Martin v Norton Rose Fulbright Australia

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Martin v Norton Rose Fulbright Australia [2019] FCAFC 234

Appeal from: Application for extension of time: Martin v Norton Rose Fulbright Australia (No 2) [2019] FCA 96
File number: SAD 40 of 2019
Judges: BESANKO, FLICK AND ABRAHAM JJ
Date of judgment: 18 December 2019
Catchwords:

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – leave to appeal from interlocutory decision granted – failure to file notice of appeal within time – application for extension of time – extension refused – delay on part of applicant – insufficient prospects of success – interests of justice – finality in litigation 

EVIDENCE – claim for legal professional privilege – discretion to inspect documents – discretion did not miscarry  

Legislation:

Federal Court of Australia Act1976 (Cth) ss 27, 37AF

Federal Court Rules2011 (Cth) r 36.05

Cases cited:

AZAEY v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 193

CDJ v VAJ (1998) 197 CLR 19

Grant v Downs (1976) 135 CLR 674

Hancock v Rinehart (Privilege) [2016] NSWSC 12

House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499

Martin v Norton Rose Fulbright Australia [2019] FCA 1101

Martin v Norton Rose Fulbright Australia (No 2) [2019] FCA 96

Reaper v Baycorp Collections PDL (Australia) Pty Ltd [2014] FCA 426

Rich v Harrington [2007] FCA 1987, (2007) 245 ALR 106

Rinehart v Rinehart [2016] NSWCA 58

Trade Practices Commission v Sterling (1979) 36 FLR 244

Waterford v Commonwealth of Australia [1987] 163 CLR 54.

Date of hearing: 26 November 2019
Registry: South Australia
Division: Fair Work Division
National Practice Area: Employment & Industrial Relations
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 52
Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant appeared in person
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr P Braham SC with Ms B Ng
Solicitor for the Respondent: King & Wood Mallesons

ORDERS

SAD 40 of 2019
BETWEEN:

THOMAS PATRICK MARTIN

Applicant

AND:

NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT AUSTRALIA

Respondent

JUDGES:

BESANKO, FLICK AND ABRAHAM JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

18 DECEMBER 2019

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application for an extension of time within which to file a notice of appeal dated 10 October 2019 be refused.

2.The application to adduce further evidence on the appeal dated 5 November 2019 be refused.

3.The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to the following:

(a)the application for leave to appeal dated 25 February 2019;

(b)the application for an extension of time within which to file a notice of appeal dated 10 October 2019;

(c)the application to adduce further evidence on appeal dated 5 November 2019; and

(d)the application to amend the application for an extension of time in which to file a notice of appeal dated 26 November 2019.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THE COURT:

  1. In February 2017 the Applicant in the present proceeding, Mr Thomas Martin, filed in this Court an Originating Application.  The Respondent was named as Norton Rose Fulbright Australia (“Norton Rose”), a firm of legal practitioners.   

  2. In…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCAFC 234
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Martin v Norton Rose Fulbright Australia, the applicant, Mr Martin, sought leave to appeal from an interlocutory decision and an extension of time to file a Notice of Appeal. The dispute primarily revolved around the refusal of the primary Judge to allow Mr Martin to inspect certain documents and the claim for legal professional privilege upheld by the primary Judge. The case was heard by the Federal Court of Australia.

The legal issues before the court were whether the refusal to grant an extension of time to file a Notice of Appeal was justified, whether additional evidence should be allowed on appeal, and whether the primary Judge’s exercise of discretion in upholding the claim for privilege was appropriate. The court had to consider the principles governing interlocutory appeals, the relevance of additional evidence, and the application of legal professional privilege.

The court held that the delay on the part of Mr Martin in seeking an extension of time and his conduct aimed at delaying the resolution of interlocutory disputes warranted the refusal of an extension. The court also found that the arguments sought to be pursued on appeal lacked sufficient prospects of success. The application to adduce additional evidence on appeal was refused as it was not of central relevance to the issues to be resolved on appeal. The court concluded that the discretion exercised by the primary Judge in upholding the claims for privilege did not miscarry.

The court's orders included the refusal of the application for an extension of time to file a Notice of Appeal and the application to adduce further evidence on appeal. Additionally, Mr Martin was ordered to pay the respondent's costs of and incidental to the various applications made in the proceeding.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for an extension of time within which to file a notice of appeal dated 10 October 2019 be refused.

2. The application to adduce further evidence on the appeal dated 5 November 2019 be refused.

3. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to the following:

(a) the application for leave to appeal dated 25 February 2019;

(b) the application for an extension of time within which to file a notice of appeal dated 10 October 2019;

(c) the application to adduce further evidence on appeal dated 5 November 2019; and

(d) the application to amend the application for an extension of time in which to file a notice of appeal dated 26 November 2019.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Irrespective of how other arguments may have been resolved, the arguments sought to be pursued on appeal as to appellable error on the part of the primary Judge in upholding the claims for privilege lacked any sufficient prospects of success to warrant an extension of time being granted.Additional evidence on appeal Outstanding is the further application by Mr Martin to adduce additional evidence on appeal. An appellate Court may admit additional evidence: Federal Court of Australia Act, s 27. It is a power which exists “to serve the demands of justice”: cf. CDJ v VAJ (1998) 197 CLR 172 at 202 per McHugh, Gummow and Callinan JJ. In the present case, the additional evidence sought to be adduced was understood to be the privilege documents said by Norton Rose to have been mistakenly provided to Mr Martin. These documents were provided to Mr Martin in July 2019. They were thus (obviously enough) not available to be tendered during the course of the hearing before the primary Judge when the hearing was conducted in December 2018 which preceded the judgment in February 2019: [2019] FCA 96. But the application made to this Court to adduce that evidence is to be refused for two reasons, either of which would be sufficient, namely:·the refusal of leave does not lead to irremediable prejudice to Mr Martin and there is no injustice; and/or ·the evidence is not of sufficiently central relevance to the issues to be resolved on appeal as to warrant the grant of leave. As to the former, Senior Counsel for Norton Rose was most probably correct in his submission that it is sufficient for the purposes of resisting Mr Martin’s application to adduce further evidence to make it abundantly clear to Mr Martin that the Respondent’s claim for privilege is being maintained and (on Senior Counsel’s approach) has not been waived. Although it would have been desirable to have had any argument as to whether the documents had been mistakenly provided to Mr Martin and any argument as to waiver of privilege resolved during the course of the present hearing, those arguments could not proceed without occasioning procedural unfairness to Mr Martin. The oral application for the return of the documents was thus, quite properly, abandoned. But any freedom on the part of Mr Martin to use such documents will have to be confronted when (for example) Mr Martin may seek to rely upon those documents when making a possible application to amend his Further Amended Statement of Claim or if he seeks to tender those documents during the course of any final hearing. Whether the provision of the documents in July 2019 operated as a waiver of a prior existing claim for privilege could then be tested. Given this conclusion, it is unnecessary to consider whether any attempt could be made to revisit the existing interlocutory decision upholding the claim for privilege by reason of the circumstances in which Mr Martin came to be in possession of some of the privileged documents. The refusal of leave to adduce the additional evidence on appeal thus does not preclude Mr Martin seeking to rely upon the documents at some later stage in the proceeding.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Any relevance that the documents now sought to be adduced may have had in respect to the relief sought in the proposed Amended Application fell away when leave to amend was refused.CONCLUSIONS The circumstances in which leave for an extension of time in which to file a Notice of Appeal should be granted are confined by well-accepted principles. One of those principles is that there is a public interest in interlocutory disputes being resolved quickly and expeditiously. Mr Martin has done little to either have his Application for leave to appeal or his Application for an extension of time in which to file a Notice of Appeal resolved quickly and expeditiously. Indeed his conduct is such as to be properly characterised as conduct more directed to delaying the resolution of interlocutory disputes and conduct directed to ensuring that the proposed final hearing in about March 2020 is delayed. There may be many reasons why a plaintiff seeking relief may wish to defer a final hearing as long as possible. It is unnecessary, and indeed imprudent, to speculate as to what his reasons may be. His delay in seeking an extension of time in which to file a Notice of Appeal in the present case is such as to warrant an extension of time being refused. Even if attention were shifted to the prospects of success of the arguments sought to be advanced had time been extended, the prospects of success are not such as to warrant an extension of time. The Application for an extension of time is thus refused. It is therefore unnecessary to resolve the substantive appeal or the Notice of Contention which was otherwise sought to be relied on by the Respondent. The application to adduce additional evidence on appeal should also be refused. There is no reason why the costs of the present hearing should not follow the event. The issues pursued, and the manner in which those issues have been pursued, should be resolved now and not deferred to be resolved as part of the overall costs of the proceeding. THE ORDERS OF THE COURT ARE:1.The application for an extension of time within which to file a notice of appeal dated 10 October 2019 be refused.2.The application to adduce further evidence on the appeal dated 5 November 2019 be refused.3.The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to the following:(a)the application for leave to appeal dated 25 February 2019;(b)the application for an extension of time within which to file a notice of appeal dated 10 October 2019;(c)the application to adduce further evidence on appeal dated 5 November 2019; and(d)the application to amend the application for an extension of time in which to file a notice of appeal dated 26 November 2019.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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