FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
CPJ16 v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCA 1553
File number: NSD 1141 of 2020 Judgment of: WIGNEY J Date of judgment: 16 October 2020 Catchwords: MIGRATION – detention – where Minister set aside a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal and refused the applicant’s protection visa application – where primary judge dismissed applicant’s judicial review application – where applicant sought urgent interlocutory relief – whether applicant should be released from immigration detention – application refused Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 189, 501A(3) Cases cited: Division: General Division Registry: New South Wales National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Number of paragraphs: 17 Date of hearing: 16 October 2020 Counsel for the Applicant: The applicant appeared in person Counsel for the Respondent: Mr B Kaplan Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor ORDERS
NSD 1141 of 2020 BETWEEN: CPJ16
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS
Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
WIGNEY J
DATE OF ORDER:
16 OCTOBER 2020
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The applicant’s interlocutory application be dismissed.
2.The applicant pay the respondent’s costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Delivered ex tempore, revised from transcript)WIGNEY J:
The applicant in this matter, who has been given the pseudonym CPJ16, has filed an interlocutory application seeking relief against the Minister for Home Affairs. The main relief she seeks is, in effect, a mandatory injunction requiring the Minister to release her from immigration detention. Three main grounds were advanced by the applicant for the grant of that relief: first, that she has and is being denied adequate medical treatment and medication in immigration; second, that she is at risk of being attacked by certain groups of people while in immigration detention; and third, that her continuing detention is having a deleterious impact on her son who had not been able to visit her.
The applicant’s interlocutory application was listed before me as duty judge because, so it was said, the applicant’s situation and circumstances were serious and required urgent attention. The Minister was, however, put on notice of the application and was represented by counsel at the hearing. The applicant was not legally represented.
The applicant’s engagement with the Minister and his Department in relation to her immigration status has a long and somewhat unfortunate, if not extraordinary, history. That history and the reason why the applicant is presently in immigration detention, and has been so for some time, is explained in the most recent judgment in her case: see CPJ16 v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCA 1408. In that decision, Mortimer J dismissed the applicant’s most recent challenge to a decision made by the Minister in relation to her immigration status, being a decision to set aside a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal and refuse the applicant’s…
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- Case
- [2020] FCA 1553
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered the applicant’s submissions, which referenced a decision by Murphy J in BNL20 v Minister for Home Affairs, where similar relief was granted on the basis of a breach of the Minister’s duty of care. However, the court found that the circumstances in CPJ16’s case did not warrant the same relief. The court highlighted that the applicant had not previously raised her claims of misfeasance and false imprisonment before the primary judge and had instead chosen to pursue them in this interlocutory application. The court further found that there was no evidence to support a claim of bias against the primary judge, and thus, the application for relief based on this ground was also unsuccessful.
In light of these findings, the court dismissed the applicant’s interlocutory application and ordered her to pay the respondent’s costs. This decision underscores the importance of pursuing appropriate legal avenues to address grievances and the court’s reluctance to grant relief in circumstances where the applicant has not followed the proper judicial processes.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The applicant’s interlocutory application be dismissed.
2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The applicant’s engagement with the Minister and his Department in relation to her immigration status has a long and somewhat unfortunate, if not extraordinary, history. That history and the reason why the applicant is presently in immigration detention, and has been so for some time, is explained in the most recent judgment in her case: see CPJ16 v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCA 1408. In that decision, Mortimer J dismissed the applicant’s most recent challenge to a decision made by the Minister in relation to her immigration status, being a decision to set aside a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal and refuse the applicant’s application for a protection visa pursuant to s 501A(3) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). It is unnecessary to refer at length to the judgment and reasons of Mortimer J in that case. It suffices to note three things. First, the applicant has appealed Mortimer J’s decision to refuse her application for judicial review of the Minister’s decision. Second, the applicant’s case before Mortimer J extended beyond a judicial review challenge to the Minister’s decision and included allegations of misfeasance in public office and false imprisonment. Justice Mortimer adjourned the latter aspect of the applicant’s case to a further case management hearing. That case management hearing, however, did not take place and is unlikely to take place in the future. That is apparently because the applicant has advised that she intends to discontinue that aspect of her case. Indeed, the applicant says that she has now signed a notice of discontinuance, though it appears that the notice of discontinuance has not been filed. The remaining aspect of the proceeding before Mortimer J is accordingly still on foot. Third, and significantly, it would seem that the allegations that underlie the applicant’s claims of misfeasance in public office and false imprisonment in the proceeding before Mortimer J are essentially the same or similar to the claims and allegations she has made in support of her interlocutory application in this matter. That is, in all the circumstances, a somewhat unsatisfactory state of affairs. Having raised those allegations before Mortimer J, the applicant should pursue them before her Honour and not seek to raise them in new proceedings or seek interlocutory relief based on them before a different judge. The applicant sought to address that issue before me by claiming that Mortimer J appeared to be biased. It is clear, however, that the applicant has not made that claim before Mortimer J and has not applied for her Honour to disqualify herself on that basis. Nor does there appear, at least on the basis of the submissions made by the applicant in that respect before me, to be any merit in her claim of bias, apprehended or otherwise. Putting those issues to one side for the moment, the applicant based her claim for interlocutory relief primarily on the decision of Murphy J in BNL20 v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCA 1180. In that matter, Murphy J considered an interlocutory application in which orders were sought concerning the manner or circumstances in which the applicant in that case was being held in immigration detention. It was alleged in that regard that the Minister was in breach of his duty of care to that applicant to avoid foreseeable harm to him while detained in a particular immigration detention facility. That breach was said to arise from a risk that the applicant might contract COVID-19.