Legal Service Commissioner v Pennisi

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QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND
ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL


CITATION:

Legal Service Commissioner v Pennisi [2024] QCAT 97

PARTIES:

LEGAL SERVICES COMMISSIONER

(applicant)

v

VINCENT PENNISI

(respondent)

APPLICATION NO/S:

OCR191-23

MATTER TYPE:

Occupational regulation matters

DELIVERED ON:

14 March 2024

HEARING DATE:

4 March 2024

HEARD AT:

Brisbane

DECISION OF:

Williams J

ORDERS:

1.     The Respondent’s application is dismissed.

2.     The Tribunal will hear further from the parties as to costs.

CATCHWORDS:

PROFESSIONS AND TRADES – LAWYERS – COMPLAINTS AND DISCIPLINE – DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS – QUEENSLAND – PROCEEDINGS IN TRIBUNALS – where the applicant filed a disciplinary application made under s 452 Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld) for the Tribunal to make disciplinary orders pursuant to s 456 Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld) – where the respondent sent a letter on behalf of the client – where the conduct is alleged to be likely, to a material degree, to bring the profession into disrepute – where the applicant seeks to rely on documents from the respondent’s client file – where the respondent seeks orders striking out material claimed to be subject to legal professional privilege – where the respondent contends that legal professional privilege arises and there has been no waiver by the respondent’s client – whether an exception to legal professional privilege arises in the current circumstances – whether a prima facie case of improper purpose is made out – whether a claim of legal professional privilege can be upheld

Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 (Qld), s 60

Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld), s 452, s 456

Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 47(2), s 62(1)

Amcor Ltd v Barnes [2011] VSC 341

Attorney-General for the Northern Territory v Kearney (1985) 158 CLR 500
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Mercorella (No 3) [2006] FCA 772
AWB Ltd v Cole and Another (No 5) (2006) 155 FCR 30
Barclays Bank Plc v Eustice [1995] 4 All ER 511
Carbotech-Australia Pty Ltd v Yates [2008] NSWSC 1151
Commissioner of Australian Federal Police and Another v Propend Finance Pty Limited and Other (1996-7) 188 CLR 501
Gartner v Carter; In the Matter of Gartner Wines Pty Ltd [2004] FCA 258
James George Hodgson v Amcor [2011] VSC 204
John Selak v National Tiles Co Pty Ltd [2023] VSC 446
P & V Industries Pty Ltd v Porto (No 3) [2007] VSC 133

Watson v McLernon [2000] NSWSC 306

APPEARANCES & REPRESENTATION:

Applicant:

M Black, instructed by Gilshenan & Luton Legal Practice

Respondent:

P C O’Connor, instructed by Legal Services Commission

REASONS FOR DECISION

  1. The Legal Services Commissioner (LSC) has commenced a discipline application under s 452 of the Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld) (LP Act) for disciplinary orders pursuant to s 456 of the LP Act. The discipline application raises a single charge against the respondent, Vincent Pennisi (Respondent) of engaging in “conduct in the course of practice which was likely, to a material degree, to bring the profession into disrepute.”[1]

    [1]Discipline Application, p.…

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Details
Case
[2024] QCAT 97
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Legal Service Commissioner v Pennisi, the Legal Service Commissioner filed a disciplinary application against the respondent, a legal practitioner, under the Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld). The Commissioner alleged that the respondent's conduct, specifically sending a letter on behalf of a client, was likely to bring the legal profession into disrepute. The Commissioner sought to rely on documents from the respondent's client file, which the respondent claimed were subject to legal professional privilege and sought to have struck out.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether an exception to legal professional privilege applied in the circumstances of this case, and if so, whether a prima facie case of improper purpose was made out. The respondent argued that the privilege arose and there had been no waiver by the client, while the Commissioner contended that an exception to privilege applied due to the alleged improper purpose of the communication.

The court considered the relevant legal principles concerning legal professional privilege and its exceptions. It noted that a party resisting a claim of privilege must show reasonable grounds for believing that the communication was made for an illegal or improper purpose, which is an objective test that does not require proof of the ulterior purpose but rather a prima facie case that such a purpose exists. The court further clarified that if there is evidence suggesting an illegal or improper purpose, a further evidentiary burden is cast on the person claiming privilege to demonstrate that the privilege still applies. The court found that the Commissioner had not provided sufficient evidence to rebut the claim of privilege, and thus, the respondent's application to strike out the privileged documents was dismissed.

The final orders of the court were that the respondent's application to strike out the privileged documents was dismissed, and the matter was to be heard further by the Tribunal, including consideration of costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The Respondent’s application is dismissed.

2. The Tribunal will hear further from the parties as to costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

It is of assistance to consider some of the specific comments of the Court in this regard:(a)Brennan CJ at p. 514:“In determining whether a claim of legal professional privilege can be upheld, it is open to the party resisting the claim to show reasonable grounds for believing that the communication effected by the document for which legal professional privilege is claimed was made for some illegal or improper purpose, that is, some purpose that is contrary to the public interest.[61] I state the criterion as ‘reasonable grounds for believing’ because (a) the test is objective and (b) it is not necessary to prove the ulterior purpose but there has to be something ‘to give colour to the charge’,[62] a ‘prima facie case’ that the communication is made for an ulterior purpose.[63] The purposes that deny the protection of privilege for a communication[64] (whether documentary or oral) between a client and the client's solicitor or counsel include[65] the furthering of the commission of an offence.[66]When a party in curial proceedings is seeking to rebut a claim of privilege by asserting that the communication with the legal adviser was made for an ulterior purpose, the evidence of ulterior purpose must be admissible in those proceedings. It is not sufficient to rely on the information laid before the justice who issued the warrant. The informant is not necessarily a witness and, if he or she is a witness, the admissible evidence is what is then deposed to, not a statement made to or before the issuing justice. In the present case no admissible evidence was tendered, although Davies J at first instance recorded that counsel for the parties were content that he ‘should have regard to’ the sworn information laid before the issuing justice.”(b)Gaudron J at p. 546:“… the privilege does not attach to documents which are brought into existence or which are provided to a lawyer for the purpose of furthering some illegal object. Thus, as McHugh J pointed out in Carter v Northmore Hale Davy & Leake, the so-called ‘exceptions’ to legal professional privilege, namely, communications to further illegal purposes, communications made for the purpose of frustrating the processes of the law and communications made to further an abuse of public power ‘are in truth not exceptions at all’[67]. Rather, legal professional privilege never attaches to them. This has some significance in relation to the nature of the evidence necessary to raise a question of illegality.If illegality were a true exception to legal professional privilege, it would be arguable that the person challenging the existence of the privilege should establish that the communication in question was made in furtherance of some illegal purpose[68]. However, it is not a true exception and, thus, it is not necessary that illegality be established positively. On the other hand, a mere allegation of illegal purpose is not, itself, sufficient. There must be ‘not merely an allegation ... of a fraud, but ... something to give colour to the charge’[69], ‘some prima facie evidence that it has some foundation in fact’[70]. The reason for this is obvious. Persons are presumed innocent, not guilty. And, thus, there must be evidence to raise a sufficient doubt as to a claim of privilege to cast a further evidentiary onus on the person making the claim to show that, in truth, the privilege attaches.(c)McHugh J at p. 547:“Bearing in mind the purpose served by legal professional privilege and the importance of the presumption of innocence, a further evidentiary burden is, in my view, cast upon a person claiming legal professional privilege only if there is evidence which, if accepted, raises a prima facie case of illegal or other purpose falling outside the privilege. Evidence of that nature need not be led by the person resisting the claim of privilege. It might emerge, for example, from documents for which the claim is made.If a person wishes to resist a claim of privilege and to lead evidence of an illegal or other purpose inconsistent with its existence, that evidence must be in admissible form. Ordinarily, that will exclude hearsay. But if, as here, hearsay evidence is properly admitted on some other issue, ordinary considerations of fairness require that the person claiming privilege be given an opportunity to test that evidence by cross-examination.” (emphasis added)[61]Attorney-General (NT) v Kearney (1985) 158 CLR 500 at pp. 514-515; R v Bell; Ex parte Lees (1980) 146 CLR 141 at pp. 147, 156, 159, 161.[62]O’Rourke v Darbishire [1920] AC 581 at pp. 604, 633; Attorney-General (NT) v Kearney (1985) 158 CLR 500 at pp. 516, 517, 525, 527.[63]Butler v Board of Trade [1971] Ch 680 at p. 689.[64]Attorney-General (NT) v Kearney (1985) 158 CLR 500 at p. 515; Carter v Northmore Hale Davy & Leake (1995) 183 CLR 121 at p. 163.[65]Attorney-General (NT) v Kearney (1985) 158 CLR 500 at pp. 516, 528-529.[66]R v Cox and Railton (1884) 14 QBD 153 at p. 175; O’Rourke v Darbishire [1920] AC 581 at pp. 613, 632; Varawa v Howard Smith & Co Ltd (1910) 10 CLR 382 at pp. 385, 386, 389-390; Butler v Board of Trade [1971] Ch 680 at p. 689.[67]Carter (1995) 183 CLR 121 at p. 163.[68]As to the onus of proving matters which except a situation from the general rule, see, generally, Chugg v Pacific Dunlop Ltd (1990) 170 CLR 249.[69]O’Rourke v Darbishire [1920] AC 581 at p. 604, per Viscount Finlay, cited with approval in Attorney-General (NT) v Kearney (1985) 158 CLR 500 at p. 516, per Gibbs CJ.[70]O’Rourke v Darbishire [1920] AC 581 at p. 604.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established