IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Sydney No S154 of 2013
B e t w e e n -
RONALD WILLIAMS
Plaintiff
and
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
First Respondent
MINISTER FOR EDUCATION
Second Respondent
SCRIPTURE UNION QUEENSLAND
Third Respondent
FRENCH CJ
HAYNE J
CRENNAN J
KIEFEL J
BELL J
KEANE J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT CANBERRA ON THURSDAY, 9 MAY 2014, AT 10.00 AM
(Continued from 8/05/14)
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
____________________
FRENCH CJ: Yes, Mr Walker.
MR WALKER: May it please your Honours. The holdings in Pape to which I referred in opening the reply yesterday are, in our submission, such as to justify utterly and without need of qualification the accuracy of the last part of the headnote prepared by the editors, to which I draw attention just after halfway down on page 3 of 238 CLR. The holdings themselves to which we specifically draw attention may be listed as follows; in the Chief Justice’s reasons at page 23 in paragraph 8, proposition 5, and in particular the specific focus for my argument today is the third sentence of proposition 5. That, in our submission, simply leaves no room for the arguments to which I am now replying.
If I could then go, in the reasons of Justices Gummow, Crennan and Bell, to the passage that starts with paragraph 176 on page 72, and in particular the second last sentence of paragraph 176. That too leaves no room for the submissions to which I am replying. In the same reasons, one could also see in paragraph 197 on page 78 an important reference to “the conclusion” in the, with respect, pithy formulation denying to section 81:
the character of a legislative “spending power”.
I draw to attention, while at that paragraph for purposes of a later part of my reply, to the consequence of the high level of generality that one typically, since Federation indeed, has found in items of appropriation, certainly in Appropriation Acts, and in particular then providing an insufficient textural basis for the determination of issues of constitutional fact.
There said, in particular, by reference to section 81 and the argument to which I am now addressing reply but I flag that that is going to be very important when it comes to a consideration of what might be called, with respect, a motley mixture of material, ultimately literally inconclusive: not permitting of conclusion, which you find in and annexed to the special case for the purposes of the 51(xxiiiA) determination with which I will be concluding. The next passage for the question of the authority of Pape standing in the way of the arguments us, could I take your Honours to paragraph 283 in the reasons of Justices Hayne and Kiefel at page 100 and 101.
That also serves a double purpose when I come to the reply in relation to the argument of the dual function served by section 8 of the Appropriation Act
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Williams v Commonwealth of Australia and Ors and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2014] HCATrans 95
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the Court was whether the impugned legislative provisions, which imposed restrictions on the political activities of public servants, were consistent with the implied freedom of political communication protected by the Australian Constitution. Specifically, the Court had to determine if these restrictions went beyond what was reasonably necessary to protect the integrity and impartiality of the public service and therefore unduly burdened the implied freedom.
The Court's reasoning focused on the balancing exercise required when assessing restrictions on political communication. It affirmed that while the implied freedom protects political communication, it is not absolute and can be limited by laws that are reasonably appropriate and adapted to serve a legitimate purpose. The Court examined the purpose of the restrictions, which was to ensure the apolitical nature of the public service, and considered whether the breadth of the restrictions was proportionate to that purpose. Ultimately, the majority of the Court found that the legislative provisions were a valid exercise of legislative power and did not impermissibly infringe the implied freedom of political communication.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi