Kenquist Nominees Pty Ltd v Campbell (No 5)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Kenquist Nominees Pty Limited v Campbell (No 5) [2018] FCA 853

File number: NSD 1364 of 2015
Judge: THAWLEY J
Date of judgment: 18 June 2018
Catchwords:

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for discovery of documents – legal advice privilege – where non-party to proceeding resisted order requiring respondents to produce discovered documents on the basis that discovery would reveal communications subject to legal advice privilege – where confidential bundle of sample documents provided to Court for examination – whether sample documents privileged

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – waiver of legal advice privilege – whether privilege attaching to sample documents waived by limited disclosure to third party

Cases cited:

Archer Capital 4A Pty Ltd v Sage Group Plc(No 2) (2013) 306 ALR 384

Asahi Holdings (Australia) Pty Ltd v Pacific Equity Partners Pty Limited (No 4) [2014] FCA 796

Australian Rugby Union Ltd v Hospital Products (1999) 165 ALR 253

AWB Ltd v Cole (2006) 152 FCR 382

AWB Ltd v Cole (No 5) (2006) 155 FCR 30

Balabel v Air India [1988] Ch 317

Cargill Australia Ltd v Viterra Malt Pty Ltd (No 8) [2018] VSC 193

Commissioner of Australian Federal Police v Propend Finance Pty Ltd (1997) 188 CLR 501

Commissioner of Taxation v PrattHoldings Pty Ltd (2004) 136 FCR 357

Commissioner of Taxation v Pratt Holdings Pty Ltd (2005) 225 ALR 266

Daniels Corporation International Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2002) 213 CLR 543

Desane Properties Pty Ltd v New South Wales [2018] NSWSC 173

DSE (Holdings) Pty Ltd v InterTAN Inc (2003) 135 FCR 151

Esso Australia Resources Limited v Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 201 CLR 49

Gotha City v Sotheby’s [1998] 1 WLR 114

Grantv Downs (1976) 135 CLR 674

Kamasaee v Commonwealth (No 2) [2016] VSC 404

Kenquist Nominees Pty Limited v Campbell (No 2) [2016] FCA 911

Lakatoi v Walker [1999] NSWSC 156

Mann v Carnell (1999) 201 CLR 1

Osland v Secretary, Department of Justice (2008) 234 CLR 275

Date of hearing: 3 May 2018
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations
Sub-area: Corporations and Corporate Insolvency
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 113
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr A S Martin SC and Mr T L Bagley
Solicitor for the Applicant: Corrs Chambers Westgarth
Counsel for the First, Second and Third Respondents: Ms J D Little
Solicitor for the First, Second and Third Respondents: Norton Rose Fulbright Australia
Counsel for the Fourth Respondent: Mr P Jammy
Solicitor for the Fourth Respondent: Wotton + Kearney
Counsel for the Fifth Respondent: Mr L T Livingston
Solicitor for the Fifth Respondent: Sparke Helmore Lawyers
Counsel for QRxPharma Limited: Mr T Maltz
Solicitor for QRxPharma Limited: Arnold Bloch Leibler

ORDERS

NSD 1364 of 2015
BETWEEN:

KENQUIST NOMINEES PTY LIMITED ACN 008 797 225 AS TRUSTEE FOR THE KENQUIST SUPERANNUATION FUND

Applicant

AND:

PETER CAMPBELL

First Respondent

MICHAEL QUINN

Second Respondent

JOHN HOLADAY (and others named in the Schedule)

Third Respondent

QRXPHARMA…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 853
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Kenquist Nominees Pty Ltd v Campbell (No 5) involved the applicant, Kenquist Nominees, seeking an order for the discovery of documents from various respondents, including QRx, a non-party to the proceeding. The dispute centred on whether certain discovered documents were protected by legal advice privilege, a common law principle that allows a person to resist the production of documents that would reveal confidential communications between a client and their lawyer made for the dominant purpose of obtaining legal advice. The respondents, including Morgans and DibbsBarker, resisted the order on the basis that discovery would reveal communications subject to legal advice privilege.

The legal issues the court had to decide included whether the privilege applied to the documents in question and whether the privilege was waived by limited disclosure to a third party. The court had to determine whether the communications were made for the dominant purpose of giving or obtaining legal advice and whether the privilege was waived by the limited disclosure to Morgans. The court also had to consider whether the privilege was waived by the disclosure of sample documents to the court for examination.

The court concluded that Document 47, an attachment to a "host email," was a draft legal opinion and was privileged. The court rejected the argument that Morgans was authorised to use the confidential material provided to it, including the 2009 Legal Opinion, in these proceedings. The court held that the pleading by Morgans in its defence of these proceedings of the 2009 Legal Opinion was not done "in connection with" Morgans’ services to and relationship with QRx and is not a matter which was relevantly "authorised" by the statement made by Morgans in its retainer letter sent to QRx.

The court ordered the parties to file within 7 days agreed short minutes of order reflecting the reasons for decision or, failing agreement, arrange within 14 days for the matter to be relisted. This case highlights the importance of determining the dominant purpose of communications and the potential consequences of limited disclosure of privileged material.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The parties file within 7 days agreed short minutes of order reflecting the reasons for decision or, failing agreement, arrange within 14 days for the matter to be relisted.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The claim of privilege was abandoned by QRx with respect to Documents 6, 17, 25, 26, 39, 42 and 46. Counsel for QRx properly indicated that QRx would re-examine the discovered documents in order to determine whether there were documents in respect of which the claim for privilege should be abandoned for the same reasons for which privilege was abandoned in relation to these documents. BACKGROUND The background to the principal proceeding is set out in the decision of Yates J in Kenquist Nominees Pty Limited v Campbell (No 2) [2016] FCA 911 at [3]-[15]. In summary, the applicant commenced the proceeding as a representative proceeding pursuant to Part IVA of the Federal Court Act 1976 (Cth) on behalf of itself and other persons (group members) who obtained a security interest in QRx under certain rights issues, placements and plans, or otherwise on the financial market operated by the Australian Securities Exchange Limited (ASX) during the period 6 November 2009 to 25 June 2012. The applicant claims that QRx breached its disclosure and capital raising obligations in relation to three capital raisings undertaken in 2009, 2010 and 2011 by failing to disclose to the ASX and to potential investors information that would have been material to making a decision to invest in QRx. It is alleged that the group members suffered loss or damage by reason of QRx’s disclosure and capital raising contraventions. The proceeding was brought against the first to third respondents as directors of QRx at the relevant time; against the fourth respondent, Morgans, which acted as lead manager, joint lead manager and underwriter in relation to the three capital raisings; and against the fifth respondent, DibbsBarker, as legal advisor to QRx. RELEVANT PRINCIPLESOverview of legal advice privilege The present dispute, which is concerned with pre-trial disclosure and inspection rather than the adducing of evidence, is to be determined according to the common law rather than the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth): Esso Australia Resources Limited v Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 201 CLR 49 at [17]-[28] (per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron and Gummow JJ); at [64] (per McHugh J). Legal advice privilege “may be availed of by a person to resist the giving of information or the production of documents which would reveal communications between a client and his or her lawyer made for the dominant purpose of giving or obtaining legal advice”: Daniels Corporation International Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2002) 213 CLR 543 at [9], per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ. The “dominant” purpose is a prevailing or paramount purpose or one which predominates over other purposes: AWB Ltd v Cole (2006) 152 FCR 382 at [105], per Young J; Archer Capital 4A Pty Ltd v Sage Group Plc(No 2) (2013) 306 ALR 384 at [11], per Wigney J. The purpose for which a communication is made is a question of fact to be determined objectively from the nature of the relevant communication, the content of the communication, the relevant commercial context and the relationships between the parties: Commissioner of Taxation v Pratt Holdings Pty Ltd (2005) 225 ALR 266 at [30], per Kenny J; AWB at [110]. Notwithstanding that the purpose must be determined objectively, evidence of subjective purpose is relevant and although not necessarily conclusive, can be decisive: Esso at [172], per Callinan J; AWB Ltd v Cole (No 5) (2006) 155 FCR 30 (AWB No 5) at [44(2)], per Young J; Archer at [11]; Asahi Holdings (Australia) Pty Ltd v Pacific Equity Partners Pty Limited (No 4) [2014] FCA 796 at [32]. Of course, mere assertion that disclosure may tend to reveal privileged material is inadequate: DSE (Holdings) Pty Ltd v InterTAN Inc (2003) 135 FCR 151 at [29].

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Document 47 was an attachment to a “host email” contained at Exhibit JOM-3, pages 147 to 149. The attachment is a draft legal opinion and is privileged. CONCLUSION The conclusions have been set out above. The parties should file within 7 days agreed short minutes of order reflecting the reasons for decision or, failing agreement, arrange within 14 days for the matter to be relisted.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Morgans was aware of the obligation of confidentiality on the members of the Due Diligence Committee, the Due Diligence Planning Memorandum having been provided to Morgans. Its executives were present when the Due Diligence Planning Memorandum was adopted by the members of the Due Diligence Committee. It does not matter that the observers did not themselves undertake an express obligation of confidentiality – cf: Australian Rugby Union Ltd v Hospital Products (1999) 165 ALR 253 at [44], per Sackville J. A reasonable participant would have understood from the circumstances that the confidentiality in sensitive information exchanged in the due diligence process should be respected. Consideration The disclosures made to Morgans were made confidentially and for a limited purpose. It may be accepted that the interests of Morgans and QRx were not completely overlapping and further that, in some limited respects, their interests were opposed. Morgans provided both management services and underwriting services. To the extent that the capital raisings were not fully subscribed and the conditions precedent were met, Morgans would have to underwrite. Both Morgans and QRx had an interest in the capital raisings going ahead and being successful. On the other hand, their interests diverged or were opposed so far as the issue or subscription price was concerned. None of the legal advice was shown to go to the subscription price nor to any dispute between QRx and Morgans. It is natural enough in this commercial context, as expanded upon below, for QRx to disclose privileged communications to Morgans without attracting the judgment that QRx’s conduct in disclosing the privileged material was inconsistent with the maintenance of confidentiality in those communications: Mann at [30]-[32]; Osland at [45]. It is true that the 2009 Underwriting Agreement did not contain an express obligation of confidentiality. However, the 27 September 2010 Morgans’ retainer under which Morgans was named “Lead Manager and Bookrunner” contained the following acknowledgement:The Company [QRx] should be aware that the Lead Manager and/or its related bodies corporate may be providing or may in the future provide financial or other services to other parties with conflicting interests. However, consistent with our long-standing policy to hold in confidence the affairs of our customers, we will not use confidential information obtained from the Company except in connection with our services to, and our relationship with, the Company, nor will we use on the Company’s behalf any confidential information obtained from any other customer. In oral submissions, Counsel for the applicant submitted that the conduct which was inconsistent with maintaining confidentiality was QRx authorising Morgans to use confidential information in connection with Morgans’ services to, and relationship with, QRx. This submission was advanced by reference to the words set out immediately above. An earlier retainer, dated 23 October 2009, contained a substantially similar acknowledgement. It was submitted that these words “authorised” Morgans to use the confidential material provided to it, including the 2009 Legal Opinion, in these proceedings. I reject that submission. Those words – which appear in the retainer letter under the heading “Certain Acknowledgements” – simply indicate that Morgans might also be providing services to other parties whose interests might conflict with those of QRx, and that Morgans would keep confidential any information obtained from QRx; Morgans would not use that information except in connection with its services to and relationship with QRx (as distinct from its services to and relationship with other clients). The pleading by Morgans in its defence of these proceedings of the 2009 Legal Opinion was not done “in connection with” Morgans’ services to and relationship with QRx and is not a matter which was relevantly “authorised” by the statement made by Morgans in its retainer letter sent to QRx.