FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Martin v Norton Rose Fulbright Australia (No 7) [2020] FCA 5
File number: NSD 1610 of 2016 Judge: KERR J Date of judgment: 6 January 2020 Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 20(2) – whether single judge of the Federal Court of Australia lacks jurisdiction to determine whether Fair Work Commission has jurisdiction under Part 3-1 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 20(2) Cases cited: Drake v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1976] 46 FLR 409; 2 ALD 60
Evans v Secretary, Department of Social Services [2014] FCA 491
JJ Richards & Sons Pty Ltd v Fair Work Australia [2012] FCAFC 503; 201 FCR 297
P v Child Support Registrar [2013] FCA 1089
SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] HCA 34; 262 CLR 362
Date of hearing: 23 and 24 December 2019 Date of last submissions: 23 December 2019 Registry: New South Wales Division: Fair Work Division National Practice Area: Employment & Industrial Relations Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 54 Solicitor for the Applicant: Mr Toemoe of King & Wood Mallesons Counsel for the Respondent: Mr Martin appeared in person ORDERS
NSD 1610 of 2016 BETWEEN: NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT AUSTRALIA
Applicant
AND: TOM MARTIN
Respondent
JUDGE:
KERR J
DATE OF ORDER:
6 JANUARY 2020
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. The Respondent’s oral application that this proceeding be remitted for determination by a Full Court on the basis that a single judge of the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear and determine it be dismissed.
2. The Respondent pay the Applicant’s costs of that application, as agreed or assessed.
3. The Respondent’s oral application for Kerr J’s recusal be dismissed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
KERR J:
On 19 September 2016, Norton Rose Fulbright Australia (NRFA) filed an originating application for the following relief under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), relying on the grounds set out in a statement of claim subsequently filed:
1.Pursuant to section 21 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), a declaration that the Fair Work Commission does not have jurisdiction under Part 3-1 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) to deal with the ‘General Protections Application Involving Dismissal’ dated 5 August 2016 filed by the Second Respondent (FWC Application).
2.Pursuant to section 23 of the Act, an order in the nature of prohibition against the First Respondents restraining them from dealing with, or otherwise purporting to exercise jurisdiction over the Applicants in respect, of the FWC Application.
3.An order that the Second Respondent pay the Applicants’ costs of these proceedings on an indemnity basis.
The President and Members of the Fair Work Commission (FWC) were named as the…
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- Case
- [2020] FCA 5
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issue before the court was whether the exception provided for in s 20(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) deprived a single judge of the Federal Court of jurisdiction in relation to the proceeding. The respondent argued that the exception in s 20(2) of the FCA Act meant that a single judge could not determine the matter, while the applicant contended that the exception did not apply. The court had to interpret the statutory provision to determine the scope of the jurisdiction of a single judge of the Federal Court.
In determining the issue, Kerr J found that the exception provided for in s 20(2) of the FCA Act did not deprive a single judge of the Court of jurisdiction in relation to the proceeding. The court held that the starting point for the ascertainment of the meaning of a statutory provision was the text of the statute, while regard was had to its context and purpose. The court found that the exception in s 20(2) of the FCA Act did not apply to the proceeding, and therefore, a single judge of the Court had the jurisdiction to determine the matter. Consequently, the respondent's oral application that the proceeding be remitted for determination by a Full Court on the basis that a single judge of the Court lacked jurisdiction to hear and determine it was dismissed. The court also dismissed the respondent's oral application for Kerr J’s recusal and ordered the respondent to pay the applicant’s costs of the application, as agreed or assessed.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The Respondent’s oral application that this proceeding be remitted for determination by a Full Court on the basis that a single judge of the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear and determine it be dismissed.
2. The Respondent pay the Applicant’s costs of that application, as agreed or assessed.
3. The Respondent’s oral application for Kerr J’s recusal be dismissed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Mr Toemoe then advanced orally the further following submissions with respect to costs, after I indicated that I was not presently minded to order that costs be paid forthwith given that the hearing of this matter had been listed in the near future at which time a number of costs issues relating to NSD1610/2019 and SAD49/2017 would be considered in aggregate:I accept that an order that costs be payable forthwith … isn’t the ordinary type of order that would be made in relation to the costs of the interlocutory application. But, in my submission, the circumstances in which this matter comes before you … ought [to have the] result in an order that costs be payable forthwith, and I say that for this reason. This is a matter that was raised yesterday for the first time was capable of being argued with, or to have been capable of being argued before your Honour yesterday.Indeed, I conceded that whilst I – whilst taken by surprise at yesterday’s hearing, I was prepared to take that, deal with the matter then and there, and, effectively, deal with it on my feet. That did not happen and Mr Martin was given more time to bring the matter before your Court today and to develop his submissions. He now says out the outset of this hearing that he was prepared to, in fact, argue that yesterday and had already developed his submissions. Yet, we have, effectively, wasted a day of the court’s time and my client’s time, and my client’s cost and money in dealing with these matters. And taking those matters into Court, it is appropriate, in those circumstances, that an order for costs be payable forthwith be made if your Honour is to find in favour of my client.CONSIDERATIONJurisdiction In my view, the exception provided for in s 20(2) of the FCA Act does not deprive a single judge of this Court of jurisdiction in relation to proceeding NSD1610/2016. In SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] HCA 34; 262 CLR 362 at [14] Kiefel CJ, Nettle and Gordon JJ recently articulated the approach required to be taken to statutory interpretation as follows (at [14]): The starting point for the ascertainment of the meaning of a statutory provision is the text of the statute whilst, at the same time, regard is had to its context and purpose. Context should be regarded at this first stage and not at some later stage and it should be regarded in its widest sense. This is not to deny the importance of the natural and ordinary meaning of a word, namely how it is ordinarily understood in discourse, to the process of construction. Considerations of context and purpose simply recognise that, understood in its statutory, historical or other context, some other meaning of a word may be suggested, and so too, if its ordinary meaning is not consistent with the statutory purpose, that meaning must be rejected. It is settled law that it is competent for a person who is a judge of a Ch III court to be appointed to certain non-judicial tribunals, provided always that there is no inconsistency between such roles and their judicial office such as to make the two roles incompatible: Drake v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1976] 46 FLR 409; 2 ALD 60.