Elevate NSW Pty Ltd v Canada Bay Private Hospital Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Elevate NSW Pty Ltd v Canada Bay Private Hospital Pty Ltd [2019] FCA 1248

File number: NSD 160 of 2019
Judge: GRIFFITHS J
Date of judgment: 12 August 2019
Catchwords:

CORPORATIONS – application to set aside a statutory demand under s 459H(1)(b) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) – offsetting claims for misleading or deceptive conduct, conversion and detinue, and breaches of contract – whether the evidence of loss is sufficient to meet the threshold for establishing an offsetting claim

TRADE PRACTICES – claim of misleading or deceptive conduct by silence or failure to disclose – whether knowledge of the matter that has not been disclosed is necessary for the claim to be established

Legislation:

Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) sch 2 s 236

Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 440D, 459G, 459H

Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s 52

Private Health Facilities Regulation 2017 (NSW)

Cases cited:

Aussie Hoist Property Pty Ltd v Mulqueen [2018] FCA 1493

Broke Hills Estate Pty Ltd v Oakvale Wines Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 638; 23 ACLC 1,266

Bunnings Group Limited v CHEP Australia Limited [2011] NSWCA 342; 82 NSWLR 420

Central City Pty Ltd v Montevento Holdings Pty Ltd [2011] WASCA 5; 29 ACLC 11-011

Demagogue Pty Ltd v Ramensky (1992) 39 FCR 31

Elm Financial Services Pty Ltd v MacDougal [2004] NSWSC 560

Financial Solutions Australasia Pty Ltd v Predella Pty Ltd [2002] WASCA 51; 26 WAR 306

First Equilibrium Pty Limited v Bluestone Property Services Pty Limited (in liq) [2013] FCAFC 108; 95 ACSR 654

General and Finance Facilities Ltd v Cooks Cars (Romford) Ltd [1963] 1 WLR 644

Grandview Aust Builder Pty Ltd v Budget Demolitions Pty Ltd [2019] NSWCA 60

Grass Manufactures Pty Ltd v Sraennik Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 95

Graywinter Properties Pty Ltd v Gas & Fuel Corporation Superannuation Fund [1996] FCA 822; 70 FCR 452

Henjo Investments Pty Limited v Collins Marrickville Pty Limited (No 1) (1988) 39 FCR 546

Hornsby Building Information Centre Pty Ltd v Sydney Building Information Centre Ltd (1978) 140 CLR 216

John Holland Construction and Engineering Pty Limited v Kilpatrick Green Pty Limited (1994) 14 ACSR 250

Leda Holdings Pty Ltd v Oraka Pty Ltd (1998) ATPR 41-601

Macleay Nominees v Belle Property East [2001] NSWSC 743

Miller & Associates Insurance Broking Pty Ltd v BMW Australia Finance Ltd [2010] HCA 31; 241 CLR 357

MNWA Pty Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2016] FCAFC 154; 250 FCR 381

NT Beverages Group Pty Ltd v PT Bromo Tirta Lestari, in the matter of NT Beverages Group Pty Ltd [2017] FCA 775

Pravenkav Group Pty Ltd  Diploma Construction (WA) Pty Ltd [2014] WASCA 132; 46 WAR 483

Radaich v Smith (1959) 101 CLR 209

Re Citadel Financial Corporation Pty ltd [2019] NSWSC 65

Tokich Holdings Pty Ltd v Sheraton Constructions (NSW) Pty Ltd (in liq) [2004] NSWSC 527; 185 FLR 130

Date of hearing: 1 May 2019
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Details
Case
[2019] FCA 1248
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Elevate NSW Pty Ltd sought to set aside a statutory demand under s 459H(1)(b) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). The demand was in the amount of $110,863.76, relating to outstanding fees under a sublease for a property at 57 Burwood Road, Concord. The plaintiff argued that it had offsetting claims equivalent to the debt under s 459H(3) of the Corporations Act. The defendant, Canada Bay Private Hospital Pty Ltd, contested the application, contending that the plaintiff’s claims were insufficient to meet the threshold for setting aside the statutory demand.

The primary legal issues were whether the plaintiff's offsetting claims met the requirements under s 459H(3) of the Corporations Act. The court had to determine whether the evidence provided by the plaintiff was sufficient to establish claims for misleading or deceptive conduct, conversion, detinue, and breaches of contract. Additionally, the court needed to consider if the plaintiff’s claims were genuinely disputed as per s 459H(1)(a) of the Corporations Act.

The court considered the plaintiff's claims of misleading or deceptive conduct by silence or failure to disclose, conversion, detinue, and breaches of contract. It found that the evidence was insufficient to establish these claims. Specifically, the court held that the plaintiff's evidence regarding loss did not provide a basis for quantifying the offsetting claim. The court also rejected the plaintiff’s objections regarding the sufficiency of its affidavits under the principles established in Graywinter Properties Pty Ltd v Gas & Fuel Corporation Superannuation Fund. The court concluded that the plaintiff's claims did not constitute a genuine dispute as required by s 459H(1)(b) of the Corporations Act.

The court dismissed the application to set aside the statutory demand, ordering that the originating process filed on 8 February 2019 be dismissed and that the plaintiff pay the defendant’s costs, as agreed or assessed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The originating process filed on 8 February 2019 be dismissed.

2. The plaintiff pay the defendant’s costs, as agreed or assessed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

As will shortly emerge, the plaintiff claims it has three offsetting claims, which will be summarised after the background facts are outlined. Background facts It is appropriate to emphasise at the outset that the evidence in this proceeding was somewhat obscure and left several questions unanswered or uncertain. The plaintiff relied upon two affidavits affirmed by its chief executive officer, Ms Brookes McTavish. The affidavits are dated 8 February and 15 April 2019 respectively. The affidavits establish the following relevant matters. The plaintiff operated a sleep laboratory business from the ground floor and lower ground floor of the premises at 57 Burwood Road Concord (Property) between February 2018 and December 2018. The Property was owned by a company called Canada Bay Properties Pty Limited (Canada Bay Properties) but the plaintiff paid what it described as “fees” to the defendant. To understand this somewhat peculiar arrangement, it is necessary to explain some of the background history preceding the plaintiff’s purchase of the sleep laboratory business in February 2018. The plaintiff purchased the sleep laboratory business from a company called K Chan Medical Services Pty Ltd (K Chan). K Chan had a written licence agreement with another company called Concord Private Hospital Pty Ltd (Concord Private Hospital). At this time, Concord Private Hospital was both the owner of the Property as well as the holder of the relevant medical licence required to provide medical services at the Property (in particular to keep patients overnight). The licence agreement allowed K Chan to operate a sleep study clinic on the ground floor of the Property, including utilisation of the medical licence held by Concord Private Hospital. Under the licence agreement, K Chan was obliged to pay Concord Private Hospital $25,000 per calendar month, less any rebates paid by private health funds stemming from the accommodation of their patients (bed fee rebates). As Concord Private Hospital was the owners of the medical licence, it was to them that the rebates were due. The licence agreement was for an initial 18 month period, after which it reverted to a monthly period subject to termination for convenience by any party by 6 months’ notice given after the end of the initial 18 month period. The initial 18 month period expired in January 2018. It appears that there was no formal novation of the licence agreement with Concord Private Hospital after the plaintiff’s purchase of the sleep laboratory business from K Chan, but the plaintiff continued to pay fees on the same basis as that provided for in the written licence agreement with K Chan. The other significant change was that the plaintiff began to utilise the lower ground floor, in addition to the ground floor that had been used by K Chan. The plaintiff paid a monthly fee of $3,333.33 plus GST for use of the lower ground floor. The ground floor was used to house consulting suites, while the lower ground floor housed the beds and the sleep laboratory.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

For the failure to give reasonable notice aspect of the breach of contract claim, the defendant submitted that the plaintiff’s figures based on total gross income said nothing about the profitability of the sleep study business. The defendant submitted the proper measure of loss was lost profit resulting from an inability to operate the sleep study business. As the gross income figure said nothing about profitability, the defendant submitted the evidence provided no basis for quantifying the plaintiff’s offsetting claim. Defendant’s objections to plaintiff’s evidence The defendant took objection to various paragraphs in the second of Ms McTavish’s affidavits, including several objections relying upon what is described as the “Graywinter principle” (referring to Sundberg J’s decision in Graywinter Properties Pty Ltd v Gas & Fuel Corporation Superannuation Fund [1996] FCA 822; 70 FCR 452). I said that I would explain my rulings on those particular objections in my final reasons for judgment. Those reasons relate to [5], [6], [8], [10], [13]-[15] of Ms McTavish’s second affidavit, which evidence may be summarised as follows:(a)the plaintiff’s engagement on a part time basis of an administrative person, Ms Sharon Stapleton, to collect bed fee rebates, deal with health funds and produce patient records. Her wages were $21,000 per annum. It was deposed that her employment was necessary due to the fact that the defendant did not employ a Director of Nursing “in any meaningful capacity” nor did it provide for the production of patients records in order to meet the requirements of the hospital ([5]-[6]).(b)Ms McTavish deposed that she had not been informed by the defendant or any person before its acquisition of the sleep study business that there was no Occupation Certificate for the lower ground floor. The plaintiff also deposed that had she known there was no Occupation Certificate, she would not have allowed the plaintiff to continue to occupy the premises ([8], [10]).(c)While the plaintiff has been unable to operate its sleep study business it continued to incur fixed costs, including remuneration of staff, insurance payments and leasing fees associated with specialist sleep laboratory equipment (13]-[15]). I reject the objections for the following reasons. In Aussie Hoist Property Pty Ltd v Mulqueen [2018] FCA 1493 at [47]-[48], I described the nature and rationale of a Graywinter objection as follows:In Graywinter Properties Pty Ltd v Gas & Fuel Corporation Superannuation Fund [1996] FCA 822; 70 FCR 452 (Graywinter), Sundberg J summarised the following minimum requirements that had to be satisfied by the supporting affidavit required under s 459G(3)(a) of the Act:(a)The affidavit must state material facts which show that there is a genuine dispute.(b)The affidavit need not include, in admissible form, all the evidence that supports the contention of a genuine dispute.(c)Neither a mere assertion that there is a genuine dispute nor a bare claim that the debt is disputed will suffice.His Honour also held that if the supporting affidavit did not meet the minimum requirements, the Court did not have jurisdiction and this could not be overcome by filing a supplementary affidavit after the 21 day period had expired. Justice Sundberg held, however, that where the minimum requirements had been met, material relied upon in the supporting affidavit could be supplemented by affidavits filed after the 21 day period had expired (but they cannot raise a new ground see [61] below).

Decision

Reasons for decision

The well known stay of proceedings pursuant to s 440D of the Corporations Act applies to proceedings against a company in administration. As these proceedings are brought by the company in administration, I do not see that section as applying to the present proceedings. For that reason, I did not regard the plaintiff’s entry into voluntary administration as relevant. Different considerations might arise if the defendant seeks to enforce the judgment and/or the order for costs in its favour.Conclusion For these reasons, the application to set aside the statutory demand will be dismissed, with costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The plaintiff seeks to set aside a statutory demand under s 459H of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (Corporations Act). The statutory demand is dated 15 January 2019 and is in the amount of $110,863.76 which the accompanying affidavit described as outstanding “rent” under a sublease for a property situated at 57 Burwood Road Concord (Property). The statutory demand identifies 8 invoices, in varying amounts, which give rise to the total amount the subject of the statutory demand. The statutory demand was accompanied by an affidavit dated 15 January 2019 sworn by Mr Peter Mangles, a director of the defendant. He deposes that the plaintiff owes the defendant a debt in the amount claimed “relating to outstanding licence fees under an agreement on the premises known as Concord Private Hospital located at 57 Burwood Road Concord in the State of New South Wales”. The plaintiff contends that it has an offsetting claim equivalent to the amount of the total debt under s 459H(3) of the Corporations Act. The plaintiff did not press its alternative claim that there was a genuine dispute for the purposes of s 459H(1)(a). As will shortly emerge, the plaintiff claims it has three offsetting claims, which will be summarised after the background facts are outlined. Background facts It is appropriate to emphasise at the outset that the evidence in this proceeding was somewhat obscure and left several questions unanswered or uncertain. The plaintiff relied upon two affidavits affirmed by its chief executive officer, Ms Brookes McTavish. The affidavits are dated 8 February and 15 April 2019 respectively. The affidavits establish the following relevant matters. The plaintiff operated a sleep laboratory business from the ground floor and lower ground floor of the premises at 57 Burwood Road Concord (Property) between February 2018 and December 2018. The Property was owned by a company called Canada Bay Properties Pty Limited (Canada Bay Properties) but the plaintiff paid what it described as “fees” to the defendant. To understand this somewhat peculiar arrangement, it is necessary to explain some of the background history preceding the plaintiff’s purchase of the sleep laboratory business in February 2018. The plaintiff purchased the sleep laboratory business from a company called K Chan Medical Services Pty Ltd (K Chan). K Chan had a written licence agreement with another company called Concord Private Hospital Pty Ltd (Concord Private Hospital). At this time, Concord Private Hospital was both the owner of the Property as well as the holder of the relevant medical licence required to provide medical services at the Property (in particular to keep patients overnight). The licence agreement allowed K Chan to operate a sleep study clinic on the ground floor of the Property, including utilisation of the medical licence held by Concord Private Hospital. Under the licence agreement, K Chan was obliged to pay Concord Private Hospital $25,000 per calendar month, less any rebates paid by private health funds stemming from the accommodation of their patients (bed fee rebates). As Concord Private Hospital was the owners of the medical licence, it was to them that the rebates were due. The licence agreement was for an initial 18 month period, after which it reverted to a monthly period subject to termination for convenience by any party by 6 months’ notice given after the end of the initial 18 month period. The initial 18 month period expired in January 2018.