Cape Byron Power 1 Pty Ltd v Downer Energy Systems Pty Ltd

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Cape Byron Power 1 Pty Ltd & Ors v Downer Energy Systems Pty Ltd & Ors [2022] QSC 294

PARTIES:

CAPE BYRON POWER I PTY LTD ACN 074 408 923 (formerly known as Delta Electricity Australia Pty Ltd) and CAPE BYRON POWER II PTY LTD ACN 095 991 638 (formerly known as Sunshine Renewable Energy Pty Ltd) as joint venturers in the Sunshine Electricity Joint Venture 

(first plaintiffs)

CAPE BYRON POWER II PTY LTD ACN 095 991 638 (formerly known as Sunshine Renewable Energy Pty Ltd)

(second plaintiff)

NEW SOUTH WALES SUGAR MILLING CO-OPERATIVE LIMITED ACN 051 052 209

(third plaintiff)

v
DOWNER ENERGY SYSTEMS PTY LIMITED ACN 067 158 954 

(first defendant)

DMH PLANT SERVICES PTY LTD ACN 010 975 256 (formerly known as MHPS Plant Services Pty Ltd and Clyde Babcock-Hitachi Pty Ltd)

(second defendant)

DOWNER EDI LIMITED ACN 003 872 848

(third defendant)

FILE NO/S:

BS 11011 of 2014

DIVISION:

Trial Division

PROCEEDING:

Trial

ORIGINATING COURT:

Supreme Court at Brisbane

DELIVERED ON:

22 December 2022

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

30 and 31 May 2022 and 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 13, 14, 15, 16, 20, 21, 22 and 23 June 2022 and 31 August 2022 and 1 September 2022

JUDGE:

Applegarth J

ORDER:

1.    The plaintiffs have any further leave that may be required pursuant to rule 376(4) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) in addition to the leave granted by paragraph two of the order of Douglas J made 19 September 2017 to amend paragraph 72, 73, 74 and 75 of their pleading in accordance with the Further Amended Statement of Claim filed 31 October 2017.

2.   The defendants have leave to further amend their defence by reinstating those parts of their defence to the plaintiffs’ negligence claim that were deleted in the Amended Defence to the Further Amended Statement of Claim, particularly the matters deleted in sub-paragraph 69(b) and 71 of the Amended Defence filed on 15 December 2017.

3.   The plaintiffs bring in draft minutes of judgment to reflect the judgments indicated in the reasons for judgment published on 22 December 2022.

4.    The matter be adjourned to a date to be fixed not before 30 January 2023 for the purpose of pronouncing judgment and making directions about submissions in relation to interest on the judgment sums and costs.

CATCHWORDS:

CONTRACTS – GENERAL CONTRACTUAL PRINCIPLES – DISCHARGE, BREACH AND DEFENCES TO ACTION FOR BREACH – where the first plaintiffs contracted for the first and second defendants to design, engineer, procure, construct, test and commission two practically identical co-generation plants at Broadwater and Condong (“the EPC Contract”) – where each plant was operated by the third plaintiff – where each plant contained a boiler system that would produce steam to generate electricity  – where, in constructing the boiler at Broadwater, the first and second defendants erroneously installed and programmed a damper that controls the flow of air to the boiler’s oil burner in reverse…

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Details
Case
[2022] QSC 294
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Cape Byron Power 1 Pty Ltd v Downer Energy Systems Pty Ltd, the Federal Court of Australia addressed the dispute between the plaintiffs, Cape Byron Power 1 Pty Ltd, and the defendants, Downer Energy Systems Pty Ltd and CBH. The plaintiffs, who contracted the defendants to design, engineer, procure, construct, test, and commission co-generation plants at Broadwater and Condong, alleged that the defendants had breached the contract by installing and programming a damper in reverse in the boiler at Broadwater, leading to overheating and significant damage in July 2010. The court was required to decide whether the reverse operation of the damper was a substantial cause of the overheating and damage, whether a Deed of Release executed before the damage barred the plaintiffs' claims, and whether the limitation period for the breach of contract claims had expired.

The court found that the reverse operation of the damper was a substantial cause of the overheating and damage. The plaintiffs' evidence, supported by expert reports and boiler operators' testimonies, demonstrated that the boiler operated differently and did not overheat as frequently after the damper was corrected. The court rejected the defendants' argument that overheating was due to factors other than the reverse operation of the damper. Regarding the Deed of Release, the court held that the plaintiffs were not aware of the reverse operation at the time of execution and could not have become aware of it by making reasonable enquiries. The court also found that the limitation period for the breach of contract claims did not start from the installation of the defective damper but from the date of practical completion of the works.

The court concluded that the defendants were liable for the breach of contract and awarded damages to the plaintiffs. The court granted the plaintiffs leave to amend their pleadings and directed the parties to bring in draft minutes of judgment and set a date for pronouncing judgment and making directions about submissions in relation to interest on the judgment sums and costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The plaintiffs have any further leave that may be required pursuant to rule 376(4) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) in addition to the leave granted by paragraph two of the order of Douglas J made 19 September 2017 to amend paragraph 72, 73, 74 and 75 of their pleading in accordance with the Further Amended Statement of Claim filed 31 October 2017.

2. The defendants have leave to further amend their defence by reinstating those parts of their defence to the plaintiffs’ negligence claim that were deleted in the Amended Defence to the Further Amended Statement of Claim, particularly the matters deleted in sub-paragraph 69(b) and 71 of the Amended Defence filed on 15 December 2017.

3. The plaintiffs bring in draft minutes of judgment to reflect the judgments indicated in the reasons for judgment published on 22 December 2022.

4. The matter be adjourned to a date to be fixed not before 30 January 2023 for the purpose of pronouncing judgment and making directions about submissions in relation to interest on the judgment sums and costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

There are many other issues to which I will turn. Openings and the evidence in the trial occupied 18 hearing days. The evidence consists of a large volume of witness statements, expert reports, documents, and oral evidence. Written submissions from the parties run to hundreds of pages, and oral submissions occupied two days. In due course I will address the submissions and some of the more important evidence. Before doing so, I will give an overview of the case and a summary of my reasons for concluding in favour of the plaintiffs on the two main issues that I have identified.Background The first and second defendants (who were often referred to in the evidence as “Downer” and “CBH”) are experts in constructing and commissioning power plants. CBH was particularly experienced in the construction and optimisation of boilers for a range of biofuels including bagasse and woodchip. The first plaintiffs formed a joint venture to construct and operate co-generation plants at Broadwater and Condong to power sugar mills that were operated by the third plaintiff (“NSWSMC”). The idea was that the co-generation plants would operate year-round and burn biofuel in a furnace and boiler system that would produce steam to generate electricity. The biofuel would be principally bagasse (a fibrous by-product of sugar cane crushed at the mill) and wood waste, such as sawdust and woodchips, when bagasse was not available. Any excess electricity that was not used to power the mill was to be transferred into the electricity grid and earn income for the joint venture. In 2005, the joint venture contracted for Downer and CBH to design, engineer, procure, construct, test and commission a 30 MW co-generation plant at Broadwater and a practically identical plant at Condong. The third defendant (“DEDI”) guaranteed the performance of “the Contractor” (the first and second defendants) under the contract and agreed to indemnify “the Principal” (the first plaintiffs) against losses for any default in performing the contract. The proper operation of the boiler depends on a complex and mainly automated system that Downer and CBH developed to control the flow of fuel and the flow of air into the boiler. The aim is to have a well-positioned fireball in the furnace that consumes fuel in an optimal way. Biofuels enter through a fuel duct and are injected into the furnace by compressed air from plates that are set at a certain angle. When bagasse is being used, the aim is for practically all of it to be consumed in suspension in a rotating fireball and before it falls onto the grate at the bottom of the furnace. Otherwise, unburnt fuel will fall onto a slowly travelling grate, may pile in large quantities and overheat the grate. When wood material is used instead of bagasse the fuel tends to fall onto the grate and combust there. Ash that is the product of combustion and impurities in the fuel is removed from the boiler. It falls through the travelling grate or falls off its end as it rotates. The ash is reclaimed and impurities such as stones are disposed of.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

As a result, the defendants were not released from claims made by the plaintiffs in this proceeding relating to the reverse operation of the ATO Damper.The evidence The trial heard from many witnesses, including boiler operators who were employed by the third plaintiff (NSWSMC), engineers who were employed by the parties in different capacities, a consulting engineer (Mr Ironside) who was engaged by the parties, and experts who provided expert reports for the purpose of this proceeding. The evidence-in-chief of lay witnesses was reduced to statement form. Some witnesses gave supplementary statements and some of their witness statements were voluminous. The experts’ reports, including reports that responded to other experts’ reports, were many and voluminous. Areas of agreement between Mr Lowry and Dr Dixon were identified in a joint report. Due to the volume of exhibits and other documents, the trial was conducted as an electronic trial. The parties do not suggest that the resolution of issues of substance turns on making an assessment of the credibility and reliability of each lay witness. It is unnecessary to give a witness-by-witness account of their evidence. I shall refer to their evidence only to the extent necessary to resolve a contentious issue of fact. Naturally, my findings of fact depend upon my assessment of the reliability or otherwise of the recollections of each lay witness, and the extent to which their evidence is supported or contradicted by contemporaneous documents. Some evidence, including metallurgical reports, was received into evidence without either party requiring the author of the report to be called as a witness. This became evidence for all purposes. Some evidence was admitted on a more limited basis. It is appropriate that I make some general observations about the reliability of the lay witnesses. Some witnesses had better recollections than others. Lay witnesses, such as boiler operators, were being asked to recall events that occurred between 2008 and 2010. Having witness statements stand as their evidence-in-chief had the advantage of reducing the length of the trial. It did not allow the lay witnesses to tell their stories, unprompted, in evidence-in-chief. However, in circumstances in which much of the lay evidence was uncontested and findings are not sought by the parties in relation to the reliability of the evidence of most lay witnesses, not being able to hear their evidence-in-chief given orally was not a significant disadvantage. Their evidence was tested under cross-examination. Some of the boiler operators were more suggestable than others. Some conceded that they could not recall matters. Others gave recollections that probably involved a fair degree of reconstruction, given the passage of time. I was generally impressed with the evidence of the operators. To take the first witness as an example, Mr David Timms was employed by NSWSMC as a “No 1 Operator”. This meant that he spent a large amount of time in the control room. The reference to “No 1 Operator” distinguishes him from some witnesses who were employed by NSWSMC as “No 2 Operators” or “Rovers”. They would undertake inspections and have other tasks around the boiler. Mr Timms gave reliable evidence about the training that was provided by CBH and Downer and problems that were experienced with the boiler both during the commissioning period and after. I found his evidence credible and reliable. Under cross-examination he made appropriate concessions, accepting that it was “hard to remember things from 13 years ago, but it-it’s strange, some things are more memorable than others”.

Decision

Reasons for decision

In the circumstances, and having regard to the report’s limitations, I am prepared to act on Mr O’Shea’s report in coming to a conclusion about the quantum of the plaintiffs’ business interruption losses.Conclusion on economic loss claims I use the term economic loss claims to refer to the first plaintiffs’ claimed revenue losses and NSWSMC’s claimed expenditure apart from repair costs, being the three entries in the table that I have prepared. The shortcomings in the plaintiffs’ proof of their economic loss would not result in their being denied compensation for those losses if compensation were to be awarded. Substantial losses for these kinds of claims were suffered. The plaintiffs’ poor documentation of some parts of their claims would not necessarily warrant a discounting of the amounts claimed. The deficiencies in documentation and proof were addressed by Mr O’Shea’s work and analysis. A discount would not necessarily be applied because it is open to conclude that losses in the amounts claimed probably were suffered. Still, had I been required to award compensation for the economic loss claims, I would have discounted the claimed amounts by 10 percent because of the imprecision in some parts of the plaintiffs’ proof of quantum. Third defendant’s liability The first plaintiffs and the third defendant (DEDI) entered into a Deed of Guarantee. The Deed contains two separate and distinct obligations. First, in clause 1, there is an unconditional guarantee to the first plaintiffs of the “due and punctual performance… and observance by the Contractor of all of its obligations under the Contract”. Second, there is a separate undertaking in clause 2 to indemnify the first plaintiffs. Clause 7 of the Deed is a conventional provision by which the guarantor “waives any right it has of first requiring the Principal to commence proceedings or enforce any other right against the Contractor or any other person before claiming under this Guarantee and Indemnity”. A difference between the obligation imposed by clause 1 and the obligation imposed by clause 2 is that the latter depends “on receipt of written demand from the Principal”. Clause 1 does not condition the guarantee obligation contained in it upon receipt of a written demand. It is the kind of guarantee where, upon default of the relevant primary obligation, the person having the benefit of the guarantee can sue the guarantor for damages for breach of contract.[35][35]Sunbird Plaza Pty Ltd v Maloney (1988) 166 CLR 245 at 255; Filmana Pty Ltd v Tynan [2013] QCA 256 at [38]. Clause 2 of the Deed provides: “As a separate undertaking, the Guarantor unconditionally and irrevocably agrees that, on receipt of written demand from the Principal, it will indemnify the Principal against all losses, damages, costs (including legal costs on a full indemnity basis and the costs of enforcing this Guarantee and Indemnity), expenses or otherwise which may be incurred by it by reason of: (a) any default on the part of the Contractor in performing and observing the agreements and provisions on its part contained in the Contract; or (b) an obligation the Contractor would otherwise have under the Contract being found to be unenforceable. The Principal need not incur expense or make payment before enforcing his right of indemnity.” (emphasis added)

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

There is no dispute that in constructing and programming the boiler so that the ATO Damper operated in reverse, and then not identifying that it did, the first and second defendants breached their contract with the first plaintiffs. Was the reverse operation of the ATO Damper a substantial cause of the overheating that resulted in damage to the grate? The central issue in the case is about causation. The causation question stated above involves important factual questions about the practical consequences of the ATO Damper operating in reverse. In particular, did it:1. deprive the grate of undergrate air, and thereby:(a) reduce the intended cooling effect of undergrate air;(b) reduce combustion of unburnt fuel on the grate and lead to increased piling? 2. redirect air that should have entered through the grate via the ATO Damper to a higher location in the boiler, and thereby affect combustion in the furnace?3. by a combination of 1 and 2: (a) affect the intended distribution of air and fuel within the furnace;(b) reduce efficient combustion; and(c) cause an excessive accumulation of unburnt fuel (“piling”) on the grate?4. result in overheating of the grate over a prolonged period? These questions require consideration of a large body of lay and expert evidence. Predictably, the plaintiffs rely on the noticeable difference in the operation of the boiler after the defective operation of the ATO Damper was corrected. After the ATO Damper was reprogrammed by Mr Ironside so that it operated correctly, boiler operators at the Broadwater mill noticed that it operated very differently. Some of their evidence describes it as operating as a completely different boiler. Their evidence, which I accept, is that it did not overheat as frequently as it did when the ATO Damper operated in reverse. The plaintiffs also rely on expert evidence about the effect of the ATO Damper operating in reverse. Also, after the reverse operation was corrected, Mr Rojo did a test of the effects of the correction. Grate temperatures reduced by 30°C in 30 minutes. The defendants, for their part, rely on expert opinion and other evidence to submit that the consequences of the ATO Damper operating in reverse were not as great as the plaintiffs suggest. As part of their defence, they say that if the reverse operation of the ATO Damper was a serious problem then overheating would have been evident in 2008 and before the handover. They submit that the grate did not overheat as often as the plaintiffs and their witnesses suggest it did during this period. This argument suggests that overheating only became a serious problem after the handover and was due to factors other than the reversal of the ATO Damper, such as the way the operators conducted themselves or the presence of bad fuel and rocks in the biofuel. However, for reasons that emerge from the evidence I will later discuss, I find that overheating was a frequent problem before the handover. Reduced to its basics, the dispute between the parties on the issue of causation goes something like this.