FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Noumi Ltd [2024] FCA 349
File number: NSD 163 of 2023 Judgment of: SHARIFF J Date of judgment: 11 April 2024 Catchwords: EVIDENCE – informal discovery – claim of legal professional privilege over investigation report and communications protocol – whether privilege attaches to these communications – requirements of legal professional privilege – held that privilege attaches to the relevant communications
EVIDENCE – informal discovery – waiver – whether privilege attaching to the investigation report was waived by its disclosure to regulator – whether privilege attaching to the investigation report was waived by references in ASX announcements – considerations as to implied or imputed waiver – whether the privilege holder’s conduct was inconsistent with the maintenance of confidentiality in the privileged communication – held that privilege was waived by disclosure to regulator but not waived by reason of the ASX announcements
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – whether non-publication and suppression orders should be made – whether orders necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice – orders made
Legislation: Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) ss 19, 68 and 76
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 180(1), 344, 674(2), 674(2A), 1309(2) and 1309(12)
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 37AF, 37AJ(2)
Cases cited: Australian Broadcasting Commission v Parish (1980) 29 ALR 228
BHP Petroleum (Australia) Pty Ltd v Sagasco South East Linc [2001] WASCA 159
Commissioner of Australian Federal Police v Propend Financial Pty Ltd (1997) 188 CLR 501
Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia v Pratt Holdings Pty Ltd [2005] FCA 1247
Commissioner of Taxation v PricewaterhouseCoopers [2022] FCA 278
Craine v Colonial Mutual Fire Insurance Co Ltd (1920) 28 CLR 305
Daniels Corporation International Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2002] HCA 49; (2002) 213 CLR 543
DSE (Holdings) Pty Ltd v InterTAN Inc [2003] FCA 1191; (2003) 135 FCR 151
Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 201 CLR 49
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- Case
- [2024] FCA 349
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was required to decide whether the privilege attached to the investigation report and communications and, if so, whether this privilege was waived by the disclosure of the report to the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) and references in Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) announcements. The analysis involved examining the dominant purpose test for legal professional privilege, which requires the communication to have been created primarily for the purpose of obtaining or giving legal advice.
The court found that privilege did indeed attach to the relevant communications, as they were created for the dominant purpose of obtaining legal advice. However, the privilege was deemed waived by the disclosure of the investigation report to ASIC, as this disclosure was made voluntarily and in the context of a regulatory investigation. The court distinguished the case from previous decisions, such as Cantor and Goldberg, by highlighting the differences in the nature and purpose of the disclosures in those cases compared to the present one. The court also ruled that the privilege was not waived by the ASX announcements, as these did not constitute an implied or imputed waiver. The court concluded that the disclosure to ASIC, which was made with knowledge of the potential for proceedings against third parties, was inconsistent with maintaining the confidentiality required for privilege to exist.
In light of the above findings, the court made orders requiring the parties to confer and propose short minutes of orders to give effect to the court's reasons. If the parties could not agree, they were to file written submissions within a specified timeframe. Additionally, the court ordered that the unredacted version of the reasons be suppressed until the completion of related proceedings in the Supreme Court of Victoria or until further order of the court.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Within 7 days, the parties are to confer and provide by email to the Associate to Shariff J any agreed or competing proposed short minutes of orders:
(a) to give effect to the Court’s reasons; and
(b) in relation to the order as to costs that the Court should make.
2. In the event that the parties do not reach agreement as to the proposed orders to be made by the Court pursuant to Order 1, within 14 days the parties are to file written submissions of no more than 5 pages in support of their respective positions as to the orders the Court should make including in relation to costs.
3. Pursuant to s 37AF of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), the unredacted version of these reasons be suppressed until the completion (including by way of appeal) of Proceeding No S ECI 2020 04505 in the Supreme Court of Victoria or until further order of the Court.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
A communication will only attract legal professional privilege if it was brought into existence for the dominant purpose of giving or obtaining legal advice or the provision of legal services: Esso at [61] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron and Gummow JJ); Daniels Corporation International Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2002] HCA 49; (2002) 213 CLR 543 at [9] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ). Privilege can only exist and be maintained when the conditions of the test for its existence are strictly complied with and continue to apply: Grant v Downs (1976) 135 CLR 674 at 677 (Barwick CJ), 685, 688, 690 (Stephen, Mason and Murphy JJ); Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52 at 86 (Murphy J), 95-96 (Wilson J), 114-116 (Deane J), 122 (Dawson J); Commissioner of Australian Federal Police v Propend Financial Pty Ltd (1997) 188 CLR 501 at 508 (Brennan CJ), 540, 543 (Gaudron J), 552 (McHugh J), 568 (Gummow J), 584-585 (Kirby J); Esso at [35] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron and Gummow JJ); and Daniels Corporation at [9]-[11] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ). For legal advice privilege, a confidential communication with a legal adviser will not attract privilege unless it has the requisite dominant purpose associated with obtaining or giving legal advice, although that concept is to be interpreted widely so as to include advice as to what a client should prudently and sensibly do in the relevant legal context: AWB Ltd v Cole [2006] FCA 571; (2006) 152 FCR 382 at [100]; DSE (Holdings) Pty Ltd v InterTAN Inc [2003] FCA 1191; (2003) 135 FCR 151 at [45]. In this sense, courts have taken a “pragmatic and realistic approach” in circumstances where advice involves legal and commercial elements, provided always that the dominant purpose test is met: Barnes v Commissioner of Taxation [2007] FCAFC 88 at [8]. The dominant purpose test can be difficult to apply when there are competing purposes. To characterise a purpose as “dominant” entails that it is the “prevailing or paramount purpose or one which predominates over other purposes”: AWB v Cole at [105]; Archer Capital 4A Pty Ltd as trustee for the Archer Capital Trust 4A v Sage Group plc (No 2) [2013] FCA 1098 at [11]; Kenquist Nominees Pty Ltd v Campbell (No 5) [2018] FCA 853 at [11]. If two purposes are of equal weight, “neither can be said to be the dominant purpose”: Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions v Citigroup Global Markets Australia Pty Ltd [2021] FCA 511 at [95](f). If the most that can be said on the evidence is that one of the purposes of the communication included providing legal advice to the client, privilege will not apply: Esso at [50]. If the decision to bring the document into existence would have been made irrespective of any purpose of obtaining legal advice, the latter purpose cannot be dominant: Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia v Pratt Holdings Pty Ltd [2005] FCA 1247 at [30](8). Legal professional privilege is not limited to communications between lawyer and client, but may also cover communications with a third party if those communications are made for the dominant purpose of a lawyer providing legal services: Pratt Holdings Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation [2004] FCAFC 122; (2004) 136 FCR 357. However, privilege does not extend “to third party advices to the principal simply because they are then ‘routed’ to the legal adviser”: Pratt Holdings at [46] (Finn J). The principle in Pratt Holdings extends to communications from the client to the third party and not only communications emanating from the third party. In this way, the privilege captures communications between the client and third party during the “iterative process” of the third party preparing a commissioned document: New South Wales v Betfair Pty Ltd [2009] FCAFC 160; (2009) 180 FCR 543 at [36]-[40].