Martin v Norton Rose Fulbright Australia

Link copied
Case Copied 34 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Martin v Norton Rose Fulbright Australia [2019] FCA 1101

Appeal from: Application for leave to appeal: Martin v Norton Rose Fulbright Australia (No 2) [2019] FCA 96
File number: SAD 40 of 2019
Judge: WHITE J
Date of judgment: 15 July 2019
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for leave to appeal against an interlocutory judgment of a Judge of this Court – s 24(1A) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) – primary Judge dismissed an interlocutory application of the Applicant concerning issues of discovery and claims of legal professional privilege – whether there is sufficient doubt about the correctness of the primary Judge’s decision in the light of conflicting first instance decisions – leave to appeal granted in respect of limited grounds.
Legislation:

Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) Sch 2, Australian Consumer Law, s 18

Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) Pt 3‑1

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 24(1A)

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 1.21, 29.08

Cases cited:

Adam P Brown Male Fashions Pty Ltd v Philip Morris Inc [1981] HCA 39; (1981) 148 CLR 170

Aquila Coal Pty Ltd v Bowen Central Coal Pty Ltd [2013] QSC 82

Archer Capital 4A Pty Ltd (as trustee for the Archer Capital Trust 4A) v Sage Group plc (No 2) [2013] FCA 1098; (2013) 306 ALR 384

Commissioner of Australian Federal Police v Propend Finance Pty Ltd [1997] HCA 3; (1997) 188 CLR 501

Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc [1991] FCA 844; (1991) 33 FCR 397

Dye v Commonwealth Securities Ltd (No 5) [2010] FCA 950

Grant v Downs [1976] HCA 63; (1976) 135 CLR 674

Hancock v Rinehart (Privilege) [2016] NSWSC 12

House v The King [1936] HCA 40; (1936) 55 CLR 499

Lawrie v Carey DCM [2016] NTSC 23

Mortgage Results Pty Ltd v Millsave Holdings Pty Ltd (Legal Privilege) [2017] VSC 704

R v Bell; ex parte Lees [1980] HCA 26; (1980) 146 CLR 141

Re Southland Coal Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 899

Rich v Harrington [2007] FCA 1987; (2007) 245 ALR 106

Rinehart v Rinehart [2016] NSWCA 58

Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd v Apple Inc. [2013] FCAFC 138

Seven Network Ltd v News Ltd [2005] FCA 142

Seven Network Ltd v News Ltd [2005] FCA 1551; (2005) 225 ALR 672

Tavcol Pty Ltd v Valbeet Pty Ltd [2016] NSWSC 1002

Telstra Corporation Ltd v Minister for Communications, Information Technology and the Arts (No 2) [2007] FCA 1445

The Attorney‑General for the Northern Territory v Kearney [1985] HCA 60; (1985) 158 CLR 500

Waterford v The Commonwealth of Australia [1987] HCA 25; (1987) 163 CLR 54

Date of hearing: 23, 24 and 27 May 2019 and determined on the papers
Date of last submissions: 7 June 2019 (Respondent).  The Applicant did not file any further submissions.
Registry: South Australia
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Employment…
CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Martin v Norton Rose Fulbright Australia and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2019] FCA 1101
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In this case, the applicant, Mr Martin, sought leave to appeal against an interlocutory judgment of Charlesworth J. The primary dispute concerned issues of discovery and claims of legal professional privilege. The Full Court of Australia was required to determine whether there was sufficient doubt about the correctness of the primary Judge’s decision in light of conflicting first instance decisions. The court examined several grounds for appeal, including the quality of evidence supporting claims of privilege, the decision to inspect documents, and whether communications were made in furtherance of a fraud.

The Full Court found that Mr Martin had not demonstrated sufficient doubt about the correctness of the primary Judge’s decision on several grounds. The court noted that the conclusion on these issues at the interlocutory stage did not preclude Mr Martin from pursuing them as substantive matters at trial. However, regarding Grounds 5, 6, and 7, the Full Court found that there was a reasonable basis for reconsidering the primary Judge’s assessment of the evidence supporting claims of privilege, the decision to inspect documents, and the independence of the parties involved. These grounds were considered to have sufficient merit for appeal.

Accordingly, the Full Court granted leave to appeal on limited grounds. Mr Martin was granted leave to appeal concerning Grounds 5, 6, and 7 but was refused leave to appeal regarding Grounds 1 to 4 and Ground 8. The Full Court's decision highlighted the importance of demonstrating clear error or significant doubt in interlocutory appeal applications.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The Applicant is granted leave to appeal with respect to Grounds 5, 6 and 7 contained in the draft Notice of Appeal attached to the Application for Leave to Appeal filed on 25 February 2019.

2. The Applicant is refused leave to appeal with respect to Grounds 1 to 4 inclusive and with respect to Ground 8.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

On 11 February 2019, Charlesworth J dismissed an interlocutory application of the applicant (Mr Martin) which concerned, principally, issues of discovery: Martin v Norton Rose Fulbright Australia (No 2) [2019] FCA 96. Mr Martin now seeks leave to appeal against that judgment. Matters of background In the underlying proceedings, Mr Martin seeks damages from the firm of Norton Rose Fulbright Australia (NRFA), following the termination of his staff partnership in that firm on 15 July 2016. There is an issue as to the correct characterisation of Mr Martin’s relationship with NRFA, and I am using the term “partnership” and its cognates for convenience only and without intending any pre‑judgment of that issue. None of Mr Martin’s claims concern the actual termination of his staff partnership. Instead, they arise out of steps taken subsequent to that termination. Those steps, as alleged by Mr Martin, were:(a)on 5 August 2016, Mr Martin commenced in the Fair Work Commission (the FWC) a General Protections Application under Pt 3‑1 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (the FW Act) seeking relief in respect of the termination. The respondents to that application were NRFA and four of its partners. A conciliation conference in those proceedings was listed before the FWC on 20 September 2016;(b)between 26 August 2016 and 19 September 2016, Mr Martin, by his then solicitors, Harmers, and NRFA engaged in discussions about participation in a private mediation;(c)on 21 September 2016, NRFA commenced proceedings in this Court under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) (NSD1610/2016) seeking an order prohibiting the FWC from proceeding with Mr Martin’s General Protections Application, on the basis that it lacked jurisdiction to do so. NRFA had sent the Originating Application, Statement of Claim and a Genuine Steps Statement to the Court on 19 September 2016 at 10.59 am, but they were not accepted for filing until 21 September 2016;(d)on 19 September 2016, the FWC, at the request of the parties, adjourned the listed conciliation conference to 19 October 2016; (e)the proceedings in NSD1610/2016 were served on Harmers on 23 September 2016;(f)on 7 October 2016, the parties participated in a private mediation, but did not reach a concluded settlement;(g)on 17 October 2016, Mr Martin discontinued his General Protections Application in the FWC; and(h)on 18 October 2016, at the First Case Management Hearing in NSD1610/2016, NRFA sought an order that Mr Martin pay the costs of those proceedings. Mr Martin’s claims, summarised at a high level of generality, are as follows. He seeks damages in respect of an alleged contravention of s 18 of the Australian Consumer Law (the ACL). Mr Martin alleges that statements and conduct by members of NRFA in relation to the negotiation of the agreement for the private mediation were misleading or deceptive, were made in order to induce him to continue the negotiation of terms for the private mediation, and were made to provide a basis on which NRFA could “force the adjournment” of the conciliation conference in the FWC. He also alleges that representations made by NRFA when serving the proceedings in NSD1610/2016 were false or misleading.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Mr Martin has not pointed to any matter suggesting reason to doubt the correctness of her Honour’s assessment. In my view, he has not shown a basis, in accordance with the principles to which I referred earlier, for a grant of leave to appeal on this ground. Like the primary Judge, I note that the conclusion on this issue at the interlocutory stage does not preclude Mr Martin from pursuing this claim as a substantive matter at the trial. Grounds 5 and 6: The quality of the evidence and the decision to inspect There is some overlap between Grounds 5, 6 and 7. Ground 5 concerns the primary Judge’s assessment of the evidence to support the claims of privilege; Ground 6 the primary Judge’s decision to inspect the documents; and Ground 7 the question of whether members of NRFA were sufficiently independent and detached so that their communications and documents with respect to Mr Martin’s claims could attract legal professional privilege. In relation to the quality of the evidence necessary to sustain a claim for privilege, a passage in the reasons of Brennan CJ in Commissioner of Australian Federal Police v Propend Finance Pty Ltd [1997] HCA 3; (1997) 188 CLR 501 at 513‑4 has been influential:When a claim of privilege attaching to a document seized under a warrant comes to be determined judicially, the court must ascertain for itself whether the document was brought into existence solely for a privilege purpose … In determining the claim of privilege, the court is not reviewing judicially an executive action but is determining a distinct controversy between the person who seeks to inspect the seized document and the person who seeks to maintain its immunity from inspection on the ground of legal professional privilege. To determine that controversy, the court must act upon admissible evidence, not upon hearsay. In Hancock v Rinehart (Privilege) [2016] NSWSC 12, Brereton J relied on Propend and other authorities when saying:[7]To sustain a claim of privilege, the claimant must not merely assert it; but must prove the facts that establish that it is properly made. Thus a mere sworn assertion that the documents are privileged does not suffice, because it is an inadmissible assertion of law; the claimant must set out the facts from which the court can see that the assertion is rightly made, or in other words “expose ... facts from which the [court] would have been able to make an informed decision as to whether the claim was supportable”. The evidence must reveal the relevant characteristics of each document in respect of which privilege is claimed, and must do so by admissible direct evidence, not hearsay.(Citations omitted) Later, at [35], Brereton J stated his conclusion that:(2)A claim for privilege must be made on sworn direct evidence – not inadmissible hearsay or opinion – proving the facts on which the claim is founded. This is unaffected by the court’s discretionary power to require production in order to enable inspection for the purpose of adjudicating the claim, which exists to enable a claim for privilege to be scrutinised, not to enable it to be proved. No party – least of all the party claiming privilege – may insist that the court inspect the documents.(Emphasis added)

Decision

Reasons for decision

Mr Martin has not advanced any submissions in support of these grounds and it is not apparent that they raise any matter which would warrant the Court to conclude that the decision of the primary Judge is attended by sufficient doubt to warrant reconsideration by the Full Court. My own consideration of the transcript of the hearing before the primary Judge does not suggest that there is a reasonable basis for any of these sub‑grounds.Conclusion on denial of procedural fairness For these reasons, leave to appeal with respect to the alleged denial of procedural fairness is refused. Ground 3: The refusal to order a further affidavit by Mr Cash By [13] of the interlocutory application of 19 October 2018, Mr Martin sought an order that NRFA file and serve an affidavit setting out the nature and extent of the “reasonable enquiries” conducted by Mr Cash as to the existence and location of the documents required to be disclosed by the respondent, including the nature and extent of his enquiries as to the grounds for the claims of privilege made by NRFA. The primary Judge declined to make an order to that effect. Her Honour said that she was not satisfied that there was cause for concern that the searches for documents falling within the scope of the order made by Wigney J on 21 June 2018, at [76]. Mr Martin has not advanced any submissions in support of a grant of leave on this ground. In particular, he has not sought to show an arguable case of error so as to bring this application within the principles for the grant of leave to which I referred earlier. Accordingly, the application for a grant of leave with respect to Ground 3 is refused. Legal professional privilegeGround 4: The allegation of fraud Mr Martin claims that the communications in issue are not protected by privilege because they were made in furtherance of a fraud (The Attorney‑General for the Northern Territory v Kearney [1985] HCA 60, (1985) 158 CLR 500; R v Bell; ex parte Lees [1980] HCA 26, (1980) 146 CLR 141). This claim was founded principally on inferences Mr Martin submitted arise from statements made by Mr Cross in email correspondence concerning the commencement of the proceedings which occurred in the period between 19 and 23 September 2016. Mr Martin relied, in addition, on the apparent alteration by Mr Cross of the Originating Application in Action NSD1610/2016 after it had been accepted for filing and sealed by the Court. The alteration was the addition of the date (19 September 2016) and Mr Cross entering his signature. The primary Judge noted that NRFA had not adduced evidence to rebut the inferences arising from the documents for which Mr Martin contended. Her Honour reviewed the material on which Mr Martin relied and concluded that the evidence was not sufficient to “displace the privilege”, at [135]. Her Honour gave reasons for that conclusion at [135]‑[141], which it is not necessary to repeat presently. Mr Martin has not pointed to any matter suggesting reason to doubt the correctness of her Honour’s assessment. In my view, he has not shown a basis, in accordance with the principles to which I referred earlier, for a grant of leave to appeal on this ground. Like the primary Judge, I note that the conclusion on this issue at the interlocutory stage does not preclude Mr Martin from pursuing this claim as a substantive matter at the trial. Grounds 5 and 6: The quality of the evidence and the decision to inspect

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.