FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Martin v Norton Rose Fulbright Australia (No 5) [2019] FCA 1481
File numbers: SAD 49 of 2017
NSD 1610 of 2016Judge: KERR J Date of judgment: 9 September 2019 Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for recusal of the basis of apprehended bias – correspondence relating to a purely procedural matter between a party and the judge’s associate not copied to all parties – whether a fair minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend bias – application refused
COSTS – the absence of impropriety in sending correspondence in relation to a purely procedural matter omitting a party may be nonetheless relevant to costs when a legally represented party does not comply with the usual practice with respect to an unrepresented partyLegislation: Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) ss 2, 23
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 26.12, 26.13
Cases cited: CUR24 v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) [2012] NSWCA 65; 83 NSWLR 38
Doggett v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2019] FCAFC 19
Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63; 205 CLR 337
John Holland Rail Pty Ltd v Comcare [2011] FCAFC 34; 276 ALR 221
Johnson v Johnson [2000] HCA 48; 201 CLR 488
Martin v Norton Rose Fulbright Australia [2019] FCA 967
Martin v Norton Rose Fulbright Australia [2019] FCA 1101
Martin v Norton Rose Fulbright Australia (No 4) [2019] FCA 1441
Re JRL; Ex parte CJL [1986] HCA 39; 161 CLR 342
R v Magistrates’ Court at Lilydale: Ex parte Ciccone [1973] VR 122
Date of hearing: 29 August 2019 Registry: South Australia Division: Fair Work Division National Practice Area: Employment & Industrial Relations Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 99 Counsel for Mr Martin: Mr Martin appeared in person Counsel for Norton Rose Fulbright Australia: Ms B Ng Solicitor for Norton Rose Fulbright Australia: King & Wood Mallesons ORDERS
SAD 49 of 2017 BETWEEN: THOMAS PATRICK MARTIN
Applicant
AND: NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT AUSTRALIA
Respondent
JUDGE:
KERR J
DATE OF ORDER:
9 SEPTEMBER 2019
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The Applicant’s application for Kerr J’s recusal on the basis of apprehended bias be dismissed.
2.There be no order as to costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
ORDERS
NSD 1610 of 2016 BETWEEN: NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT AUSTRALIA
Applicant
AND: TOM MARTIN
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
KERR J
DATE OF ORDER:
9 September 2019
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The Second Respondent’s application for Kerr J’s recusal on the basis of apprehended bias be dismissed.
2.There be no order as to costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
KERR J:
On Thursday 29 August 2019, Mr Martin (the Applicant in SAD49/2017 and the Second Respondent in NSD1610/2016, which have been ordered to be heard together) made an oral application that…
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- Case
- [2019] FCA 1481
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered the well-established principles of apprehended bias, particularly the apprehension of bias principle, which requires that a judge be disqualified if a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the question the judge is required to decide. The court noted that the correspondence in question was procedural in nature and did not involve the merits of the case. The judge's associate's response was consistent with the procedural rules, and there was no suggestion of actual bias. Consequently, the court found that there was no reasonable apprehension of bias.
The court also considered the matter of costs, noting that while the absence of impropriety in the correspondence was relevant, it was also pertinent that Mr Martin, being legally represented, did not follow the usual practice expected of an unrepresented party. However, the court decided not to make any order as to costs.
Ultimately, the court dismissed the application for Justice Kerr’s recusal, finding that no reasonable apprehension of bias existed. Justice Kerr remained to preside over the case, and no order was made regarding costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The Second Respondent’s application for Kerr J’s recusal on the basis of apprehended bias be dismissed.
2. There be no order as to costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Ms Ng subsequently submitted that there was nothing in Mr Martin’s submissions as might give rise to apprehended bias on the part of a reasonable observer:The communication that was sent to your Honour’s chambers and to which your associate responded is, in my respectful submission, nothing more than, as the Full Court said in John Holland, a matter of procedural practicality. It has nothing to do with the substance of – or the merits of the proceedings. And further, the communication from your Honour’s associate is consistent with the patently clear words of rule 26.12(2)(b), that is, that only the parties to the discontinuance are required to consent and, with respect to any other parties involved in the proceedings, notice is given by way of service through rule 26.13.So contrary to what Mr Martin has submitted, his consent is not required … given that he is not a party to the [discontinuance], being another party. It’s only the parties who are involved in the discontinuance itself, so that in this case, it’s Norton Rose and the Fair Work Commission that are the necessary parties.Consideration The relevant principles in relation to the resolution of an application for a judge’s recusal for apprehended bias are well settled. In Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63; 205 CLR 337 (Ebner), Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ conveniently summarised the principles in the followings terms (at [6]-[8]): 6Where, in the absence of any suggestion of actual bias, a question arises as to the independence or impartiality of a judge (or other judicial officer or juror), as here, the governing principle is that, subject to qualifications relating to waiver (which is not presently relevant) or necessity (which may be relevant to the second appeal), a judge is disqualified if a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the question the judge is required to decide. That principle gives effect to the requirement that justice should both be done and be seen to be done, a requirement which reflects the fundamental importance of the principle that the tribunal be independent and impartial. It is convenient to refer to it as the apprehension of bias principle.7The apprehension of bias principle may be thought to find its justification in the importance of the basic principle, that the tribunal be independent and impartial. So important is the principle that even the appearance of departure from it is prohibited lest the integrity of the judicial system be undermined. There are, however, some other aspects of the apprehension of bias principle which should be recognised. Deciding whether a judicial officer (or juror) might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of a question that has not been determined requires no prediction about how the judge or juror will in fact approach the matter. The question is one of possibility (real and not remote), not probability. Similarly, if the matter has already been decided, the test is one which requires no conclusion about what factors actually influenced the outcome. No attempt need be made to inquire into the actual thought processes of the judge or juror.8The apprehension of bias principle admits of the possibility of human frailty. Its application is as diverse as human frailty. Its application requires two steps. First, it requires the identification of what it is said might lead a judge (or juror) to decide a case other than on its legal and factual merits. The second step is no less important. There must be an articulation of the logical connection between the matter and the feared deviation from the course of deciding the case on its merits. The bare assertion that a judge (or juror) has an “interest” in litigation, or an interest in a party to it, will be of no assistance until the nature of the interest, and the asserted connection with the possibility of departure from impartial decision making, is articulated. Only then can the reasonableness of the asserted apprehension of bias be assessed.(Citations omitted.)