GLEESON CJ, GAUDRON, McHUGH, GUMMOW, KIRBY AND CALLINAN JJ
ESSO AUSTRALIA RESOURCES LIMITED APPELLANT
AND
THE COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA RESPONDENT
Esso Australia Resources Limited v The Commissioner of Taxation [1999] HCA 67 21 December 1999 M53/1999
ORDER
Appeal allowed with costs.
Set aside the orders of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia made on 22 December 1998, and in place thereof, order that:
i)the appeal to that Court be allowed with costs; and
ii)the respondents pay the costs of the proceedings before Foster J.
Questions of law raised for decision for Foster J answered:
a) The correct test is the dominant purpose test, which is the common law test for claiming legal professional privilege.
b)Does not arise.
On appeal from the Federal Court of Australia
Representation:
B J Shaw QC with J W de Wijn QC for the appellant (instructed by Clayton Utz)
2.
D M J Bennett QC, Solicitor-General for the Commonwealth with C M Maxwell QC and M M Gordon for the respondent (instructed by Australian Government Solicitor)
Notice: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.
CATCHWORDS
Esso Australia Resources Limited v The Commissioner of Taxation
Practice and procedure – Discovery – Legal professional privilege – Whether test for privilege is "dominant purpose" test or "sole purpose" test.
Evidence – Legal professional privilege – Client legal privilege – Test for – Whether "dominant purpose or sole purpose".
Statutes – Influence on common law – Evidence Act 1995 – Applicable in three Australian jurisdictions – Whether enactments affect development of common law – Significance of non-enactment in other jurisdictions – Relevance (if any) of Act to application to review past authority of High Court.
Words and phrases – "client legal privilege".
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), ss 118, 119. Federal Court Rules, O 15 r 15.
GLEESON CJ, GAUDRON AND GUMMOW JJ. The central issue in this appeal concerns the test for determining whether what is usually called legal professional privilege, (an expression which might suggest erroneously that the privilege is that of the lawyer), or what is called in the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) client legal privilege[1], applies in relation to discovery and inspection of confidential written communications between lawyer and client.
[1]The Evidence Act also confers a similar privilege on unrepresented litigants: s 120.
The test in the Evidence Act is whether the communication was made, or the document was prepared, for the dominant purpose of the lawyer providing legal advice or legal services[2]. The dominant purpose test accords with the common law test now adopted in England[3], New Zealand[4], Ireland[5], and most Canadian Provinces[6]. It was favoured by Barwick CJ in the leading Australian case on the subject, Grant v Downs[7]. However, a majority in that case (Stephen, Mason and Murphy JJ) preferred a sole purpose test. Hence, since 1976, courts in Australia have applied the common law of…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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Details
AGLC
Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1999] HCA 67
Case
[1999] HCA 67
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court of Australia heard an appeal from the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia concerning the test for legal professional privilege. The dispute centred on whether the privilege should be determined by the "dominant purpose" or the "sole purpose" for which a communication was made.
The Court was required to determine the correct test for establishing legal professional privilege in Australia. Specifically, it had to decide whether the common law test, as previously applied, required the communication to be made for the sole purpose of obtaining legal advice, or if a dominant purpose was sufficient. The Court also considered the influence of the *Evidence Act 1995* (Cth) on the development of the common law in this area, and whether its non-enactment in all Australian jurisdictions had any bearing on the application of past High Court authority.
A majority of the High Court held that the "dominant purpose" test was the correct common law standard for claiming legal professional privilege. The Court reasoned that this test struck a more just balance between competing policies, effectively ruling out claims where legal advice was not the primary reason for the communication, and aligning Australian common law with that of other common law jurisdictions. The Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the orders of the Full Court of the Federal Court and answering the question of law in favour of the dominant purpose test.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Appeal allowed with costs.
2. Set aside the orders of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia made on 22 December 1998, and in place thereof, order that:
1. the appeal to that Court be allowed with costs; and
2. the respondents pay the costs of the proceedings before Foster J.
3. Questions of law raised for decision for Foster J answered:
a) The correct test is the dominant purpose test, which is the common law test for claiming legal professional privilege.
b) Does not arise.
Background
Background to the litigation
In Commissioner of Australian Federal Police v Propend Finance Pty Ltd[95], after referring to the undesirability of impeding the beneficial operation of pretrial facilities such as discovery and subpoenas, which had "contributed to a tendency in Australia to define narrowly the applicability of legal professional privilege"[96], I suggested[97]:"… a brake on the application of legal professional privilege is needed to prevent its operation bringing the law into 'disrepute'[98], principally because it frustrates access to communications which would otherwise help courts to determine, with accuracy and efficiency, where the truth lies in disputed matters".I remain of that view. This appeal is an attempt to change the common law in Australia. It should be rejected.[95](1997) 188 CLR 501.[96](1997) 188 CLR 501 at 581 citing Ligertwood, Australian Evidence, 2nd ed (1993) at 226-227, 228-229; Cross and Tapper on Evidence, 8th ed (1995) at 472; cf ReUnited States of America v Mammoth Oil Co [1925] 2 DLR 966.[97](1997) 188 CLR 501 at 581.[98]Zuckerman, "Legal Professional Privilege and the Ascertainment of Truth", (1990) 53 Modern Law Review 381 at 381.Facts, issues and common ground The facts and issues in the appeal are stated in the reasons of Gleeson CJ, Gaudron and Gummow JJ. Certain basic matters are not in dispute. They can be stated briefly to provide the setting for the fundamental question which must be answered. First, whilst called "legal professional privilege" in common law decisions the description of the privilege in the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth)[99] ("the Act") as "client legal privilege" is now more accurate. The privilege belongs to the client not the lawyer. This feature, which involved a "change of hands" in the 18th century[100], derives from the fundamental contemporary character and purpose of the privilege.[99]ss 118, 119. See also Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), ss 118, 119.[100]Desiatnik, Legal Professional Privilege in Australia (1999) at 10. Secondly, in practical terms, whether in interlocutory proceedings (such as discovery or the answer to subpoenas) or at a trial (as in the tender of, or attempts to elicit, evidence) claims for the privilege usually concern documents. However, the privilege actually attaches to communications[101] – oral, written, electronic or by signs. This is also a feature of the privilege that derives from the purpose which it upholds to permit a person, with an actual or potential legal problem, to communicate with a legal practitioner with complete candour, being able to "bare his breast"[102] so as to obtain the full benefit of professional advice and assistance[103].[101]Odgers, Uniform Evidence Law, 3rd ed (1998) at 341.[102]Waugh v British Railways Board [1980] AC 521 at 531 per Lord Wilberforce; Anderson v Bank of British Columbia (1876) 2 Ch D 644 at 649; cf Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52 at 74; Upjohn Co v United States 449 US 383 at 389 (1981).[103]Grant v Downs (1976) 135 CLR 674 at 685. See also Waterford v The Commonwealth (1987) 163 CLR 54 at 62; Carter v Northmore Hale Davy & Leake (1995) 183 CLR 121 at 126-128; Commissioner of Australian Federal Police v Propend Finance Pty Ltd (1997) 188 CLR 501 at 551-552, 583-584.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
GLEESON CJ, GAUDRON AND GUMMOW JJ
CJ, GAUDRON AND GUMMOW JJ
(dissent)
HUGH J
KIRBY J
It would be possible to seek to formulate a new test, such as that adopted by Jacobs J in Grant v Downs, or Deane J in Waterford, in a further attempt to adjust the necessary balance of competing policies. To do so, however, would produce only confusion. As a practical matter, the choice presently confronting this Court is between sole purpose and dominant purpose. The dominant purpose test should be preferred. It strikes a just balance, it suffices to rule out claims of the kind considered in Grant v Downs and Waugh, and it brings the common law of Australia into conformity with other common law jurisdictions.Conclusion The appeal should be allowed with costs. The orders of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia should be set aside. In their place, the appeal to that court from Foster J should be allowed. The questions of law raised for decision by Foster J should be answered:(a)The correct test is the dominant purpose test, which is the common law test for claiming legal professional privilege.(b)Does not arise. The respondent should pay the appellant's costs of the proceedings before Foster J and of the appeal to the Full Court of the Federal Court. Mc In my opinion this appeal should be dismissed. The facts and issues are set out in the joint judgment of Gleeson CJ, Gaudron and Gummow JJ. I agree with their Honours that the Full Court of the Federal Court was correct in holding that the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) does not apply to the discovery of confidential written communications made between lawyer and client, either directly or by a derivative modification of the common law. I also agree with their Honours that the discretionary power in O 15 r 15 of the Federal Court Rules should not be exercised for the purpose of subverting or circumventing the rules "which determine the existence of privilege"[66]. [66]Esso Australia Resources Ltd v The Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia [1999] HCA 67 at [32]. However, I am unable to accept the proposition that the Court should now overrule the ratio decidendi of Grant v Downs[67] and substitute a dominant purpose test of privilege for the sole purpose test laid down in that case. Two reasons lead me to that conclusion. First, it would extend the area of privilege with the result that a party to litigation, and the court, would have less access to relevant material. Second, it would impose a test that is not easy of application and which seems inconsistent with the rationale of legal professional privilege. Furthermore, a dominant purpose test is one that must lead to extensive interlocutory litigation because there seems to be a growing acceptance, contrary to earlier authority and former practice, that the person claiming privilege can be cross-examined on the affidavit claiming privilege[68].[67](1976) 135 CLR 674.[68]For the earlier reluctance to allow cross-examination, see Brambles Holdings Ltd v Trade Practices Commission (No 3) (1981) 58 FLR 452 at 454 per Franki J; Fruehauf Finance Corporation Pty Ltd v Zurich Australian Insurance Ltd (1990) 20 NSWLR 359 at 366 per Giles J; and cf Morgan v Shaw (1819) 4 Madd 54 [56 ER 629] (a solicitor's statement on oath that he cannot answer a question without breaching privilege is conclusive unless it appears from the question that no issue of privilege could arise). The more permissive approach is seen in National Crime Authority v S (1991) 29 FCR 203 at 211 per Lockhart J; Hartogen Energy Ltd (in liq) v Australian Gas Light Company (1992) 36 FCR 557 at 561 per Gummow J; and Re Compass Airlines Pty Ltd (1992) 35 FCR 447 at 462 per Beaumont and Gummow JJ.In New South Wales, Pt 36 r 13(3) of the Supreme Court Rules confers power on the Court to permit, if it thinks fit, cross-examination on any affidavit used in support of a claim of privilege.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by:
GLEESON CJ, GAUDRON AND GUMMOW JJ,
HUGH J,
KIRBY J