Cape Byron Power 1 Pty Ltd v Downer Energy Systems Pty Limited

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Cape Byron Power 1 Pty Ltd & Ors v Downer Energy Systems Pty Limited & Ors [2023] QSC 76

PARTIES:

CAPE BYRON POWER I PTY LTD ACN 074 408 923 (formerly known as Delta Electricity Australia Pty Ltd) and CAPE BYRON POWER II PTY LTD ACN 095 991 638 (formerly known as Sunshine Renewable Energy Pty Ltd) as joint venturers in the Sunshine Electricity Joint Venture 

(first plaintiffs)

CAPE BYRON POWER II PTY LTD ACN 095 991 638 (formerly known as Sunshine Renewable Energy Pty Ltd)

(second plaintiff)

NEW SOUTH WALES SUGAR MILLING CO-OPERATIVE LIMITED ACN 051 052 209

(third plaintiff)

v
DOWNER ENERGY SYSTEMS PTY LIMITED ACN 067 158 954 

(first defendant)

DMH PLANT SERVICES PTY LTD ACN 010 975 256 (formerly known as MHPS Plant Services Pty Ltd and Clyde Babcock-Hitachi Pty Ltd)

(second defendant)

DOWNER EDI LIMITED ACN 003 872 848

(third defendant)

FILE NO:

BS 11011 of 2014

DIVISION:

Trial Division

PROCEEDING:

Trial

ORIGINATING COURT:

Supreme Court at Brisbane

DELIVERED ON:

14 April 2023

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

Written Submissions

JUDGE:

Applegarth J

ORDER:

1.   The period over which interest should be awarded should be a period of 8 years between 10 July 2010 and 9 July 2018.

2.   Direct the parties to calculate interest according to the applicable Practice Direction rates for the relevant period. 

CATCHWORDS:

INTEREST – RECOVERABILITY OF INTEREST – IN GENERAL – where the defendants allege that there were unreasonable delays by the plaintiffs in initiating and litigating its claims – where the defendants contend the period of interest should be the period from 14 November 2019 to the date of judgment – where the plaintiffs contend that the period of interest should be the total period of 12 years from the incident date when loss was first suffered to the date of judgment – whether the plaintiffs’ delay was unreasonable so as to warrant a reduction of the interest awarded

Civil Proceedings Act 2011 (Qld), s 58
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999, r 5

Bishopsgate Insurance Ltd (in liq) v Deloitte Haskins & Sells [1999] 3 VR 863, cited
Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor
(1996) 186 CLR 541, cited
Cape Byron Power 1 Pty Ltd & Ors v Downer Energy Systems Pty Limited & Ors
[2022] QSC 294, cited
Cerutti v Crestside Pty Ltd [2016] 1 Qd R 89, cited
Department of Transport v Chris Smaller (Transport) Ltd [1989] AC 119, cited
Fulcher v Knott Investments Pty Ltd
[2012] QSC 232, cited
Interchase Corporation Ltd (in liq.) v Grosvenor Hill (Queensland) Pty Ltd (No. 3) [2003] 1 Qd R 26, cited
Jackamarra v Krakouer (1998) 195 CLR 516, cited
Latrobe Country Credit Co-operative Ltd v Smith
[1999] 1 VR 44, cited
The Queen v Edwards
[2009] HCA 20; (2009) 255 ALR 399, cited

COUNSEL:

Ms B O’Brien for the plaintiffs

Mr M T Hickey for the defendants

SOLICITORS:

Carter Newell for the plaintiffs

Clayton…

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Details
Case
[2023] QSC 76
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Cape Byron Power 1 Pty Ltd v Downer Energy Systems Pty Limited involved a dispute between the parties over the recoverability of interest. The plaintiffs, Cape Byron Power 1 Pty Ltd, sought compensation for economic loss they alleged resulted from the defendants', Downer Energy Systems Pty Limited, failure to complete a project. The defendants contested the claim and, among other things, argued that the period for which interest should be awarded should be limited to the period from 14 November 2019 to the date of judgment. The plaintiffs, on the other hand, argued that the period of interest should cover the entire 12 years from when the loss was first suffered to the date of judgment. The court was required to decide whether the plaintiffs' delays in initiating and litigating the claims were unreasonable and whether this warranted a reduction in the period for which interest was awarded.

The court examined the evidence and submissions from both parties. The plaintiffs argued that their delays were not unreasonable, as they had faced difficulties in progressing the matter to trial and had made forensic decisions about proving their economic loss claim. The court accepted that the plaintiffs had attempted to progress the matter with difficulty and did not consider their conduct unreasonable. Regarding the defendants' claim of prejudice due to the unavailability of witnesses and documents, the court found that the plaintiffs had adequately explained the challenges in securing witnesses and documents given the complex and lengthy history of the case. The court was not satisfied that the defendants had suffered significant prejudice due to the plaintiffs' delays. The court determined that the period for which interest should be awarded should be a period of 8 years, between 10 July 2010 and 9 July 2018, and directed the parties to calculate interest according to the applicable Practice Direction rates for the relevant period.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The period over which interest should be awarded should be a period of 8 years between 10 July 2010 and 9 July 2018.

2. Direct the parties to calculate interest according to the applicable Practice Direction rates for the relevant period.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

In my view, the plaintiffs have sufficiently explained how it attempted, with difficulty, to progress the matter to trial. I do not consider their conduct during this period was unreasonable. They were entitled to make forensic decisions about proper proof of their economic loss claim, which was hard-fought by the defendants. Evidence of prejudice to the defendants Mr Brackin’s evidence is that, as a result of the plaintiffs’ repeated delays in prosecuting the proceedings, the defendants suffered prejudice in relation to:(a)the unavailability of witnesses;(b)the unavailability of documents; and(c)additional legal costs the defendants incurred. In response, the plaintiffs contend that it is unsurprising that both the defendants and the plaintiffs had difficulty with the availability of witnesses in circumstances in which practical completion of the May 2005 contract was not achieved until 21 November 2008, the incident did not occur until 5 July 2010, its suspected cause was not discovered by the plaintiffs until 25 August 2010, that cause was not accepted by the defendants at the time or subsequently, the matter remained controversial, required further investigation and did not result in proceedings commencing until November 2014. As to the defendants’ lay witnesses and potential lay witnesses, the plaintiffs note that the defendants had five lay witnesses at trial and it has not been suggested that the defendants could not have subpoenaed witnesses, including former employees. They further submit that Mr Brackin has not explained the points of time at which potential witnesses were contacted by the defendants’ legal representatives. Given the history of the matter, it seems unlikely that the potential witnesses were only contacted by the defendants’ investigators or solicitors at a late stage close to trial. If this is the case, then the defendants’ delay in doing so is largely unexplained. Further, according to the plaintiffs, it was always likely that there were going to be difficulties with the availability or willingness of some witnesses to assist because:“(a) Rick Phillips was engaged by the defendants on a contract basis (not as an employee) and had not been engaged by any entity associated with the defendants for ‘several years’;(b) Keith Harvey was engaged by the second defendant on a contract basis and ceased his engagement ‘shortly after practical completion in approximately late 2008’;(c) Terry Cole left his employment with the second defendant in mid to late 2012;(d) Adrian Hughes left his employment with the second defendant ‘shortly after practical completion of the Broadwater co-generation project in or about late 2008.” The defendants respond that the plaintiffs’ criticisms of Mr Brackin’s evidence about prejudice should be rejected because of the inherent difficulty in pin-pointing such prejudice with any precision. I accept, consistent with the authorities to which I have referred, that some general prejudice may be inferred by reason of delay itself. However, the plaintiffs make a valid point about the lack of clarity as to whether any of the potential witnesses who were not called were approached years earlier, why their accounts of events were not the subject of statements soon after the events, or at least soon after the May 2013 letters of demand. I cannot be satisfied that the potential witnesses were not spoken to by the defendants’ representatives, loss adjusters or solicitors at an early stage. I cannot conclude that their evidence would have been of any great assistance to the defendants had they been approached sooner and been prepared to talk. Moreover, if potential witnesses were expected to give evidence favourable to the defendants, but were not willing to provide statements, they might always have been subpoenaed. Overall, I am not satisfied about the extent of prejudice claimed by the defendants due to the unavailability of potential witnesses.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established