LOCAL GOVERNMENT – LEGAL RELATIONSHIPS AND PROCEEDINGS – LIABILITY FOR TORTS – NEGLIGENCE – PARTICULAR CASES – CARELESS OR NEGLIGENT STATEMENTS – where the appellant council issued a limited planning and development certificate to the new owner of a lot which incorrectly noted the lot as zoned industrial – where the lot was zoned rural – where a previous owner had successfully applied for a material change of use over the lot from rural to industrial that would lapse within four years of being granted – where the respondent purchaser relied on a statement in the limited planning and development certificate that the lot was zoned industrial when purchasing the lot – where the lot was worth considerably less than the purchase price as a result of its real zoning – where the limited planning and development certificate was not issued to the respondent – where the respondent argued that it was a member of an identified class of persons who the appellant knew or ought to have known would receive the information – whether the appellant owed the respondent a duty of care

Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 11, s 28, s 30(1), s 31(1)(a)
Integrated Planning Act 1997 (Qld), s 5.7.9

Brookfield Multiplex Ltd v Owners Corporation Strata Plan 61288 (2014) 254 CLR 185; [2014] HCA 36, considered
Bryan v Maloney (1995) 182 CLR 609; [1995] HCA 17, considered
Esanda Finance Corporation Ltd v Peat Marwick Hungerfords (1997) 188 CLR 241; [1997] HCA 8, considered
Geju Pty Ltd v Central Highlands Regional Council (No 2) [2016] QSC 279, related
L Shaddock & Associates Pty Ltd v Parramatta City Council (No 1) (1981) 150 CLR 225; [1981] HCA 59, considered
Mid Density Developments Pty Ltd v Rockdale Municipal Council (1993) 44 FCR 290; [1993] FCA 408, distinguished

Mutual Life & Citizens’ Assurance Co Ltd v Evatt (1968) 122 CLR 556; [1968] HCA 74, considered
Precision Products (NSW) Pty Ltd v Hawkesbury City Council (2008) 74 NSWLR 102; [2008] NSWCA 278, cited
Raftopoulos v Brisbane City Council[2012] QCA 84, considered
San Sebastian Pty Ltd v Minister Administering Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979

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Details
Case
[2018] QCA 38
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Central Highlands Regional Council, an appellant, appealed against a decision of the Queensland Supreme Court which found it liable for damages to Geju Pty Ltd, the respondent. The respondent had purchased a lot of land from the Mayfair Group, who had previously applied for and received a material change of use from Rural to Industrial. The approval was set to lapse in four years. The Council issued a limited planning and development certificate which incorrectly noted the lot as zoned industrial. The respondent relied on this information when purchasing the lot, resulting in a significant financial loss when it was discovered that the lot was actually zoned rural. The respondent argued that the Council owed it a duty of care.

The legal issue before the court was whether the Council owed the respondent a duty of care in relation to the incorrect information provided in the limited planning and development certificate. The respondent argued that the Council knew or ought to have known that the information would be relied upon by the respondent when purchasing the lot. The Council argued that a duty of care did not arise as it was not reasonable for the respondent to act on the information without further inquiry. The court considered the relevant authorities and determined that the question of whether the Council owed the respondent a duty of care was not novel and had been answered in the respondent's favour by previous High Court decisions.

The court found that the respondent could have extricated itself from the contract if it had been informed of the correct zoning. The court rejected the Council's argument that the relevant authorities did not support the trial judge's conclusions. The court found that the Council owed the respondent a duty of care in relation to the incorrect information provided in the limited planning and development certificate. The appeal was allowed, and the orders made in the Queensland Supreme Court were set aside. The parties were to make submissions about the costs of the proceedings in the trial division and on appeal in accordance with the Practice Direction.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Allow the appeal.

2. Set aside the orders made in the Queensland Supreme Court on 13 December 2016.

3. The parties may make submissions about the costs of the proceedings in the trial division and on appeal in accordance with the Practice Direction.

Background

Background to the litigation

Ground 2 is a particular of the contention in ground 1 that the appellant did not owe the respondent a duty of care. The appellant’s argument invoked authority that, in a case of the present kind, a duty of care does not arise if it is not “reasonable for the recipient [of the information or advice] to act on that information or advice without further inquiry.”[1][1]Esanda Finance Corporation Ltd v Peat Marwick Hungerfords (1997) 188 CLR 241 at 265 (Toohey and Gaudron JJ).Factual and legal background The facts relevant to the duty question are largely uncontentious. In late March 2007 the owners (“Ford Property”) of a lot of land contracted to sell that lot to three corporations (“Mayfair Group”) for $484,000. The lot was in the Rural Zone. On 9 May 2007 Ford Property applied to the appellant for reconfiguration of the lot into two lots and for a material change of use from the Rural Zone to Industrial Use. On 22 August 2007 the council approved that application subject to conditions, including conditions specifically related to the change of use. That decision was communicated to Ford Property by letter from the appellant’s chief executive on 24 August 2007. The land the subject of this litigation, Lot 70, was created upon the registration of the survey plan on 5 October 2007. The approved material change of use from Rural to Industrial (described in the heading in the appellant’s letter as “rezoning 1 lot from Rural to Industrial”) would lapse on 24 August 2011 (four years after the date of the approval) unless the approved change of use happened within that four year period.[2] The approval allowed Lot 70 to be used for certain industrial purposes (“light and service industries”). The primary judge construed a condition of the approval as meaning that before the land was developed, which could occur at any time within the four year period for which the approval was in effect, the applicant/developer was obliged to supply a master plan of Lot 70 to the council,[3] but held that the meaning was not clear and there was a potential for confusion.[4][2]Integrated Planning Act 1997 (Qld), s 3.5.21; [2016] QSC 279 at [26]-[27].[3][2016] QSC 279 at [20]-[25].[4][2016] QSC 279 at [23], [36]. On 13 December 2007 the Mayfair Group settled their purchase of Lot 70.[5] On the same day, solicitors (Anne Murray & Co) wrote to the council confirming that they acted for the purchasers and enclosing their cheque for $50.00 in payment of the council’s fee for a limited planning and development certificate.[6] There was no evidence of what was said in the telephone discussion referred to in that letter. The letter was probably not sent before late January 2008.[7] It is stamped by the council as having been received on 1 February 2008.[5][2016] QSC 279 at [17].[6]The respondent’s pleaded case that those solicitors acted for the respondent in sending that letter was not proven and it was rejected by the trial judge: [2016] QSC 279 at [8], [14], [17] (13 December 2007). See also [2016] QSC 290 at [8].[7][2016] QSC 279 at [17], footnote 3.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the Central Highlands Regional Council owed Geju Pty Ltd a duty of care.
2. Whether the Council's issuance of an incorrect limited planning and development certificate led to Geju Pty Ltd suffering financial loss.

Held
1. The court concluded that the Central Highlands Regional Council did owe Geju Pty Ltd a duty of care. The appeal was allowed.
2. The court found that the Council's issuance of an incorrect limited planning and development certificate did not lead to Geju Pty Ltd suffering financial loss.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The respondent entered into the contact to purchase Lot 70 four months after the issue date on the certificate (4 February 2008) and after Mr Birch had been given a copy of the certificate weeks or months earlier. The respondent borrowed more than the entire purchase price of the lot. The contract settled on 1 August 2008. The respondent did not engage solicitors to act on its behalf until after it entered into the contract of 5 June 2008,[25] but the trial judge found that if the respondent’s solicitors had learned of the correct zoning the respondent could have extricated itself from the contract.[26] (The trial judge found that: when the solicitors were retained the contract was still conditional; the contract included a provision making it subject to the respondent obtaining sufficient finance to complete the contract; and because the lot was significantly less valuable upon the correct zoning than the amount of the purchase price, finance would not have been approved if the financier had been informed of the correct zoning.)[25][2016] QSC 279 at [108].[26][2016] QSC 279 at [108].Consideration The trial judge rejected the appellant’s argument that this was not one of the categories of case in which a duty of care has traditionally been imposed. The trial judge considered that the question whether the appellant owed the respondent the alleged duty of care was not novel; it was answered in the respondent’s favour by the High Court’s decisions in Esanda Finance Corporation Ltd v Peat Marwick Hungerfords,[27] and by L Shaddock & Associations Pty Ltd v Parramatta City Council (No 1),[28] the continuing authority of which was affirmed in Woolcock Street Investments Pty Ltd v CDG Pty Ltd.[29] The trial judge also discussed the particular features of this case upon which the appellant relied as militating against a finding that a duty of care existed. In the course of that discussion, the trial judge referred to the decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court in Mid Density Developments Pty Ltd v Rockdale Municipal Council[30] as authority for the proposition that, in a situation very similar to the instant case, a duty of care is owed not only to a person who requests information but also to a person dealing with the recipient of the information.[27](1997) 188 CLR 241 at 252 (Brennan CJ) and 265 (Toohey and Gaudron JJ).[28](1981) 150 CLR 225 at 235 (Gibbs CJ); and 252 (Mason J).[29](2004) 216 CLR 515 at 531 [24].[30](1993) 44 FCR 290. The effect of the respondent’s argument is that the trial judge’s conclusions are correct for the reasons given by his Honour. The appellant argued that the cases cited for those conclusions do not support them. The High Court has affirmed that, as Brennan CJ put it in Esanda,[31] “mere foreseeability of the possibility that a statement made or advice given by A to B might be communicated to a class of which C is a member and that C might enter into some transaction as a result thereof and suffer financial loss in that transaction is not sufficient to impose on A a duty of care owed to C in the making of the statement or the giving of the advice.”[32] In Bryan v Maloney,[33] Brennan J explained this aspect of the law in a passage that was subsequently approved by Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ in Woolcock Street Investments Pty Ltd v CDG Pty Ltd:[34]“If liability were to be imposed for the doing of anything which caused pure economic loss that was foreseeable, the tort of negligence would destroy commercial competition, sterilize many contracts and, in the well-known dictum of Chief Judge Cardozo, expose defendants to potential liability ‘in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class’.”[31](1997) 188 CLR 241 at 252.[32](1997) 188 CLR 241 at 252. See Woolcock Street Investments Pty Ltd v CDG Pty Ltd (2004) 216 CLR 515 at 530 [22] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ) and Brookfield Multiplex Ltd v Owners Corporation Strata Plan 61288 (2014) 254 CLR 185 at 214 [68] and 228 [127] (Crennan, Bell and Keane JJ).[33](1995) 182 CLR 609 at 632. Citations omitted.[34](2004) 216 CLR 515 at 529 – 530 [21]. Citations omitted.