Martin v Norton Rose Fulbright Australia (No 9)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Martin v Norton Rose Fulbright Australia (No 9) [2020] FCA 275

File numbers: SAD 49 of 2017
NSD 1610 of 2016
Judge: KERR J
Date of judgment: 3 March 2020
Date of publication of reasons: 5 March 2020
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for recusal on the basis of apprehended bias – application arising  out of refusal of trial judge to grant adjournment application –circumstances raised found not to relevantly engage the principles set out in Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63; 205 CLR 337 – application dismissed
Legislation:

Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ss 575(2), 653

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 20(2)

Cases cited:

CUR24 v Director of Public Prosecutions(NSW) [2012] NSWCA 65; 83 NSWLR 385

Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63; 205 CLR 337

Johnson v Johnson [2000] HCA 48; 201 CLR 488

Martin v Norton Rose Fulbright Australia (No 5) [2019] FCA 1481

Martin v Norton Rose Fulbright Australia (No 7) [2020] FCA 5

R v George (1987) 9 NSWLR 527

Re Jarman; Ex parte Cook(No 1) [1997] HCA 13; 188 CLR 595

Date of hearing: 3 March 2020
Registry: Victoria
Division: Fair Work Division
National Practice Area:  Employment and Industrial Relations
Category: No Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 29
Counsel for Mr Martin: Mr Martin appeared in person
Counsel for Norton Rose Fulbright Australia: Mr Potts SC and Ms Laing
Solicitor for Norton Rose Fulbright Australia: King & Wood Mallesons

ORDERS

SAD 49 of 2017
BETWEEN:

THOMAS PATRICK MARTIN

Applicant

AND:

NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT AUSTRALIA

Respondent

JUDGE:

KERR J

DATE OF ORDER:

3 MARCH 2020

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The Applicant’s application for Kerr J’s recusal on the basis of apprehended bias be dismissed.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

ORDERS

NSD 1610 of 2016
BETWEEN:

NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT AUSTRALIA

Applicant

AND:

TOM MARTIN

Respondent

JUDGE:

KERR J

DATE OF ORDER:

3 MARCH 2020

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The Respondent’s application for Kerr J’s recusal on the basis of apprehended bias be dismissed.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(REVISED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT)

KERR J:

  1. On Monday 2 March 2020, Mr Martin made an oral application for my recusal after I had given ex tempore reasons stating why I had not been persuaded to grant him an adjournment of the trial of the two proceedings listed for concurrent hearing for five days (proceeding NSD1610/2016 and SAD49/2017).  That adjournment application was premised on Mr Martin having indicated on the afternoon of the Friday before the trial was to commence that he was proposing to seek relief in the High Court of Australia, contending that I had erred in earlier dismissing his application to have proceeding NSD1610/2016 remitted for determination by a Full Court on the basis that a single judge of the…

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Details
Case
[2020] FCA 275
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Martin v Norton Rose Fulbright Australia (No 9), the dispute arose out of a refusal by the trial judge, Kerr J, to grant an adjournment application. The applicant sought to have Kerr J recused on the basis of apprehended bias. The case was heard in the Federal Court of Australia.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether Kerr J should be recused due to the apprehension of bias. The applicant argued that the circumstances surrounding the refusal of the adjournment application warranted recusal. The court was required to determine whether the principles set out in Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy applied to the circumstances of this case.

The court found that the circumstances raised did not relevantly engage the principles of apprehended bias as articulated in Ebner. It was determined that there was no sufficient basis to conclude that Kerr J's decision was influenced by bias. The court held that the application for recusal did not meet the threshold required for such an order. Accordingly, the application for recusal was dismissed.

The court's final order was that the respondent's application for Kerr J's recusal on the basis of apprehended bias be dismissed. The matter proceeded before Kerr J, without the recusal being granted.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The Respondent’s application for Kerr J’s recusal on the basis of apprehended bias be dismissed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established