FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Assarapin v Australian Community Pharmacy Authority [2015] FCA 268
Citation: Assarapin v Australian Community Pharmacy Authority [2015] FCA 268 Parties: JOHN ASSARAPIN, KATHY BELEGRINOS, ROBERT HARRISON and JOHN THORNE v AUSTRALIAN COMMUNITY PHARMACY AUTHORITY, QUANG LIN and SECRETARY DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND AGEING File number: NSD 2203 of 2013 Judge: NICHOLAS J Date of judgment: 27 March 2015 Corrigendum: 30 March 2015 Catchwords: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – whether decision of first respondent to recommend approval under s 90 of the National Health Act 1953 (Cth) involved an error of law – whether approved premises ceased to be “within a facility” within the meaning of Sch 1, Part 1, Item 124 of the National Health (Australian Community Pharmacy Authority Rules) Determination 2011 as a result of demolition of building in which approved premises were located – whether each of the applicants was a person aggrieved by the first respondent’s decision Legislation: Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) ss 3(4), 5
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B
National Health (Australian Community Pharmacy Authority Rules) Determination 2011 ss 6(1), 6(2), 8, 10, 11, Sch 1, Part 1, Item 124
National Health Act 1953 (Cth) ss 90, 98, 99K, 99LCases cited: Big Country Developments Pty Ltd v Australian Community Pharmacy Authority (1995) 60 FCR 85
Dasreef Pty Ltd v Hawchar (2011) 243 CLR 588
Hope v Bathurst City Council (1980) 144 CLR 1
NSW Associated Blue-Metal Quarries Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1955) 94 CLR 509
Pharmacy Guild of Australia v Australian Community Pharmacy Authority (1996) 70 FCR 462
Right to Life Association (NSW) Inc v Secretary,
Department of Human Services and Health (1995) 56 FCR 50
Tooheys Ltd v Minister for Business and Consumer Affairs (1981) 54 FLR 421Date of hearing: 23 May 2014 Place: Sydney Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 50 Counsel for the Applicants: Ms RM Henderson Solicitor for the Applicants: Meridian Lawyers Counsel for the First and Third Respondents: Mr A Dillon Solicitor for the First and Third Respondents: Australian Government Solicitor Counsel for the Second Respondent: Mr H Woods Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Michael Flaherty Solicitor FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Assarapin v Australian Community Pharmacy Authority [2015] FCA 268
CORRIGENDUM
1. In paragraph [39], delete “the Tribunal” and in lieu thereof insert “the Authority”.
2. In paragraph [49], delete “the Minister” and in lieu thereof insert “the Secretary”.
I certify that the preceding two (2) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Corrigendum to the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Nicholas. Associate:
Dated: 30 March 2015
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 2203 of 2013
BETWEEN: JOHN ASSARAPIN
First ApplicantKATHY BELEGRINOS
Second ApplicantROBERT HARRISON
Third ApplicantJOHN THORNE
Fourth ApplicantAND: AUSTRALIAN COMMUNITY PHARMACY AUTHORITY
First RespondentQUANG LIN
Second RespondentSECRETARY DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND AGEING
Third Respondent
JUDGE:
NICHOLAS J
DATE OF ORDER:
27 march 2015
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS…
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- Case
- [2015] FCA 268
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered whether the Authority's decision involved an error of law and whether the applicants had standing to bring the proceedings. The court found that the Authority's decision involved a mixed question of fact and law, and that the Authority had not erred in finding that the approved premises were no longer within a facility. The court held that the rules did not require approved premises to remain within a facility indefinitely and that it would be inappropriate to interpret the rules on such a basis. The court also concluded that the applicants had standing to bring the proceedings, as they were pharmacists who supplied pharmaceutical benefits at premises located within 500 metres of the approved premises.
The application for judicial review was dismissed, and the applicants were ordered to pay 80% of the second respondent's costs. The court did not make any order as to the costs of the Authority or the Minister. The court held that the applicants had not succeeded in obtaining any of the relief they sought, but had achieved some success in relation to the second respondent's notice of objection to competency. The court considered this to be an appropriate basis for ordering the applicants to pay a proportion of the second respondent's costs.
The final orders of the court were: (1) the application be dismissed; (2) the applicants pay 80% of the second respondent's costs; and (3) there be no other order as to costs. Entry of orders was dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application be dismissed.
2. The applicants pay 80% of the second respondent’s costs.
3. There be no other order as to costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Counsel for the applicants submitted that at all relevant times there was an approval in place allowing Mr Lin to operate a pharmacy at particular premises at which he could supply pharmaceutical benefits in the Westfield Miranda Shopping Centre, “[s]o that one has, unquestionably, a pharmacy that is located within a large shopping centre, and therefore within a facility.” Counsel also submitted that the destruction of the Approved Premises was not a matter that the Authority should have considered at all. CONSIDERATION In holding that the Approved Premises were not in a “facility” the Authority made a finding on a mixed question of fact and law: see Hope v Bathurst City Council (1980) 144 CLR 1 per Mason J at 7-8 citing the judgment of Kitto J in NSW Associated Blue-Metal Quarries Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1955) 94 CLR 509 at 511-512. The resolution of this question was complicated by two matters: first, the Approved Premises were located in a building that was outside the main Westfield Miranda building; secondly, the Approved Premises (and the building in which they were located) had been demolished. I do not understand the Authority to have held that merely because approved premises have been demolished, it necessarily follows that such premises cannot be within a “shopping centre” or (a fortiori) a “facility”. However, the Authority did conclude that, in this case, the Approved Premises had been demolished, were unavailable for occupation, and therefore no longer formed part of the Westfield Miranda shopping centre. The definition of “shopping centre” is reproduced in an attachment to the Authority’s statement of reasons, and there is no reason to infer that it was overlooked by the Authority when it considered this question. The critical finding was that the approved premises no longer formed part of a shopping centre. If the applicants are to succeed in this proceeding it is necessary for them to show that the Authority’s finding on that question was affected by an error of law. I say that because, if it is accepted that the approved premises no longer formed part of a shopping centre, then it must follow that they cannot be within a facility. It is implicit in the applicants’ argument that if approved premises are within a shopping centre at the time the relevant approval is granted, then they must be taken to remain within a shopping centre for the purpose of determining any later application for approval made under Item 124 of the Rules. However, if the Rules were intended to be interpreted in that way, it would have been easy enough to have avoided the use of the present tense (eg. “the existing premises were not in a facility at the time approval was granted”). There is no doubt that, in point of fact, existing premises that were once part of a shopping centre (as defined) might cease to be part of a shopping centre at some future time. Leaving aside demolition, the existing premises might be located in a section of a complex that was once, but is no longer, under “single management” (as defined). So in my opinion it would be wrong to interpret the Rules on the footing that existing premises that are within a facility cannot cease to be within the facility at some time after the relevant approval is granted.