Woodcock & Woodcock (No 6)

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

(DIVISION 1)

Woodcock & Woodcock (No 6) [2024] FedCFamC1F 333

File number MLC 13421 of 2020
Judgment of WILSON J
Date of judgment 27 May 2024
Catchwords

FAMILY LAW – MAJOR COMPLEX FINANCIAL PROCEEDINGS LIST – valuation of the dual choses in action of the right to due administration and the right to due consideration of an object under a discretionary trust – adversarial expert appointed by the court to conduct valuation – parties ordered by consent to provide such documents and information as the adversarial expert may reasonably require.

FAMILY LAW – PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – whether competent for husband and the trustees to assert that the expert is not entitled to the documents he seeks – novel point involved – adversarial expert should not be impaired in his task by the husband or trustees telling him what he is to receive in order for him to do his valuation.

FAMILY LAW – PRIVILEGE – legal advice privilege – wife prematurely asserting that privilege does not apply by reason of fraud or improper purpose – general discovery inapplicable as pleadings have not closed – general discovery principles inapplicable to information sought by the adversarial expert.

Legislation

Corporations Act 2001 ss 180, 198F, 290

Evidence Act 2008 s 125

Family Law Act 1975 ss 79, 106B

Property Law Act 1958 (Vic) s 173

Cases cited

Alister v R (1984) 154 CLR 404

Annesley v Earl of Anglesea (1743) LR QB 317

Attorney-General for the Northern Territory of Australia v Kearney (1985) 158 CLR 500

B v B [1979] 1 All ER 801

Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52

Bullivant v Attorney-General [1901] AC 196

Butler v Board of Trade [1971] Ch 680

Buttes Gas & Oil Co v Hammer [1981] QB 223

Commissioner of Australian Federal Police v Propend Finance Pty Ltd (1997) 188 CLR 501

Crescent Farm (Sidcup) Sports Ltd v Sterling Offices Ltd [1972] Ch 553

Crowe v Stevedoring Employees Retirement Fund Pty Ltd [2003] VSC 316

Dasreef Pty Ltd v Hawchar (2011) 243 CLR 588

Dick v Alan Powell Holdings Pty Ltd [2009] QSC 184

Ding v Ding (2018) 59 Fam LR 262

Esso Resources Australia Ltd v The Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 201 CLR 49

Gartside v Outram (1856) 26 LJ Ch 113

Goodridge v Beadle (2017) 57 Fam LR 425

Grant v Downs (1976) 135 CLR 674

Hardcastle v Advanced Mining Technologies Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 1846

Hartigan Nominees Pty Ltd v Rydge (1992) 29 NSWLR 405

Holloway v McFeeters (1956) 94 CLR 470

Honeysett v R (2014) 253 CLR 122

In Re Londonderry’s Settlement; Peat v Walsh [1965] Ch 918

Kang v Kwan [2001] NSWSC 698

Kennon v Spry (2008) 238 CLR 366

Makita (Australia) Pty Ltd v Sprowles (2001) 52 NSWLR 705

Mandie v Memart Nominees Pty Ltd (2014) 42 VR 325

O’Rourke v Darbishire [1920] AC 581

R v Bell; ex parte Lees (1980) 146 CLR 141

R v Cox & Railton (1884) 14…

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Details
Case
[2024] FedCFamC1F 333
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of MLC 13421 of 2020 involves a complex financial dispute within the family law jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia. The primary dispute revolves around the valuation of the husband's rights under discretionary trusts and the necessity of specific documents and information for an expert to complete this valuation. The court was tasked with deciding whether the trustees and the husband could assert that the adversarial expert was not entitled to certain documents and information they sought, particularly those related to the 2020 amendments to the trust deeds. Additionally, the court had to address whether legal advice privilege could be invoked prematurely by the wife and whether general discovery principles applied to the information sought by the adversarial expert.

The reasoning of the court was grounded in the necessity of ensuring that the adversarial expert could perform his valuation task without undue interference. The judge found that the trustees and the husband were not competent to dictate what information the expert required to complete his valuation. The court emphasized the importance of not impairing the expert's ability to assess the husband's rights accurately, especially given the novel nature of the valuation task. The judge also noted that the trustees' reasons for the 2020 amendments to the trust deeds were relevant to the expert's valuation and should not be withheld. The premature assertion of legal advice privilege by the wife was deemed inappropriate as the pleadings had not closed, and general discovery principles were found inapplicable to the information sought by the adversarial expert.

The court made an order requiring the trustees to produce specific documents to the wife's adversarial expert by a certain date. The further hearing of the proceeding was adjourned for directions, and the costs of the application were reserved. The form of the order is subject to review for minor typographical or grammatical errors or to record any variations to the order.

Orders

Orders of the court

MLC 13421 of 2020

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 1)

BETWEEN

MR WOODCOCK

Applicant

AND

MS WOODCOCK

First Respondent

B PTY LTD

Second Respondent

F PTY LTD

Third Respondent

E PTY LTD

Fourth Respondent

ORDER MADE BY

WILSON J

DATE OF ORDER

27 MAY 2024

THE ORDERS I MAKE ARE AS FOLLOWS –

1. On or before 4pm on 17 June 2024, the trustees must produce to Mr T, the wife’s adversarial expert, all documents corresponding to the requests for the production of documents made in paragraphs 1(a), 1(c), 1(e) and 2 of the wife’s application in a proceeding dated 17 April 2024 and filed herein.

2. By noon on 18 June 2024 the solicitors for all parties must email my associates informing my associates that documents have in fact been produced in accordance with paragraph one of these orders by 17 June 2024.

3. The further hearing of this proceeding is adjourned to 1 July 2024 for directions.

4. Costs of all parties of and incidental to this application are reserved.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.

Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

As these reasons reveal, an order for production of documents in the categories mentioned in the early pages of these reasons should be made. RELEVANT FACTUAL SCENARIO – MR O’S EVIDENCE The events leading to the wife’s application in a proceeding dated 17 April 2024 were recorded in an affidavit made by her solicitor sworn 17 April 2024. Along with exhibits, that affidavit spanned a substantial 339 pages.[3] The wife’s solicitor’s affidavit stated as follows –[3] Affidavits of that size and complexity are a commonplace feature of cases in the Major Complex Financial Proceedings List having regard to the legal and factual intricacies in each of those cases, including this. (a)at all relevant times the husband has been and remains a director of the relevant trustees, being the second, third and fourth respondents; (b)the husband is the managing director of the G Group and the chair of the investment committee and family council of the G Group; (c)the husband and wife separated in early 2019;(d)on 4 July 2019 the wife’s solicitor was informed by the husband’s solicitor that –(i)the husband is a primary beneficiary of the trusts;(ii)the husband possesses no enshrined right to capital or income from the G Group and instead any decisions of significance regarding distributions are subject to unanimous agreement between family members of the trustees pursuant to prescribed rules;(iii)those rules governing distributions provide that by simple majority the relevant trustee can declare whether a distribution is to be made at all in which case, absent any further resolution passed unanimously by all five directors, any such distribution would go to beneficiaries in specified percentages of which the husband’s notional share was 16%; (iv)by special majority represented by 75% of the five directors who vote unanimously, the trustees can resolve to distribute to anyone in a particular class of beneficiaries;[4] [4] The husband’s solicitors added in their 4 July 2019 letter to the wife’s solicitor that in practical terms that occurred in respect of most distributions. (v)where no decision to distribute was made, funds accumulated in the relevant trust; (vi)where the relevant trust reaches its vesting date and no decisions have been made to distribute to beneficiaries prior to the vesting date, all trust assets are distributed in accordance with the same specified percentages governing distributions during the life of the trust;(e)on or about 1 September 2020 the deeds governing the trusts were amended, a matter about which the wife’s solicitor was not told; (f)the husband and wife divorced in mid-2020; (g)on 7 December 2020 the husband commenced this proceeding at which time a case assessment conference was fixed for 22 February 2021;(h)ahead of the case assessment conference, on 17 February 2021 the wife’s solicitor provided the husband’s solicitor with a minute of proposed consent orders pursuant to which the husband proposed providing by mid-March copies of all deeds or other instruments establishing each trust including any amending documents to which proposed consent minute the husband refused to agree; (i)on 29 April 2021 the wife’s solicitor issued one or more subpoenae for the production of the deeds of trust;(j)the trustees of the trusts were then separately represented, they objected to the production of the documents sought and sought orders setting aside the subpoenae; (k)on 30 September 2021 I made orders dismissing the objections to the subpoenae and I ordered the production of the documents sought by the wife;[5](l)in October 2021 after the parties executed confidentiality agreements, copies of the deeds were produced at which time, for the first time, the wife’s solicitor ascertained that the deeds of trust had been amended in or about September 2020; (m)one effect of the operation of the amending deeds is recorded in a document entitled “statement of assumptions and questions for the expert” dated 31 January 2022 provided to Mr U (the husband’s expert) and to Mr T (the wife’s expert); (n)another effect of the operation of the amending deeds is recorded in a document entitled “statement of agreed facts” provided to the court on 18 October 2023;(o)on 27 October 2023 consent orders were made by me authorising the appointment of Mr T as the wife’s expert to value the husband’s rights as defined in the draft letter of 11 October 2023; and (p)correspondence then commenced to pass between Mr T and the parties’ solicitors, originating on 16 November 2023.[5] Woodcock v Woodcock (2021) 64 Fam LR 489.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In viva voce submissions addressed on 10 May 2024 Mr Shaw KC made a collection of points on this issue. They included the following – (a)in his affidavit in support of this application Mr T does not say that he cannot possibly value the husband’s interests without having the documents or information concerning the reasons for the 2020 amendments to the trust deeds; (b)Mr T has everything he needs to complete his report; (c)the report by Mr T will illuminate the s 106B claim because there will be no s 106B claim if the husband’s interests were valued at a particular sum prior to the 2020 amendments and the husband’s interests were valued at the same amount subsequent to the amendments; and (d)in circumstances where a s 106B claim may never see the light of day, it would be extraordinary for disclosure to be required.[52] [52] Transcript 10 May 2024 T 30 L 43.CONSIDERATION Any consideration of those submissions requires the setting of the 2020 amendments in a chronological context. During the currency of the marriage, that is to say, up to 2020 or thereabouts, the husband regularly received trust distributions in substantial amounts made pursuant to trust instruments that operated prior to the 2020 trust deeds. The distributions altered subsequent to 2020. Put most basically, the wife is advancing a contention in this litigation that the 2020 amendments to the trust deeds were effected in order to alter the assets available for allocation under s 79 of the Family Law Act. She wants to know why the 2020 amending trust deeds were executed in the first place. Mr K says the 2020 amending deeds were made as part of general succession planning. The wife takes a different view of the reasons why the 2020 amending deeds were executed. Mr T says that his knowing the reasons for the making of the 2020 amendments will enable him to form a reasonable basis for assessing future change. The trustees say that speculative attempts by Mr T to predict the likelihood of the deeds being amended provide no assistance to the task of valuing the husband’s rights and the reasons for previous amendments similarly give no assistance in that regard. There is authority to the effect that trustees are not bound to disclose to their beneficiaries their reasons for exercising a discretionary power.[53] Statements of principle from those cases were premised on considerations very different from those with which I am concerned here. Here, the trustees’ reasons are sought to enable an expert valuer to advance his valuation. General concepts about whether trustees are bound to disclose their reasons are of little, if any, utility in my view.[53] In Re Londonderry’s Settlement; Peat v Walsh [1965] Ch 918, applied in Crowe v Stevedoring Employees Retirement Fund Pty Ltd [2003] VSC 316 and Hartigan Nominees Pty Ltd v Rydge (1992) 29 NSWLR 405. I take the view that Mr T is entitled to be provided with information and documents that provide reasons for the making of the 2020 amendments to the trust deeds. With that information and documentation the veracity of Mr K’s stated reasons for the amendments can be measured. It may be that at least one reason for the amendments was a desire of the trustees to limit a divorcing couple among the beneficiaries from having recourse to interests of beneficiaries under the trusts. If so, that may be relevant to the s 106B claim. Mr Shaw KC may well be correct when submitting that the valuation of the husband’s interest prior to and after the 2020 deeds is relevant. But it is equally important to know why the 2020 trust deed amendments were made at all and whether Mr K’s account for the amendments is correct. The documentation relevant to the reasons for making the 2020 amendments is likely to provide some of the answers. I do not agree that there is no warrant for Mr T’s request for that information. His requests for information and documentation should not be sanitized by the trustees. I accept that the process underway in requiring the trustees to provide documentation is invasive. Understandably, the trustees are likely unwilling to provide documentation unless its need is made demonstrably apparent. That said, the task that has been set of Mr T in this case is novel. No case law exists to offer guidance about what a valuer of the dual choses in action in issue in this case should be given to enable the valuer to complete the valuer’s task. That task is sufficiently complicated without the intervention of the 2020 amending trust deeds. Knowing why the relevant trusts were amended is a matter of importance to Mr T. In my view he should be told in order to enable him to perform the task of valuing the dual choses in action. It must be remembered that French CJ in Kennon v Spry[54] held that valuing the dual choses in action in issue in this case is not beyond the actuarial arts. Precisely how to undertake that valuation went unexplained in Kennon v Spry. I take the view that it is unwise to fetter the legitimate requests made by Mr T for documentation. I also take the view that it is no reason to impede his access to such information for the trustees to say, in effect, that Mr T has already been provided with all he needs. It is not up to the trustees (or, more importantly, one director of one trustee) to tell a highly qualified valuer what the valuer needs to perform his tasks. [54] (2008) 238 CLR 366.