Martin v Norton Rose Fulbright Australia (No 5)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Martin v Norton Rose Fulbright Australia (No 5) [2019] FCA 1481

File numbers: SAD 49 of 2017
NSD 1610 of 2016
Judge: KERR J
Date of judgment: 9 September 2019
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for recusal of the basis of apprehended bias – correspondence relating to a purely procedural matter between a party and the judge’s associate not copied to all parties – whether a fair minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend bias – application refused
COSTS – the absence of impropriety in sending correspondence in relation to a purely procedural matter omitting a party may be nonetheless relevant to costs when a legally  represented party does not comply with the usual practice with respect to an unrepresented party
Legislation:

Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) ss 2, 23

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 26.12, 26.13

Cases cited:

CUR24 v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) [2012] NSWCA 65; 83 NSWLR 38

Doggett v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2019] FCAFC 19

Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63; 205 CLR 337

John Holland Rail Pty Ltd v Comcare [2011] FCAFC 34; 276 ALR 221

Johnson v Johnson [2000] HCA 48; 201 CLR 488

Martin v Norton Rose Fulbright Australia [2019] FCA 967

Martin v Norton Rose Fulbright Australia [2019] FCA 1101

Martin v Norton Rose Fulbright Australia (No 4) [2019] FCA 1441

Re JRL; Ex parte CJL [1986] HCA 39; 161 CLR 342

R v George (1987) 9 NSWLR 527

R v Magistrates’ Court at Lilydale: Ex parte Ciccone [1973] VR 122

Vakauta v Kelly [1989] HCA 44; 167 CLR 568

Date of hearing: 29 August 2019
Registry: South Australia
Division: Fair Work Division
National Practice Area: Employment & Industrial Relations
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 99
Counsel for Mr Martin: Mr Martin appeared in person
Counsel for Norton Rose Fulbright Australia: Ms B Ng
Solicitor for Norton Rose Fulbright Australia: King & Wood Mallesons

ORDERS

SAD 49 of 2017
BETWEEN:

THOMAS PATRICK MARTIN

Applicant

AND:

NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT AUSTRALIA

Respondent

JUDGE:

KERR J

DATE OF ORDER:

9 SEPTEMBER 2019

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The Applicant’s application for Kerr J’s recusal on the basis of apprehended bias be dismissed.

2.There be no order as to costs.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


ORDERS

NSD 1610 of 2016
BETWEEN:

NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT AUSTRALIA

Applicant

AND:

TOM MARTIN

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

KERR J

DATE OF ORDER:

9 September 2019

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The Second Respondent’s application for Kerr J’s recusal on the basis of apprehended bias be dismissed.

2.There be no order as to costs.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

KERR J:

  1. On Thursday 29 August 2019, Mr Martin (the Applicant in SAD49/2017 and the Second Respondent in NSD1610/2016, which have been ordered to be heard together) made an oral application that…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCA 1481
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Martin v Norton Rose Fulbright Australia (No 5) involved an application for the recusal of a judge on the basis of apprehended bias. The applicant, Mr Martin, sought to have Justice Kerr recuse himself from the proceedings due to correspondence between the judge's associate and Norton Rose Fulbright Australia (NRFA). The correspondence pertained to procedural matters and was not copied to all parties involved. The primary legal issue before the court was whether a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that Justice Kerr might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the case.

The court considered the well-established principles of apprehended bias, particularly the apprehension of bias principle, which requires that a judge be disqualified if a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the question the judge is required to decide. The court noted that the correspondence in question was procedural in nature and did not involve the merits of the case. The judge's associate's response was consistent with the procedural rules, and there was no suggestion of actual bias. Consequently, the court found that there was no reasonable apprehension of bias.

The court also considered the matter of costs, noting that while the absence of impropriety in the correspondence was relevant, it was also pertinent that Mr Martin, being legally represented, did not follow the usual practice expected of an unrepresented party. However, the court decided not to make any order as to costs.

Ultimately, the court dismissed the application for Justice Kerr’s recusal, finding that no reasonable apprehension of bias existed. Justice Kerr remained to preside over the case, and no order was made regarding costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The Second Respondent’s application for Kerr J’s recusal on the basis of apprehended bias be dismissed.

2. There be no order as to costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

It is convenient first to set out the background to these proceedings to provide the context in which the correspondence was made. For that purpose I respectfully adopt White J’s short summary of what the underlying two proceedings (earlier ordered to be heard together) involve. His Honour’s summary appears as a preface to his Honour’s reasons granting Mr Martin leave to appeal an interlocutory decision of Charlesworth J to the Full Court: Martin v Norton Rose Fulbright Australia [2019] FCA 1101. Her Honour had upheld claims of legal professional privilege that Norton Rose Fulbright Australia (NRF) had advanced over a significant number of documents. It is as follows:Matters of background2. In the underlying proceedings, Mr Martin seeks damages from the firm of Norton Rose Fulbright Australia (NRFA), following the termination of his staff partnership in that firm on 15 July 2016. There is an issue as to the correct characterisation of Mr Martin’s relationship with NRFA, and I am using the term “partnership” and its cognates for convenience only and without intending any pre-judgment of that issue.3. None of Mr Martin’s claims concern the actual termination of his staff partnership. Instead, they arise out of steps taken subsequent to that termination. Those steps, as alleged by Mr Martin, were:(a) on 5 August 2016, Mr Martin commenced in the Fair Work Commission (the FWC) a General Protections Application under Pt 3-1 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (the FW Act) seeking relief in respect of the termination. The respondents to that application were NRFA and four of its partners. A conciliation conference in those proceedings was listed before the FWC on 20 September 2016;(b) between 26 August 2016 and 19 September 2016, Mr Martin, by his then solicitors, Harmers, and NRFA engaged in discussions about participation in a private mediation;(c) on 21 September 2016, NRFA commenced proceedings in this Court under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) (NSD1610/2016) seeking an order prohibiting the FWC from proceeding with Mr Martin’s General Protections Application, on the basis that it lacked jurisdiction to do so. NRFA had sent the Originating Application, Statement of Claim and a Genuine Steps Statement to the Court on 19 September 2016 at 10.59 am, but they were not accepted for filing until 21 September 2016;(d) on 19 September 2016, the FWC, at the request of the parties, adjourned the listed conciliation conference to 19 October 2016; (e) the proceedings in NSD1610/2016 were served on Harmers on 23 September 2016;(f) on 7 October 2016, the parties participated in a private mediation, but did not reach a concluded settlement;(g) on 17 October 2016, Mr Martin discontinued his General Protections Application in the FWC; and(h) on 18 October 2016, at the First Case Management Hearing in NSD1610/2016, NRFA sought an order that Mr Martin pay the costs of those proceedings.4. Mr Martin’s claims, summarised at a high level of generality, are as follows. He seeks damages in respect of an alleged contravention of s 18 of the Australian Consumer Law (the ACL). Mr Martin alleges that statements and conduct by members of NRFA in relation to the negotiation of the agreement for the private mediation were misleading or deceptive, were made in order to induce him to continue the negotiation of terms for the private mediation, and were made to provide a basis on which NRFA could “force the adjournment” of the conciliation conference in the FWC. He also alleges that representations made by NRFA when serving the proceedings in NSD1610/2016 were false or misleading. 5. Mr Martin also seeks damages for the alleged deceit by NRFA constituted by the same conduct on which he relies for the s 18 claim. 6. Mr Martin alleges that the conduct of NRFA in commencing NSD1610/2016 constituted an intentional abuse of this Court’s process because it was commenced for the purpose of causing him vexation and harassment, to obstruct, hinder and frustrate his FWC application as well as for other inappropriate purposes and not for the predominant purpose of obtaining relief to which NRFA may be entitled. Further, Mr Martin alleges that the action of NRFA in making the costs application in NSD1610/2016 was vexatious and an abuse of this Court’s process. 7. Mr Martin alleges that, by reason of the alleged misleading or deceptive conduct and the alleged deceit, he discontinued the General Protections Application, and incurred costs and a potential liability for the costs of NRFA in Action NSD1610/2016, as well as other detriments. Several of Mr Martin’s allegations concern the conduct of Mr David Cross, a partner in NRFA. Mr Martin alleges, and NRFA admits, that between 8 August 2016 and 8 February 2017, Mr Cross was instructed to represent the respondents in his FWC action and to represent NRFA in Action NSD1610/2016.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Ms Ng subsequently submitted that there was nothing in Mr Martin’s submissions as might give rise to apprehended bias on the part of a reasonable observer:The communication that was sent to your Honour’s chambers and to which your associate responded is, in my respectful submission, nothing more than, as the Full Court said in John Holland, a matter of procedural practicality. It has nothing to do with the substance of – or the merits of the proceedings. And further, the communication from your Honour’s associate is consistent with the patently clear words of rule 26.12(2)(b), that is, that only the parties to the discontinuance are required to consent and, with respect to any other parties involved in the proceedings, notice is given by way of service through rule 26.13.So contrary to what Mr Martin has submitted, his consent is not required … given that he is not a party to the [discontinuance], being another party. It’s only the parties who are involved in the discontinuance itself, so that in this case, it’s Norton Rose and the Fair Work Commission that are the necessary parties.Consideration The relevant principles in relation to the resolution of an application for a judge’s recusal for apprehended bias are well settled. In Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63; 205 CLR 337 (Ebner), Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ conveniently summarised the principles in the followings terms (at [6]-[8]): 6Where, in the absence of any suggestion of actual bias, a question arises as to the independence or impartiality of a judge (or other judicial officer or juror), as here, the governing principle is that, subject to qualifications relating to waiver (which is not presently relevant) or necessity (which may be relevant to the second appeal), a judge is disqualified if a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the question the judge is required to decide. That principle gives effect to the requirement that justice should both be done and be seen to be done, a requirement which reflects the fundamental importance of the principle that the tribunal be independent and impartial. It is convenient to refer to it as the apprehension of bias principle.7The apprehension of bias principle may be thought to find its justification in the importance of the basic principle, that the tribunal be independent and impartial. So important is the principle that even the appearance of departure from it is prohibited lest the integrity of the judicial system be undermined. There are, however, some other aspects of the apprehension of bias principle which should be recognised. Deciding whether a judicial officer (or juror) might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of a question that has not been determined requires no prediction about how the judge or juror will in fact approach the matter. The question is one of possibility (real and not remote), not probability. Similarly, if the matter has already been decided, the test is one which requires no conclusion about what factors actually influenced the outcome. No attempt need be made to inquire into the actual thought processes of the judge or juror.8The apprehension of bias principle admits of the possibility of human frailty. Its application is as diverse as human frailty. Its application requires two steps. First, it requires the identification of what it is said might lead a judge (or juror) to decide a case other than on its legal and factual merits. The second step is no less important. There must be an articulation of the logical connection between the matter and the feared deviation from the course of deciding the case on its merits. The bare assertion that a judge (or juror) has an “interest” in litigation, or an interest in a party to it, will be of no assistance until the nature of the interest, and the asserted connection with the possibility of departure from impartial decision making, is articulated. Only then can the reasonableness of the asserted apprehension of bias be assessed.(Citations omitted.)