John Pfeiffer Pty Ltd v Rogerson

Case [2000] HCA 36

HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

GLEESON CJ,
GAUDRON, McHUGH, GUMMOW, KIRBY, HAYNE AND CALLINAN JJ

JOHN PFEIFFER PTY LIMITED  APPLICANT

AND

DAVID ROGERSON  RESPONDENT

John Pfeiffer Pty Limited v Rogerson
[2000] HCA 36
21 June 2000
C14/1998

ORDER

  1. Special leave to appeal granted, the appeal treated as instituted and heard instanter, and allowed.

  1. Orders of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia made on 8 July 1998 set aside.  In place thereof order that:

(a)the appeal to that Court be allowed; and

(b)the orders of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory made on 3 December 1997 be set aside and, in place of those orders, order that:

i)the appeal to the Full Court of the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory be allowed;

ii)the orders of the Master made on 24 April 1997 be set aside;

iii)the matter be remitted to the Master to be determined in accordance with the reasons of this Court; and

iv)the costs of the whole of the proceedings before the Master to abide the outcome of that further hearing.

On appeal from the Federal Court of Australia

Representation:

B W Walker SC with A S Bell for the applicant (instructed by Hickson Wisewoulds)

T F Bathurst QC with F M G Parker and D J C Mossop for the respondent (instructed by Gary Robb & Associates)

2.

Interveners:

D M J Bennett QC, Solicitor-General of the Commonwealth with M A Perry and G A Hill intervening on behalf of the Attorney-General of the Commonwealth (instructed by Australian Government Solicitor)

W C R Bale QC, Solicitor-General of the State of Tasmania with S K Lighton intervening on behalf of the Attorney-General of the State of Tasmania (instructed by Crown Solicitor for the State of Tasmania)

T I Pauling QC, Solicitor-General for the Northern Territory intervening on behalf of the Attorney-General for the Northern Territory (instructed by the Solicitor for the Northern Territory)

D Graham QC, Solicitor-General for the State of Victoria with S G E McLeish intervening on behalf of the Attorney-General for the State of Victoria (instructed by Victorian Government Solicitor)

R J Meadows QC, Solicitor-General for the State of Western Australia with R M Mitchell intervening on behalf of the Attorney-General for the State of Western Australia (instructed by Crown Solicitor for the State of Western Australia)

B M Selway QC, Solicitor-General for the State of South Australia with M D Walter intervening on behalf of the Attorney-General for the State of South Australia (instructed by Crown Solicitor for the State of South Australia)

M G Sexton SC, Solicitor-General for the State of New South Wales with N E Abadee intervening on behalf of the Attorney-General for the State of New South Wales (instructed by Crown Solicitor for the State of New South Wales)

P M Donohoe QC with P A Walker intervening on behalf of the Attorney-General for the Australian Capital Territory (instructed by the ACT Government Solicitor)

Notice:  This copy of the Court’s Reasons…

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Details
AGLC
John Pfeiffer Pty Ltd v Rogerson [2000] HCA 36
Case
[2000] HCA 36
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

John Pfeiffer Pty Ltd (the applicant) appealed to the High Court of Australia from a decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia. The dispute concerned an action commenced in the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory by the respondent, Mr. Rogerson, against the applicant for damages for personal injury. The respondent, an employee of the applicant, suffered injury in a workplace accident in New South Wales, although the applicant's principal place of business was in the Australian Capital Territory. The case was framed in tort, and the central issue revolved around which jurisdiction's law should govern the assessment of damages.

The High Court was required to determine several legal issues. These included whether the "double actionability rule" is a choice of law rule and whether it applies to proceedings in federal jurisdiction. The Court also considered whether a single, consistent choice of law rule should be adopted across all Australian federal and non-federal jurisdictions. Furthermore, the Court had to decide whether the *lex fori* (the law of the forum) or the *lex loci delicti* (the law of the place where the tort was committed) should apply to torts with an interstate element. Finally, the Court examined whether limitations on damages, such as those imposed by Part 5 of the *Workers Compensation Act 1987* (NSW), are substantive or procedural matters for the purposes of choice of law.

The Court reasoned that the common law choice of law rules for torts involving an interstate element should be adapted to provide certainty and uniformity across the Australian federation. It held that the *lex loci delicti* governs torts committed in Australia with an interstate element, meaning the law of New South Wales should apply to the assessment of damages in this case. The Court clarified that limitations on the type and quantum of damages, as well as limitation provisions that bar a right or remedy, are substantive matters, not procedural ones. Consequently, these substantive issues are subject to the choice of law rules. The Court also considered the effect of section 118 of the Constitution, which mandates full faith and credit to the laws of other states and territories, and concluded that it supports the adoption of a uniform choice of law rule.

The High Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the orders of the Full Court of the Federal Court and the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory. The matter was remitted to the Master of the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory to be determined in accordance with the High Court's reasons, with costs to abide the outcome of that further hearing.

Orders

Orders of the court

1.

Special leave to appeal granted, the appeal treated as instituted and heard instanter, and allowed.

2.

Orders of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia made on 8 July 1998 set aside. In place thereof order that:

(a) the appeal to that Court be allowed; and

(b) the orders of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory made on 3 December 1997 be set aside and, in place of those orders, order that:

i) the appeal to the Full Court of the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory be allowed;

ii) the orders of the Master made on 24 April 1997 be set aside;

iii) the matter be remitted to the Master to be determined in accordance with the reasons of this Court; and

iv) the costs of the whole of the proceedings before the Master to abide the outcome of that further hearing.

Background

Background to the litigation

Secondly, the common law of Australia includes the rules for choice of law, again subject to statutory modification. Thirdly, where those common law rules select the law of a law area other than that in which the court in question exercises jurisdiction as the law which determines the outcome of an action, generally they do so by applying the statute law of that other law area in preference to the common law. Sometimes, however, they may apply the common law in preference to statute law[2]. In the present case, the applicant contends that the statute law of the law area in which the events in question occurred should be applied in preference to the common law. Other and more difficult questions arise where, in the case of the States and Territories of Australia, the statute law of two law areas differs and it is sought to apply one rather than the other as the governing law. That is not this case.[2]See, for example, Anderson v Eric Anderson Radio & TV Pty Ltd (1965) 114 CLR 20.The facts and earlier proceedings The applicant seeks special leave to appeal from the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia. The application for special leave was heard by the whole Court as if on the hearing of the full appeal. The applicant was sued by the respondent in the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory for damages for personal injury suffered by the respondent in 1989 in a workplace accident. The action was framed in tort and the present matter must be decided on that basis notwithstanding that, in this Court, the respondent sought also to frame the case in contract. The respondent, a carpenter, was employed by the applicant in the Australian Capital Territory where the applicant had its principal business office. The incident which led to the respondent's injury occurred, however, while the respondent was working for the applicant at the Queanbeyan District Hospital in New South Wales. When the action came on for hearing before the Master of the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory, the parties indicated that the case was in the nature of a test case to determine whether s 118 of the Constitution[3] requires that the law to be applied in the assessment of the respondent's damages is that of New South Wales rather than that of the Australian Capital Territory. The parties appear to have agreed before the Master that, if liability were established and the law to be applied were that of New South Wales, the damages to be allowed would be limited by Pt 5 of the Workers Compensation Act 1987 (NSW) ("the NSW Compensation Act"). If, however, the law to be applied were the law of the Australian Capital Territory, the parties agreed that those damages should be assessed in accordance with the common law at $30,000 together with out of pocket expenses.[3]Section 118 provides:" Full faith and credit shall be given, throughout the Commonwealth to the laws, the public Acts and records, and the judicial proceedings of every State." The Master found that the applicant had failed to provide a safe system of work and was liable to the respondent. The Master concluded that the decision of this Court in Stevens v Head[4] bound him to hold that the law of the Australian Capital Territory applied to determine the quantum of the damages to be allowed and accordingly gave judgment for the respondent for $31,689.75 (being the sum of the agreed general damages and the agreed out of pocket expenses) together with costs.[4](1993) 176 CLR 433.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The third point which should be made with respect to the statement in McKain is that, as already pointed out but subject to certain State legislation dealing with one of the issues that arise in choice of law cases for Australian torts involving an interstate element[61], the choice of law rules are provided by the common law of Australia. It is now well accepted that the common law must adapt to the Constitution[62]. Ideally, it should also adapt so as to provide practical solutions to particular legal problems which occur in the federal system. Thus, ideally, the choice of law rules should provide certainty and uniformity of outcome no matter where in the Australian federation a matter is litigated, and whether it is litigated in federal or non-federal jurisdiction. The question whether the common law with respect to the choice of law rule for Australian torts involving an interstate element should now be modified, as the applicant contends, requires analysis of the manner in which it operates both in non-federal and federal jurisdiction.[61]That issue is whether limitation laws are substantive or procedural.[62] See Theophanous v Herald & Weekly Times Ltd (1994) 182 CLR 104 at 140; Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520 at 566.Operation of the choice of law rules – non-federal jurisdiction Two questions arise with respect to choice of law rules. First, what kinds of issues are subject to those rules. The second is whether the source of the content of the rules which the forum applies to the determination of the rights and duties of the parties is the law of the forum or some other law. These two questions lie at the heart of the issues raised with respect to torts involving an interstate element which are litigated in the courts of a State other than that in which the events in question occurred. In McKain, the majority said:" Traditionally, a distinction has been drawn between substantive law (the subject of the conflict of law rules) and procedural law which is governed by the lex fori alone. Though the dividing line is sometimes doubtful or even artificial, the need to distinguish between substantive law and procedural law is clearly recognized for a number of forensic purposes."[63]The majority accepted and applied this traditional distinction. That is, they accepted that only substantive questions (as opposed to procedural questions) were the subject of the choice of law rules.[63] (1991) 174 CLR 1 at 40. A conclusion that questions of substance are governed by choice of law rules does not necessarily mean, however, that the relevant rule will direct attention to some law other than the law of the forum. As already indicated, the question whether the choice of law rule directs attention to the law of the forum or to some other law did not have to be decided in either McKain or Stevens because the relevant statute of the place of commission of the tort (upon which the defendant relied, in denial or diminution of liability to the plaintiff) was, in each case, classified as relating to a procedural issue.