Doggett v Commonwealth Bank of Australia

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Doggett v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2019] FCAFC 19

Appeal from: Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Doggett [2017] FCA 1176
File number: VID 1150 of 2017
Judges: KERR, DAVIES AND THAWLEY JJ
Date of judgment: 6 February 2019
Catchwords: BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY – appeal from a decision of a single judge – whether primary judge erred in refusing to go behind the judgment debt upon which a bankruptcy notice was based – whether primary judge showed actual or apprehended bias in dealing with the appellants – appeal dismissed  
Legislation:

Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 52

Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 912A(1)(a)

Cases cited:

Ankar Pty Ltd v National Westminster Finance (Australia) Ltd [1987] HCA 15; 162 CLR 549

Asden Developments Pty Ltd (in liq) v Dinoris [2017] FCAFC 117

Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Doggett and Anor [2014] VSC 423

Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Doggett [2017] FCA 1176

Doggett v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2015] VSCA 351; 47 VR 302

Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63; 205 CLR 337

Fingleton v The Queen [2005] HCA 34; 227 CLR 166

In the Marriage of Stiffle (1988) 93 FLR 206

Lazarus Estates v Beasley [1956] 1 QB 702

Ling v Enrobook [1997] FCA 226; 74 FCR 19

Ramsay Health Care Australia Pty Ltd v Compton [2017] HCA 28; 261 CLR 132

R v Watson; Ex parte Armstrong [1976] HCA 39; 136 CLR 248

Wren v Mahony [1972] HCA 5; 126 CLR 212

Date of hearing: 6 February 2019
Registry: Victoria
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations
Sub-area: General and Personal Insolvency
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 54
Counsel for the First Appellant: The first appellant appeared in person
Counsel for the Second Appellant: The second appellant appeared in person
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr C Brown
Solicitor for the Respondent: Minter Ellison

ORDERS

VID 1150 of 2017
BETWEEN:

STEVEN JOSEPH ANTHONY DOGGETT

First Appellant

KEVIN SULLIVAN

Second Appellant

AND:

COMMONWEALTH BANK OF AUSTRALIA ACN 123 123 124

Respondent

JUDGES:

KERR, DAVIES AND THAWLEY JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

6 FEBRUARY 2019

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The respondent’s costs, including reserved costs, be taxed and paid from the estates of the appellant debtors in accordance with the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth).

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Revised from Transcript)

THE COURT:

  1. The factual background to the appeal currently before the Court commenced with proceedings in the Victorian Supreme Court: see Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Doggett and Anor [2014] VSC 423 (Doggett No 1). In his Honour’s reasons, Hargrave J commenced by setting out a short summary of the matter that was then before him:

    1The defendants, Steven Doggett and Kevin Sullivan, are domestic partners.  They live in Melbourne.  Mr Doggett is a self-employed painter and handyman and Mr Sullivan is employed as an…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCAFC 19
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Doggett v Commonwealth Bank of Australia, the appellants, Doggett, sought to appeal a decision made by a single judge in the Federal Court of Australia, which upheld a bankruptcy notice issued by the Commonwealth Bank of Australia. The central dispute revolved around whether the primary judge erred in his refusal to examine the underlying basis of the judgment debt upon which the bankruptcy notice was based, and whether the primary judge demonstrated actual or apprehended bias in his handling of the appellants. The court was tasked with determining whether the primary judge had misapplied the statutory provisions of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), and whether there was any evidence of bias that would warrant a re-evaluation of the case.

The legal issues at the heart of this appeal were twofold: first, whether the primary judge had correctly interpreted and applied the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) in determining the proof of the debt; and second, whether there was any bias demonstrated by the primary judge that would call into question the fairness of the proceedings. The appellants argued that the primary judge should have looked behind the judgment to verify the existence of the debt, whereas the primary judge maintained that there was no requirement to do so under the Act. Additionally, the appellants contended that the primary judge exhibited bias, which was a matter that the court needed to address to ensure the integrity of the judicial process.

In delivering the judgment, the court held that the primary judge had not erred in his refusal to look behind the judgment. The court explained that while the Bankruptcy Court has the discretion to examine the underlying basis of a judgment debt, this discretion is not exercised where there is no substantial reason to doubt the existence of the debt. The court further noted that the primary judge had correctly identified the provisions of the Act and had appropriately applied them in his decision. Regarding the issue of bias, the court found that the appellants had failed to substantiate their claims of actual or apprehended bias, thus dismissing all grounds of appeal related to this issue. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the respondent's costs were ordered to be paid from the estates of the appellant debtors in accordance with the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth).

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The respondent’s costs, including reserved costs, be taxed and paid from the estates of the appellant debtors in accordance with the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth).

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

In all the circumstances, the claims of apprehended bias or actual bias simply are not established and the grounds of appeal that collectively express that issue are all dismissed. Refusal to look behind the judgment The appellants submit that the primary judge erred in failing to look behind the judgment. The task of the primary judge was that which was provided for by s 52 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth). The primary judge correctly identified the relevant provisions at [3] and [4] of his Honour’s reasons as follows: 3 Section 52(1) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (the Act) provides:At the hearing of a creditor’s petition, the Court shall require proof of:(a)the matters stated in the petition (for which purpose the Court may accept the affidavit verifying the petition as sufficient);(b) service of the petition; and(c)the fact that the debt or debts on which the petitioning creditor relies is or are still owing;and, if it is satisfied with the proof of those matters, may make a sequestration order against the estate of the debtor.4 Section 52(2) of the Act provides:If the Court is not satisfied with the proof of any of those matters, or is satisfied by the debtor:(a) that he or she is able to pay his or her debts; or(b)that for other sufficient cause a sequestration order ought not to be made;it may dismiss the petition. When a person’s sequestration is sought, it always remains open to the Court to look behind the form of the judgment should there be a reason to doubt the truth and reality of the debt upon which his or her sequestration has been sought: see Wren v Mahony [1972] HCA 5; 126 CLR 212 per Barwick CJ at 224-225:Lord Esher in emphasizing that the Bankruptcy Court did not go behind a judgment as a matter of course but only if appropriate circumstances were shown to exist, said in Re Flatau; Ex parte Scotch Whisky Distillers Ltd.:“There is no statute which imposes any such obligation on the Court of Bankruptcy. Section 7 [of which s. 52(1) is a counterpart] does no more than give a discretion.”His Lordship, in using this expression, was not intending, in my opinion, to weaken the emphasis he had always placed on the need for the Court of Bankruptcy to be satisfied of the existence of the petitioning creditor’s debt. Rather, if one reads all his expressions in the several cases I have cited, he was pointing out that the Bankruptcy Court could in general accept a judgment debt as sufficient proof of that debt particularly where it resulted from a fully heard contest between parties but that it always had the power to go behind the judgment and if the case was a proper one, should do so. The judgment is never conclusive in bankruptcy. It does not always represent itself as the relevant debt of the petitioning creditor, even though under the general law, the prior existing debt has merged in a judgment. But the Bankruptcy Court may accept the judgment as satisfactory proof of the petitioning creditor's debt. In that sense that court has a discretion. It may or may not so accept the judgment. But it has been made quite clear by the decisions of the past that where reason is shown for questioning whether behind the judgment or as it is said, as the consideration for it, there was in truth and reality a debt due to the petitioning creditor, the Court of Bankruptcy can no longer accept the judgment as such satisfactory proof. It must then exercise its power, or if you will, its discretion to look at what is behind the judgment: to what is its consideration. It is not the law, in my opinion, that whether in any case the Court of Bankruptcy will consider whether there is satisfactory proof of the petitioning creditor's debt is a mere matter of its own discretion. Nothing in Corney v. Brien (1951) 84 CLR 343 lends support for such a view. Rather the emphasis is upon the paramount need to have satisfactory proof of the petitioning creditor’s debt. The Court’s discretion in my opinion is a discretion to accept the judgment as satisfactory proof of that debt. That discretion is not well exercised where substantial reasons are given for questioning whether behind that judgment there was in truth and reality a debt due to the petitioner.Although I have made reference to the general power of the Court of Bankruptcy to go behind a judgment and to some of the circumstances in which it will do so, in the instant case, as I have said, the consideration for the judgment was expressed in the petition itself and the debt claimed to be due was that said to arise on the breach of the promise of indemnity. The proof of the petitioning creditor’s debt was thus to be found in the petition and the affidavit verifying it. The recital of the terms of the deed as the source of the debt and the non-payment of the tax in my opinion provided all that was necessary to call for an exercise of the Bankruptcy Court’s duty to consider whether there was a debt in “truth and reality”. So far as the recited judgment was concerned, the reasons for judgment of the Supreme Court in striking out the appellant’s pleas in the common law action were not binding on the learned judge in Bankruptcy. There had been no more in the Supreme Court than a contest at the pleading stage of the action. No more could have been decided than a question of law. It was a case, in my opinion, in which the Bankruptcy Court was bound to consider for itself whether what was alleged in the petition could and did establish a debt due to the petitioning creditor. In my opinion the learned judge in Bankruptcy's reasons which I have quoted, did not justify his refusal to examine the fundamental question which the petition itself so clearly raised.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established