Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Noumi Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Noumi Ltd [2024] FCA 349

File number: NSD 163 of 2023
Judgment of: SHARIFF J
Date of judgment: 11 April 2024
Catchwords:

EVIDENCE – informal discovery – claim of legal professional privilege over investigation report and communications protocol – whether privilege attaches to these communications – requirements of legal professional privilege – held that privilege attaches to the relevant communications

EVIDENCE – informal discovery – waiver – whether privilege attaching to the investigation report was waived by its disclosure to regulator – whether privilege attaching to the investigation report was waived by references in ASX announcements – considerations as to implied or imputed waiver – whether the privilege holder’s conduct was inconsistent with the maintenance of confidentiality in the privileged communication – held that privilege was waived by disclosure to regulator but not waived by reason of the ASX announcements

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – whether non-publication and suppression orders should be made – whether orders necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice – orders made  

Legislation:

Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) ss 19, 68 and 76

Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 180(1), 344, 674(2), 674(2A), 1309(2) and 1309(12)

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 37AF, 37AJ(2)

Cases cited:

Archer Capital 4A Pty Ltd as trustee for the Archer Capital Trust 4A v Sage Group plc (No 2) [2013] FCA 1098

Australian Broadcasting Commission v Parish (1980) 29 ALR 228

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v NSW Ports Operations Hold Co Pty Ltd [2020] FCA 1232

Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (No 2) [2020] FCA 1013

AWB Ltd v Cole (No 5) [2006] FCA 1234; (2006) 155 FCR 30

AWB Ltd v Cole [2006] FCA 571; (2006) 152 FCR 382

Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52

Barnes v Commissioner of Taxation [2007] FCAFC 88

Benecke v National Australia Bank (1993) 35 NSWLR 110

BHP Petroleum (Australia) Pty Ltd v Sagasco South East Linc [2001] WASCA 159

Cadbury Schweppes Pty Ltd v Amcor Limited [2008] FCA 88

Cantor v Audi Australia Pty Limited (No 4) [2019] FCA 1633

Cantor v Audi Australia Pty Ltd [2016] FCA 1391

Commissioner of Australian Federal Police v Propend Financial Pty Ltd (1997) 188 CLR 501

Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia v Pratt Holdings Pty Ltd [2005] FCA 1247

Commissioner of Taxation v PricewaterhouseCoopers [2022] FCA 278

Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions v Citigroup Global Markets Australia Pty Ltd [2021] FCA 511

Craine v Colonial Mutual Fire Insurance Co Ltd (1920) 28 CLR 305

Daniels Corporation International Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2002] HCA 49; (2002) 213 CLR 543

DSE (Holdings) Pty Ltd v InterTAN Inc [2003] FCA 1191; (2003) 135 FCR 151

Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 201 CLR 49

Expense Reduction Analysts Group Pty Ltd v Armstrong Strategic Management and Marketing Pty Ltd [2013]…

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Details
Case
[2024] FCA 349
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Noumi Ltd, the primary dispute centred around claims of legal professional privilege over an investigation report and communications protocol, with the Federal Court of Australia tasked with determining the validity of these claims. The case hinged on whether privilege attached to the investigation report and related communications, and if so, whether this privilege was waived by certain disclosures.

The court was required to decide whether the privilege attached to the investigation report and communications and, if so, whether this privilege was waived by the disclosure of the report to the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) and references in Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) announcements. The analysis involved examining the dominant purpose test for legal professional privilege, which requires the communication to have been created primarily for the purpose of obtaining or giving legal advice.

The court found that privilege did indeed attach to the relevant communications, as they were created for the dominant purpose of obtaining legal advice. However, the privilege was deemed waived by the disclosure of the investigation report to ASIC, as this disclosure was made voluntarily and in the context of a regulatory investigation. The court distinguished the case from previous decisions, such as Cantor and Goldberg, by highlighting the differences in the nature and purpose of the disclosures in those cases compared to the present one. The court also ruled that the privilege was not waived by the ASX announcements, as these did not constitute an implied or imputed waiver. The court concluded that the disclosure to ASIC, which was made with knowledge of the potential for proceedings against third parties, was inconsistent with maintaining the confidentiality required for privilege to exist.

In light of the above findings, the court made orders requiring the parties to confer and propose short minutes of orders to give effect to the court's reasons. If the parties could not agree, they were to file written submissions within a specified timeframe. Additionally, the court ordered that the unredacted version of the reasons be suppressed until the completion of related proceedings in the Supreme Court of Victoria or until further order of the court.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Within 7 days, the parties are to confer and provide by email to the Associate to Shariff J any agreed or competing proposed short minutes of orders:

(a) to give effect to the Court’s reasons; and

(b) in relation to the order as to costs that the Court should make.

2. In the event that the parties do not reach agreement as to the proposed orders to be made by the Court pursuant to Order 1, within 14 days the parties are to file written submissions of no more than 5 pages in support of their respective positions as to the orders the Court should make including in relation to costs.

3. Pursuant to s 37AF of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), the unredacted version of these reasons be suppressed until the completion (including by way of appeal) of Proceeding No S ECI 2020 04505 in the Supreme Court of Victoria or until further order of the Court.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

In light of the above analysis, I am satisfied that Noumi waived privilege in the PwC Report by voluntarily disclosing it to ASIC. This finding also means that privilege has been waived in the documents identified as Documents 2 to 5 and 8 to 14.D.3.4 The decisions in Cantor, Goldberg, Woollahra, Betfair and Kirby For completeness, I have addressed the parties’ various submissions which relied upon other cases. Both ASIC and Noumi placed reliance upon Cantor. Mr Macleod contended that it was distinguishable and, alternatively, wrongly decided. I do not regard the decision in Cantor as analogous. There, the disclosure by Volkswagen to the German regulator did not contemplate that the regulator would use the information outside the limited purpose for which it was disclosed, such as the commencement of proceedings against Volkswagen or third parties. There was also no relevant unfairness to inform the question of inconsistency as there was no correspondence or, as Bromwich J described it, “nexus”, between the parties to the regulatory investigation in Germany and the class action proceedings in Australia. By contrast, in the present proceedings, the disclosure was made to ASIC in the course of an investigation leading to the commencement by ASIC of proceedings against both Noumi and third parties including Mr Macleod. As to Bromwich J’s reference to the requirement for a “nexus” in [169] of Cantor, his Honour’s reasons need to be read and understood in the context of the arguments advanced in that case as to “unfairness”. His Honour reasoned that, because there was no relevant connection or nexus between the regulatory process in Germany and the class action proceedings before the Court, there was no relevant unfairness to the class action litigants by which to inform the conclusion as to inconsistency. I do not understand his Honour to have been erecting a general test of nexus, and I do not understand his Honour to have been applying a two-step test or giving precedence to a test of unfairness above any question of inconsistency. Mr Macleod placed considerable reliance on Goldberg. I do not regard the factual circumstances of that decision as being determinative here. In Goldberg, it was found that the disclosure to the Law Society was made for the “calculated purpose” of demonstrating the reliability of Mr Goldberg’s denial of the allegation of failure to account. No such calculated purpose on the part of Noumi can be discerned here. Goldberg was also decided prior to Mann, such that the question of whether the disclosure gave rise to an imputed waiver of privilege was resolved by reference to general considerations of fairness. That is no longer the law. Noumi placed considerable reliance upon the decision of Giles J in Woollahra. That case is also distinguishable. The critical parts of Giles J’s reasoning at 540D-F were that the “disclosure was confined to the inspectors” and that evidence demonstrated that there had been no greater dissemination than flowed from the fact that inspectors were officers of the Department. Critically, there was no evidence before Giles J that the Council had permitted particular uses of the relevant document by the inspector, only that it was given subject to obligations of confidence. In the present case, Noumi knew and expressly agreed that ASIC could use the information for the purposes specified in the VDA in the context of what it knew to be the prospect of a regulatory investigation and potential proceedings against a third party, Mr Macleod.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

A communication will only attract legal professional privilege if it was brought into existence for the dominant purpose of giving or obtaining legal advice or the provision of legal services: Esso at [61] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron and Gummow JJ); Daniels Corporation International Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2002] HCA 49; (2002) 213 CLR 543 at [9] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ). Privilege can only exist and be maintained when the conditions of the test for its existence are strictly complied with and continue to apply: Grant v Downs (1976) 135 CLR 674 at 677 (Barwick CJ), 685, 688, 690 (Stephen, Mason and Murphy JJ); Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52 at 86 (Murphy J), 95-96 (Wilson J), 114-116 (Deane J), 122 (Dawson J); Commissioner of Australian Federal Police v Propend Financial Pty Ltd (1997) 188 CLR 501 at 508 (Brennan CJ), 540, 543 (Gaudron J), 552 (McHugh J), 568 (Gummow J), 584-585 (Kirby J); Esso at [35] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron and Gummow JJ); and Daniels Corporation at [9]-[11] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ). For legal advice privilege, a confidential communication with a legal adviser will not attract privilege unless it has the requisite dominant purpose associated with obtaining or giving legal advice, although that concept is to be interpreted widely so as to include advice as to what a client should prudently and sensibly do in the relevant legal context: AWB Ltd v Cole [2006] FCA 571; (2006) 152 FCR 382 at [100]; DSE (Holdings) Pty Ltd v InterTAN Inc [2003] FCA 1191; (2003) 135 FCR 151 at [45]. In this sense, courts have taken a “pragmatic and realistic approach” in circumstances where advice involves legal and commercial elements, provided always that the dominant purpose test is met: Barnes v Commissioner of Taxation [2007] FCAFC 88 at [8]. The dominant purpose test can be difficult to apply when there are competing purposes. To characterise a purpose as “dominant” entails that it is the “prevailing or paramount purpose or one which predominates over other purposes”: AWB v Cole at [105]; Archer Capital 4A Pty Ltd as trustee for the Archer Capital Trust 4A v Sage Group plc (No 2) [2013] FCA 1098 at [11]; Kenquist Nominees Pty Ltd v Campbell (No 5) [2018] FCA 853 at [11]. If two purposes are of equal weight, “neither can be said to be the dominant purpose”: Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions v Citigroup Global Markets Australia Pty Ltd [2021] FCA 511 at [95](f). If the most that can be said on the evidence is that one of the purposes of the communication included providing legal advice to the client, privilege will not apply: Esso at [50]. If the decision to bring the document into existence would have been made irrespective of any purpose of obtaining legal advice, the latter purpose cannot be dominant: Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia v Pratt Holdings Pty Ltd [2005] FCA 1247 at [30](8). Legal professional privilege is not limited to communications between lawyer and client, but may also cover communications with a third party if those communications are made for the dominant purpose of a lawyer providing legal services: Pratt Holdings Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation [2004] FCAFC 122; (2004) 136 FCR 357. However, privilege does not extend “to third party advices to the principal simply because they are then ‘routed’ to the legal adviser”: Pratt Holdings at [46] (Finn J). The principle in Pratt Holdings extends to communications from the client to the third party and not only communications emanating from the third party. In this way, the privilege captures communications between the client and third party during the “iterative process” of the third party preparing a commissioned document: New South Wales v Betfair Pty Ltd [2009] FCAFC 160; (2009) 180 FCR 543 at [36]-[40].