FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Azimitabar v Commonwealth of Australia (No 2) [2024] FCA 1383
File number(s): VID 177 of 2021 Judgment of: MURPHY J Date of judgment: 2 December 2024 Catchwords: COSTS —where applicant unsuccessful in proceeding and seeks no order as to costs in the proceeding — whether appropriate to depart from usual order as to costs — proceeding brought in the public interest — appropriate to make no order as to costs. Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 43
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5, 273
Cases cited: Animals Angels’ eV v Secretary, Department of Agriculture [2014] FCAFC 173; 228 FCR 35
Azimitabar v Commonwealth of Australia [2024] FCAFC 52; 303 FCR 282
Caroona Coal Action Group Inc v Coal Mines Australia Pty Ltd (No 3) [2010] NSWLEC 59; 173 LGERA 280
Commonwealth v AJL20 [2021] HCA 21; 273 CLR 43
CPCF v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] HCA 1; 255 CLR 514
DBE17 v Commonwealth of Australia (No 2) [2018] FCA 1793
Jacob v Save Beeliar Wetlands (Inc) [2016] WASCA 126; 216 LGERA 201
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v CQZ15 (No 2) [2018] FCAFC 19; 259 FCR 569
Norbis v Norbis [1986] HCA 17; 161 CLR 513
Northern Territory v Sangare [2019] HCA 25; 265 CLR 164
Oshlack v Richmond River Council [1998] HCA 11; 193 CLR 72
Plaintiff M96A/2016 v Commonwealth [2017] HCA 16; 261 CLR 582
Division: General Division Registry: Victoria National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Number of paragraphs: 27 Date of last submission/s: 27 July 2023 Date of hearing: Determined on the papers Counsel for the Applicant: Ms L De Ferrari SC and Mr J Hartley Solicitor for the Applicant: Marque Lawyers Counsel for the Respondent: Mr G Hill SC, Mr A Yuile and Ms K McInnes Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor ORDERS
VID 177 of 2021 BETWEEN: MOSTAFA AZIMITABAR
Applicant
AND: COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
MURPHY J
DATE OF ORDER:
2 DECEMBER 2024
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.There be no order as to costs in the proceeding.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
MURPHY J
In Azimitabar v Commonwealth of Australia [2023] FCA 760 (J) I found against the applicant on each of the causes of action alleged in the proceeding. I did not decide the question of costs. Judgment in the appeal was handed down earlier this year, which dismissed the appeal with costs: Azimitabar v Commonwealth of Australia [2024] FCAFC 52; 303 FCR 282 (Rangiah, Anderson and Button JJ). I am reminded by the parties that it is necessary to deal with the question of…
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- Case
- [2024] FCA 1383
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Court deliberated on whether to impose costs on Azimitabar, who was unsuccessful in his claims. Typically, the unsuccessful party pays the costs of litigation. However, the Court found that making no order for costs was appropriate because the proceeding was in the public interest. This decision was supported by the broad public interest in the legality of executive detention and the potential impact on other detainees in similar conditions. The Court held that the proceeding was significant for a disadvantaged section of the public and served as a test case for future claims regarding alternative places of detention.
In reaching its conclusion, the Court considered the public interest nature of the proceeding, the lack of novelty in the legal questions raised, and the potential broader impacts of the case. Despite the respondent's arguments that the proceeding did not sufficiently concern the public interest, the Court found the case to be of considerable public importance due to its implications for executive detention and individual liberty. The Court's decision to make no order as to costs was seen as a justified departure from the usual rule, given the public interest considerations.
The final order of the Court was that there be no order as to costs in the proceeding. This decision underscores the Court's recognition of the public interest in the case and its willingness to depart from the usual cost orders in such circumstances.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. There be no order as to costs in the proceeding.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
It contends that even if the matter can be characterised as “in the public interest”, there is nothing additional that would justify a departure from the usual order as to costs, because:(a)the question of the power to determine places as APODs was not novel, noting the remarks at J [108] that “numerous judicial statements either refer to a ‘power’ in subpara (b)(v) of the definition of ‘immigration detention’ or treat subpara (b)(v) as if it confers power”; (b)the resolution of this point did not materially contribute to an understanding of, or clarify the operation of, the Act because the power to determine APODs had been assumed without concern. The primary judgment confirmed the plain meaning of the Act; and(c)the applicant’s challenge would not have had broader impacts or have affected the broader public because, even if the Court accepted that the Minister’s power was limited to the approval of places which are not de facto detention centres, it would not have followed that all other APODs and types of detention were unlawful. The legality of each APOD would be determined in potential future litigation, turning upon the characteristics of the relevant place.CONSIDERATION I am persuaded that the proceeding can properly be described as “being in the public interest” and that it is appropriate to depart from the usual order that the successful respondent be entitled to its cost, and instead order that there be no order as to costs. A departure from the usual order as to costs may be justified in proceedings that have been brought in the public interest. In my view this is such a proceeding. As Marshall J observed in The Wilderness Society Inc v The Hon Malcolm Turnbull, Minister for the Environment and Water Resources [2007] FCA 1863 at [30]:Each case must turn on its facts and the relevant considerations through which it may be found appropriate to depart from the usual order are not closed. The real issue is not what is considered to be in the public interest or whether public interest considerations are a recognised exception to the usual rule, but rather, whether it can be said that there are sufficient public interest related reasons connected with or leading up to the litigation that warrant a departure from or outweigh the important consideration that a wholly successful respondent would ordinarily be awarded its costs. First, the respondent’s argument that the proceeding was not “brought in the public interest” because, for example, it did not concern a legislative scheme for the benefit of the public generally, such as environmental legislation has no force. Nor is there any force in its contention that the case merely “touched” on a matter of public interest insofar as it concerned the applicant’s liberty. The proceeding concerned the applicant’s executive detention by the Commonwealth. It challenged the legality of that detention by arguing that the Commonwealth had no power to detain the applicant in a hotel that had been declared by the Minister to be “another place of detention”, in circumstances where the Act does not contain an express power to detain a person in such a place. I consider the proceeding plainly concerned the public interest as it not only concerned “one of the foundational rights recognised by the common law - of liberty”, but also “the lawful scope of executive detention, as authorised by statute, in Australia [which is] plainly also a matter of considerable public importance”: see DBE17 at [23(a)]).