Azimitabar v Commonwealth of Australia (No 2)

Link copied
Case Copied 20 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Azimitabar v Commonwealth of Australia (No 2) [2024] FCA 1383  

File number(s): VID 177 of 2021
Judgment of: MURPHY J
Date of judgment: 2 December 2024
Catchwords: COSTS —where applicant unsuccessful in proceeding and seeks no order as to costs in the proceeding — whether appropriate to depart from usual order as to costs — proceeding brought in the public interest — appropriate to make no order as to costs.
Legislation:

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 43

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5, 273

Cases cited:

Animals Angels’ eV v Secretary, Department of Agriculture [2014] FCAFC 173; 228 FCR 35

Azimitabar v Commonwealth of Australia [2024] FCAFC 52; 303 FCR 282

Caroona Coal Action Group Inc v Coal Mines Australia Pty Ltd (No 3) [2010] NSWLEC 59; 173 LGERA 280

Commonwealth v AJL20 [2021] HCA 21; 273 CLR 43

CPCF v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] HCA 1; 255 CLR 514

DBE17 v Commonwealth of Australia (No 2) [2018] FCA 1793

Jacob v Save Beeliar Wetlands (Inc) [2016] WASCA 126; 216 LGERA 201

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v CQZ15 (No 2) [2018] FCAFC 19; 259 FCR 569

Norbis v Norbis [1986] HCA 17; 161 CLR 513

Northern Territory v Sangare [2019] HCA 25; 265 CLR 164

Oshlack v Richmond River Council [1998] HCA 11; 193 CLR 72

Plaintiff M96A/2016 v Commonwealth [2017] HCA 16; 261 CLR 582

Ruddock v Vadarlis (No 2) [2001] FCA 1865; 115 FCR 229

The Wilderness Society Inc v The Hon Malcolm Turnbull, Minister for the Environment and Water Resources [2007] FCA 1863

Division: General Division
Registry: Victoria
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Number of paragraphs: 27
Date of last submission/s: 27 July 2023
Date of hearing: Determined on the papers
Counsel for the Applicant:  Ms L De Ferrari SC and Mr J Hartley
Solicitor for the Applicant:  Marque Lawyers
Counsel for the Respondent:  Mr G Hill SC, Mr A Yuile and Ms K McInnes
Solicitor for the Respondent:  Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

VID 177 of 2021
BETWEEN:

MOSTAFA AZIMITABAR

Applicant

AND:

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

MURPHY J

DATE OF ORDER:

2 DECEMBER 2024

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.There be no order as to costs in the proceeding.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

MURPHY J 

  1. In Azimitabar v Commonwealth of Australia [2023] FCA 760 (J) I found against the applicant on each of the causes of action alleged in the proceeding. I did not decide the question of costs. Judgment in the appeal was handed down earlier this year, which dismissed the appeal with costs: Azimitabar v Commonwealth of Australia [2024] FCAFC 52; 303 FCR 282 (Rangiah, Anderson and Button JJ). I am reminded by the parties that it is necessary to deal with the question of…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Azimitabar v Commonwealth of Australia (No 2) and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2024] FCA 1383
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Azimitabar v Commonwealth of Australia (No 2) involved Mostafa Azimitabar, an Iranian citizen who arrived in Australia by boat without a visa, and the Commonwealth of Australia. Azimitabar contended that his detention in two hotels was unlawful and sought damages. The central issues revolved around whether the Minister had the power to approve places like the hotels as detention centres, if the hotels' conditions made them de facto detention centres, and whether the Commonwealth was legally authorised to spend public money on these hotels. The Court concluded that Azimitabar's detention was not unlawful but deemed the conditions inhumane. The case had significant public interest implications, as it involved the legality of detaining individuals in hotels designated as alternative places of detention.

The Court deliberated on whether to impose costs on Azimitabar, who was unsuccessful in his claims. Typically, the unsuccessful party pays the costs of litigation. However, the Court found that making no order for costs was appropriate because the proceeding was in the public interest. This decision was supported by the broad public interest in the legality of executive detention and the potential impact on other detainees in similar conditions. The Court held that the proceeding was significant for a disadvantaged section of the public and served as a test case for future claims regarding alternative places of detention.

In reaching its conclusion, the Court considered the public interest nature of the proceeding, the lack of novelty in the legal questions raised, and the potential broader impacts of the case. Despite the respondent's arguments that the proceeding did not sufficiently concern the public interest, the Court found the case to be of considerable public importance due to its implications for executive detention and individual liberty. The Court's decision to make no order as to costs was seen as a justified departure from the usual rule, given the public interest considerations.

The final order of the Court was that there be no order as to costs in the proceeding. This decision underscores the Court's recognition of the public interest in the case and its willingness to depart from the usual cost orders in such circumstances.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. There be no order as to costs in the proceeding.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For reasons I explain, I have concluded that it is appropriate to make no order as to the costs.THE BACKGROUND I summarised the factual background, the applicant’s arguments and the result in the case as follows (at J [1]-[4]):[1]The applicant, Mostafa Azimitabar, is a 37-year-old citizen of Iran of Kurdish ethnicity who came to Australia, by boat, without a visa, arriving at Christmas Island in July 2013. He was detained initially on Christmas Island and in mid-August 2013 taken to Manus Island Regional Processing Centre in Papua New Guinea (PNG). In 2017, the PNG Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Immigration determined that he was owed protection obligations under the international Refugees Convention as a Kurdish-Iranian asylum seeker. In August 2019, having been detained in Manus Island for six years at that point, he was assessed by a psychiatrist as suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and a major depressive episode. He applied to be transferred to Australia under the medical transfer provisions of the Act which were then in force, and on 11 November 2019 he was transferred to Australia for the purpose of receiving psychiatric assessment and treatment. [2]Following his arrival in Australia for such treatment, the applicant was detained for more than 14-months, from 11 November 2019 to 21 January 2021, first in the Mantra Bell City Hotel in Preston (Mantra Hotel), and then in the Park Hotel in Carlton (Park Hotel) (the Hotels). On 21 January 2021 the applicant was granted a bridging visa and was released from immigration detention into the community. Since then the applicant’s bridging visa has been extended and he has continued to live in the community. [3]The applicant contends that his detention in the Hotels was unlawful and claims damages in that regard. Broadly, he advances three arguments, which may be summarised as follows.(a)First, the applicant contends that neither subpara (b)(v) of the definition of “immigration detention” in s 5(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act), nor anything else in the Act, confers a power on the Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (Minister) to approve ‘another place’ in writing as a place of immigration detention. On his argument, any purported approval of the Hotels as places of immigration detention therefore had no effect; the Commonwealth detained him other than in “immigration detention”, as defined in the Act, which it had no authority to do, and his detention was therefore unlawful (the No Power to Approve ‘Another Place’ of Immigration Detention Contention).(b)Second, in the alternative, the applicant contends that the conditions of his detention in both Hotels meant they were de facto “detention centres”, and the power to establish a “detention centre” is only found in s 273 of the Act. He argues that on the principle of statutory construction usually associated with Anthony Hordern & Sons Ltd v Amalgamated Clothing & Allied Trades Union of Australia [1932] HCA 9; 47 CLR 1 any power sourced in subpara (b)(v) of the definition of “immigration detention” cannot be used to establish a de facto detention centre. Again, on his argument the Commonwealth detained him other than in “immigration detention” which it had no authority to do, and his detention was therefore unlawful (the No Power to Approve a De Facto Detention Centre Contention).(c)Third, the applicant contends that the Act does not authorise the Commonwealth to contract and spend public monies on creating and operating the Hotels as places of immigration detention; neither does the executive power under 61 of the Constitution, and nor does s 32B of the Financial Framework (Supplementary Powers) Act 1997 (Cth) and the regulations made thereunder. On his argument, the Commonwealth detained him in the Hotels despite it not having authority to contract and spend public monies to create and operate the Hotels as places of immigration detention, and his detention in the Hotels was therefore unlawful (the Unlawful Expenditure Contention).4For the reasons I now turn to explain I do not consider the applicant’s detention in the Hotels to have been unlawful, and his application must therefore be dismissed. First, I consider subpara (b)(v) of the definition of “immigration detention” impliedly confers power on the Minister to approve ‘another place’ in writing as a place of immigration detention, and I am satisfied the Hotels were so approved. Second, although the Hotels did in my view operate as de facto detention centres, I consider the power in subpara (b)(v) is not impliedly limited by the Anthony Hordern principle or otherwise such that it does not include a power to approve ‘another place’ of immigration detention that is, in effect, a detention centre. Third, I consider the lawfulness of the applicant’s detention in the Hotels does not depend on whether or not the Commonwealth’s contracting and expenditure on the Hotels as places of immigration detention was lawfully authorised. In any event, I consider the executive power under s 61 of the Constitution authorised the Commonwealth’s contracting and expenditure on the Hotels.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Sixth, unlike DBE17 this is not a representative proceeding but the proceeding has significance for other persons detained in places designated as “alternative places of detention”. The evidence shows that, at any given time, there may be more than 100 approved APODs around Australia, involving hundreds if not thousands of people over time (and certainly into the future). I concluded that to detain the applicant in the manner that he was, while not unlawful, was nevertheless uncaring and inhumane (J [5]). There was widespread public interest in the proceeding and in a real sense, the applicant’s case was a test case for persons detained in such conditions. Had the proceeding been successful I have little doubt that other persons detained in hotels designated as “alternative places of detention” would have brought similar claims so as to get out of such forms of detention. The proceeding was of real significance to a disadvantaged section of the public.CONCLUSION Having regard to those matters I am satisfied that it is appropriate that there be no order as to costs in the application.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

It contends that even if the matter can be characterised as “in the public interest”, there is nothing additional that would justify a departure from the usual order as to costs, because:(a)the question of the power to determine places as APODs was not novel, noting the remarks at J [108] that “numerous judicial statements either refer to a ‘power’ in subpara (b)(v) of the definition of ‘immigration detention’ or treat subpara (b)(v) as if it confers power”; (b)the resolution of this point did not materially contribute to an understanding of, or clarify the operation of, the Act because the power to determine APODs had been assumed without concern. The primary judgment confirmed the plain meaning of the Act; and(c)the applicant’s challenge would not have had broader impacts or have affected the broader public because, even if the Court accepted that the Minister’s power was limited to the approval of places which are not de facto detention centres, it would not have followed that all other APODs and types of detention were unlawful. The legality of each APOD would be determined in potential future litigation, turning upon the characteristics of the relevant place.CONSIDERATION I am persuaded that the proceeding can properly be described as “being in the public interest” and that it is appropriate to depart from the usual order that the successful respondent be entitled to its cost, and instead order that there be no order as to costs. A departure from the usual order as to costs may be justified in proceedings that have been brought in the public interest. In my view this is such a proceeding. As Marshall J observed in The Wilderness Society Inc v The Hon Malcolm Turnbull, Minister for the Environment and Water Resources [2007] FCA 1863 at [30]:Each case must turn on its facts and the relevant considerations through which it may be found appropriate to depart from the usual order are not closed. The real issue is not what is considered to be in the public interest or whether public interest considerations are a recognised exception to the usual rule, but rather, whether it can be said that there are sufficient public interest related reasons connected with or leading up to the litigation that warrant a departure from or outweigh the important consideration that a wholly successful respondent would ordinarily be awarded its costs. First, the respondent’s argument that the proceeding was not “brought in the public interest” because, for example, it did not concern a legislative scheme for the benefit of the public generally, such as environmental legislation has no force. Nor is there any force in its contention that the case merely “touched” on a matter of public interest insofar as it concerned the applicant’s liberty. The proceeding concerned the applicant’s executive detention by the Commonwealth. It challenged the legality of that detention by arguing that the Commonwealth had no power to detain the applicant in a hotel that had been declared by the Minister to be “another place of detention”, in circumstances where the Act does not contain an express power to detain a person in such a place. I consider the proceeding plainly concerned the public interest as it not only concerned “one of the foundational rights recognised by the common law - of liberty”, but also “the lawful scope of executive detention, as authorised by statute, in Australia [which is] plainly also a matter of considerable public importance”: see DBE17 at [23(a)]).