Azimitabar v Commonwealth of Australia

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Azimitabar v Commonwealth of Australia [2024] FCAFC 52  

Appeal from: Azimitabar v Commonwealth of Australia [2023] FCA 760
File number(s): VID 604 of 2023
Judgment of: RANGIAH, ANDERSON AND BUTTON JJ
Date of judgment: 26 April 2024
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from a decision of a single judge of the Federal Court of Australia dismissing an application for damages arising from the alleged unlawful detention of the appellant at the Mantra Bell City Hotel and the Park Hotel (the Hotels) – whether subpara (b)(v) of the definition of “immigration detention” in s 5(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act) impliedly confers a power on the Minister to approve “another place” of immigration detention – whether the Hotels were validly approved by the Minister as “another place” of immigration detention – whether the construction of subpara (b)(v) is limited by s 273 of the Act which contains an express power to establish detention centres – where appellant sought leave to rely on an argument not raised before the primary judge – leave refused as new ground lacks sufficient prospects of success to warrant leave being granted – whether lawfulness of immigration detention is conditional upon proper authorisation of the expenditure on the place of detention – where authorisation of the Hotels as “another place” of immigration detention did not depend on lawfulness of associated expenditure – appeal dismissed
Legislation:

Constitution ss 51, 61

Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth)

Financial Framework (Supplementary Powers) Act 1997 (Cth) s 32B

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5, 6A, 189, 196, 198B, 198C, 272, 273, 495, 496

Financial Framework (Supplementary Powers) Regulations 1997 (Cth) Sch 1AAA, items 417.017, 417.018

Cases cited:

Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue(NT) (2009) 239 CLR 27; HCA 41

AZC20 v Minister for Home Affairs [2021] FCA 1234

Azimitabar v Commonwealth of Australia [2023] FCA 760 Anthony Hordern & Sons Ltd v Amalgamated Clothing & Allied Trades Union of Australia (1932) 47 CLR 1; HCA 9

B v Secretary, Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 699

Behrooz v Secretary, Department of Immigration (2004) 219 CLR 486; HCA 36

Burns Philp & Co Ltd v Murphy (1993) 29 NSWLR 723

Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1992) 176 CLR 1; HCA 64

Commonwealth of Australia v AJL20 (2021) 273 CLR 43; HCA 21

Davis v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services andMulticultural Affairs (2023) 97 ALJR 214; HCA 10

Entick v Carrington (1765) 19 St Tr 1029

Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Consolidated Media Holdings Ltd (2012) 250 CLR 503; HCA 55

Gibb v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1996) 118 CLR 628; HCA 74

Helme v Fox (1948) 49 SR (NSW) 60

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Mayer (1985) 157 CLR 290; HCA 70

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Nystrom (2006) 228…

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Details
Case
[2024] FCAFC 52
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellant in this case, Azimitabar, sought damages for his alleged unlawful detention at two hotels, the Mantra Bell City Hotel and the Park Hotel, in Australia between November 2019 and January 2021. The Commonwealth of Australia, represented by the Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs, opposed the claim. The central legal issues revolved around the interpretation of the definition of "immigration detention" under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and whether the Hotels were validly approved by the Minister as places of immigration detention. Specifically, the court had to determine whether subparagraph (b)(v) of the definition of "immigration detention" impliedly conferred a power on the Minister to approve "another place" of immigration detention and whether this power was limited by the express power in section 273 of the Act to establish detention centres. Additionally, the court considered whether the lawfulness of the detention was contingent on the proper authorisation of expenditure on the place of detention.

The primary judge dismissed the appellant's claim, concluding that subparagraph (b)(v) of the definition of "immigration detention" impliedly conferred a power on the Minister to approve "another place" in writing as a place of immigration detention, and that the Hotels were approved as such. The judge held that the Hotels, despite operating as de facto detention centres, did not limit the power in subparagraph (b)(v) under the principle of statutory construction. Furthermore, the judge ruled that the lawfulness of the appellant's detention did not depend on the lawful authorisation of the expenditure on the Hotels. The judge found that the executive power under section 61 of the Constitution authorised the Commonwealth's contracting and expenditure on the Hotels.

The appeal was dismissed by the court, which found that the primary judge's interpretation of the statutory provisions and the reasoning were sound. The court refused the appellant leave to rely on an argument not raised before the primary judge, as the new ground lacked sufficient prospects of success to warrant leave being granted.

The final orders of the court were that the appeal be dismissed and that the appellant pay the respondent's costs, to be taxed if not agreed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is dismissed.

2. The Appellant pay the Respondent’s costs, to be taxed if not agreed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

From 11 November 2019 to 21 January 2021, the appellant was detained in Australia by, or on behalf of, the Commonwealth. From 11 November 2019 to 16 December 2020, he was detained at the Mantra Bell City Hotel, and from 17 December 2020 until 21 January 2021, at the Park Hotel. The appellant was granted a bridging visa and released from immigration detention on 21 January 2021. Primary Judgment Before the primary judge, the appellant contended that his detention in the Hotels was unlawful and claimed damages. The appellant advanced three arguments before the primary judge:(a)First, the appellant contended that neither subpara (b)(v) of the definition of “immigration detention” in s 5(1) of the Act, nor any other provision in the Act, conferred a power on the Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (Minister) to approve “another place” in writing as a place of immigration detention. The appellant submitted that any purported approval of the Hotels as places of immigration detention, therefore, had no effect; the Commonwealth detained him other than in “immigration detention”, as defined in the Act, which it had no authority to do, and his detention was therefore unlawful.(b)Second, in the alternative, the appellant contended that the conditions of his detention in both Hotels meant that they were de-facto “detention centres” and the power to establish a “detention centre” was only found in s 273 of the Act. The appellant argued that on the principle of statutory construction usually associated with Anthony Hordern & Sons Ltd v Amalgamated Clothing & Allied Trades Union of Australia (1932) 47 CLR 1; HCA 9 (Anthony Hordern), any power sourced in subpara (b)(v) of the definition of “immigration detention” could not be used to establish a de-facto detention centre. The appellant submitted that the Commonwealth had detained him other than in “immigration detention” which it had no authority to do, and his detention was therefore unlawful. (c)Third, the appellant contended that the Act did not authorise the Commonwealth to contract and spend public monies on creating and operating the Hotels as places of immigration detention; neither did the executive power under s 61 of the Constitution, and nor did s 32B of the Financial Framework (Supplementary Powers) Act 1997 (Cth) and the regulations made thereunder. The appellant argued that the Commonwealth detained him in the Hotels despite it not having authority to contract and spend public monies to create and operate the Hotels as places of immigration detention, and his detention in the Hotels was therefore unlawful. The primary judge (J at [4]) summarised the reasons why he concluded that the appellant’s detention in the Hotels was lawful, and his application must be dismissed, as follows: First, I consider subpara (b)(v) of the definition of “immigration detention” impliedly confers power on the Minister to approve ‘another place’ in writing as a place of immigration detention, and I am satisfied the Hotels were so approved. Second, although the Hotels did in my view operate as de facto detention centres, I consider the power in subpara (b)(v) is not impliedly limited by the Anthony Hordern principle or otherwise such that it does not include a power to approve ‘another place’ of immigration detention that is, in effect, a detention centre. Third, I consider the lawfulness of the applicant’s detention in the Hotels does not depend on whether or not the Commonwealth’s contracting and expenditure on the Hotels as places of immigration detention was lawfully authorised. In any event, I consider the executive power under s 61 of the Constitution authorised the Commonwealth’s contracting and expenditure on the Hotels.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

At all material times, subpara (b) of the definition of “immigration detention” in s 5(1) of the Act provided:immigration detention means:…(b) being held by, or on behalf of, an officer:(i) in a detention centre established under this Act; or(ii) in a prison or remand centre of the Commonwealth, a State or a Territory; or(iii) in a police station or watch house; or(iv) in relation to a non-citizen who is prevented, under section 249, from leaving a vessel—on that vessel; or(v) in another place approved by the Minister in writing Pursuant to subpara (b) of the definition, being in “immigration detention” meant being held by, or on behalf of, an officer in one of five types of places described. At all material times “officer” was broadly defined in s 5(1), and included, amongst others, officers of the Department, a protective services officer for the purposes of the Australian Federal Police Act 1979 (Cth), persons authorised in writing by the Minister to be an officer for the purposes of the Act, and members of the Australian Federal Police or of the police force of a State or Territory. It was not in contest that the appellant was held by or on behalf of an “officer”. Subparagraph (b)(i) of the definition of “immigration detention” provided that immigration detention includes being held by or on behalf of an officer “in a detention centre established under this Act”. It is not in dispute that subpara (b)(i) referred to “detention centres” established and maintained pursuant to the Minister’s express power under s 273(1) of the Act to “cause detention centres to be established and maintained”. At all material times s 273(4) provided that “detention centre” means “a centre for the detention of persons whose detention is authorised under this Act”. The only authority the Commonwealth had to detain the appellant while he was in Australia was the power under the Act to detain an “unlawful non-citizen” in “immigration detention”. Because the appellant was an “unlawful non-citizen”, under ss 189 and 196 of the Act, an “officer” (as defined) had a duty to detain him in immigration detention, and had he not been detained in the Hotels, an officer had a duty to detain him at some other place constituting “immigration detention”. The Commonwealth did not contend before the primary judge that it would have been lawful for it to detain the appellant in a place that did not fall within the definition of “immigration detention”. The Minister had the authority under s 273 of the Act to establish and maintain a “detention centre”. The Minister accepted before the primary judge that neither of the Hotels was, in fact, established or maintained under that provision or under subpara (b)(i) of the definition of “immigration detention”. There was no substantive provision in the Act which expressly empowered the Minister to approve “another place” in writing as a place of immigration detention. The Hotels were not:(a)a prison or remand centre of the Commonwealth, a State or a Territory (and therefore did not fall within subpara (b)(ii) of the definition of “immigration detention”);(b)a police station or watch house (and therefore did not fall within subpara (b)(iii)); or(c)a vessel (and therefore did not fall within subpara (b)(iv)).