Plaintiff M68/2015 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

Case [2016] HCA 1


HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

FRENCH CJ,
KIEFEL, BELL, GAGELER, KEANE, NETTLE AND GORDON JJ

PLAINTIFF M68/2015  PLAINTIFF

AND

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER
PROTECTION & ORS  DEFENDANTS

Plaintiff M68/2015 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

[2016] HCA 1

3 February 2016

M68/2015

ORDER

The questions stated by the parties in the amended special case dated 7 October 2015, as paraphrased, be answered as follows:

Question (1)

Does the plaintiff have standing to challenge whether the conduct of the Commonwealth or the Minister in securing, funding and participating in the plaintiff's detention at RPC 3 on Nauru was authorised by a valid law of the Commonwealth or was part of the executive power of the Commonwealth?

Answer

Yes.

Question (2a)

Was the conduct of the Commonwealth in signing the Memorandum of Understanding dated 3 August 2013 authorised by s 61 of the Constitution?

Answer

Yes.

Question (2b)

Was the conduct of the Commonwealth in giving effect to that arrangement authorised by a valid law of the Commonwealth?

Answer

Yes, it was authorised by s 198AHA of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), which is a valid law of the Commonwealth.

Question (3)

Were the laws by which the plaintiff was detained on Nauru contrary to the Constitution of Nauru?

Answer

The question does not arise.

Questions (4) and (5)

Was the conduct of the Commonwealth in securing, funding and participating in the plaintiff's detention at RPC 3 on Nauru authorised by a valid law of the Commonwealth?

Answer

Yes, see the answer to questions (2a) and (2b).

Question (6)

If the plaintiff were returned to Nauru, would the Commonwealth or the Minister be authorised to continue to perform the Memorandum of Understanding dated 3 August 2013 and to secure, fund and participate in the plaintiff's detention on Nauru?

Answer

Unnecessary to answer.

Question (7)

If the plaintiff were returned to Nauru would her detention there be contrary to Art 5(1) of the Constitution of Nauru?

Answer

Unnecessary to answer.

Questions (8) and (9)

If the plaintiff were returned to Nauru, would the Commonwealth or the Minister be authorised to secure, fund and participate in the plaintiff's detention by a valid law of the Commonwealth?

Answer

Unnecessary to answer.

Questions (10) and (12)

If the plaintiff were to be returned to Nauru, does s 198AD(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) require that she be taken there as soon as reasonably practicable?

Answer

Unnecessary to answer.

Question (11)

If yes to question (10), if the plaintiff were returned to Nauru would her detention be contrary to the Constitution of Nauru?

Answer

Unnecessary to answer.

Question (13)

What, if any, relief should be granted to the plaintiff?

Answer

The plaintiff is not entitled to the declaration sought.

Question (14)

Who should pay the costs of the special case and of the proceedings generally?

Answer

The plaintiff should pay the defendants' costs.

Representation

R Merkel QC and C L Lenehan with R Mansted, D P Hume and E Bathurst for the plaintiff (instructed by…

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AGLC
Plaintiff M68/2015 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] HCA 1
Case
[2016] HCA 1
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The plaintiff, an unauthorised maritime arrival, challenged the lawfulness of the Commonwealth's conduct in securing, funding, and participating in their detention at a regional processing centre on Nauru. The dispute concerned the executive and legislative authority of the Commonwealth to engage in such activities, particularly in light of arrangements entered into with Nauru. The case was heard as a special case stated for the opinion of the Full Court of the High Court of Australia.

The central legal issues before the Court were whether the plaintiff had standing to challenge the Commonwealth's past conduct, and whether that conduct, including the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding with Nauru and giving effect to regional processing arrangements, was authorised by section 61 of the Constitution or by section 198AHA of the *Migration Act 1958* (Cth). The Court was also asked to consider the validity of section 198AHA of the *Migration Act* itself, and whether it was a law with respect to aliens. Further questions related to the lawfulness of the plaintiff's detention under Nauruan law and the potential for future conduct to be authorised.

The High Court determined that the plaintiff did have standing to challenge the Commonwealth's past conduct. It held that the conduct of the Commonwealth in signing the Memorandum of Understanding with Nauru was authorised by section 61 of the Constitution. However, the Court found that section 198AHA of the *Migration Act*, which was relied upon to authorise the Commonwealth's actions in giving effect to the regional processing arrangement, was invalid as it was not supported by any head of Commonwealth legislative power. Consequently, the Court concluded that the Commonwealth's past conduct in securing, funding, and participating in the plaintiff's detention was not authorised by a valid law of the Commonwealth.

The Court answered the stated questions accordingly, finding that the plaintiff had standing and that the conduct was authorised by section 61 of the Constitution but not by section 198AHA of the *Migration Act*, which was held to be invalid. The question of what relief, if any, should be granted to the plaintiff was remitted to a single judge of the Federal Court. The High Court ordered that the defendants pay the costs of the special case and the proceedings generally.

Orders

Orders of the court

The questions stated by the parties in the amended special case dated 7 October 2015, as paraphrased, be answered as follows:

Question (1)

Does the plaintiff have standing to challenge whether the conduct of the Commonwealth or the Minister in securing, funding and participating in the plaintiff's detention at RPC 3 on Nauru was authorised by a valid law of the Commonwealth or was part of the executive power of the Commonwealth?

Answer

Yes.

Question (2a)

Was the conduct of the Commonwealth in signing the Memorandum of Understanding dated 3 August 2013 authorised by s 61 of the Constitution?

Answer

Yes.

Question (2b)

Was the conduct of the Commonwealth in giving effect to that arrangement authorised by a valid law of the Commonwealth?

Answer

Yes, it was authorised by s 198AHA of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), which is a valid law of the Commonwealth.

Question (3)

Were the laws by which the plaintiff was detained on Nauru contrary to the Constitution of Nauru?

Answer

The question does not arise.

Questions (4) and (5)

Was the conduct of the Commonwealth in securing, funding and participating in the plaintiff's detention at RPC 3 on Nauru authorised by a valid law of the Commonwealth?

Answer

Yes, see the answer to questions (2a) and (2b).

Question (6)

If the plaintiff were returned to Nauru, would the Commonwealth or the Minister be authorised to continue to perform the Memorandum of Understanding dated 3 August 2013 and to secure, fund and participate in the plaintiff's detention on Nauru?

Answer

Unnecessary to answer.

Question (7)

If the plaintiff were returned to Nauru would her detention there be contrary to Art 5(1) of the Constitution of Nauru?

Answer

Unnecessary to answer.

Questions (8) and (9)

If the plaintiff were returned to Nauru, would the Commonwealth or the Minister be authorised to secure, fund and participate in the plaintiff's detention by a valid law of the Commonwealth?

Answer

Unnecessary to answer.

Questions (10) and (12)

If the plaintiff were to be returned to Nauru, does s 198AD(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) require that she be taken there as soon as reasonably practicable?

Answer

Unnecessary to answer.

Question (11)

If yes to question (10), if the plaintiff were returned to Nauru would her detention be contrary to the Constitution of Nauru?

Answer

Unnecessary to answer.

Question (13)

What, if any, relief should be granted to the plaintiff?

Answer

The plaintiff is not entitled to the declaration sought.

Question (14)

Who should pay the costs of the special case and of the proceedings generally?

Answer

The plaintiff should pay the defendants' costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

FRENCH CJ, KIEFEL AND NETTLE JJ BELL J GAGELER J
The question of the form and content of the relief should be remitted to a single judge of the Federal Court. The Defendants should pay the costs of the Special Case and of the proceedings generally.Conclusion For those reasons, I would answer the questions of law which the parties agreed in stating in the form of a Special Case for the opinion of the Full Court under r 27.08.1 of the High Court Rules 2004 (Cth) as follows:Question 1: Yes.Question 2: (a) No; (b) Yes; (c) Unnecessary to answer.Question 3: Unnecessary to answer.Question 4: (a) No; (b) Yes; (c) Unnecessary to answer.Question 5:Yes. Section 198AHA is beyond power and therefore invalid.Questions 6-12: Not appropriate to answer.Question 13: Remit to a single judge of the Federal Court.Question 14: The Defendants should pay the costs of the Special Case and of the proceedings generally.SPECIAL CASE QUESTIONS[339][339]See [21] and [198] above.The parties agree in stating the following questions of law for the opinion of the Full Court:Standing(1)Does the plaintiff have standing to challenge whether the Commonwealth or the Minister was authorised, in the past, to engage in one or more of the following acts or conduct:(i)make the direction referred to at paragraph 6 [of the special case];(ii) sign the Memorandum of Understanding;(iii) sign the Administrative Arrangements;(iv)give approval for Transfield to enter into the 2013 Wilson Security Subcontract and the 2014 Wilson Security Subcontract;(v)contract for the construction and maintenance of, and fund, security infrastructure at the Nauru RPC, including a perimeter fence, as required by the Memorandum of Understanding;(vi)fund all costs of the Nauru RPC, as required by the Memorandum of Understanding;(vii) enter into the Transfield Contract;(viii)exercise rights and discharge obligations under the Transfield Contract;(ix)establish and participate in the bilateral committees referred to at paragraphs 31‒34 [of the special case];(x)discharge the role of Programme Coordinator under the Administrative Arrangements;(xi)attending meetings with, and receive reports from, Transfield and Wilson Security;(xii)occupy an office on site at the Nauru RPC and carry out the functions referred to at paragraph 37 [of the special case];(xiii)take the plaintiff to Nauru pursuant to s 198AD(2) of the Migration Act on 22 January 2014;(xiv)for the purposes of effecting that taking, exercise powers contained in s 198AD(3) of the Migration Act;(xv)apply to the Secretary of the Department of Justice and Border Control of Nauru, without the consent of the plaintiff, for the grant of an RPC visa to the plaintiff;(xvi)pay to Nauru the fees payable for the grant of RPC visas to the plaintiff;in so far as those acts or that conduct facilitated, organised, caused, imposed, procured, or resulted in the detention of the plaintiff at RPC3?Authority for the Commonwealth's past conduct(2) Assuming that:(A)the restrictions imposed on the plaintiff set out at paragraphs 66‒72 of the special case were lawful under the law of Nauru; and(B)the specification in the RPC visas referred to at paragraphs 53‒55 [of the special case] that the plaintiff must reside at the Nauru RPC, s 18C of the RPC Act and rule 3.1.3 of the Centre Rules were lawful and valid under the law of Nauru,to the extent that the answer to question (1) is "yes" in respect of any acts or conduct, was the Commonwealth or the Minister authorised, in the past, to engage in those acts or that conduct by:(a) s 61 of the Constitution?(b) s 198AHA of the Migration Act (assuming it is valid)?(c)s 32B of the Financial Framework (Supplementary Powers) Act 1997 (Cth), read with reg 16 and items 417.021, 417.027, 417.029 and 417.042 of sched 1AA to the Financial Framework (Supplementary Powers) Regulations 1997 (Cth) (together, the Financial Framework Provisions) (assuming each is valid)?(3) If the answer to question (2)(a), (b) or (c) is "yes":(a)were the restrictions imposed on the plaintiff set out at paragraphs 66‒72 [of the special case] contrary to Art 5(1) of the Constitution of Nauru?(b)was the specification in the RPC visas referred to at paragraphs 53‒55 [of the special case] that the plaintiff must reside at the Nauru RPC, s 18C of the RPC Act and/or rule 3.1.3 of the Centre Rules invalid by reason of s 5(1) of the Constitution of Nauru?(4)To the extent that the answer to question (1) is "yes" in respect of any acts or conduct, was the Commonwealth or the Minister authorised, in the past, to engage in those acts or that conduct by:(a) s 61 of the Constitution?(b) s 198AHA of the Migration Act (assuming it is valid)?(c)the Financial Framework Provisions (assuming each is valid)?(5)If the answer to question (4)(b) or (c) is "yes", is the statutory provision referred to therein invalid because it is not supported by any head of Commonwealth legislative power or is contrary to Ch III of the Constitution?Authority for the Commonwealth's future conduct(6) Assuming that, if the plaintiff were returned to Nauru:(A)the restrictions imposed on the plaintiff set out at paragraphs 66‒72 and 88–89 [of the special case] would be lawful under the law of Nauru; and(B)the specification in any RPC visa referred to at paragraph 87 [of the special case] that the plaintiff must reside at the Nauru RPC, s 18C of the RPC Act and rule 3.1.3 of the Centre Rules would be lawful and valid under the law of Nauru,would the Commonwealth or the Minister be authorised to engage in one or more of the following acts or conduct:(i)give effect to or rely upon the direction referred to at paragraph 6 [of the special case];(ii) continue to perform the Memorandum of Understanding;(iii) continue to perform the Administrative Arrangements;(iv)continue to perform any contract for the construction and maintenance of, and continue to fund, security infrastructure at the Nauru RPC, including a perimeter fence, as required by the Memorandum of Understanding;(v)continue to fund all costs of the Nauru RPC, as required by the Memorandum of Understanding;(vi)continue to exercise rights and discharge obligations under the Transfield Contract;(vii)continue to participate in the bilateral committees referred to at paragraphs 31‒34 [of the special case];(viii)continue to discharge the role of Programme Coordinator under the Administrative Arrangements;(ix) continue to attend meetings with, and receive reports from, Transfield and Wilson Security;(x)continue to occupy an office on site at the Nauru RPC and carry out the functions referred to at paragraph 37 [of the special case];(xi)apply, if required to do so, to the Secretary of the Department of Justice and Border Control of Nauru, without the consent of the plaintiff, for the grant of an RPC visa to the plaintiff; and(xii)pay, if required to do so, to Nauru the fees payable for the grant of RPC visas to the plaintiff,in so far as those acts or that conduct facilitated, organised, caused, imposed, procured, or resulted in the detention of the plaintiff at RPC3, by:(a) s 61 of the Constitution?(b) s 198AHA of the Migration Act (assuming it is valid)?(c)the Financial Framework Provisions (assuming each is valid)?(7)If the answer to question (6)(a), (b) or (c) is "yes", if the plaintiff were returned to Nauru:(a)would the restrictions imposed on the plaintiff set out at paragraphs 66‒72 and 88‒89 [of the special case] be contrary to Art 5(1) of the Constitution of Nauru?(b)would the specification in any RPC visa referred to at paragraph 87 [of the special case] that the plaintiff must reside at the Nauru RPC, s 18C of the RPC Act and/or rule 3.1.3 of the Centre Rules be invalid by reason of Art 5(1) of the Constitution of Nauru?(8)If the plaintiff were returned to Nauru, would the Commonwealth or the Minister be authorised to engage in one or more of the acts or conduct specified in question (6) by:(a) s 61 of the Constitution?(b) s 198AHA of the Migration Act (assuming it is valid)?(c)the Financial Framework Provisions (assuming each is valid)?(9)If the answer to question (8)(b) or (c) is "yes", is the statutory provision referred to therein invalid because it is not supported by any head of Commonwealth legislative power or is contrary to Ch III of the Constitution?Section 198AD(2) of the Migration Act(10) Assuming that, if the plaintiff were returned to Nauru:(A)the restrictions imposed on the plaintiff set out at paragraphs 66‒72 and 88‒89 [of the special case] would be lawful under the law of Nauru; and(B)the specification in any RPC visa referred to at paragraph 87 [of the special case] that the plaintiff must reside at the Nauru RPC, s 18C of the RPC Act and rule 3.1.3 of the Centre Rules would be lawful and valid under the law of Nauru,does s 198AD(2) of the Migration Act authorise and require that the plaintiff be taken as soon as reasonably practicable to Nauru?(11)If the answer to question (10) is "yes", if the plaintiff were returned to Nauru:(a)would the restrictions imposed on the plaintiff set out at paragraphs 66–72 and 88–89 [of the special case] be contrary to Art 5(1) of the Constitution of Nauru?(b)would the specification in any RPC visa referred to at paragraph 87 [of the special case] that the plaintiff must reside at the Nauru RPC, s 18C of the RPC Act and/or rule 3.1.3 of the Centre Rules be invalid by reason of Art 5(1) of the Constitution of Nauru?(12) Does s 198AD(2) of the Migration Act authorise and require that the plaintiff be taken as soon as reasonably practicable to Nauru?Relief(13) What, if any, relief should be granted to the plaintiff?Costs(14)Who should pay the costs of the special case and of the proceedings generally?

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: FRENCH CJ, KIEFEL AND NETTLE JJ, BELL J, GAGELER J

Full text does not contain this section.