FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Martin v Norton Rose Fulbright Australia (No 9) [2020] FCA 275
File numbers: SAD 49 of 2017
NSD 1610 of 2016Judge: KERR J Date of judgment: 3 March 2020 Date of publication of reasons: 5 March 2020 Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for recusal on the basis of apprehended bias – application arising out of refusal of trial judge to grant adjournment application –circumstances raised found not to relevantly engage the principles set out in Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63; 205 CLR 337 – application dismissed Legislation: Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ss 575(2), 653
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 20(2)
Cases cited: CUR24 v Director of Public Prosecutions(NSW) [2012] NSWCA 65; 83 NSWLR 385
Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63; 205 CLR 337
Johnson v Johnson [2000] HCA 48; 201 CLR 488
Martin v Norton Rose Fulbright Australia (No 5) [2019] FCA 1481
Martin v Norton Rose Fulbright Australia (No 7) [2020] FCA 5
Re Jarman; Ex parte Cook(No 1) [1997] HCA 13; 188 CLR 595
Date of hearing: 3 March 2020 Registry: Victoria Division: Fair Work Division National Practice Area: Employment and Industrial Relations Category: No Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 29 Counsel for Mr Martin: Mr Martin appeared in person Counsel for Norton Rose Fulbright Australia: Mr Potts SC and Ms Laing Solicitor for Norton Rose Fulbright Australia: King & Wood Mallesons ORDERS
SAD 49 of 2017 BETWEEN: THOMAS PATRICK MARTIN
Applicant
AND: NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT AUSTRALIA
Respondent
JUDGE:
KERR J
DATE OF ORDER:
3 MARCH 2020
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The Applicant’s application for Kerr J’s recusal on the basis of apprehended bias be dismissed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
ORDERS
NSD 1610 of 2016 BETWEEN: NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT AUSTRALIA
Applicant
AND: TOM MARTIN
Respondent
JUDGE:
KERR J
DATE OF ORDER:
3 MARCH 2020
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The Respondent’s application for Kerr J’s recusal on the basis of apprehended bias be dismissed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(REVISED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT)KERR J:
On Monday 2 March 2020, Mr Martin made an oral application for my recusal after I had given ex tempore reasons stating why I had not been persuaded to grant him an adjournment of the trial of the two proceedings listed for concurrent hearing for five days (proceeding NSD1610/2016 and SAD49/2017). That adjournment application was premised on Mr Martin having indicated on the afternoon of the Friday before the trial was to commence that he was proposing to seek relief in the High Court of Australia, contending that I had erred in earlier dismissing his application to have proceeding NSD1610/2016 remitted for determination by a Full Court on the basis that a single judge of the…
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- Case
- [2020] FCA 275
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court was whether Kerr J should be recused due to the apprehension of bias. The applicant argued that the circumstances surrounding the refusal of the adjournment application warranted recusal. The court was required to determine whether the principles set out in Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy applied to the circumstances of this case.
The court found that the circumstances raised did not relevantly engage the principles of apprehended bias as articulated in Ebner. It was determined that there was no sufficient basis to conclude that Kerr J's decision was influenced by bias. The court held that the application for recusal did not meet the threshold required for such an order. Accordingly, the application for recusal was dismissed.
The court's final order was that the respondent's application for Kerr J's recusal on the basis of apprehended bias be dismissed. The matter proceeded before Kerr J, without the recusal being granted.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The Respondent’s application for Kerr J’s recusal on the basis of apprehended bias be dismissed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
The background to the recusal application involves a long-standing dispute between the parties, Martin and Norton Rose Fulbright Australia, which has seen multiple legal proceedings over a number of years. The relationship between the parties and Justice Kerr dates back to previous hearings where the judge had made orders against Martin for costs and had issued a contempt order against him. These previous rulings became part of the context for the current recusal application. The plaintiff's legal team aimed to challenge the judge's impartiality based on these prior interactions, arguing that they indicated a predisposition that would affect the fairness of the trial.
The proceedings leading to the recusal application included several stages where the plaintiff sought relief from Justice Kerr's decisions. These included an appeal to the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia, which was dismissed, and an application to the High Court of Australia for special leave to appeal, which was also refused. The current application for recusal was the latest in a series of attempts by the plaintiff to influence the outcome of the case by questioning the judge's suitability to preside.
The procedural journey of Martin v Norton Rose Fulbright Australia (No 9) began with an application for Justice Kerr's recusal filed by the plaintiff, Martin. This application followed the refusal of an adjournment request in an earlier proceeding, which Martin argued demonstrated the judge's bias. The application for recusal was heard in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, where Justice Kerr was presiding. The respondent, Norton Rose Fulbright Australia, opposed the application, submitting that the circumstances did not support the claim of apprehended bias.
Prior to the recusal application, the case had a significant procedural history. It included an appeal to the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia, where the plaintiff's application for an adjournment was dismissed. This decision was subsequently challenged by Martin, leading to an application for special leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia. The High Court refused the application for special leave, and the matter was remitted back to the Federal Circuit Court for further proceedings. The recusal application arose as part of the ongoing litigation, seeking to remove Justice Kerr from the case on the grounds of bias.
Key procedural steps in this case included the initial application for recusal, the opposition to this application by Norton Rose Fulbright Australia, and the hearing of the recusal application by the court. The court considered the submissions from both parties and the context of previous proceedings between the parties and Justice Kerr. The outcome of the recusal application was a dismissal, with the court finding that the circumstances did not engage the principles of apprehended bias as articulated in Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the circumstances of the case relevantly engage the principles of apprehended bias as articulated in Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy.
2. If the principles of apprehended bias are engaged, whether Justice Kerr should be recused from presiding over the trial.
Held
1. The court held that the circumstances of the case do not relevantly engage the principles of apprehended bias as articulated in Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy.
2. Consequently, the application for Justice Kerr to be recused from presiding over the trial is dismissed.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court examined the principles of apprehended bias as established in Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy, which requires that a fair-minded observer, having considered the facts, might reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the resolution of the questions arising in the case. In this instance, the court found that the circumstances raised by the applicant, particularly the refusal of the trial judge to grant an adjournment application, did not meet the threshold to engage these principles. The court underscored that the mere refusal to grant an adjournment did not provide sufficient grounds to apprehend a lack of impartiality in the judge's conduct or judgment. The court distinguished the current case from situations where the judge's prior involvement or statements would reasonably lead to a perception of bias. Therefore, the application for Justice Kerr's recusal was dismissed as the facts did not sufficiently establish a risk of bias. The binding principle here is that refusal to grant an adjournment alone does not engage the principles of apprehended bias unless accompanied by other circumstances that would reasonably lead to such an apprehension.