Cape Byron Power 1 Pty Ltd v Downer Energy Systems Pty Limited

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Cape Byron Power 1 Pty Ltd & Ors v Downer Energy Systems Pty Limited & Ors [2023] QSC 109

PARTIES:

CAPE BYRON POWER I PTY LTD ACN 074 408 923 (formerly known as Delta Electricity Australia Pty Ltd) and CAPE BYRON POWER II PTY LTD ACN 095 991 638 (formerly known as Sunshine Renewable Energy Pty Ltd) as joint venturers in the Sunshine Electricity Joint Venture 

(first plaintiffs)

CAPE BYRON POWER II PTY LTD ACN 095 991 638 (formerly known as Sunshine Renewable Energy Pty Ltd)

(second plaintiff)

NEW SOUTH WALES SUGAR MILLING
CO-OPERATIVE LIMITED ACN 051 052 209

(third plaintiff)

v
DOWNER ENERGY SYSTEMS PTY LIMITED ACN 067 158 954 

(first defendant)

DMH PLANT SERVICES PTY LTD ACN 010 975 256 (formerly known as MHPS Plant Services Pty Ltd and Clyde Babcock-Hitachi Pty Ltd)

(second defendant)

DOWNER EDI LIMITED ACN 003 872 848

(third defendant)

FILE NO:

BS 11011 of 2014

DIVISION:

Trial Division

PROCEEDING:

Trial

ORIGINATING COURT:

Supreme Court at Brisbane

DELIVERED ON:

18 May 2023

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

Written Submissions 20, 25 and 28 April 2023

JUDGE:

Applegarth J

ORDER:

1.   The first and second defendants pay 85 per cent of the first plaintiffs’ costs of and incidental to the proceeding on the standard basis.

2.   The third defendant pay 85 per cent of the first plaintiffs’ costs of and incidental to the proceeding on the indemnity basis.

3.   The plaintiffs’ costs referred to in orders 1 and 2 herein, not include the costs associated with the affidavits of Laura Horvat filed 18 June 2020, 20 August 2020, 24 September 2021, 3 December 2021 and 3 May 2022, and the affidavit of David Rodighiero filed 21 August 2020.

4.   The third plaintiff pay the first and second defendants’ costs of defending the third plaintiff’s claims in the proceeding on the standard basis.   

CATCHWORDS:

PROCEDURE – CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS – COSTS – DEPRIVING SUCCESSFUL PARTY OF COSTS – OTHER CASES – SUBSTANTIAL SUCCESS - where the first plaintiffs were successful on the most substantial issues in the proceeding - where the parties agree that the first plaintiffs should receive an award of costs that is reduced to reflect the first plaintiff’s failure on some claims - where the plaintiffs propose a 10 per cent reduction while the defendants propose a 30 per cent reduction in the costs award - where the defendants further submit that the first plaintiffs should be precluded from recovering some specific costs – what is the appropriate percentage reduction to the plaintiffs’ costs

PROCEDURE – CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS – COSTS – OFFERS OF COMPROMISE, PAYMENTS INTO COURT AND SETTLEMENTS – where the first plaintiffs seek costs on the indemnity basis from the date on which they made a Calderbank offer for settlement – where the offer was expressed to be inclusive of costs – where the defendants contend that the making of an “all-up” offer impedes the plaintiffs from…

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Details
Case
[2023] QSC 109
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Cape Byron Power 1 Pty Ltd v Downer Energy Systems Pty Limited involved a complex dispute between the plaintiffs and the defendants. The plaintiffs, Cape Byron Power 1 Pty Ltd and others, sought damages and other remedies against the defendants for alleged breaches of contract and other wrongs. The case was heard in the Supreme Court of New South Wales, where the plaintiffs were successful on some claims but not others. The central issues for the court were the determination of the appropriate percentage reduction of the plaintiffs’ costs, the applicability of indemnity costs, and the enforceability of a contractual right to indemnity costs.

The court first considered the appropriate percentage reduction of the plaintiffs' costs, given their partial success. The plaintiffs proposed a 10 per cent reduction while the defendants suggested a 30 per cent reduction. The court concluded that an 85 per cent recovery was appropriate, balancing the plaintiffs' success on the most substantial issues against their failure on some claims. Next, regarding indemnity costs, the court examined the Calderbank offer made by the plaintiffs and whether it was more favourable than the judgment. The court determined that the judgment was more favourable to the plaintiffs in terms of costs incurred at the time of the offer, and it was not unreasonable for the defendants to reject the offer. Lastly, the court considered whether to enforce a contractual right to indemnity costs as per a Deed of Guarantee. The court found that the Deed did not plainly and unambiguously provide for indemnity costs and that the plaintiffs had not foreshadowed such a claim. Therefore, the court declined to exercise its discretion to award indemnity costs on this basis.

The court made several orders. The first and second defendants were ordered to pay 85 per cent of the first plaintiffs' costs on the standard basis, while the third defendant was ordered to pay 85 per cent of the first plaintiffs' costs on the indemnity basis. Specific costs associated with certain affidavits were excluded from the costs orders. Finally, the third plaintiff was ordered to pay the first and second defendants’ costs of defending the third plaintiff's claims on the standard basis.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The first and second defendants pay 85 per cent of the first plaintiffs’ costs of and incidental to the proceeding on the standard basis.

2. The third defendant pay 85 per cent of the first plaintiffs’ costs of and incidental to the proceeding on the indemnity basis.

3. The plaintiffs’ costs referred to in orders 1 and 2 herein, not include the costs associated with the affidavits of Laura Horvat filed 18 June 2020, 20 August 2020, 24 September 2021, 3 December 2021 and 3 May 2022, and the affidavit of David Rodighiero filed 21 August 2020.

4. The third plaintiff pay the first and second defendants’ costs of defending the third plaintiff’s claims in the proceeding on the standard basis.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The plaintiffs respond that this is of no great significance because of: (a)the relatively modest value of the third plaintiff’s claims; (b)the extent of overlap with the claims of the first plaintiffs; and (c)the proportion of the proceeding and costs dedicated solely to the third plaintiff’s claim of $200,214 was minimal because at the time Mr O’Shea’s report had not been prepared, nor had the witness statement of Mr Welch that addressed the third plaintiff’s expense claims.Conclusion – a more favourable outcome? It is far from clear that the offer was more favourable to the defendants at the time it was made than the judgment that was obtained. The issue includes the issue of interest and a need to adjust for an uncertain amount on account of costs in favour of the first plaintiffs and against the third plaintiff. As for interest, although I awarded eight out of the 11 years and, for convenience, ordered interest over the first eight years, as at the date of the offer there was a basis to limit interest, and not award interest for years of delay that preceded 2018. Even assuming that interest as at 14 January 2021 was likely to be in the order of the amount awarded by me, the costs issue is complex. I am prepared to accept the evidence of Mr Rodighiero and conclude that the first plaintiffs had incurred reasonable legal costs well in excess of $250,000 as at the date of the offer. I note that:(a)the proceeding had been on foot for at least six years, and many significant events had occurred in it;(b)the plaintiffs had engaged a law firm and junior and senior counsel to represent them in the matter; and(c)the plaintiffs had engaged the expert Mr Lowry who had produced four expert reports and participated in a joint expert conference and prepared a joint expert report. Even now, the defendants are not to know what the first plaintiffs’ recoverable costs probably were as at the date of the offer, but that matter relates more to the issue of reasonableness than the “more favourable” issue. The defendants do not advance reasons or a sound evidentiary basis to reject Mr Rodighiero’s estimate. I also accept that a costs order against the third plaintiff would have been relatively small as at the date of the offer for the reasons given by the plaintiffs. I conclude that the net position of the plaintiffs’ costs as at the date of the offer probably exceeded $270,000. Therefore, the judgment for the first plaintiffs is more favourable to them than the offer the plaintiffs made, having regard to the costs that were recoverable by them at the date of the offer.Was it unreasonable for the defendants not to accept the offer? In SHA Premier Constructions Pty Ltd v Niclin Constructions Pty Ltd (No 2)[19] Bond J (as his Honour then was) summarised the principles relating to Calderbank offers:[19][2020] QSC 323 (emphasis in original; footnotes omitted).“[10] First, the usual rule is that where the Court orders the costs of one party to litigation to be paid by another party, the order is for assessment of those costs on the standard basis. [11] Second, the Court will depart from the usual rule where the circumstances of the case warrant that course. [12] Third, one feature which may justify a departure from the usual rule is the rejection of a Calderbank offer to compromise. However, it is wrong to think that an offeree’s rejection of a Calderbank offer gives rise to a presumption that the offeree should pay the offeror’s costs on an indemnity basis if the offeree obtains a less favourable result than contained in the offer. Rather, the correct approach is to consider whether the rejection of the Calderbank offer, in all the circumstances, justifies a departure from the usual rule. [13] Fourth, the balance between the competing policy considerations of, on the one hand, appropriately encouraging settlement and, on the other, not discouraging potential litigants from bringing their disputes to the courts, is found by applying a test of “reasonableness”. The policy rationale for requiring the offeree to indemnify the offeror for costs incurred after the offeree’s unreasonable rejection of an offer is that, from the time of the unreasonable rejection, notionally the real cause and occasion of the litigation is the unreasonable attitude adopted by the offeree. [14] Fifth, deciding the critical question of whether the offeree’s rejection of the offer is unreasonable in all the circumstances will always involve matters of judgment and impression. However, the discretion as to costs must be exercised judicially and is subject to review in accordance with the principles set out in House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 at 505. Without being exhaustive concerning the considerations which should be taken into account, a court should ordinarily have regard to at least the following matters: (a) the stage of the proceeding at which the offer was received;(b) the time allowed to the offeree to consider the offer;(c) the extent of the compromise offered;(d) the offeree’s prospects of success, assessed as at the date of the offer;(e) the clarity with which the terms of the offer were expressed; and(f) whether the offer foreshadowed an application for indemnity costs in the event of the offeree rejecting it.”

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established