IPN Medical Centres (NSW) Pty Ltd v Idoshore Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

IPN Medical Centres (NSW) Pty Limited v Idoshore Pty Limited [2008] FCAFC 163

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 24(1A)
Federal Court Rules O 52 r 10(2), O 52 r 10(2A)(b)

Cubillo v Commonwealth [2001] FCA 1213 (2001) 112 FCR 455 cited
Idoshore Pty Limited v IPN Medical Centres (NSW) Pty Limited [2007] FCA 1175 affirmed
Idoshore Pty Limited ACN 068 703 293 v IPN Medical Centres (NSW) Pty Limited ACN 093 560 448 [2007] FCA 2025 cited
Katsilis v Broken Hill Pty Co Ltd (1977) 18 ALR 181 followed

IPN MEDICAL CENTRES (NSW) PTY LIMITED ACN 093 560 448 and IPN HEALTHCARE PTY LIMITED ACN 002 611 501 v IDOSHORE PTY LIMITED ACN 068 703 293; IDOSHORE PTY LIMITED ACN 068 703 293; IPN MEDICAL CENTRES (NSW) PTY LIMITED ACN 093 560 448 and IPN HEALTHCARE PTY LIMITED ACN 002 611 501

NSD 1715 OF 2007

GRAY, LINDGREN AND TRACEY JJ
9 SEPTEMBER 2008
SYDNEY


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD 1715 OF 2007

ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

IPN MEDICAL CENTRES (NSW) PTY LIMITED
ACN 093 560 448
First Appellant

IPN HEALTHCARE PTY LIMITED
ACN 002 611 501
Second Appellant

AND:

IDOSHORE PTY LIMITED
ACN 068 703 293
Respondent

IDOSHORE PTY LIMITED
ACN 068 703 293
Cross Appellant

IPN MEDICAL CENTRES (NSW) PTY LIMITED
ACN 093 560 448
First Cross Respondent

IPN HEALTHCARE PTY LIMITED
ACN 002 611 501
Second Cross Respondent

JUDGES:

GRAY, LINDGREN AND TRACEY JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

9 SEPTEMBER 2008

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The cross-appeal be dismissed.

3.The appellants pay the respondent’s costs of the mention before Lindgren J on 22 May 2008, such costs to be assessed on the basis that the attendance of senior counsel was not required.

4.Otherwise, there be no order as to the costs of the appeal or the cross-appeal.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD 1715 OF 2007

ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

IPN MEDICAL CENTRES (NSW) PTY LIMITED
ACN 093 560 448
First Appellant

IPN HEALTHCARE PTY LIMITED
ACN 002 611 501
Second Appellant

AND:

IDOSHORE PTY LIMITED
ACN 068 703 293
Respondent

IDOSHORE PTY LIMITED
ACN 068 703 293
Cross Appellant

IPN MEDICAL CENTRES (NSW) PTY LIMITED
ACN 093 560 448
First Cross Respondent

IPN HEALTHCARE PTY LIMITED
ACN 002 611 501
Second Cross Respondent

JUDGES:

GRAY, LINDGREN AND TRACEY JJ

DATE:

9 SEPTEMBER 2008

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THE COURT:

The nature and history of the proceeding

  1. This appeal and cross-appeal concern issues arising from the operation of a contract for the sale of a business.  In particular, provisions of the contract relating to adjustments of the purchase price after the purchaser of the business…

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Details
Case
[2008] FCAFC 163
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

IPN Medical Centres (NSW) Pty Ltd v Idoshore Pty Ltd involved a dispute between Idoshore Pty Ltd and Foundation, concerning the purchase of Oxford Square Medical Centre. The case was initially heard by Conti J, who found against Idoshore on their claims of misleading and deceptive conduct and breach of collateral warranties. Idoshore's cross-appeal focused on the terms of the contract of 14 December 2000 and subsequent events. The key issue was the definition and calculation of "EBITDA" and its impact on the purchase price. The Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia was tasked with determining whether the contract terms were properly interpreted and applied, and whether there was any basis for the claims made by Idoshore.

The court examined the detailed contract and found that the definition of "EBITDA" was clear and unambiguous. The contract provided for adjustments to the purchase price based on the EBITDA, but these adjustments never occurred as the relocation of the medical centre did not happen. The court held that Idoshore had failed to demonstrate any error in the application of the contract terms by Conti J. The court also found that Idoshore's claims regarding misleading and deceptive conduct and collateral warranties were not substantiated by the evidence. The Full Court dismissed both the appeal and the cross-appeal, affirming the decision of Conti J.

The Full Court concluded that Foundation had failed to make out any of the grounds of its appeal, and Idoshore had failed to make out any of the grounds of its cross-appeal. As a result, the appeal and cross-appeal were dismissed. The court ordered that Foundation pay Idoshore's costs of the mention before Lindgren J on 22 May 2008, but only on the basis that no allowance should be made for the attendance of senior counsel. Otherwise, no order was made regarding the costs of the appeal or the cross-appeal, to avoid increasing costs through the calculation and taxation of bills of costs.

In summary, the Full Court upheld the decision of Conti J, finding that Idoshore's claims were not supported by the contract terms or the evidence. The appeal and cross-appeal were dismissed, and costs were ordered to be paid for the mention before Lindgren J, with no further costs awarded for the appeal or cross-appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The cross-appeal be dismissed.

3. The appellants pay the respondent’s costs of the mention before Lindgren J on 22 May 2008, such costs to be assessed on the basis that the attendance of senior counsel was not required.

4. Otherwise, there be no order as to the costs of the appeal or the cross-appeal.

Background

Background to the litigation

Before dealing with the grounds of appeal and cross-appeal, it is necessary to set out in some greater detail the facts, to provide some account of how the parties’ claims bore on those facts, and to summarise the findings of Conti J. The facts, the claims and the findings In the course of approximately five years up to the year 2000, Idoshore established and expanded a business known as Oxford Square Medical Centre (“OSMC”). The managing director of Idoshore was Mr P G O’Shanassy, a legal practitioner who also held a Master of Business Administration degree, and who conducted a legal practice as well as being heavily involved in the administration of Idoshore. OSMC was conducted in leased premises in Oxford Square in inner Sydney. Its business was essentially that of facilitating the provision by qualified medical practitioners of medical services to those who sought them. Idoshore made available consulting rooms and employed necessary ancillary staff. It was remunerated in part by an agreed percentage of fees charged by doctors to patients whom they saw at the OSMC premises, and partly by rent paid by doctors to whom Idoshore sublet portions of its premises. In the course of its development of OSMC, Idoshore had expanded its premises and in 1999 had absorbed a practice conducted in Kings Cross by Dr Joseph Grech, who was appointed medical director of OSMC. In September 2000, after an expression of interest in purchasing OSMC by Foundation, negotiations for that purchase began. Among the people involved in the negotiations on behalf of Idoshore were Mr O’Shanassy and Dr Grech, and among those involved on behalf of Foundation were a Mr Meehan and a Dr Jones. There were written heads of agreement on 31 October 2000 and a detailed contract in writing dated 14 December 2000. In the proceeding at first instance, Idoshore alleged that Mr Meehan had made a number of representations to Mr O’Shanassy in the course of negotiations, particularly as to the intentions of Foundation with respect to the future expansion of the business, on which Idoshore claimed to have relied in entering into the contract. These representations were the basis for the claims in respect of misleading and deceptive conduct or breach of collateral warranties. In his reasons for judgment, Conti J rejected those claims, on the basis that the contract of 14 December 2000 was so detailed and comprehensive that there was no room for the view that Idoshore was induced to enter into it by any prior representation, or that any such representation survived as a collateral warranty. There is no appeal from this aspect of his Honour’s judgment. The only issues in dispute at the appeal stage are those relating to the terms of the contract of 14 December 2000 and to events subsequent to the making of that contract. In the course of negotiations about the purchase price for OSMC, agreement emerged about the manner in which the price should be calculated. The contract contained a crucial definition in cl 1.1 of the term “EBITDA”. This term was defined to mean “earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation, determined in accordance with the Accounting Standards”. “Accounting Standards” was defined to mean “the Australian Accounting Standards from time to time, and where no accounting standard exists means generally accepted accounting principles for a business similar to” OSMC. After making separate calculations, the parties agreed on the “EBITDA Benchmark”, as being the maintainable EBITDA of OSMC, the figure being $250,000. The purchase price was agreed at a multiple of 4.5 times the EBITDA Benchmark, ie $1,125,000. In addition, cl 3.3 of the contract made detailed provision for the adjustment of the purchase price. It is unnecessary for present purposes to set out the whole of these provisions. The effect of cl 3.3(a) was that an adjustment to the purchase price would be made 12 months after the completion date, calculated by applying the 4.5 multiple to the amount by which the EBITDA for the first year exceeded the EBITDA Benchmark. In other words, if in the first year of operation of the business by Foundation, the EBITDA was $270,000, then the first adjustment would be 4.5 times $20,000, or $90,000. By cl 3.3(d), Idoshore acknowledged that Foundation intended to undertake a relocation of OSMC. If the parties agreed to such a relocation within 18 months from the completion date, there was to be a second adjustment to the purchase price at 24 months from the date of the relocation, calculated by a different formula. The relocation never in fact occurred.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

GRAY, LINDGREN AND TRACEY JJ
For these reasons, Idoshore has failed to make out the grounds of its cross-appeal. Conclusion Foundation having failed to make out any of the grounds of its appeal, the appeal must be dismissed. Similarly, Idoshore having failed to make out any of the grounds of its cross-appeal, the cross-appeal must be dismissed. Costs Ordinarily, costs would be expected to follow the event. Orders that Foundation pay Idoshore’s costs of the appeal and that Idoshore pay Foundation’s costs of the cross-appeal would give rise to an increase in costs, because of the necessity to calculate bills of costs on a party-party basis, negotiate and, perhaps, engage in the process of taxation of costs. In the circumstances, the costs of each side are likely to be broadly similar. Foundation probably bore the costs of producing the appeal book, but Idoshore was represented by two counsel. The likelihood is that, at least substantially, the costs of the respective parties would cancel each other out. In the circumstances, and to save further expense, a fair result would be to make no order as to costs either of the appeal or of the cross-appeal, but to allow them to lie where they fall. There is one exception to this. Foundation was in default in filing and serving its written outline of submissions by the due date, prior to the hearing of the appeal. As a result, Idoshore requested that the matter be listed for mention. It was so listed, before Lindgren J on Thursday, 22 May 2008. On that occasion, the parties were represented by the counsel who appeared on the hearing of the appeal and the cross-appeal. Idoshore was therefore represented by senior and junior counsel. Foundation’s default was remedied, but there was no doubt that Foundation should bear the costs of the mention, because of that default. So much was conceded by counsel for Foundation, but he did argue that the costs to be paid by Foundation in respect of the mention should not include the costs of senior counsel. Lindgren J reserved the question of costs for the Full Court. Counsel for Idoshore argued that their client was entitled to be represented as they chose at the mention. There is no doubt that this is true, but it is not necessarily true that the defaulting party should pay the costs of senior counsel if the attendance of senior counsel was not warranted by the issues likely to arise at the mention. Counsel for Idoshore conceded that any issues that were likely to arise could have been handled perfectly adequately by junior counsel. This concession concludes the issue of the amount of costs. Foundation will be ordered to pay Idoshore’s costs of the mention, but on the basis that no allowance should be made for the attendance of senior counsel.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: GRAY, LINDGREN AND TRACEY JJ