Kenquist Nominees Pty Limited v Campbell (No 2)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Kenquist Nominees Pty Limited v Campbell (No 2) [2016] FCA 911

File number: NSD 1364 of 2015
Judge: YATES J
Date of judgment: 9 August 2016
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – pleadings – application to strike out – whether the pleading fails to disclose a reasonable cause of action – “knowledge” – “participation”  
Legislation: Federal Court Rules 2011 rr 16.21, 16.43
Cases cited:

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v SensaSlim Australia Pty Ltd (in liq) (No 5)
(2014) 98 ACSR 347; [2014] FCA 340

In the matter of HIH Insurance Limited (In Liquidation) [2016] NSWSC 482

Lifeplan Australia Friendly Society Ltd v Woff
[2016] FCA 248

Date of hearing: 25 July 2016
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations
Sub-area: Corporations and Corporate Insolvency
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 48
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr AS Martin SC with Mr T Bagley
Solicitor for the Applicant: Gillis Delaney Lawyers
Counsel for the Fourth Respondent: Mr P Jammy
Solicitor for the Fourth Respondent: Wotton + Kearney

ORDERS

NSD 1364 of 2015
BETWEEN:

KENQUIST NOMINEES PTY LIMITED ACN 008 797 224 ATF THE KENQUIST SUPERANNUATION FUND

Applicant

AND:

PETER CAMPBELL (and others named in the Schedule)

Respondents

JUDGE:

YATES J

DATE OF ORDER:

9 AUGUST 2016

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The applicant provide further and better particulars of the allegation made in paragraph 165(a) of the amended statement of claim filed on 2 May 2016 (the statement of claim), by 4.00 pm on 19 August 2016.

2.The interlocutory application filed on 3 June 2016 (the interlocutory application) be otherwise dismissed.

3.The fourth respondent file and serve its defence to the statement of claim, by 4.00 pm on 2 September 2016.

4.Paragraphs 169 and 172 of the statement of claim be amended by deleting therefrom the following words:  “in the decision by QRxPharma to engage”.

5.Paragraph 174 of the statement of claim be amended by deleting therefrom the following words:  “in authorising the decision by QRxPharma to engage”.

6.As between the applicant and the fourth respondent, the costs of the interlocutory application be the fourth respondent’s costs in the cause.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

YATES J:

INTRODUCTION

  1. By its interlocutory application filed on 3 June 2016 (the interlocutory application), the fourth respondent, Morgans Corporate Limited (Morgans), moves to strike out paragraphs 165 to 175 of the amended statement of claim filed on 2 May 2016 (the statement of claim). Morgans also moves to strike out paragraphs 200 and 202 of the statement of claim insofar as those paragraphs seek final relief against it. The basis for the strike-out is that the relevant paragraphs fail to disclose a reasonable cause of action: r 16.21(1)(e) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (FCR). 

  2. The points taken by Morgans are relatively confined.  They nevertheless require an understanding of…

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Details
Case
[2016] FCA 911
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Federal Court of Australia was asked to decide a matter between Kenquist Nominees Pty Limited and Campbell, among others. The dispute arose from the sale of shares in a company, where Kenquist claimed that Campbell, through Morgans, failed to disclose relevant information that would have impacted the share price. Specifically, Kenquist argued that Morgans did not disclose the denial of a Special Protocol Assessment (SPA) by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), which would have made the MoxDuo study more challenging. The legal issues revolved around whether the pleadings in the statement of claim were sufficient to establish a reasonable cause of action. Morgans argued that the statement of claim did not adequately allege that it had the requisite knowledge of the effect of the SPA denial. They contended that the pleadings failed to show that Morgans, through its representatives Mr Johnston and Ms Miller, had actual knowledge of the effect of the SPA denial.

The court considered whether the statement of claim sufficiently alleged that Morgans had actual knowledge of the effect of the SPA denial. Kenquist argued that the SPA denial was communicated to the due diligence committee, attended by Mr Johnston and Ms Miller, and that the SPA denial was explicit in its content. The court found that while the statement of claim did allege that Morgans knew of the SPA denial, it did not adequately plead that Mr Johnston or Ms Miller had actual knowledge of the effect of the SPA denial. The court held that the statement of claim failed to disclose a reasonable cause of action in this respect. Consequently, the court ordered Kenquist to provide further and better particulars regarding the allegation in paragraph 165(a) of the statement of claim, and directed that certain words be deleted from specific paragraphs of the statement of claim. The interlocutory application was dismissed, and the costs of the application were awarded to the fourth respondent.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The applicant provide further and better particulars of the allegation made in paragraph 165(a) of the amended statement of claim filed on 2 May 2016 (the statement of claim), by 4.00 pm on 19 August 2016.

2. The interlocutory application filed on 3 June 2016 (the interlocutory application) be otherwise dismissed.

3. The fourth respondent file and serve its defence to the statement of claim, by 4.00 pm on 2 September 2016.

4. Paragraphs 169 and 172 of the statement of claim be amended by deleting therefrom the following words: “in the decision by QRxPharma to engage”.

5. Paragraph 174 of the statement of claim be amended by deleting therefrom the following words: “in authorising the decision by QRxPharma to engage”.

6. As between the applicant and the fourth respondent, the costs of the interlocutory application be the fourth respondent’s costs in the cause.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Thus, Morgans submits, the statement of claim fails to plead the necessary allegation that Morgans, through Mr Johnston and Ms Miller, had the requisite knowledge of the effect of the SPA Denial.Consideration I do not accept the submission that the statement of claim does not plead actual knowledge on the part of Morgans in relation to the effect of the SPA Denial. Morgans’ submission does not give sufficient regard to the definition in paragraph 61 of the SPA Information as “the matters pleaded in paragraph 48”. These “matters” comprise aspects of the content of the SPA Denial letter and the effect that “the MoxDuo study would not be able to take advantage of the SPA process”. Paragraph 165(a) of the statement of claim specifically pleads that, in the relevant period, Morgans knew the SPA Information. Kenquist advances the argument that, even without the definition of the SPA Information provided by paragraph 61 of the statement of claim, paragraph 48 makes clear that the SPA Denial comprised the content and effect of the SPA Denial letter. Paragraph 76(f) of the statement of claim pleads that the SPA Denial was communicated to the due diligence committee on 6 November 2009—a meeting attended by Mr Johnston and Ms Miller. Kenquist argues that there are, therefore, two separate paths, each of which is sufficient to defeat Morgans’ submission. In making this submission, Kenquist equates the SPA Denial with the SPA Information. I am not persuaded that the statement of claim treats the SPA Denial and the SPA Information as equivalent expressions. Indeed, as Morgans submits, if that were so, there would be no point in having the separate definitions. I think the better reading of paragraph 48 is the one proffered by Morgans. Nevertheless, this construction does not win the day, in light of my conclusion expressed at [24] above. As to the related submission that the statement of claim does not plead that Mr Johnston or Ms Miller had actual knowledge of the effect of the SPA Denial (one of the defined elements of the SPA Information), Kenquist relies on the particulars provided to paragraph 165(a) of the statement of claim and certain other allegations that are pleaded. In submissions, it provided the following narrative. Firstly, Kenquist says that Morgans knew the contents of the SPA Denial itself. As I have noted, paragraph 76(f) of the statement of claim pleads that the SPA Denial was disclosed to the due diligence committee. This meeting took place on 6 November 2009. Paragraph 76(g) pleads that the SPA Denial was tabled. The particulars to paragraph 165(a) of the statement of claim state that Mr Johnston and Ms Miller were present at this meeting. Kenquist says that the SPA Denial letter is explicit: it informs the reader that the request for the SPA had been denied; that the FDA’s resources did not provide for a third review; and that QRx’s revised protocol for the MoxDuo study would be reviewed as a “regular protocol”. Kenquist says that it is apparent that the SPA Denial letter was a significant response from the regulator with whom QRx was negotiating.