FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Charlie v State of Queensland [2025] FCAFC 55
Appeal from: Charlie on behalf of the North Eastern Peninsula Sea Claim Group v State of Queensland (No 2) [2024] FCA 612 File number(s): QUD 348 of 2024 Judgment of: PERRY, BURLEY AND SARAH C DERRINGTON JJ Date of judgment: 17 April 2025 Catchwords: NATIVE TITLE – where primary judge on separate question upheld validity of special leases granted by the Governor in Council over land excluded from consent determination – whether special leases were validly granted and constituted previous exclusive possession acts as defined in the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) which wholly extinguished native title in the land by force of s 20(2) of the Native Title (Queensland) Act 1993 (Qld) – construction of s 203 of the Land Act 1962 (Qld) vesting power to grant special leases in the Minister – whether the Governor in Council had power to grant special leases under the general power in s 6(1) of the Land Act concurrently with the power vested in the Minister under s 203 – whether principle in Anthony Hordern & Sons Ltd v Amalgamated Clothing and Allied Trades Union of Australia (1932) 47 CLR 1 applied – appeal dismissed Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 200, 201 and 501
Native Title Act 1993 (Cth), ss 23B(2) and 85A(1)
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), r 30.01
Crown Lands Act 1884 (Qld), s 94
Crown Lands Alienation Act 1860 (Qld), s II
Forestry Act 1959 (Qld)
Harbours Act 1955 (Qld)
Land Act 1897 (Qld), s 188
Land Act 1910 (Qld), ss 6 and 179
Land Act 1962 (Qld), ss 6, 202, 203, 205 and 343
Native Title (Queensland) Act 1993 (Qld), s 20(2)
Property Law Act 1974 (Qld), s 102
Residential Tenancies Act 1975 (Qld), s 12
Cases cited: Azimitabar v Commonwealth (2004) 303 FCR 282
Boensch v Pascoe (2019) 268 CLR 593
Bone v Mothershaw [2003] 2 Qd R 600
David on behalf of the Torres Strait Regional Seas Claim v State of Queensland [2022] FCA 1430
FAI Insurances Ltd v Winneke (1982) 151 CLR 342
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Consolidated Media Holdings Ltd (2012) 250 CLR 503
Kuru v New South Wales (2008) 236 CLR 1
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Nystrom (2006) 228 CLR 566
Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355
SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 262 CLR 362
Theiss v Collector of Customs (2014) 250 CLR 664
Vincentia MC Pharmacy Pty Ltd v Australian Community Pharmacy Authority 280 FCR 397
Division: General Division Registry: Queensland National Practice Area: Native Title Number of paragraphs: 60 Date of hearing: 18 November 2024 Counsel…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Charlie v State of Queensland and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2025] FCAFC 55
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues addressed by the court involved interpreting sections 6(1) and 203 of the Land Act 1962, particularly whether the Governor in Council had the authority to grant special leases concurrently with the power vested in the Minister. The court also considered the principle from Anthony Hordern & Sons Ltd v Amalgamated Clothing and Allied Trades Union of Australia, which held that the legislature would not have intended to give the Governor in Council the power to do something that the Minister could do. The court's task was to construe the statutes in a way that was consistent with the language, purpose, and context of the entire statute.
The court found that the legislative intent was for the Minister to issue the lease by advising the Governor to exercise his power to demise, with the Governor then executing the lease instrument. The court emphasised that the provisions of the Land Act 1962 must be construed harmoniously, with the context and purpose of the statute guiding the interpretation. The court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Governor in Council had the power to grant the leases, and the principle from Anthony Hordern & Sons Ltd v Amalgamated Clothing and Allied Trades Union of Australia did not apply in this context.
The final orders of the court were to dismiss the appeal and make no order as to costs. This outcome upheld the primary judge's decision that the special leases were validly granted and constituted acts of previous exclusive possession, leading to the extinguishment of native title in the land.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal is dismissed.
2. There be no order as to costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
This convention must equally be taken to have been assumed by the legislature in enacting s 6(1) of the Land Act 1962 and its predecessors. As the Commonwealth submitted, “the legislature can be taken to have intended that the Minister would issue the lease by taking steps to advise the Governor to effect the issuance of the lease by exercising his power to demise under s 6(1) and otherwise facilitating the execution of the lease instrument by the Governor and its transmission to the relevant lessee”. 4. CONSIDERATION 4.1 Relevant principles of statutory construction Sections 6(1) and 203 of the Land Act 1962 fall to be construed according to the ordinary principles of statutory interpretation. As the primary judge held at [59] of the primary decision, “the task of statutory construction involves the attribution of meaning to statutory text”, citing Theiss v Collector of Customs (2014) 250 CLR 664 at [22]. The relevant principles of statutory construction are well-established. In Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355 at [69]-[70], McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ explained that:The primary object of statutory construction is to construe the relevant provision so that it is consistent with the language and purpose of all the provisions of the statute. The meaning of the provision must be determined “by reference to the language of the instrument viewed as a whole”. In Commissioner for Railways (NSW) v Agalianos [(1955) 92 CLR 390 at 397], Dixon CJ pointed out that “the context, the general purpose and policy of a provision and its consistency and fairness are surer guides to its meaning than the logic with which it is constructed”. Thus, the process of construction must always begin by examining the context of the provision that is being construed.A legislative instrument must be construed on the prima facie basis that its provisions are intended to give effect to harmonious goals. Where conflict appears to arise from the language of particular provisions, the conflict must be alleviated, so far as possible, by adjusting the meaning of the competing provisions to achieve that result which will best give effect to the purpose and language of those provisions while maintaining the unity of all the statutory provisions.(Emphasis added.) The importance of starting with the statutory context and text was also emphasised by Kiefel CJ, Nettle and Gordon JJ in SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 262 CLR 362 at [14]:The starting point for the ascertainment of the meaning of a statutory provision is the text of the statute whilst, at the same time, regard is had to its context and purpose [citing Project Blue Sky with approval]. Context should be regarded at this first stage and not at some later stage and it should be regarded in its widest sense. This is not to deny the importance of the natural and ordinary meaning of a word, namely how it is ordinarily understood in discourse, to the process of construction. Considerations of context and purpose simply recognise that, understood in its statutory, historical or other context, some other meaning of a word may be suggested, and so too, if its ordinary meaning is not consistent with the statutory purpose, that meaning must be rejected.